area handbook series 



Bangladesh 

a country study 




Bangladesh 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
James Heitzman 
and Robert L. Worden 
Research Completed 
September 1988 





On the cover: Sailing boats on the Padma 



Second Edition, 1989; First Printing, 1989. 

Copyright ®1989 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Area handbook series, DA Pam. 550-175 
Supt. of Docs. No.: D 101.22:550-175/990 
Research completed September 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 263-288. 
Includes index. 

1. Bangladesh. I. Heitzman, James, 1950- 
II. Worden, Robert L., 1945- . III. Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress. IV. Area Handbook for Bangladesh. V. Series: 
DA Pam. 550-175. 

DS393.4.B372 1989 954.92— dc20 89-600298 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-175 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supersedes the Area Handbook for Bangladesh, 
coauthored by Richard F. Nyrop, et alia, in 1975. Some parts of 
that edition have been used in the preparation of the current book, 
and the authors of Bangladesh: A Country Study are grateful for the 
seminal work done by the earlier edition's authors. 

Several individuals provided timely insight and assistance to the 
authors. They included Lieutenant Colonel Russell Olson, United 
States Army; Major James A. Dunn, Jr., United States Army; 
former diplomat Archer Kent Blood; and Professor Harry W. Blair. 
The authors also wish to thank various members of the staff of the 
Embassy of the People's Republic of Bangladesh in Washington, 
D.C., especially Brigadier Sharifuddin Ahmed, M. Tajul Islam, 
Mohammed Nazimuddin, and Obaedul Huq, for useful comments 
and primary- source research materials. Bazlur Rahim and Joyce 
L. Rahim provided and tabulated key statistical information, respec- 
tively. Additionally, the staffs of the United States Embassy in 
Dhaka, the Department of State, and the World Bank provided 
timely economic data. Labanya Borra of the Library of Congress 
Descriptive Cataloging Division assisted with some of the Bangla- 
language materials. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Elizabeth Park prepared the telecommunications sections in chap- 
ters 3 and 4. Carolina E. Forrester checked the content of all of 
the maps used in the book and reviewed the text of the section on 
geography. Thomas Collelo provided substantive review of parts 
of the book. Tracy M. Coleman performed numerous essential 
tasks, ranging from assistance on research for the text, tables, and 
maps to word processing and proofreading. Andrea Matles Savada 
reviewed the Bibliography and helped proofread parts of the text 
and statistical tables. David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Cotugno, and 
Kimberly A. Lord prepared the graphics. Harriett R. Blood assisted 
in the preparation of the maps. Helpful suggestions were made by 
Richard F. Nyrop during his review of all parts of the book. Noelle 
B. Beatty, Vincent Ercolano, Martha E. Hopkins, Marilyn L. 
Majeska, Ruth Nieland, Evan A. Raynes, and Gage Ricard 
edited portions of the manuscript. Izella Watson and Barbara 
Edgerton performed word processing. Martha E. Hopkins managed 
editing and production of the book. Andrea T. Merrill performed 
the final prepublication editorial review, and Shirley Kessel of 



Communicators Connection prepared the index. Sheryle O. Shears 
of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared camera-ready 
copy, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. Those who provided 
photographs and other illustrations have been acknowledged in the 
illustration captions. 



vi 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xix 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Peter R. Blood 

EARLY HISTORY, 1000 B.C.-A.D. 1202 4 

ISLAMIZATION OF BENGAL, 1202-1757 4 

EUROPEAN COLONIZATION, 1757-1857 6 

Early Settlements 6 

The British Raj 7 

THE UPRISING OF 1857 10 

A Great Divide in South Asian History 10 

Reappraisal of British Policy 10 

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF 

MUSLIM CONSCIOUSNESS, 1857-1947 . 11 

The Division of Bengal, 1905-12 12 

Development of the Muslim League, 1906-20 14 

Two Nations Concept, 1930-47 16 

PAKISTAN PERIOD, 1947-71 19 

Transition to Nationhood, 1947-58 19 

The "Revolution" of Ayub Khan, 1958-66 25 

Emerging Discontent, 1966-70 27 

The War for Bangladeshi Independence, 1971 30 

BIRTH OF BANGLADESH 31 

Early Independence Period, 1971-72 31 

Fall of the Bangabandhu, 1972-75 32 

Restoration of Military Rule, 1975-77 36 

The Zia Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82 37 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 43 

Enayetur Rahim 

GEOGRAPHY 46 

The Land 46 



vii 



Climate 47 

River Systems 49 

POPULATION 53 

Population Structure and Settlement Patterns 53 

Migration 55 

Population Control 57 

Ethnicity and Linguistic Diversity 58 

SOCIAL SYSTEM 60 

Transition to a New Social Order 60 

Rural Society 61 

Urban Society 62 

Family, Household, and Kinship 62 

Women's Role in Society 65 

Social Classes and Stratification 66 

RELIGION 68 

Religion and Society 68 

Islam 69 

Hinduism 78 

Buddhism 82 

Christianity 83 

EDUCATION 84 

The British Legacy 84 

Education System 84 

Religious Education 88 

Role of English and Arabic in Education 89 

Education Planning and Policy 89 

HEALTH 90 

Disease and Disease Control 90 

Health Care Facilities 92 

Medical Education and Training 94 

Medicinal Drugs and Drug Policy 95 

Chapter 3. The Economy 97 

Lawrence B. Lesser 

THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT 100 

Historical Perspective . 100 

Economic Reconstruction after Independence 101 

MANAGING THE ECONOMY 102 

Economic Policy and Planning 102 

Government Budget Process 104 

Joint Ventures and Foreign Investment 106 

Bilateral Investment 108 

Money and Banking 108 



vm 



FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 112 

Test Case for Development 112 

Aid Dependence 114 

AGRICULTURE 117 

Structure of Agricultural Production 117 

Food Crops 121 

Industrial Crops 123 

Fisheries 128 

INDUSTRY 129 

Traditional Sectors 129 

Ready-made Garments 130 

Other Industries 131 

Mineral Development 131 

Technological Advances 135 

FOREIGN TRADE 135 

Export Sectors 135 

Balance and Terms of Trade 138 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 140 

Inland Waterways and Ports 140 

Road Transportation 143 

Railroads 144 

Civil Aviation 145 

Telecommunications 146 

Tourism 146 

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 146 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 149 

James Heitzman 

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 152 

Constitution 152 

Legislature 154 

Executive 156 

Judiciary 158 

Civil Service 160 

Local Administration 162 

THE ERSHAD PERIOD 165 

Achieving Stability, 1982-83 165 

Emerging Opposition, 1983-86 167 

Relaxation of Martial Law, 1986-87 169 

More Opposition Pressure 171 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 174 

Local Elites 174 

The National Party 176 

Party Politics 178 



IX 



THE MEDIA 185 

FOREIGN POLICY 187 

South and Southeast Asia 188 

China and Other Asian Nations 193 

The Islamic World 194 

The Superpowers 195 

Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and 

New Zealand 197 

International Organizations 197 

Chapter 5. National Security 201 

Douglas C. Makeig 

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 204 

Colonial Origins 204 

Pakistan Era 206 

The Liberation War 208 

Postindependence Period 211 

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES 217 

Legal Basis 217 

Recruitment 218 

Mission 219 

Security Environment 222 

Defense Spending 224 

Foreign Acquisitions and Ties 225 

THE THREE SERVICES 227 

Army 227 

Navy 231 

Air Force 234 

AUXILIARY FORCES 236 

Bangladesh Rifles 236 

Ansars 237 

Police 237 

Village Defence Party 240 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 240 

Violence and Crime 240 

Insurgency in the Chittagong Hills 241 

Criminal Justice 242 

THE MILITARY IN THE LATE 1980s 244 

Appendix. Tables 247 

Bibliography 263 

Glossary 289 

Index 293 

x 



List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Bangladesh, 1988 xxvi 

2 Bengal: 1772, 1856, 1945, and 1947 8 

3 Typical Rainfall, Temperature, and Pressure at Dhaka .... 50 

4 Flood and Cyclone Vulnerability, 1960-80 52 

5 Topography and Drainage, 1988 54 

6 Population Distribution, 1988 56 

7 Age-Sex Distribution, 1981 Census 58 

8 Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 124 

9 Economic Activity, 1988 134 

10 Transportation System, 1988 ... . 142 

11 Structure of the Government, 1988 156 

12 Growth of the Armed Forces, 1973-87 228 

13 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1988 232 

14 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1988 233 



XI 



Preface 



Bangladesh: A Country Study supersedes the 1975 Area Handbook for 
Bangladesh. Although much of what characterizes Bangladesh — its 
status as one of the world's largest but poorest countries and its 
corresponding need for international aid, its susceptibility to severe 
natural disasters, and the optimism of its people — has not changed 
in the years between publication of these two books, a considerable 
number of major developments have occurred. Just before the Area 
Handbook for Bangladesh went to press in 1975, the founding father 
of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), and several 
members of his family were assassinated. The ensuing years brought 
two periods of transitional political instability, each followed by 
relative stability under long-term military regimes. More than a 
year passed after Mujib' s death before Bangladesh Army chief of 
staff Ziaur Rahman (Zia) emerged as chief martial law adminis- 
trator in November 1976. Zia assumed the presidency in April 1977, 
but he, too, became the victim of an assassination plot in May 1981 . 
Army chief of staff Hussain Muhammad Ershad, after consider- 
able hesitation, assumed the position of chief martial law adminis- 
trator following a bloodless coup in March 1982 and became 
president in December 1983. By 1986 martial law had been relaxed, 
and civilian control gradually replaced military rule throughout 
all sectors of society. In 1988 Ershad continued to consolidate his 
role as civilian ruler of Bangladesh by calling for parliamentary 
elections and establishment of Islam as the state religion of Ban- 
gladesh. Continual pressure from opposition political forces shook 
the Ershad regime as the 1980s continued. 

The authors of the 1975 work were examining a nation only 
slightly more than three years old. In contrast, the authors of the 
new edition have aimed to show the maturity Bangladesh has 
attained over nearly twenty years of development. Despite the 
continual adversity faced by Bangladeshis as they confront their 
historical development, difficult climate, burgeoning population, 
and fractious political forces, a national identity has emerged (see 
table A). Although the nation has much to accomplish in order 
to meet the basic needs of its people, much has been achieved in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Economic achievements have been made. Per- 
sistent demands by the people for basic freedoms and political 
expression have moved the country toward democratic rule. In 
international forums, Bangladesh's representatives had taken strong 
stands against injustice and in defense of their nation's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 



Xlll 



The transliteration of Bangla — the national language — varies 
widely among Bangladeshi and foreign scholars. Common family 
names may be transliterated in several ways, for example, Chou- 
dhury, Chaudri, Chowdhury, and several other variants. Where 
it is known, the authors have followed the spelling used by the 
individual. In other instances, the authors have followed the form 
used by the Bangladesh government; for example, the word national 
is transliterated asjatiyo, although many American sources use the 
less phonetically accurate jatiya. To the extent possible, the authors 
have used the place-names established by the United States Board 
on Geographic Names, e.g., Dhaka instead of Dacca. 

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table 
is provided to assist readers who want to convert measurements 
from metric (see table 1 , Appendix). A bibliography of works used 
in researching the book is included. Whereas major sources of infor- 
mation are published in English, the readers of this book, after refer- 
ring to the English- and other Western-language sources cited in 
the bibliography, may want to consult Bangla-language sources, 
such as the daily newspapers Azad (Free), Ittefaq (Unity), Sangbad 
(News), or Dainik Bangla (Daily Bangla); periodicals, such as the 
weekly Bichitra (Variety), Rahbar (Guide), or Sachitra Sandhani (Seeing 
Through Pictures); or the armed forces journal Senani (Army). 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period Description 



Ancient Empires 

ca. 1000 B.C Settlement of Bengal (see Glossary) by 

Dravidian-speaking peoples 

ca. 550-486 B.C Life of Siddartha Gautama— the Buddha; 

founding of Buddhism 

ca. 320-180 B.C Mauryan Empire; reign of Asoka (273-232 

B.C.); spread of Buddhism 

A.D. ca. 319-ca. 540 Gupta Empire; Classical Age in northern India 

606-47 North Indian empire of Harsha 

750-1150 Pala Dynasty 

1150-1202 Sena Dynasty 

Coming of Islam 

1001-1030 Turkish armies led by Mahmud of Ghazni raid 

into Indian subcontinent 

1202 Turkish conquerors defeat Sena Dynasty and 

overrun Bengal 

1206 Establishment of Delhi Sultanate 

1341 Bengal achieves independence from Delhi; 

Dhaka established as capital 

The Mughal Period 

1526-30 Babur lays foundation of Mughal Empire 

1 556- 1 605 Akbar the Great expands and reforms the empire 

1576 Bengal conquered by Mughals 

1605-27 Reign of Jahangir; British East India Company 

opens first trading post in 1612 

1658-1707 Reign of Aurangzeb, last great Mughal ruler 

1704 Capital of Bengal moved from Dhaka to 

Murshidabad 

1707-1858 Lesser emperors; decline of the Mughal Empire 

British Period 

Company Rule 

1757 Battle of Plassey — British victory over Mughal 

forces in Bengal; British rule in India begins 

1793 Britain imposes Permanent Settlement (Land- 

lease) Act on Bengal, establishing a new land- 
lord system, which turns out to be disastrous 
for farmers 

1835 Institution of British education and other reform 

measures 

1857-58 Revolt of Indian sepoys (soldiers) against British 

East India Company 
1858 British East India Company dissolved; rule of 

India under the British crown — the British 

Raj — begins; marks formal end of Mughal 

Empire 



Empire to Independence 

1885 Indian National Congress (Congress) formed 

1905 Partition of Bengal into separate provinces of East 

Bengal (including Assam) and West Bengal 



XV 



Table A. — Cont. 



Period Description 



1906 All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) 

founded 

1909 Morley-Minto reforms: separate electorates for 

Muslims 

1912 Partition of Bengal annulled 

1916 Congress-Muslim League Pact (often referred 

to as Lucknow Pact) signed 

1919 India Act 

1935 Government of India Act 

1940 Muslim League adopts Lahore Resolution; 

"Two Nations" theory articulated by Muslim 

League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and 

others 

1946 "Direct action" day of Muslim League, 

August 16 

Independent Pakistan 

August 15, 1947 Partition of British India; India achieves inde- 



pendence and incorporates West Bengal and 
Assam; Pakistan is created and incorporates 
East Bengal (the East Wing, or East Pakistan) 
and territory in the northwest (the West Wing, 
or West Pakistan); Jinnah becomes governor 
general of Pakistan; Liaquat Ali Khan 
becomes prime minister 

October 27, 1947 Undeclared war with India begins 

September 11, 1948 Jinnah dies; Khwaja Nazimuddin becomes 

governor general 

January 1, 1949 United Nations-arranged ceasefire between 

Pakistan and India takes effect 

October 16, 1951 Liaquat assassinated; Nazimuddin becomes 

prime minister; Ghulam Mohammad 
becomes governor general 

October 6, 1955 Iskander Mirza sworn in as governor general, 

succeeding Ghulam Mohammad, who had 
retired in ill health the previous month 

March 23, 1956 Constitution adopted; Mirza becomes president 

August 8, 1956 Muslim League leader Choudhry Mohammad 

Ali tenders resignation as prime minister and 
is succeeded the following month by Awami 
League (People's League) leader Hussain 
Shaheed Suhrawardy 

October 7, 1958 President Mirza abrogates constitution and 

declares martial law 

October 27, 1958 Mirza sent into exile; General Mohammad 

Ayub Khan begins rule 
August-September 1965 War with India 

March 25, 1969 Ayub resigns as result of public pressure; 

General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan 
assumes power; East Pakistani Awami League 
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) 
arrested and jailed in West Pakistan 



XVI 



Table A. — Cont. 



Period Description 

December 7, 1970 First general elections; Awami League under 

Mujib secures absolute majority in new Con- 
stituent Assembly; West Pakistan-dominated 
government declines to convene assembly 

March 26-28, 1971 East Pakistan attempts to secede, beginning civil 

war; Mujib, imprisoned in West Pakistan, 
declared provisional president 

April 17, 1971 Formal declaration of independence of 

Bangladesh issued; Mujib named president 

December 3, 1971 Pakistan launches preemptive air strikes against 

India 

December 4, 1971 India invades East Pakistan 

December 6, 1971 India recognizes Bangladesh 

December 16, 1971 Pakistani military forces in East Pakistan 

surrender to Indian armed forces, marking 
Bangladeshi independence 

Independent Bangladesh 

January 10-12, 1972 Mujib returns from prison in West Pakistan; 

promulgates interim constitution and is sworn 
in first as president, then as prime minister 

November 4, 1972 Parliamentary Constitution adopted 

March 7, 1973 Mujib's Awami League wins overwhelming 

victory in parliamentary elections 

February 22, 1974 Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh 

September 17, 1974 Bangladesh admitted to United Nations 

December 28, 1974 State of emergency declared as political situa- 

tion deteriorates; fundamental rights under 
Constitution suspended 

January 25, 1975 Constitution amended, abolishing parliamentary 

system and establishing presidential system 
with de facto one-man rule under Mujib 

February 25, 1975 Mujib abolishes all parties but one — the 

Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League 
(Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People's 
League), the new name of the Awami 
League — which is under his direct control 

August 15, 1975 Mujib assassinated in "majors' plot"; 

Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed installed as 
president 

November 3-7, 1975 Major General Khaled Musharraf killed in coup; 

Mushtaque resigns; Supreme Court chief 
justice Abu Sadat Muhammad Sayem 
becomes president and chief martial law 
administrator on November 7 

November 30, 1976 Army chief of staff Ziaur Rahman (Zia) becomes 

chief martial law administrator 

April 21, 1977 Sayem forced to resign because of "ill health"; 

Zia becomes president 

May 30, 1977 Zia wins 98.9 percent of votes in referendum on 

his continuance as president 

June 3, 1977 Supreme Court justice Abdus Sattar named vice 

president 



XVII 



Table A. — Cont. 



Period 



Description 



April 1978 Zia announces new elections and independent 

judiciary; lifts ban on political parties 
June 3, 1978 Zia elected president 

February 18, 1979 Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party wins 207 out 

of 300 seats in parliamentary election 

April 6, 1979 Martial law revoked; Constitution restored in 

full; Fifth Amendment ratifies all actions of 
Zia's martial law administration 

May 30, 1981 Zia assassinated; Sattar becomes acting president 

November 15, 1981 Sattar elected president 

March 24, 1982 Sattar ousted in coup engineered by Lieutenant 

General Hussain Muhammad Ershad; Con- 
stitution suspended, Parliament dissolved, and 
political parties abolished; Ershad assumes full 
powers as chief martial law administrator 

February 14-15, 1983 Student riots mark first major expression of 

public opposition to Ershad 's martial law 
administration 

March 1982-December 1983 .... Interim presidency of Abdul Fazal Muhammad 

Ahsanuddin Chowdhury 

December 1983 Ershad assumes presidency 

March 21, 1985 General referendum supports Ershad 's adminis- 

tration 

May 7, 1986 Parliamentary elections give pro-Ershad Jatiyo 

Party (National Party) majority in Parliament 
October 15, 1986 Ershad elected president 

November 10, 1986 Parliament passes Seventh Amendment to Con- 
stitution, ratifying all actions of Ershad 's 
martial law administration; martial law with- 
drawn; Constitution restored in full 

November 10-12, 1987 "Siege of Dhaka," mass demonstrations by 

united opposition parties against Ershad 's 
government 

December 6, 1987 Ershad dissolves Parliament 

March 3, 1988 Parliamentary elections reaffirm Jatiyo Party 

control of Parliament 
June 7, 1988 Eighth Amendment establishes Islam as state 

religion 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: People's Republic of Bangladesh. 

Short Form: Bangladesh. 

Term for Citizens: Bangladeshi(s). 

Capital: Dhaka. 

Date of Independence: April 17, 1971; eastern part of Pakistan 
(East Pakistan), 1947-71. 

Geography 

Size: Total 144,000 square kilometers, land area 133,910 square 
kilometers. 



xix 



Topography: Broad deltaic plain. Chittagong Hills in southeast, 
Low Hills in northeast and modest-elevation highlands in north 
and northwest. 

Climate: Subtropical monsoon climate, wide seasonal variations 
in rainfall, moderately warm temperatures, high humidity. Climate 
generally uniform throughout entire country. Subject to severe 
natural disasters, such as floods, tropical cyclones, tornadoes, and 
tidal bores. 

Society 

Population: Officially given at 109,963,551 in July 1988. Eighth 
largest population in world. Annual growth rate 2.6 percent. 
Projected to reach more than 140 million by year 2000. About 82 
percent live in rural areas, 18 percent in urban areas. In 1988 popu- 
lation density 821 per square kilometer, highest in world. Popula- 
tion control top priority for government. 

Ethnic Groups: Over 98 percent Bengalis. Approximately 600,000 
Biharis (Urdu-speaking, non-Bengali Muslims) and 900,000 mem- 
bers of tribal minority groups. Main tribal groups Chakmas, 
Marmas, Tipperas, and Mros, living primarily in Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (see Glossary). 

Languages: Bangla (official language); English widely used by 
educated elite. Arabic used in many Muslim homes. Various tribal 
languages. 

Religion: In 1988 nearly 83 percent Muslim, 16 percent Hindu, 
less than 1 percent Buddhist, Christian, and tribal religions. 

Education: Schools based on British system: five years primary, 
five years lower secondary, and two years higher secondary. Higher 
education includes 758 general colleges, 7 universities, and 50 
professional colleges. Traditional emphasis on arts and humani- 
ties; increased emphasis in late 1980s on technical subjects. Numer- 
ous religious-affiliated primary schools. In 1988 national literacy 
rate officially 29 percent, possibly lower; men 39 percent, women 
18 percent; urban 35 percent, rural 17 percent. 

Health: Life expectancy almost equal for males and females, aver- 
aging 55. 1 years in 1986. Major health hazards infectious and para- 
sitic diseases, poor nutrition, and inadequate sanitation. High infant 
mortality rate at 111.9 per 1,000; young children represented 40 
percent of deaths annually. 



xx 



Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): US$15.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 
1986 at current prices; per capita GNP US$150; 4.5 percent real 
growth in FY 1987. 

Agriculture: Large-scale subsistence farming, labor intensive, 
heavily dependent on monsoon rains. Main crops rice, jute, wheat, 
tea, and forestry products. Fisheries of increasing importance. 

Industry: Jute manufactures, ready-made garments, cotton tex- 
tiles, seafood processing, and pharmaceuticals. 

Services: Substantial exported labor, primarily to Persian Gulf 
nations. As many as 450,000 Bangladeshis abroad in 1987; impor- 
tant source of foreign currency remittances. 

Resources: Sufficient natural gas for country's nitrogenous fertilizer 
needs. Abundant proven coal reserves. Offshore and onshore 
reserves of petroleum. Hydroelectric power and thermal power 
sources. Biofuels widely used in rural areas. 

Exports: Approximately US$819 million in FY 1986. Raw jute 
and jute manufactures, frozen seafood, ready-made garments, tea, 
and leather goods. United States, Japan, and Britain largest buyers. 

Imports: Approximately US$2.4 billion in FY 1986. Food grains, 
fuels, raw cotton, fertilizer, and manufactured products. Singa- 
pore, Japan, and United States largest suppliers. 

Balance of Payments: Has had negative trade balance since 
independence in 1971. Exports represented 30 percent, imports 
70 percent of total annual trade in FY 1986. 

Exchange Rate: 34.20 takas = US$l (September 1988). 

Fiscal Year: July 1 to June 30. 

Transportation and Communications 

Rivers: Extensive and complex network of some 700 rivers. Major 
systems Jamuna-Brahmaputra, Padma-Ganges, Surma-Meghna, 
and Padma-Meghna, all of which flow south to Mouths of the 
Ganges and into Bay of Bengal. Fifth major system Karnaphuli 
in Chittagong region. Primary transportation system employing 
nearly 300,000 small and medium-sized sail- and human-powered 
country boats. About 8,430 kilometers of navigable waterways. 

Roads: About 10,890 kilometers of motorable roads in 1986. 
Despite severe flooding, increasingly important means of moving 



xxi 



people and goods. Extensive network of bridges and ferries cross 
numerous inland waterways. 

Railroads: About 2,818 kilometers of track in 1986. Operated by 
Bangladesh Railways, declining numbers of rolling stock as 1980s 
progressed. 

Ports: Chittagong and Chalna major freight-handling ports. 

Airports: Largest near Dhaka (Zia International Airport) and at 
Chittagong and Sylhet. National carrier Biman Bangladesh Airlines 
serving twenty-four cities in twenty countries; domestic service to 
eighteen regional airports. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Presidential form of government with popularly 
elected president and appointed prime minister. 1972 Constitu- 
tion amended numerous times to reflect new political realities. 
Unicameral Parliament (known as Jatiyo Sangsad, or House of 
the People) with 300 members. Elections held in March 1988. 

Politics: Authoritarian or military regimes have run Bangladesh 
almost since its inception. Regime in power traditionally controls 
government and Parliament through single national political party: 
under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-75), the Awami League 
(People's League); under Ziaur Rahman (1977-81), the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party; and under Hussain Muhammad Ershad (since 
1982), the Jatiyo Party (National Party). Numerous opposition 
parties joined periodically in fractious alliances against party in 
power. In 1988 most important were Awami League, centrist 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, leftist Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal 
(National Socialist Party), and conservative, pro-Islamic Jamaat 
e Islami (Congregation of Islam). Student and workers' wings of 
these and other parties important players in national politics. 

Justice: Supreme Court headed by chief justice. Two Supreme 
Court divisions: High Court Division with seven regional benches, 
and Appellate Division in Dhaka. Grass-roots judicial system at 
village level. British-style criminal codes, amended in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh eras. 

Administrative Divisions: Divided into four administration divi- 
sions headed by commissioners. Divisions divided into twenty-one 
regions, further subdivided into sixty-four districts (zilas). Urban 
subdivisions in 1988 included four municipal corporations (Dhaka, 
Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna — which corresponded to the 



xxn 



four divisions in name), eighty-seven municipalities (pourashavas), 
and thirty townships (thanas). Rural subdivisions included 460 sub- 
districts (upazilas) and 4,401 unions. Popularly elected representa- 
tive councils (parishads) at various administrative levels except 
divisions and regions. 

Foreign Affairs: Heavily dependent on massive infusions of for- 
eign development aid, Bangladesh maintains neutral policy. Main- 
tains friendly relations with United States, Soviet Union, and 
China; close relations with Muslim nations; and proper but watchful 
relations with neighboring India. Member of Afro- Asian People's 
Solidarity Organization, Asian Development Bank, Colombo Plan, 
Commonwealth of Nations, Customs Cooperation Council, Group 
of 77, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
International Olympic Committee, International Rice Coun- 
cil, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 
INTERPOL, Islamic Development Bank, Nonaligned Movement, 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation, United Nations and all its affiliated 
agencies, World Federation of Trade Unions, and World Tourism 
Organization. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: About 102,500 in 1988: army 90,000; navy 7,500; 
and air force 5,000. 

Military Units: Most powerful and prestigious Ninth Infantry 
Division near Dhaka and Twenty-fourth Infantry Division at Chit- 
tagong. Other important infantry divisions at Rangpur, Jessore, 
Bogra, and Comilla — the latter two containing country's armor 
regiments. 

Equipment: Army: Type 54/55 tanks, Chinese-made Type 59 
main battle tanks, and Type 62 light tanks; 105mm and 122mm 
howitzers; 60mm and 120mm mortars; and 57mm, 76mm, and 
106mm antitank weapons. Navy: Leopard-class Type 41 and 
Salisbury-class Type 61 frigates and more modern Chinese-made 
Hegu-class, P4-class, Hainan-class, and Shanghai II-class fast attack 
craft primarily for use in territorial waters. Air Force: three squad- 
rons, comprising MiG-21s, Chinese-made F-6s and A-5s, Soviet 
An-26 transports, and American-made Bell 212 and Soviet Mi-8 
helicopters. 



xxm 



Auxiliary Forces: Important supplement to armed forces. In 1988 
consisted of 30,000-member Bangladesh Rifles, 20,000-member 
Ansars (security guards), and 5,000-member Armed Police, all 
subordinate to Ministry of Home Affairs. Used to extend govern- 
mental authority and ensure law and order in border and internal 
areas and backup to army in wartime. Village Defence Party of 
10 million (males and females) largely involved in village security. 



xxiv 




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Bangladesh, 1988 



xxvi 



Introduction 



THE WORLD FREQUENTLY RECEIVES bad news from 
Bangladesh. So adverse is the economic situation in Bangladesh 
that some have referred to it not as a Third World developing nation 
but as member of the "fourth world," the poorest of the poor. Its 
population of 110 million — the eighth largest in the world — lives 
on constricted land affected by an unkind climate. There is rela- 
tively little industry, and most people live at the subsistence level 
in rural areas. The political system is unstable, characterized by 
military coups, authoritarian regimes, civil violence, and a poor 
human rights record. Adding to the nation's woes are natural disas- 
ters. Tropical storms whipping in from the Bay of Bengal have 
repeatedly devastated the country, causing huge losses of life. In 
1988 record floods caused by monsoon rains inundated two-thirds 
of the country, setting back economic growth. International lending 
and aid institutions bolster the country, but the problems are so 
massive that no one predicts near- term major improvements. 

Despite its problems, Bangladesh is a land of miracles and heroic 
accomplishments. Using traditional methods, farmers manage to 
produce enough food to maintain one of the densest concentrations 
of rural people in the world. The Bangladeshi people have liberated 
themselves twice, from the British and from the Pakistanis. Perhaps 
the greatest deeds are cultural. The Bangla language has a distin- 
guished history in literature and remains one of the most dynamic 
forces in South Asian arts and humanities. In Bangladesh, local 
language and artistic forms are combined with the Islamic religion 
in a special blend of orthodoxy and cultural nationalism. United 
by strong village traditions, the struggle for existence, the legacy 
of the freedom movement, the Bangla language, and Islam, most 
Bangladeshis retain considerable optimism and pride in their nation. 

The economic and political situation in Bangladesh has its roots 
in the complex relationship between its unusual geography and its 
history during the last 200 years. Most of the country is a low- 
lying delta where four major river systems come together. The land 
is subject to heavy annual monsoon flooding followed by a long 
dry season. The extreme conditions support a fertile environment 
for agriculture but often demand a high cost from cultivators, who 
are confronted with the conflicting demands of irrigation systems 
and flood prevention measures. For these reasons, the area that 
is Bangladesh remained a frontier until the last few centuries, and 
the wild characteristics of the frontier still dominate society on newly 



xxvn 



formed islands that continually emerge along the courses of silty 
rivers and along the coast. 

High mountain walls to the north and the east block easy access 
to East Asia and Southeast Asia, orienting the country toward 
Indian civilization, but from the Indian standpoint Bangladesh 
stands on the periphery of culture and politics. While the hallmarks 
of civilization first appeared in northwest India and Pakistan at 
least 4,000 years ago, and a vibrant urban society existed in north 
India by 500 B.C., large-scale social organization in the area that 
became Bangladesh developed only by the seventh century A.D. 
The peripheral position of Bangladesh allowed the long-term sur- 
vival there of cultural motifs that had been absorbed into history 
in most other parts of the subcontinent. Buddhism, for example, 
survived in Bangladesh as a royal cult and a popular religion long 
after it had died out in most of India. Even during the Mughal 
Empire (1526-1858), the neglected eastern wing of the province 
of Bengal (see Glossary) became part of a pan-Indian political sys- 
tem but remained a scene of political disunity and piracy. Under 
these conditions the population remained relatively small until the 
nineteenth century, and there was little indication of the intense 
pressure on resources that would develop by the twentieth century. 

European traders arrived in the region in the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth centuries by following traditional Indian Ocean trade routes. 
They found a prosperous Bengal dotted with small commercial 
centers where a dynamic handloom weaving industry produced 
world-class textiles. As the power of the Mughal Empire waned 
in the early eighteenth century, the British East India Company 
became the dominant force in Bengal, but with fateful consequences. 
The British chose Calcutta in West Bengal as the center of their 
operations, resulting in a decisive westward shift of commercial 
interests and capital. The conquest of Bengal coincided with 
Europe's Industrial Revolution, driven in its early stages by the 
mechanization of the British textile industry. British policy deliber- 
ately discouraged the export of finished textiles to Britain and instead 
encouraged the spread of British-made goods in the colonies. The 
handloom industry was ruined, resulting in the collapse of the old 
commercial networks in Bengal. Meanwhile, British and Indian 
entrepreneurs looking for investment opportunities in the East 
Bengal countryside found that rice would support the growing popu- 
lation in Calcutta and that jute would satisfy the world market for 
sacking material. 

As a result of these forces, during the nineteenth century East 
Bengal became a purely agricultural society, dominated by rice and 
jute, with few opportunities in commerce or manufacturing. The 



xxvm 



British administration provided some basic public works for irri- 
gation and transportation, encouraged land reclamation, prevented 
large-scale warfare, and implemented rudimentary public health 
measure. The policies of the British encouraged population growth 
but at the same time discouraged the urban and industrial develop- 
ment that had absorbed population increases in Europe. By the 
twentieth century, rapid population increases were outstripping 
advances in agriculture, and millions of Bengalis were trapped in 
subsistence agriculture with no alternative form of livelihood. 

As nationalism began to grow in South Asia during the late 
nineteenth century, it accompanied a worldwide Islamic revival 
that found a rich field for expression in East Bengal. British edu- 
cation and economic opportunities under the colonial government 
tended to benefit Hindus, who dominated the jute and rice trade 
and formed a landlord class, while the mass of poor cultivators were 
mostly Muslims. The British encouraged communal religious con- 
sciousness by implementing limited election systems with separate 
electorates for Hindus and Muslims, a strategy that preserved the 
rights of minority communities but also allowed the colonial 
administration to play one side against the other throughout the 
early twentieth century. The profound doctrinal differences between 
Hinduism and Islam, the disproportionate opportunities for Hindus 
and Muslims in the colonial economy, and the growing political 
competition created a widening rift between the two religious com- 
munities. Muslim leaders in Bengal, aware of the deepening eco- 
nomic crisis there, argued at an early date for the separation of 
the eastern and western parts of Bengal, allowing the Muslim 
majority in the east greater expression in determining their destiny. 
The British government responded by dividing Bengal in 1905 but 
after only seven years rescinded the order, due to pressure through- 
out India from nationalist forces dominated, in the eyes of Bengali 
Muslims, by Hindu interests. By the 1940s, when British and 
Japanese armies were fighting nearby and famine had killed 
hundreds of thousands of people, the masses of Muslim Bengalis 
backed the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League), established 
in 1906, with its call for a separate Islamic state. Amid widespread 
communal violence, during which many East Bengal Hindus 
migrated to Hindu areas of India, East Bengal became part of the 
new nation of Pakistan in 1947 as the East Wing, or East Pakistan. 

The issue of language, which quickly divided East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan, was a symbol for the unique role of Islam in 
the culture of East Pakistan. Conversion to Islam in Bengal had 
been a movement of the masses since the twelfth century, a rebel- 
lion against caste ideology that had kept peasants subservient to 



xxix 



landlords. Embracing Islam did not mean the adoption of a new, 
elite language and culture, however. Instead, the ancient Bangla 
language, which was based on Sanskrit, remained a vital force and 
had relatively few imports of Arabic or Persian terminology. The 
Bangla renaissance, a literary movement in reaction to British edu- 
cation in the late nineteenth century, found its roots in the long and 
rich history of Bengali folk literature and produced Nobel Prize 
winner Rabindranath Tagore. The love of Bangla that permeated 
all levels of society had links with a large and well-known religious 
literature created by mystic poets who spread the love of God regard- 
less of communal differences. The doctrinal positions of Bengali 
Islam were orthodox, but a wide variety of popular religious practices 
linked originally to polytheism remained important in the countryside. 

This web of Bangla language and culture was alien to the leaders 
of West Pakistan. Outside of Bengal, the preferred language of 
South Asian Muslims was Urdu, a combination of Sanskritic lan- 
guages and Persian with a large admixture of Arabic terms. The 
reforming ideology of many Muslim nationalists in north and north- 
west India aimed at a return to the original message of Muhammad 
and a revival of Islam's Arabic roots. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founder of Pakistan, expressed the viewpoint of the majority in the 
Muslim League when he argued for one language — Urdu — that 
would unify the two wings of the nation. In 1952 the attempts to 
impose Urdu as the second language in East Pakistan provoked 
severe riots, leading to the death of two students — an event still 
remembered in Bangladesh as Martyrs' Day, an annual holiday 
celebrating the survival of Bangla. Until 1971 the language issue 
continued to boil, as Bengali nationalists refused to compromise 
their long-standing cultural traditions. 

Neither East Pakistan nor West Pakistan had experienced demo- 
cratic government until their separation from India in 1947, but 
the British-educated leaders of the Muslim League were determined 
to implement parliamentary rule. The task proved nearly impos- 
sible. The country was under constant pressure from India, the 
government and economy had to be constructed anew, ethnic divi- 
sions rocked West Pakistan, and neglect of East Pakistan by the 
central government pushed the nation toward civil war. Amid a 
political crisis, the minister of defense, General Mohammad Ayub 
Khan, accumulated increasing powers under the constitution and 
finally implemented military rule over Pakistan in 1958. He later 
engineered elections that made him president and allowed a return 
to parliamentary government dominated by his own party and mili- 
tary interests. The pattern of crisis, military takeover, and return 
to democracy directed by the generals was to recur in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. 



xxx 



After the bloody war of independence in 1971, the leaders of 
Bangladesh implemented a republican form of government, directed 
by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib). As the new administration 
tried to cope with huge economic problems, it did not take long 
for the traditional factionalism of Bengali politics to resurface in 
the new nation. Mujib 's party was committed to socialist recon- 
struction, but communist and socialist groups advocated further 
revolutionary change while conservative religious and military 
interests opposed socialism. Mujib began to implement an authori- 
tarian, single-party dictatorship in 1974, but military factions 
revolted the following year, killed him along with most of his family, 
and plunged the nation into a period of chaos. Army chief of staff 
General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) accumulated more and more power 
and finally implemented martial law in 1976. He organized his own 
political party, manipulated elections that packed Parliament with 
his supporters, and became president in national elections in 1978. 
The rise to power of military interests followed closely the pattern 
set earlier by Ayub and the army in Pakistan. 

The parallels with Pakistan continued during the 1980s. After 
the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistani politics had drifted under civilian 
regimes until 1977, when General Zia ul Haq took control and 
directed the nation until his sudden death in an air crash in August 
1988. His regime slowly returned to a parliamentary government 
directed by his own party. In Bangladesh, President Zia's assassi- 
nation in 1981 deprived the country of its most effective leader since 
independence. After a brief interlude under a weak civilian govern- 
ment, army chief of staff Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad 
Ershad took power in a bloodless coup. Ershad's policies during 
the 1980s centered on creating his own political party, packing 
Parliament with his supporters, and winning election as president 
in 1986. By 1988 Bangladesh was officially a republic with a popu- 
larly elected government, but Ershad's Jatiyo Party (National Party) 
dominated all levels of administration and representative govern- 
ment. The parliamentary system allowed political opposition, 
however, and a wide range of political parties remained active, 
headed by the political successors of Mujib and Zia. The political 
opposition refused to give legitimacy to Ershad and his military 
supporters and generally declined to participate in parliamentary 
elections. Instead, the opposition organized periodic demonstra- 
tions and strikes that disrupted the country. The opposition was 
plagued with political factionalism that permeated Bangladeshi 
politics down to the village level, and frequent states of emergency 
kept coalitions from forming an effective unified front. Meanwhile, 
administrative reforms under Ershad's regime allowed the voters 



xxxi 



to elect popular representatives to local governing bodies with 
a wide range of authority, giving local elites and the electorate 
a real stake in Ershad's political system. In the late 1980s, it 
appeared that military democracy was entrenched for the long term 
in Bangladesh. 

The grim economic situation remained the most important 
problem for the young nation. Decades of skewed development 
under the British, followed by neglect under Pakistan and the 
destruction caused by the 1971 war, left the country prostrate during 
the ear4y-4970s. The Mujib and Zia years witnessed major accom- 
plishments in repairing damage and setting up the basic adminis- 
trative machinery needed to run the country. At no time after 
independence, however, did Bangladesh experience sustained rates 
of economic growth sufficient to allow the country to outrun popu- 
lation growth and enter a period of rapid development. With few 
mineral resources, almost no industrial infrastructure, and a mostly 
unskilled labor force, Bangladesh depended on imports for most 
of the basic requirements of a modern nation. Its exports, on the 
other hand, were agricultural commodities, especially jute, that 
declined in real value and were subject to uncontrolled fluctuations 
in world demand. Under these circumstances, the economy 
depended on large annual inputs of foreign aid. In fact, since inde- 
pendence more than 85 percent of the annual development budget 
of Bangladesh relied on foreign aid receipts. Without this aid, the 
country would certainly have experienced disaster; with the aid, 
the economy achieved stability and even registered moderate 
advances that allowed it to survive. 

In its unenviable status as "largest poorest" country in the world, 
Bangladesh was a test case for development strategies. The Mujib 
government nationalized the jute industry and other major indus- 
tries, and the officially expressed purpose of the country was to 
build a socialist economy. In the first years after independence, 
there were serious thoughts of nationalizing all economic endeavors 
and collectivizing agriculture, a major departure from the tradi- 
tional system of private ownership. Under the more conservative 
governments of Zia and Ershad, however, Bangladesh increasingly 
withdrew from the socialist path, and the administration slowly 
denationalized commercial and industrial enterprises. As the 
centrally planned economy declined, decentralized development 
strategies and private initiative became more important and were 
supported by large international donors, such as the World Bank 
(see Glossary) and the International Monetary Fund (see Glossary). 

In rural areas, the government administered aid to major 
irrigation and flood control projects, while allotting an increasing 



xxxn 



percentage of resources to local government bodies at the subdis- 
trict (upazila) level staffed by civil servants but directed by elected 
local representatives. This process funneled capital and decision- 
making power into the hands of relatively wealthy or influential 
local elites, who then created employment opportunities for land- 
poor or landless laborers. In urban areas, development concen- 
trated on major infrastructure projects such as power plants, as 
well as the encouragement of private enterprise for the export sector. 
By encouraging private industry, the government and international 
donors aimed to create jobs that would eventually provide an alter- 
nate source of income to unskilled or semiskilled laborers. The 1980s 
witnessed some major industrial advances, including a remarkable 
expansion of the ready-made garment industry and an export- 
oriented processed seafood industry. But was it enough? The 
underlying assumption of these development strategies was that 
urban capitalists and rural elites could create enough new jobs to 
outrun population increases in the future. The unanswered ques- 
tions were whether the masses of poor workers would benefit quickly 
enough or whether they would rebel as they witnessed the growth 
of an influential Bangladeshi middle class. Massive popular unrest, 
encouraged by the political opposition, was an ever-present alter- 
native to the government's development strategies. 

The necessity for development aid underlay the foreign policy 
of Bangladesh, which remained decidedly nonaligned in world 
politics. During the first few years of independence, a close rela- 
tionship with India reflected the early political isolation of Ban- 
gladesh and its dependence on its big neighbor for military 
protection as well as economic support. After achieving recogni- 
tion by most countries, including Pakistan, by 1975 Bangladesh 
was ready to diversify its international connections when Mujib's 
death severed the special relationship with India and a concomi- 
tant one with the Soviet Union. The subsequent Zia and Ershad 
governments moved closer to the sources of aid: Japan, the United 
States, Canada, Western Europe, China, the wealthy Arab nations, 
and the big international lending agencies. At no time, however, 
did Bangladesh subordinate its foreign policy to its dependence 
on foreign donors. As a member of major international forums, 
such as the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and the 
Commonwealth of Nations, Bangladesh advocated a new inter- 
national economic order and an end to superpower interference 
in the affairs of sovereign states. Bangladesh's status as a populous 
but poor country without foreign alliances allowed it to take out- 
spoken stands and to play a leading role among the nations of the 
Third World. 



xxxm 



High international visibility and clear neutrality were important 
security strategies for Bangladesh because the nation's military 
capacity was insufficient to effectively defend the country against 
foreign adversaries. The most likely foe was India, which surrounds 
Bangladesh on three sides and could quickly overrun the country. 
Disputes with India began during the trauma of separation in 1947, 
were glossed over during the honeymoon period of the early 1970s, 
and began again in earnest during the late 1970s. Despite the intense 
nationalist feelings on both sides of the border, it seemed unlikely 
that India (or any other nation) would launch an attack, risking 
world censure and bringing in its wake the inherited problems of 
Bangladesh. 

Bangladesh maintained, with help from China and other nations, 
an army of 90,000 personnel, a small air force and navy, and several 
paramilitary border and security forces. The roles of these forces 
in national defense were in reality subordinate to their roles in 
internal security. Military leaders repeatedly used the military to 
launch coups or to maintain order during massive campaigns of 
civil disobedience by the opposition parties. The army was also 
involved in ongoing counterinsurgency operations against tribal 
groups in the Chittagong Hills, where guerrillas of tribal minori- 
ties were fighting for independence. The ever-present threat of army 
intervention guaranteed the continuation of either military regimes 
or democratic governments that clearly represented the interests 
of the armed forces. 

In the late 1980s, there was still hope for Bangladesh. The gigantic 
economic disasters predicted in the early 1970s remained possibili- 
ties, and many smaller calamities did occur, but Bangladeshis 
showed a striking ability to survive and make progress. The popu- 
lation continued to increase, but the rate of increase declined. Living 
conditions remained poor, but starvation was prevented. The 
government was authoritarian, but the rule of law and parliament 
continued. The economy advanced very slowly, but it did advance 
and showed signs of agrarian expansion and industrial diversifica- 
tion. Bangladesh maintained a high profile in international affairs 
and avoided military conflict with any foreign power, guarantee- 
ing the high levels of foreign aid necessary for economic survival. 
Through it all, the rich cultural heritage of the Bangladeshis sup- 
ported a remarkably tolerant Islamic society that held the allegiance 
of its people. 



September 30, 1988 



XXXIV 



After the manuscript for this book was completed in the sum- 
mer of 1988, two calamitous events — both related to weather — 
occurred in Bangladesh. Floods devastated Bangladesh in the sum- 
mer of 1988, and in the fall a killer cyclone hit the still-beleaguered 
nation. As in the past, the resilient people of Bangladesh confronted 
the disastrous effects on the nation's economy with government 
assistance and international aid. 

The floods — caused by heavy monsoon runoff in the Himalayas — 
started in August 1988 and were described as the worst in the coun- 
try's history. Nearly 47 million people and an area of more than 
120,000 of the nation's 144,000 square kilometers were affected. 
In some districts the entire population was left homeless. Flood 
waters were deeper than ever recorded before, and for the first time 
Zia International Airport near Dhaka had to be closed when its 
runways were inundated, an occurrence that further hindered relief 
operations. Statistics provided by the government were grim: 53 
of the country's 64 districts affected; some 4 million hectares of 
crops completely destroyed and an additional 3 million partially 
destroyed; and some 100,000 head of cattle lost. Because of 
improved preparedness over previous years — some 1.5 million tons 
of food and ample supplies of medicine had been strategically stock- 
piled, and some 3,000 civilian and military medical teams were 
dispatched — the loss of human life was mitigated: just over 1 ,600 
died from the direct cause of flooding, and about 500 died from 
diseases resulting from the floods. The nation's infrastructure, 
however, suffered considerably. More than 40 railroad bridges, 
nearly 640 kilometers of railroad track, and nearly 68,000 kilome- 
ters of roads were damaged, and more than 10,000 education insti- 
tutions were partially or completely destroyed. The international 
community responded with in-kind and financial relief and rehabili- 
tation aid of more than US$500 million. 

Government efforts to rebuild water control projects destroyed 
in previous years' flooding were too little and too late to withstand 
the major floods of 1988. In the midst of the flooding, President 
Ershad called for the cooperation of China, India, Bhutan, and 
Nepal — the location of the sources of the major rivers that flow 
from the Himalayas and foothills of the Himalayas into Bangladesh — 
in determining the cause of his country's misery. Environmental 
factors upriver, such as heavy deforestation, burgeoning popula- 
tions, and overutilization of critical resources, were seen as having 
exacerbated the 1988 flooding. Heavy runoff through the flat, over- 
populated, and heavily planted Bangladesh Plain — the catch basin 



xxxv 



for the great Himalayan rivers — was too much for the manmade 
drainage system still recovering from the 1987 floods. Although 
flood control was seen by some observers as the responsibility of 
Bangladesh, regional cooperation in water management and land- 
use policy was essential. 

Just three months after the summer floods had hit and the fertile 
soil was again green with crops, a cyclone hit southeastern Ban- 
gladesh November 29-30. About 600 persons were killed, and more 
than 100 ships and smaller vessels sank or ran aground as 2-meter 
surges hit coastal areas. 

Amidst perennial disasters, Bangladesh continued to gird itself 
for the 1990s. The number one priority continued to be efforts to 
reduce the rate of population growth from 2.6 percent to 1 .8 percent 
per annum by 1990. Self-sufficiency in food was next in the order 
of targeted goals, followed by efforts to further industrialize the 
country in the ready-made garment, frozen seafood, jute, and 
leather products industries. The manufacture of electronic com- 
ponents, started only in 1985 and designed for export to Singa- 
pore, Hong Kong, and the United States, was seen in 1989 as a 
key sector for improvement. 



May 20, 1989 James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden 



xxxvi 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Detail of the Seven Dome Mosque in Dhaka, 
Mughal period, 1526-1858 



BANGLADESH, FORMERLY THE East Wing of Pakistan, 
emerged as an independent nation in December 1971. The excla- 
mation on the occasion — "Joi Bangla! Joi Bangla!" (Victory to 
Bengal! Victory to Bengal!) was a collective and plaintive cry fol- 
lowing a particularly bitter and bloody struggle for freedom. These 
words echoed the cultural and ethnic disposition of the new state — in 
short, the ethos of the people — that Bangladesh was to be a cultur- 
ally and linguistically cohesive unit. Pakistan itself had been created 
on August 15, 1947, largely the result of communal passions pit- 
ting Hindus against Muslims. Pakistan was divided into two wings, 
separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory, with Islam only 
a tenuous link between the two wings. Of paramount importance 
to East Pakistanis was the Bangla (before 1971 usually referred to 
as Bengali) language and culture, a consideration not appreciated 
by the West Wing of Pakistan until it was too late. 

When Bangladesh joined the community of nations, it was at 
first recognized by only India and Bhutan. With its fragile and 
underdeveloped economic infrastructure under extreme duress, its 
law and order situation challenged by numerous well-armed con- 
tingents of unemployed former freedom fighters, its impoverished 
population agitated by the unfulfilled promise of rising expecta- 
tions, Bangladesh was, in international circles, given the unfor- 
tunate label of "international basket case." 

Bangladeshis rejoiced at their attainment of independence and 
offered their adulation to the first national leader of Bangladesh, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), or the Bangabandhu, the 
"Beloved of Bangladesh." Yet the future of Bangladesh, envisioned 
by the Bangabandhu and enshrined in the 1972 Constitution as 
nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy, was as uncer- 
tain and ephemeral as the Bengal monsoon. In 1975 Mujib, by 
then discredited for presiding over a bankrupt and corrupt regime, 
was assassinated along with most of his family. In the ensuing years, 
a number of regimes rose and fell in the violent legacy of Ban- 
gladeshi politics. Authoritarian and military rule has dominated 
the short history of Bangladesh. But Bengali society is known for 
its mercurial politics, and popular demands for a more open govern- 
ment in Bangladesh, while under control in the late 1980s, con- 
tinued unabated. 



3 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Early History, 1000 B.C-A.D. 1202 

For most of its history, the area known as Bangladesh was a poli- 
tical backwater — an observer rather than a participant in the great 
political and military events of the Indian subcontinent (see fig. 1). 
Historians believe that Bengal, the area comprising present-day 
Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal, was settled in about 
1000 B.C. by Dravidian-speaking peoples who were later known 
as the Bang. Their homeland bore various titles that reflected earlier 
tribal names, such as Vanga, Banga, Bangala, Bangal, and Bengal. 

The first great indigenous empire to spread over most of present- 
day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was the Mauryan Empire (ca. 
320-180 B.C.), whose most famous ruler was Asoka (ca. 273-232 
B.C.). Although the empire was well administered and politically 
integrated, little is known of any reciprocal benefits between it and 
eastern Bengal. The western part of Bengal, however, achieved 
some importance during the Mauryan period because ships sailed 
from its ports to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. During the time 
of the Mauryan Empire, Buddhism came to Bengal, and it was 
from there that Asoka's son, Mahinda, carried the message of the 
Enlightened One to Sri Lanka. After the decline of the Mauryan 
Empire the eastern portion of Bengal became the kingdom of 
Samatata; although politically independent, it was a tributary state 
of the Indian Gupta Empire (A.D. ca. 319-ca. 540). 

The third great empire was the Harsha Empire (A.D. 606-47), 
which drew Samatata into its loosely administered political struc- 
ture. The disunity following the demise of this short-lived empire 
allowed a Buddhist chief named Gopala to seize power as the first 
ruler of the Pala Dynasty (A.D. 750-1150). He and his successors 
provided Bengal with stable government, security, and prosperity 
while spreading Buddhism throughout the state and into neigh- 
boring territories. Trade and influence were extensive under Pala 
leadership, as emissaries were sent as far as Tibet and Sumatra. 

The Senas, orthodox and militant Hindus, replaced the Bud- 
dhist Palas as rulers of a united Bengal until the Turkish conquest 
in 1202. Opposed to the Brahmanic Hinduism of the Senas with 
its rigid caste system, vast numbers of Bengalis, especially those 
from the lower castes, would later convert to Islam (see Religion, 
ch. 2). 

Islamization of Bengal, 1202-1757 

The Turkish conquest of the subcontinent was a long, drawn- 
out process covering several centuries. It began in Afghanistan with 



4 



- 



Ancient ruins at Paharpur 
Courtesy Bangladesh 
Ministry of Information 




the military forays of Mahmud of Ghazni in 1001. By the early 
thirteenth century, Bengal fell to Turkish armies. The last major 
Hindu Sena ruler was expelled from his capital at Nadia in western 
Bengal in 1202, although lesser Sena rulers held sway for a short 
while after in eastern Bengal. 

Bengal was loosely associated with the Delhi Sultanate, estab- 
lished in 1206, and paid a tribute in war elephants in order to main- 
tain autonomy. In 1341 Bengal became independent from Delhi, 
and Dhaka was established as the seat of the governors of indepen- 
dent Bengal. Turks ruled Bengal for several decades before the con- 
quest of Dhaka by forces of the Mughal emperor Akbar the Great 
(1556-1605) in 1576. Bengal remained a Mughal province until 
the beginning of the decline of the Mughal Empire in the eigh- 
teenth century. 

Under the Mughals, the political integration of Bengal with the 
rest of the subcontinent began, but Bengal was never truly subju- 
gated. It was always too remote from the center of government 
in Delhi. Because lines of communications were poor, local gover- 
nors found it easy to ignore imperial directives and maintain their 
independence. Although Bengal remained provincial, it was not iso- 
lated intellectually, and Bengali religious leaders from the fifteenth 
century onward have been influential throughout the subcontinent. 

The Mughals in their heyday had a profound and lasting effect 
on Bengal. When Akbar ascended the throne at Delhi, a road 



5 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

connecting Bengal with Delhi was under construction and a postal 
service was being planned as a step toward drawing Bengal into 
the operations of the empire. Akbar implemented the present-day 
Bengali calendar (see Glossary), and his son, Jahangir (1605-27), 
introduced civil and military officials from outside Bengal who 
received rights to collect taxes on land. The development of the 
zamindar (tax collector and later landlord — see Glossary) class and 
its later interaction with the British would have immense economic 
and social implications for twentieth-century Bengal. Bengal was 
treated as the "breadbasket of India" and, as the richest province 
in the empire, was drained of its resources to maintain the Mughal 
army. The Mughals, however, did not expend much energy pro- 
tecting the countryside or the capital from Arakanese or Portuguese 
pirates; in one year as many as 40,000 Bengalis were seized by 
pirates to be sold as slaves, and still the central government did 
not intervene. Local resistance to imperial control forced the 
emperor to appoint powerful generals as provincial governors. Yet, 
despite the insecurity of the Mughal regime, Bengal prospered. 
Agriculture expanded, trade was encouraged, and Dhaka became 
one of the centers of the textile trade in South Asia. 

In 1704 the provincial capital of Bengal was moved from Dhaka 
to Murshidabad. Although they continued to pay tribute to the 
Mughal court, the governors became practically independent rulers 
after the death in 1707 of Aurangzeb, the last great Mughal 
emperor. The governors were strong enough to fend off maraud- 
ing Hindu Marathas from the Bombay area during the eighteenth 
century. When the Mughal governor Alivardi died in 1756, he left 
the rule of Bengal to his grandson Siraj ud Daulah, who would 
lose Bengal to the British the following year. 

European Colonization, 1757-1857 

Early Settlements 

The Indian subcontinent had had indirect relations with Europe 
by both overland caravans and maritime routes, dating back to 
the fifth century B.C. The lucrative spice trade with India had been 
mainly in the hands of Arab merchants. By the fifteenth century, 
European traders had come to believe that the commissions they 
had to pay the Arabs were prohibitively high and therefore sent 
out fleets in search of new trade routes to India. The arrival of 
the Europeans in the last quarter of the fifteenth century marked 
a great turning point in the history of the subcontinent. The 
dynamics of the history of the subcontinent came to be shaped 
chiefly by the Europeans' political and trade relations with India 



6 



Historical Setting 



as India was swept into the vortex of Western power politics. The 
arrival of the Europeans generally coincided with the gradual decline 
of Mughal power, and the subcontinent became an arena of struggle 
not only between Europeans and the indigenous rulers but also 
among the Europeans. 

The British East India Company, a private company formed in 
1600 during the reign of Akbar and operating under a charter 
granted by Queen Elizabeth I, established a factory on the Hooghly 
River in western Bengal in 1650 and founded the city of Calcutta 
in 1690. Although the initial aim of the British East India Com- 
pany was to seek trade under concessions obtained from local 
Mughal governors, the steady collapse of the Mughal Empire 
(1526-1858) enticed the company to take a more direct involve- 
ment in the politics and military activities of the subcontinent. 
Capitalizing on the political fragmentation of South Asia, the British 
ultimately rose to supremacy through military expeditions, annex- 
ation, bribery, and playing one party off against another. Aside 
from the superior military power of the British, their ascendancy 
was fostered by the tottering economic foundations of the local 
rulers, which had been undermined by ravaging dynastic wars and 
the consequent displacement of the peasants from the land, which 
was the principal source of state revenue. 

Siraj ud Daulah, governor of Bengal, unwisely provoked a mili- 
tary confrontation with the British at Plassey in 1757. He was 
defeated by Robert Clive, an adventurous young official of the Brit- 
ish East India Company. Clive' s victory was consolidated in 1764 
at the Battle of Buxar on the Ganges, where he defeated the Mughal 
emperor. As a result, the British East India Company was granted 
the title of diwan (collector of the revenue) in the areas of Bengal, 
Bihar, and Orissa, making it the supreme, but not titular, governing 
power. Henceforth the British would govern Bengal and from there 
extend their rule to all of India. By 1815 the supremacy of the British 
East India Company was unchallengeable, and by the 1850s Brit- 
ish control and influence had extended into territories essentially 
the same as those that became the independent states of India and 
Pakistan in 1947 (see fig. 2). 

The British Raj 

Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the foun- 
dations of British rule were effectively laid, the British govern- 
ment showed increasing interest in the welfare of the people of 
India, feeling the need to curb the greed, recklessness, and cor- 
rupt activities of the private British East India Company. Begin- 
ning in 1773, the British Parliament sought to regulate the 



7 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 




1772 



NEPAL V* 




"^O BIHAR JBENGAL ¥ IC^SHILLONG 




V 



1856 
BHUTAN 

ASSAM SNAGALAND 

^sr^MP {man i pur 

TRIPURA 




1945 



Approximate boundary 
Demarcated boundary 



Source: Based on information from Michael 
Bombay, 1961, 219, 287, and 343. 



1947 



Edwards, yl History of India, 



Figure 2. Bengal: 1772, 1856, 1945, and 1947 



company's administration. By 1784 the company was made respon- 
sible to Parliament for its civil and military affairs and was trans- 
formed into an instrument of British foreign policy. 

Some new measures introduced in the spirit of government inter- 
vention clearly did not benefit the people of Bengal. The Perma- 
nent Settlement (Landlease Act) of Lord Charles Cornwallis in 
1793, which regulated the activities of the British agents and 
imposed a system of revenue collection and landownership, stands 
as a monument to the disastrous effects of the good intentions of 
Parliament. The traditional system for collecting land taxes involved 
the zamindars, who exercised the dual function of revenue collec- 
tors and local magistrates. The British gave the zamindars the status 
and rights of landlords, modeled mainly on the British landed gentry 
and aristocracy. Under the new system the revenue-collecting rights 
were often auctioned to the highest bidders, whether or not they 



8 



Historical Setting 



had any knowledge of rural conditions or the managerial skills neces- 
sary to improve agriculture. Agriculture became a matter of specu- 
lation among urban financiers, and the traditional personal link 
between the resident zamindars and the peasants was broken. 
Absentee landlordship became commonplace, and agricultural 
development stagnated. 

Most British subjects who had served with the British East India 
Company until the end of the eighteenth century were content with 
making profits and leaving the Indian social institutions untouched. 
A growing number of Anglican and Baptist evangelicals in Britain, 
however, felt that social institutions should be reformed. There was 
also the demand in Britain, first articulated by member of Parlia- 
ment and political theorist Edmund Burke, that the company's 
government balance its exploitative practices with concern for the 
welfare of the Indian people. The influential utilitarian theories 
of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill stated that societies could be 
reformed by proper laws. Influenced in part by these factors, Brit- 
ish administrators in India embarked on a series of social and 
administrative reforms that were not well received by the conser- 
vative elements of Bengali society. Emphasis was placed on the 
introduction of Western philosophy, technology, and institutions 
rather than on the reconstruction of native institutions. The early 
attempts by the British East India Company to encourage the use 
of Sanskrit and Persian were abandoned in favor of Western science 
and literature; elementary education was taught in the vernacu- 
lar, but higher education in English. The stated purpose of secu- 
lar education was to produce a class of Indians instilled with British 
cultural values. Persian was replaced with English as the official 
language of the government. A code of civil and criminal proce- 
dure was fashioned after British legal formulas. In the field of social 
reforms, the British suppressed what they considered to be 
inhumane practices, such as suttee (self-immolation of widows on 
the funeral pyres of their husbands), female infanticide, and human 
sacrifice. 

British policy viewed colonies as suppliers of raw materials and 
purchasers of manufactured goods. The British conquest of India 
coincided with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, led by the 
mechanization of the textile industry. As a result of the British policy 
of dumping machine-made goods in the subcontinent, India's 
domestic craft industries were thoroughly ruined, and its trade and 
commerce collapsed. Eastern Bengal was particularly hard hit. 
Muslin cloth from Dhaka had become popular in eighteenth-century 
Europe until British muslin drove it off the market. 



9 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

The Uprising of 1857 

A Great Divide in South Asian History 

On May 10, 1857, Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army, 
drawn mostly from Muslim units from Bengal, mutinied at the 
Meerut cantonment near Delhi, starting a year-long insurrection 
against the British. The mutineers then marched to Delhi and 
offered their services to the Mughal emperor, whose predecessors 
had suffered an ignoble defeat 100 years earlier at Plassey. The 
uprising, which seriously threatened British rule in India, has been 
called many names by historians, including the Sepoy Rebellion, 
the Great Mutiny, and the Revolt of 1857; many people of the sub- 
continent, however, prefer to call it India's "first war of indepen- 
dence." The insurrection was sparked by the introduction of 
cartridges rumored to have been greased with pig or cow fat, which 
was offensive to the religious beliefs of Muslim and Hindu sepoys 
(soldiers). In a wider sense, the insurrection was a reaction by the 
indigenous population to rapid changes in the social order engi- 
neered by the British over the preceding century and an abortive 
attempt by the Muslims to resurrect a dying political order. When 
mutinous units finally surrendered on June 20, 1858, the British 
exiled Emperor Bahadur Shah to Burma, thereby formally end- 
ing the Mughal Empire. As a direct consequence of the revolt, the 
British also dissolved the British East India Company and assumed 
direct rule over India, beginning the period of the British Raj. Brit- 
ish India was thereafter headed by a governor general (called viceroy 
when acting as the direct representative of the British crown). The 
governor general, who embodied the supreme legislative and execu- 
tive authority in India, was responsible to the secretary of state 
for India, a member of the British cabinet in London. 

Reappraisal of British Policy 

The uprising precipitated a dramatic reappraisal of British 
policy — in effect a retreat from the reformist and evangelical zeal 
that had accompanied the rapid territorial expansion of British rule. 
This policy was codified in Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 
delivered to "The Princes, Chiefs, and Peoples of India. " Formal 
annexations of princely states virtually ceased, and the political 
boundaries between British territories and the princely states became 
frozen. By this time the British territories occupied about 60 per- 
cent of the subcontinent, and some 562 princely states of varying 
size occupied the remainder. The relationship the British main- 
tained with the princely states was governed by the principle of 
paramountcy, whereby the princely states exercised sovereignty in 



10 



Historical Setting 



their internal affairs but relinquished their powers to conduct their 
external relations to Britain, the paramount power. Britain assumed 
responsibility for the defense of the princely states and reserved 
the right to intervene in cases of maladministration or gross 
injustice. 

Despite Queen Victoria's promise in 1858 that all subjects under 
the British crown would be treated equally under the law, the revolt 
left a legacy of mistrust between the ruler and the ruled. In the 
ensuing years, the British often assumed a posture of racial arro- 
gance as "sahibs" who strove to remain aloof from "native con- 
tamination." This attitude was perhaps best captured in Rudyard 
Kipling's lament that Englishmen were destined to "take up the 
white man's burden." 

As a security precaution, the British increased the ratio of Brit- 
ish to Indian troops following the mutiny. In 1857 British India's 
armies had had 45,000 Britons to 240,000 Indian troops. By 1863 
this ratio had changed to a "safer mix" of 65,000 British to 140,000 
Indian soldiers. In the aftermath of the revolt, which had begun 
among Bengalis in the British Indian Army, the British formed 
an opinion, later refined as a theory, that there were martial and 
nonmartial races in India. The nonmartial races included the 
Bengalis; the martial included primarily the Punjabis and the 
Pathans, who supported the British during the revolt (see Colo- 
nial Origins, ch. 5). 

The transfer of control from the British East India Company 
to the British crown accelerated the pace of development in India. 
A great transformation took place in the economy in the late 
nineteenth century. The British authorities quickly set out to 
improve inland transportation and communications systems, 
primarily for strategic and administrative reasons. By 1870 an 
extended network of railroads, coupled with the removal of inter- 
nal customs barriers and transit duties, opened up interior mar- 
kets to domestic and foreign trade and improved links between what 
is now Bangladesh and Calcutta. India also found itself within the 
orbit of worldwide markets, especially with the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869. Foreign trade, though under virtual British 
monopoly, was stimulated. India exported raw materials for world 
markets, and the economy was quickly transformed into a colonial 
agricultural arm of British industry. 

The Nationalist Movement and the Rise of Muslim 
Consciousness, 1857-1947 

The recovery of the Muslim community from its low status after 
the 1857 mutiny was a gradual process that went on throughout 



11 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

the ensuing century. In education, commerce, and government 
service the Muslims lagged behind the Hindus, who more quickly 
adapted themselves to rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions. 
During British rule in India, most industry was Hindu-owned and 
Hindu-operated. Muslims lagged behind in business and in indus- 
try, especially those from eastern Bengal, which had long been 
regarded as remote from the hub of commerce. The words of 
Bengali commentator Mansur Ali succinctly describe the Hindu 
dominance and Muslim inferiority in virtually all spheres of society 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: "In Bengal, the 
landlord is Hindu, the peasant Muslim. The money lender is 
Hindu, the client is Muslim. The jailor is Hindu, the prisoner is 
Muslim. The magistrate is Hindu, the accused is Muslim." By 
remaining aloof from the Western-oriented education system, the 
Muslims alienated themselves from the many new avenues open- 
ing up for the emerging middle class. This self-imposed isolation 
led to an intensified awareness of their minority role. Curiously, 
however, it was Muslim opposition to the extension of representa- 
tive government — a political stance taken out of fear of Hindu 
dominance — that helped to reestablish rapport with the British, who 
by 1900 welcomed any available support against mounting Hindu 
nationalism. 

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, under the leader- 
ship of a Muslim noble and writer, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 
(1817-98), a beginning was made toward reconciling the traditional 
views of Indian Muslims and the new ideas and education system 
being introduced by the British. Syed was responsible for the found- 
ing in 1875 of the Muhammadan- Anglo Oriental College (renamed 
the Muslim University of Aligarh in 1921), where Islamic culture 
and religious instruction were combined with a British university 
system. Syed was one of the first Muslims to recognize the problems 
facing his community under a government ruled by the Hindu 
majority. He did not propose specific alternatives to majority rule, 
but he warned that safeguards were necessary to avoid the possi- 
bility of open violence between the religious communities of India. 

The Division of Bengal, 1905-12 

In 1905 the British governor general, Lord George Curzon, 
divided Bengal into eastern and western sectors in order to improve 
administrative control of the huge and populous province. Curzon 
established a new province called Eastern Bengal and Assam, which 
had its capital at Dhaka. The new province of West Bengal (the 
present-day state of West Bengal in India) had its capital at Cal- 
cutta, which also was the capital of British India. During the next 



12 



Procession in Dhaka honoring the martyrdom of 
Muhammad's grandson shows clothing, buildings, and 
other aspects of early nineteenth- century society. 

Watercolor by Alam Musavvir, ca. 1820 
Courtesy Bangladesh National Museum, Dhaka 

few years, the long neglected and predominantly Muslim eastern 
region of Bengal made strides in education and communications. 
Many Bengali Muslims viewed the partition as initial recognition 
of their cultural and political separation from the Hindu majority 
population. Curzon's decision, however, was ardently challenged 
by the educated and largely Hindu upper classes of Calcutta. The 
Indian National Congress (Congress), a Hindu-dominated politi- 
cal organization founded in 1885 and supported by the Calcutta 
elite, initiated a well-planned campaign against Curzon, accusing 
him of trying to undermine the nationalist movement that had been 
spearheaded by Bengal. Congress leaders objected that Curzon's 
partition of Bengal deprived Bengali Hindus of a majority in either 
new province — in effect a tactic of divide and rule. In response, 
they launched a movement to force the British to annul the parti- 
tion. A swadeshi (a devotee of one's own country) movement boy- 
cotted British-made goods and encouraged the production and use 
of Indian-made goods to take their place. Swadeshi agitation spread 
throughout India and became a major plank in the Congress plat- 
form. Muslims generally favored the partition of Bengal but could 
not compete with the more politically articulate and economically 



13 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

powerful Hindus. In 1912 the British voided the partition of Bengal, 
a decision that heightened the growing estrangement between the 
Muslims and Hindus in many parts of the country. The reunited 
province was reconstituted as a presidency and the capital of India 
was moved from Calcutta to the less politically electric atmosphere 
of New Delhi. The reunion of divided Bengal was perceived by 
Muslims as a British accommodation to Hindu pressures. 

Development of the Muslim League, 1906-20 

In 1906 the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) met in 
Dhaka for the first time. The Muslim League used the occasion 
to declare its support for the partition of Bengal and to proclaim 
its mission as a "political association to protect and advance the 
political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India." The 
Muslim League initially professed its loyalty to the British govern- 
ment and its condemnation of the swadeshi movement. It was of 
an altogether different nature from Congress. Congress claimed 
to fight for only secular goals that represented Indian national 
aspirations regardless of religious community. Yet despite its neu- 
tral stance on religion, Congress encountered opposition from some 
leaders in the Muslim community who objected to participation 
in Congress on the grounds that the party was Hindu dominated. 
The Muslim League strictly represented only the interests of the 
Muslim community. Both parties originally were elitist, composed 
of intellectuals and the middle class, and lacked a mass following 
until after 1930. The Muslim League looked to the British for pro- 
tection of Muslim minority rights and insisted on guarantees for 
Muslim minority rights as the price of its participation with Con- 
gress in the nationalist movement. In 1916 the two parties signed 
the Congress-Muslim League Pact (often referred to as the Lucknow 
Pact), a joint platform and call for national independence. The 
essence of the alliance was the endorsement by the Muslim League 
of demands for democratization in representation; Indianization 
of administration and racial equality throughout India in return 
for acceptance by the Congress of separate communal electorates 
(Muslims voted for and were represented by Muslims, Sikhs voted 
for and were represented by Sikhs, while the remainder of the popu- 
lation was termed "general" and included mostly Hindus); a 
reserved quota of legislative seats for Muslims; and the Muslim 
League's right to review any social legislation affecting Muslims. 
The Lucknow Pact was a high-water mark of unity in the nation- 
alist cause, but it also endorsed a scheme that engendered com- 
munal rather than national identity. The plan for separate 
electorates for Muslims, first put into law by the Indian Councils 



14 



Historical Setting 



Act of 1909, was further strengthened and expanded by the India 
Act of 1919 (the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms). 

World War I had a profound impact on the nationalist move- 
ment in India. Congress enthusiastically supported the war effort 
in the hope that Britain would reward Indian loyalty with political 
concessions, perhaps independence, after the war. The Muslim 
League was more ambivalent. Part of this ambivalence had to do 
with the concerns expressed by Muslim writers over the fate of 
Turkey. The Balkan wars, the Italo-Turkish War, and World War I 
were depicted in India as a confrontation between Islam and 
Western imperialism. Because the sultan of Turkey claimed to be 
the caliph [khalifa; literally, successor of the Prophet) and there- 
fore spiritual leader of the Islamic community, many Muslims felt 
fervently that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire presaged 
the destruction of the last great Islamic power. Muslims in India 
also were alarmed over reports that the Allied Powers contemplated 
placing some of the holy places of Islam under non-Muslim juris- 
diction. In 1920 the Khalifat Movement was launched in response 
to the news of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire (see 
Islam, ch. 2). The Khalifat Movement combined Indian nation- 
alism and pan-Islamic sentiment with strong anti-British overtones. 

For several years the Khalifat Movement replaced the Muslim 
League as the major focus of Muslim activism. An agreement 
between the leaders of the movement and Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi, 1869-1948), the leading figure in Con- 
gress, resulted in the joint advocacy of self-rule for India on the 
one hand and agitation for the protection of Islamic holy places 
and the restoration of the caliph of Turkey on the other hand. The 
Khalifat Movement coincided with the inception of Gandhi's call 
for satyagraha (truth force), a strategy of nonviolent civil dis- 
obedience to British rule. The fusion of these two movements was 
short lived, briefly giving the illusion of unity to India's nation- 
alist agitation. 

In 1922 the Hindu-Muslim accord suffered a double blow when 
their noncooperation movement miscarried and the Khalifat Move- 
ment foundered. The outbreak of rioting, which had communal 
aspects in a number of places, caused Gandhi to call off the joint 
noncooperation movement. The Khalifat Movement lost its pur- 
pose when the postwar Turkish nationalists under the leadership 
of Mustafa Kemal (later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk) 
abolished the sultanate, proclaimed Turkey a secular republic, 
abolished the religious office of the caliph, and sent the last of the 
Ottoman ruling family into exile. 



15 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

After the eclipse of the Hindu-Muslim accord, the spirit of com- 
munal unity was never reestablished in the subcontinent. Congress 
took an uncompromising stand on the territorial integrity of any 
proposed postpartition India, downplaying communal differences 
and seriously underestimating the intensity of Muslim minority 
fears that were to strengthen the influence and power of the Muslim 
League. As late as 1938 Gandhi's deputy, Jawaharlal Nehru 
(1889-1964), said, "There is no religious or cultural problem in 
India. What is called the religious or communal problem is really 
a dispute among upper-class people for a division of the spoils of 
office or a representation in a legislature." Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, 
the fiery leader of the untouchables (referred to in Gandhian 
terminology as harijan — "children of God"), however, described 
the twenty years following 1920 as "civil war between Hindus and 
Muslims, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace." 

Two Nations Concept, 1930-47 

The political tumult in India during the late 1920s and the 1930s 
produced the first articulations of a separate state as an expression 
of Muslim consciousness. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938), an 
Islamic revivalist poet and philosopher, discussed contemporary 
problems in his presidential address to the Muslim League con- 
ference at Allahabad in 1930. He saw India as Asia in miniature, 
in which a unitary form of government was inconceivable and com- 
munity rather than territory was the basis for identification. To 
Iqbal, communalism in its highest sense was the key to the forma- 
tion of a harmonious whole in India. Therefore, he demanded the 
creation of a confederated India that would include a Muslim state 
consisting of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and 
Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated 
the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation "based on unity 
of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic 
interests." 

Iqbal gave no name to his projected state; that was done by 
Chaudhari Rahmat Ali and a group of students at Cambridge 
University who issued a pamphlet in 1933 entitled "Now or 
Never." They opposed the idea of federation, denied that India 
was a single country, and demanded partition into regions, the 
northwest receiving national status as "Pakistan." They made up 
the name Pakistan by taking the P from Punjab, A from Afghania 
(Rahmat 's name for North-West Frontier Province), K from 
Kashmir, S from Sind, and Tan from Baluchistan. (When writ- 
ten in Urdu, the word Pakistan has no letter i between the k and 
the s.) The name means "the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure 



16 



Ruins of Mainamati, center of a seventh- and eighth- century 
Buddhist kingdom, near modern Comilla 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 

and clean." There was a proliferation of articles on the theme of 
Pakistan expressing the subjective conviction of nationhood, but 
there was no coordination of political effort to achieve it. There 
was no reference to Bengal. 

In 1934 Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) took over the leader- 
ship of the Muslim League, which was without a sense of mission 
and unable to replace the Khalifat Movement, which had com- 
bined religion, nationalism, and political adventure. Jinnah set 
about restoring a sense of purpose to Muslims. He emphasized the 
"Two Nations" theory based on the conflicting ideas and concep- 
tions of Hinduism and Islam. 

By the late 1930s, Jinnah was convinced of the need for a uni- 
fying issue among Muslims, and the proposed state of Pakistan 
was the obvious answer. In its convention on March 23, 1940, in 
Lahore, the Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim 
majority in the northwest and the northeast of India should be 
grouped in "constituent states to be autonomous and sovereign" 
and that no independence plan without this provision would be 
acceptable to the Muslims. Federation was rejected and, though 
confederation on common interests with the rest of India was 
envisaged, partition was predicated as the final goal. The Pakistan 
issue brought a positive goal to the Muslims and simplified the task 



17 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

of political agitation. It was no longer necessary to remain "yoked" 
to Hindus, and the amended wording of the Lahore Resolution 
issued in 1940 called for a "unified Pakistan." It would, however, 
be challenged by eastern Bengalis in later years. 

After 1940 reconciliation between Congress and the Muslim 
League became increasingly difficult. Muslim enthusiasm for 
Pakistan grew in direct proportion to Hindu condemnation of it; 
the concept took on a life of its own and became a reality in 1947. 

During World War II, the Muslim League and Congress adopted 
different attitudes toward the British government. When in 1939 
the British declared India at war without first consulting Indian 
politicians, Muslim League politicians followed a course of limited 
cooperation with the British. Officials who were members of Con- 
gress, however, resigned from their offices. When in August 1942 
Gandhi launched the revolutionary "Quit India" movement against 
the British Raj, Jinnah condemned it. The British government 
retaliated by arresting about 60,000 individuals and outlawing Con- 
gress. Meanwhile, the Muslim League stepped up its political 
activity. Communal passions rose, as did the incidence of com- 
munal violence. Talks between Jinnah and Gandhi in 1944 proved 
as futile as did the negotiations between Gandhi and the viceroy, 
Lord Archibald Wavell. 

In July 1945 the Labour Party came to power in Britain with 
a vast majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline 
of British power and the spread of Indian unrest, even to the armed 
services. Some form of independence was the only alternative to 
forcible retention of control over an unwilling dependency. The 
viceroy held discussions with Indian leaders in Simla in 1945 in 
an attempt to decide what form an interim government might take, 
but no agreement emerged. 

New elections to provincial and central legislatures were ordered, 
and a three-man British cabinet mission arrived to discuss plans 
for India's self-government. Although the mission did not directly 
accept plans for self-government, concessions were made by severely 
limiting the power of the central government. An interim govern- 
ment composed of the parties returned by the election was to start 
functioning immediately, as was the newly elected Constituent 
Assembly. 

Congress and the Muslim League emerged from the 1946 elec- 
tion as the two dominant parties. The Muslim League's success 
in the election could be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent of 
all Muslim seats in British India — compared with a mere 4.5 per- 
cent in 1937 elections. The Muslim League, like Congress, ini- 
tially accepted the British cabinet mission plan, despite grave 



18 



Historical Setting 



reservations. Subsequent disputes between the leaders of the two 
parties, however, led to mistrust and bitterness. Jinnah demanded 
parity for the Muslim League in the interim government and tem- 
porarily boycotted it when the demand was not met. Nehru indis- 
creetly made statements that cast doubts on the sincerity of Congress 
in accepting the cabinet mission plan. Each party disputed the right 
of the other to appoint Muslim ministers. 

When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government 
without the Muslim League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, or 
"direct action," on August 16, 1946. Communal rioting on an 
unprecedented scale broke out, especially in Bengal and Bihar; the 
massacre of Muslims in Calcutta brought Gandhi to the scene. His 
efforts calmed fears in Bengal, but the rioting spread to other 
provinces and continued into the following year. Jinnah took the 
Muslim League into the government in an attempt to prevent addi- 
tional communal violence, but disagreement among the ministers 
rendered the interim government ineffective. Over all loomed the 
shadow of civil war. 

In February 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed 
viceroy and was given instructions to arrange for the transfer of 
power. After a quick assessment of the Indian scene, Mountbatten 
said that "India was a ship on fire in mid-ocean with ammunition 
in her hold." Mountbatten was convinced that Congress would 
be willing to accept partition as the price for stopping bloodshed 
and that Jinnah was willing to accept a smaller Pakistan. Mount- 
batten obtained sanction from London for the drastic action he pro- 
posed and then persuaded Indian leaders to acquiesce in a general 
way to his plan. 

On July 14, 1947, the British House of Commons passed the 
India Independence Act, by which two independent dominions were 
created on the subcontinent and the princely states were left to 
accede to either. Throughout the summer of 1947, as communal 
violence mounted and drought and floods racked the land, prepa- 
rations for partition proceeded in Delhi. The preparations were 
inadequate. A restructuring of the military into two forces took 
place, as law and order broke down in different parts of the coun- 
try (see Pakistan Era, ch. 5). Jinnah and Nehru tried unsuccess- 
fully to quell the passions that neither fully understood. Jinnah flew 
from Delhi to Karachi on August 7 and took office seven days later 
as the first governor general of the new Dominion of Pakistan. 

Pakistan Period, 1947-71 

Transition to Nationhood, 1947-58 

Pakistan was born in bloodshed and came into existence 
on August 15, 1947, confronted by seemingly insurmountable 



19 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

problems. As many as 12 million people — Muslims leaving India 
for Pakistan, and Hindus and Sikhs opting to move to India from 
the new state of Pakistan — had been involved in the mass transfer 
of population between the two countries, and perhaps 2 million 
refugees had died in the communal bloodbath that had accompanied 
the migrations. Pakistan's boundaries were established hastily 
without adequate regard for the new nation's economic viability. 
Even the minimal requirements of a working central government — 
skilled personnel, equipment, and a capital city with government 
buildings — were missing. Until 1947 the East Wing of Pakistan, 
separated from the West Wing by 1 ,600 kilometers of Indian terri- 
tory, had been heavily dependent on Hindu management. Many 
Hindu Bengalis left for Calcutta after partition, and their place, 
particularly in commerce, was taken mostly by Muslims who had 
migrated from the Indian state of Bihar or by West Pakistanis from 
Punjab. 

After partition, Muslim banking shifted from Bombay to 
Karachi, Pakistan's first capital. Much of the investment in East 
Pakistan came from West Pakistani banks. Investment was con- 
centrated in jute production at a time when international demand 
was decreasing. The largest jute processing factory in the world, 
at Narayanganj, an industrial suburb of Dhaka, was owned by the 
Adamjee family from West Pakistan. Because banking and financ- 
ing were generally controlled by West Pakistanis, discriminatory 
practices often resulted. Bengalis found themselves excluded from 
the managerial level and from skilled labor. West Pakistanis tended 
to favor Urdu-speaking Biharis (refugees from the northern Indian 
state of Bihar living in East Pakistan), considering them to be less 
prone to labor agitation than the Bengalis. This preference became 
more pronounced after explosive labor clashes between the Biharis 
and Bengalis at the Narayaganj jute mill in 1954. 

Pakistan had a severe shortage of trained administrative per- 
sonnel, as most members of the preindependence Indian Civil Ser- 
vice were Hindus or Sikhs who opted to belong to India at partition. 
Rarer still were Muslim Bengalis who had any past administra- 
tive experience. As a result, high-level posts in Dhaka, including 
that of governor general, were usually filled by West Pakistanis 
or by refugees from India who had adopted Pakistani citizenship. 

One of the most divisive issues confronting Pakistan in its infancy 
was the question of what the official language of the new state was 
to be. Jinnah yielded to the demands of refugees from the Indian 
states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, who insisted that Urdu be 
Pakistan's official language. Speakers of the languages of West 
Pakistan — Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu, and Baluchi — were upset that 



20 




Kusumba Mosque, Rajshahi, 
built in 1558, an outstanding example of pre-Mughal architecture 
Lalbagh Mosque, Dhaka, built ca. 1680 
Courtesy Bangladesh National Museum, Dhaka 



21 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

their languages were given second-class status. In East Pakistan, 
the dissatisfaction quickly turned to violence. The Bengalis of East 
Pakistan constituted a majority (an estimated 54 percent) of 
Pakistan's entire population. Their language, Bangla (then com- 
monly known as Bengali), shares with Urdu a common Sanskritic- 
Persian ancestor, but the two languages have different scripts and 
literary traditions. 

Jinnah visited East Pakistan on only one occasion after indepen- 
dence, shortly before his death in 1948. He announced in Dhaka 
that "without one state language, no nation can remain solidly 
together and function." Jinnah's views were not accepted by most 
East Pakistanis, but perhaps in tribute to the founder of Pakistan, 
serious resistance on this issue did not break out until after his death. 
On February 22, 1952, a demonstration was carried out in Dhaka 
in which students demanded equal status for Bangla. The police 
reacted by firing on the crowd and killing two students. (A 
memorial, the Shaheed Minar, was built later to commemorate 
the martyrs of the language movement.) Two years after the inci- 
dent, Bengali agitation effectively forced the National Assembly 
to designate "Urdu and Bengali and such other languages as may 
be declared" to be the official languages of Pakistan. 

What kept the new country together was the vision and forceful 
personality of the founders of Pakistan: Jinnah, the governor general 
popularly known as the Quaid i Azam (Supreme Leader); and 
Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951), the first prime minister, popularly 
known as the Quaid i Millet (Leader of the Community). The 
government machinery established at independence was similar to 
the viceregal system that had prevailed in the preindependence 
period and placed no formal limitations on Jinnah's constitutional 
powers. In the 1970s in Bangladesh, another autocrat, Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, would enjoy much of the same prestige and 
exemption from the normal rule of law. 

When Jinnah died in September 1948, the seat of power shifted 
from the governor general to the prime minister, Liaquat. Liaquat 
had extensive experience in politics and enjoyed as a refugee from 
India the additional benefit of not being too closely identified with 
any one province of Pakistan. A moderate, Liaquat subscribed to 
the ideals of a parliamentary, democratic, and secular state. Out 
of necessity he considered the wishes of the country's religious 
spokesmen who championed the cause of Pakistan as an Islamic 
state. He was seeking a balance of Islam against secularism for a 
new constitution when he was assassinated on October 16, 1951, 
by fanatics opposed to Liaquat' s refusal to wage war against India. 
With both Jinnah and Liaquat gone, Pakistan faced an unstable 



22 



Historical Setting 



period that would be resolved by military and civil service inter- 
vention in political affairs. The first few turbulent years after 
independence thus defined the enduring politico-military culture 
of Pakistan. 

The inability of the politicians to provide a stable government 
was largely a result of their mutual suspicions. Loyalties tended 
to be personal, ethnic, and provincial rather than national and issue 
oriented. Provincialism was openly expressed in the deliberations 
of the Constituent Assembly. In the Constituent Assembly frequent 
arguments voiced the fear that the West Pakistani province of 
Punjab would dominate the nation. An ineffective body, the Con- 
stituent Assembly took almost nine years to draft a constitution, 
which for all practical purposes was never put into effect. 

Liaquat was succeeded as prime minister by a conservative 
Bengali, Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin. Former finance 
minister Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi career civil servant, 
became governor general. Ghulam Mohammad was dissatisfied 
with Nazimuddin' s inability to deal with Bengali agitation for 
provincial autonomy and worked to expand his own power base. 
East Pakistan favored a high degree of autonomy, with the central 
government controlling little more than foreign affairs, defense, 
communications, and currency. In 1953 Ghulam Mohammad dis- 
missed Prime Minister Nazimuddin, established martial law in 
Punjab, and imposed governor's rule (direct rule by the cen- 
tral government) in East Pakistan. In 1954 he appointed his own 
"cabinet of talents." Mohammad Ali Bogra, another conserva- 
tive Bengali and previously Pakistan's ambassador to the United 
States and the United Nations, was named prime minister. 

During September and October 1954 a chain of events culmi- 
nated in a confrontation between the governor general and the 
prime minister. Prime Minister Bogra tried to limit the powers of 
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad through hastily adopted 
amendments to the de facto constitution, the Government of India 
Act of 1935. The governor general, however, enlisted the tacit sup- 
port of the army and civil service, dissolved the Constituent 
Assembly, and then formed a new cabinet. Bogra, a man without 
a personal following, remained prime minister but without effec- 
tive power. General Iskander Mirza, who had been a soldier and 
civil servant, became minister of the interior; General Mohammad 
Ayub Khan, the army commander, became minister of defense; 
and Choudhry Mohammad Ali, former head of the civil service, 
remained minister of finance. The main objective of the new govern- 
ment was to end disruptive provincial politics and to provide the 
country with a new constitution. The Federal Court, however, 



23 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

declared that a new Constituent Assembly must be called. Ghulam 
Mohammad was unable to circumvent the order, and the new Con- 
stituent Assembly, elected by the provincial assemblies, met for 
the first time in July 1955. Bogra, who had little support in the 
new assembly, fell in August and was replaced by Choudhry; 
Ghulam Mohammad, plagued by poor health, was succeeded as 
governor general in September 1955 by Mirza. 

The second Constituent Assembly differed in composition from 
the first. In East Pakistan, the Muslim League had been over- 
whelmingly defeated in the 1954 provincial assembly elections by 
the United Front coalition of Bengali regional parties anchored by 
Fazlul Haq's Krishak Sramik Samajbadi Dal (Peasants and 
Workers Socialist Party) and the Awami League (People's League) 
led by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. Rejection of West Pakistan's 
dominance over East Pakistan and the desire for Bengali provin- 
cial autonomy were the main ingredients of the coalition's twenty- 
one-point platform. The East Pakistani election and the coalition's 
victory proved pyrrhic; Bengali factionalism surfaced soon after 
the election and the United Front fell apart. From 1954 to Ayub's 
assumption of power in 1958, the Krishak Sramik and the Awami 
League waged a ceaseless battle for control of East Pakistan's 
provincial government. 

Prime Minister Choudhry induced the politicians to agree on 
a constitution in 1956. In order to establish a better balance between 
the west and east wings, the four provinces of West Pakistan were 
amalgamated into one administrative unit. The 1956 constitution 
made provisions for an Islamic state as embodied in its Directive 
of Principles of State Policy, which defined methods of promoting 
Islamic morality. The national parliament was to comprise one 
house of 300 members with equal representation from both the west 
and east wings. 

The Awami League's Suhrawardy succeeded Choudhry as prime 
minister in September 1956 and formed a coalition cabinet. He, 
like other Bengali politicians, was chosen by the central govern- 
ment to serve as a symbol of unity, but he failed to secure signifi- 
cant support from West Pakistani power brokers. Although he had 
a good reputation in East Pakistan and was respected for his prepar- 
tition association with Gandhi, his strenuous efforts to gain greater 
provincial autonomy for East Pakistan and a larger share of devel- 
opment funds for it were not well received in West Pakistan. 
Suhrawardy 's thirteen months in office came to an end after 
he took a strong position against abrogation of the existing "One 
Unit" government for all of West Pakistan in favor of separate 
local governments for Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, and North- West 



24 



Historical Setting 



Frontier Province. He thus lost much support from West Pakistan's 
provincial politicians. He also used emergency powers to prevent 
the formation of a Muslim League provincial government in West 
Pakistan, thereby losing much Punjabi backing. Moreover, his open 
advocacy of votes of confidence from the Constituent Assembly as 
the proper means of forming governments aroused the suspicions 
of President Mirza. In 1957 the president used his considerable 
influence to oust Suhrawardy from the office of prime minister. 
The drift toward economic decline and political chaos continued. 

The "Revolution" of Ayub Khan, 1958-66 

In East Pakistan the political impasse culminated in 1958 in a 
violent scuffle in the provincial assembly between members of the 
opposition and the police force, in which the deputy speaker was 
fatally injured and two ministers badly wounded. Uncomfortable 
with the workings of parliamentary democracy, unruliness in the 
East Pakistani provincial assembly elections, and the threat of 
Baluch separatism in West Pakistan, on October 7, 1958, Mirza 
issued a proclamation that abolished political parties, abrogated 
the two-year-old constitution, and placed the country under martial 
law. Mirza announced that martial law would be a temporary 
measure lasting only until a new constitution was drafted. On 
October 27, he swore in a twelve-member cabinet that included 
Ayub as prime minister and three other generals in ministerial posi- 
tions. Included among the eight civilians was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
a former university lecturer and future leader of Pakistan. On the 
same day, the generals exiled Mirza to London because "the armed 
services and the people demanded a clean break with the past." 
Until 1962, martial law continued and Ayub purged a number of 
politicians and civil servants from the government and replaced 
them with army officers. Ayub called his regime a "revolution to 
clean up the mess of black marketing and corruption." 

The new constitution promulgated by Ayub in March 1962 vested 
all executive authority of the republic in the president. As chief 
executive, the president could appoint ministers without approval 
by the legislature. There was no provision for a prime minister. 
There was a provision for a National Assembly and two provin- 
cial assemblies, whose members were to be chosen by the "Basic 
Democrats" — 80,000 voters organized into a five-tier hierarchy, 
with each tier electing officials to the next tier. Pakistan was declared 
a republic (without being specifically an Islamic republic) but, in 
deference to the religious scholars (ulamas — see Glossary), the presi- 
dent was required to be a Muslim, and no law could be passed 
that was contrary to the tenets of Islam. 



25 



The 1962 constitution made few concessions to Bengalis. It was, 
instead, a document that buttressed centralized government under 
the guise of "basic democracies" programs, gave legal support to 
martial law, and turned parliamentary bodies into forums for 
debate. Throughout the Ayub years, East Pakistan and West 
Pakistan grew farther apart. The death of the Awami League's 
Suhrawardy in 1963 gave the mercurial Sheikh Mujibur Rahman — 
commonly known as Mujib — the leadership of East Pakistan's 
dominant party. Mujib, who as early as 1956 had advocated the 
"liberation" of East Pakistan and had been jailed in 1958 during 
the military coup, quickly and successfully brought the issue of East 
Pakistan's movement for autonomy to the forefront of the nation's 
politics. 

During the years between 1960 and 1965, the annual rate of 
growth of the gross domestic product (see Glossary) per capita was 
4.4 percent in West Pakistan versus a poor 2.6 percent in East 
Pakistan. Furthermore, Bengali politicians pushing for more 
autonomy complained that much of Pakistan's export earnings were 
generated in East Pakistan by the export of Bengali jute and tea. 
As late as 1960, approximately 70 percent of Pakistan's export earn- 
ings originated in the East Wing, although this percentage declined 
as international demand for jute dwindled. By the mid-1960s, the 
East Wing was accounting for less than 60 percent of the nation's 
export earnings, and by the time of Bangladesh's independence 
in 1971 , this percentage had dipped below 50 percent. This reality 
did not dissuade Mujib from demanding in 1966 that separate 



26 



Two of the finest examples of tughr a.- style Arabic calligraphy used 

in Bangladesh, fifteenth century 
Courtesy Bangladesh National Museum, Dhaka (left) 
Varendra Research Museum, Rajshahi (right) 

foreign exchange accounts be kept and that separate trade offices 
be opened overseas. By the mid-1960s, West Pakistan was benefiting 
from Ayub's "Decade of Progress," with its successful "green rev- 
olution" in wheat, and from the expansion of markets for West 
Pakistani textiles, while the East Pakistani standard of living 
remained at an abysmally low level. Bengalis were also upset that 
West Pakistan, because it was the seat of government, was the major 
beneficiary of foreign aid. 

Emerging Discontent, 1966-70 

At a 1966 Lahore conference of both the eastern and the western 
chapters of the Awami League, Mujib announced his controver- 
sial six-point political and economic program for East Pakistani 
provincial autonomy. He demanded that the government be fed- 
eral and parliamentary in nature, its members elected by univer- 
sal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the basis of 
population; that the federal government have principal responsi- 
bility for foreign affairs and defense only; that each wing have its 
own currency and separate fiscal accounts; that taxation occur at 
the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitu- 
tionally guaranteed grants; that each federal unit control its own 
earning of foreign exchange; and that each unit raise its own militia 
or paramilitary forces. 

Mujib 's six points ran directly counter to Ayub's plan for greater 
national integration. Ayub's anxieties were shared by many West 
Pakistanis, who feared that Mujib' s plan would divide Pakistan 



27 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

by encouraging ethnic and linguistic cleavages in West Pakistan, 
and would leave East Pakistan, with its Bengali ethnic and linguistic 
unity, by far the most populous and powerful of the federating units. 
Ayub interpreted Mujib's demands as tantamount to a call for 
independence. After pro-Mujib supporters rioted in a general strike 
in Dhaka, the government arrested Mujib in January 1968. 

Ayub suffered a number of setbacks in 1968. His health was poor, 
and he was almost assassinated at a ceremony marking ten years 
of his rule. Riots followed, and Bhutto was arrested as the instiga- 
tor. At Dhaka a tribunal that inquired into the activities of the 
already-interned Mujib was arousing strong popular resentment 
against Ayub. A conference of opposition leaders and the can- 
cellation of the state of emergency (in effect since 1965) came too 
late to conciliate the opposition. On February 21, 1969, Ayub 
announced that he would not run in the next presidential election 
in 1970. A state of near anarchy reigned with protests and strikes 
throughout the country. The police appeared helpless to con- 
trol the mob violence, and the military stood aloof. At length, on 
March 25 Ayub resigned and handed over the administration to 
the commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. 
Once again the country was placed under martial law. Yahya 
assumed the titles of chief martial law administrator and president. 
He announced that he considered himself to be a transitional leader 
whose task would be to restore order and to conduct free elections 
for a new constituent assembly, which would then draft a new con- 
stitution. He appointed a largely civilian cabinet in August 1969 
in preparation for the election, which was scheduled to take place 
in December 1970. Yahya moved with dispatch to settle two con- 
tentious issues by decree: the unpopular "One Unit" of West 
Pakistan, which was created as a condition for the 1956 constitu- 
tion, was ended; and East Pakistan was awarded 162 seats out of 
the 300-member National Assembly. 

On November 12, 1970, a cyclone devastated an area of almost 
8,000 square kilometers of East Pakistan's mid-coastal lowlands 
and its outlying islands in the Bay of Bengal. It was perhaps the 
worst natural disaster of the area in centuries. As many as 250,000 
lives were lost. Two days after the cyclone hit, Yahya arrived in 
Dhaka after a trip to Beijing, but he left a day later. His seeming 
indifference to the plight of Bengali victims caused a great deal of 
animosity. Opposition newspapers in Dhaka accused the central 
government of impeding the efforts of international relief agencies 
and of "gross neglect, callous inattention, and bitter indifference." 
Mujib, who had been released from prison, lamented that "West 
Pakistan has a bumper wheat crop, but the first shipment of food 



28 



Historical Setting 



grain to reach us is from abroad" and "that the textile merchants 
have not given a yard of cloth for our shrouds. ' ' "We have a large 
army," Mujib continued, "but it is left to the British Marines to 
bury our dead." In an unveiled threat to the unity of Pakistan he 
added, "the feeling now pervades . . . every village, home, and 
slum that we must rule ourselves. We must make the decisions that 
matter. We will no longer suffer arbitrary rule by bureaucrats, 
capitalists, and feudal interests of West Pakistan." 

Yahya announced plans for a national election on December 7, 
1970, and urged voters to elect candidates who were committed 
to the integrity and unity of Pakistan. The elections were the first 
in the history of Pakistan in which voters were able to elect mem- 
bers of the National Assembly directly. In a convincing demon- 
stration of Bengali dissatisfaction with the West Pakistani regime, 
the Awami League won all but 2 of the 162 seats allotted East 
Pakistan in the National Assembly. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party 
came in a poor second nationally, winning 81 out of the 138 West 
Pakistani seats in the National Assembly. The Awami League's 
electoral victory promised it control of the government, with Mujib 
as the country's prime minister, but the inaugural assembly never 
met. 

Yahya and Bhutto vehemently opposed Mujib' s idea of a con- 
federated Pakistan. Mujib was adamant that the constitution be 
based on his six-point program. Bhutto, meanwhile, pleaded for 
unity in Pakistan under his leadership. As tensions mounted, Mujib 
suggested he become prime minister of East Pakistan while Bhutto 
be made prime minister of West Pakistan. It was this action that 
triggered mass civil disobedience in East Pakistan. Mujib called 
for a general strike until the government was given over to the 
"people's representatives." Tiring of the interminable game of 
politics he was playing with the Bengali leader, Yahya decided to 
ignore Mujib's demands and on March 1 postponed indefinitely 
the convening of the National Assembly, which had been sched- 
uled for March 3. March 1 also was a portentous date, for on that 
day Yahya named General Tikka Khan, who in later years was 
to earn the dubious title "Butcher of Baluchistan" for his suppres- 
sion of Baluch separatists, as East Pakistan's military governor. 
The number of West Pakistani troops entering East Pakistan had 
increased sharply in the preceding weeks, climbing from a precrisis 
level of 25,000 to about 60,000, bringing the army close to a state 
of readiness. As tensions rose, however, Yahya continued desper- 
ate negotiations with Mujib, flying to Dhaka in mid-March. Talks 
between Yahya and Mujib were joined by Bhutto but soon 
collapsed, and on March 23 Bengalis following Mujib's lead 



29 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

defiantly celebrated "Resistance Day" in East Pakistan instead of 
the traditional all-Pakistan "Republic Day." Yahya decided to 
"solve" the problem of East Pakistan by repression. On the even- 
ing of March 25 he flew back to Islamabad. The military crack- 
down in East Pakistan began that same night. 

The War for Bangladeshi Independence, 1971 

On March 25, the Pakistan Army launched a terror campaign 
calculated to intimidate the Bengalis into submission. Within hours 
a wholesale slaughter had commenced in Dhaka, with the heaviest 
attacks concentrated on the University of Dhaka and the Hindu 
area of the old town. Bangladeshis remember the date as a day 
of infamy and liberation. The Pakistan Army came with hit lists 
and systematically killed several hundred Bengalis. Mujib was cap- 
tured and flown to West Pakistan for incarceration. 

To conceal what they were doing, the Pakistan Army corralled 
the corps of foreign journalists at the International Hotel in Dhaka, 
seized their notes, and expelled them the next day. One reporter 
who escaped the censor net estimated that three battalions of 
troops — one armored, one artillery, and one infantry — had attacked 
the virtually defenseless city. Various informants, including mis- 
sionaries and foreign journalists who clandestinely returned to East 
Pakistan during the war, estimated that by March 28 the loss of 
life reached 15,000. By the end of summer as many as 300,000 
people were thought to have lost their lives. Anthony Mascaren- 
has in Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood estimates that during the entire 
nine-month liberation struggle more than 1 million Bengalis may 
have died at the hands of the Pakistan Army. 

The West Pakistani press waged a vigorous but ultimately futile 
campaign to counteract newspaper and radio accounts of whole- 
sale atrocities. One paper, the Morning News, even editorialized that 
the armed forces were saving East Pakistanis from eventual Hindu 
enslavement. The civil war was played down by the government- 
controlled press as a minor insurrection quickly being brought under 
control. 

After the tragic events of March, India became vocal in its con- 
demnation of Pakistan. An immense flood of East Pakistani 
refugees, between 8 and 10 million according to various estimates, 
fled across the border into the Indian state of West Bengal. In April 
an Indian parliamentary resolution demanded that Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi supply aid to the rebels in East Pakistan. She com- 
plied but declined to recognize the provisional government of 
independent Bangladesh. 



30 



Historical Setting 



A propaganda war between Pakistan and India ensued in which 
Yahya threatened war against India if that country made an attempt 
to seize any part of Pakistan. Yahya also asserted that Pakistan 
could count on its American and Chinese friends. At the same time, 
Pakistan tried to ease the situation in the East Wing. Belatedly, 
it replaced Tikka, whose military tactics had caused such havoc 
and human loss of life, with the more restrained Lieutenant General 
A.A.K. Niazi. A moderate Bengali, Abdul Malik, was installed 
as the civilian governor of East Pakistan. These belated gestures 
of appeasement did not yield results or change world opinion. 

On December 4, 1971, the Indian Army, far superior in num- 
bers and equipment to that of Pakistan, executed a 3 -pronged pincer 
movement on Dhaka launched from the Indian states of West 
Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, taking only 12 days to defeat the 
90,000 Pakistani defenders. The Pakistan Army was weakened by 
having to operate so far away from its source of supply. The Indian 
Army, on the other hand, was aided by East Pakistan's Mukti 
Bahini (Liberation Force), the freedom fighters who managed to 
keep the Pakistan Army at bay in many areas (see The Liberation 
War, ch. 5). 

Birth of Bangladesh 

Early Independence Period, 1971-72 

The "independent, sovereign republic of Bangladesh" was first 
proclaimed in a radio message broadcast from a captured station 
in Chittagong on March 26, 1971. Two days later, the "Voice of 
Independent Bangladesh" announced that a "Major Zia" (actually 
Ziaur Rahman, later president of Bangladesh) would form a new 
government with himself occupying the "presidency." Zia's self- 
appointment was considered brash, especially by Mujib, who in 
subsequent years would hold a grudge. Quickly realizing that his 
action was unpopular, Zia yielded his "office" to the incarcerated 
Mujib. The following month a provisional government was estab- 
lished in Calcutta by a number of leading Awami League mem- 
bers who had escaped from East Pakistan. On April 17, the 
"Mujibnagar" government formally proclaimed independence and 
named Mujib as its president. On December 6, India became the 
first nation to recognize the new Bangladeshi government. When 
the West Pakistani surrender came ten days later, the provisional 
government had some organization in place, but it was not until 
December 22 that members of the new government arrived in 
Dhaka, having been forced to heed the advice of the Indian mili- 
tary that order must quickly be restored. Representatives of the 



31 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Bangladeshi government and the Mukti Bahini were absent from 
the ceremony of surrender of the Pakistan Army to the Indian Army 
on December 16. Bangladeshis considered this ceremony insult- 
ing, and it did much to sour relations between Bangladesh and 
India. 

At independence, Mujib was in jail in West Pakistan, where he 
had been taken after his arrest on March 25. He had been con- 
victed of treason by a military court and sentenced to death. Yahya 
did not carry out the sentence, perhaps as a result of pleas made 
by many foreign governments. With the surrender of Pakistani 
forces in Dhaka and the Indian proclamation of a cease-fire on the 
western front, Yahya relinquished power to a civilian government 
under Bhutto, who released Mujib and permitted him to return 
to Dhaka via London and New Delhi. 

On January 10, 1972, Mujib arrived in Dhaka to a tumultuous 
welcome. Mujib first assumed the title of president but vacated 
that office two days later to become the prime minister. Mujib 
pushed through a new constitution that was modeled on the Indian 
Constitution. The Constitution — adopted on November 4, 1972 — 
stated that the new nation was to have a prime minister appointed 
by the president and approved by a single-house parliament. The 
Constitution then enumerated a number of principles on which Ban- 
gladesh was to be governed. These came to be known as the tenets 
of "Mujibism" (or "Mujibbad"), which included the four pillars 
of nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy. In the fol- 
lowing years, however, Mujib discarded everything Bangladesh 
theoretically represented: constitutionalism, freedom of speech, rule 
of law, the right to dissent, and equal opportunity of employment. 

Fall of the Bangabandhu, 1972-75 

The country Mujib returned to was scarred by civil war. The 
number of people killed, raped, or displaced could be only vaguely 
estimated. The task of economic rehabilitation, specifically the 
immediate goal of food distribution to a hungry populace, was frus- 
trated by crippled communications and transportation systems. The 
new nation faced many other seemingly insurmountable problems 
inhibiting its reconstruction. One of the most glaring was the break- 
down of law and order. In the wake of the war of independence, 
numerous bands of guerrillas still roamed the countryside, fully 
armed and outside the control of the government. Many fighters 
of the Mukti Bahini joined the Bangladesh Army and thus could 
legally retain their weapons, but many others ignored Mujib' s plea 
that they surrender their weapons. Some armed groups took the 
law into their own hands and set up territories under their own 



32 



The founding father 
of Bangladesh, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
(1920-75) 
Courtesy Bangladesh 
National Museum, Dhaka 



Mujib's house in Dhaka 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

jurisdiction. In time these challenges to central authority contributed 
to Mujib's suspension of democracy. 

Mujib had an unfailing attachment to those who participated 
in the struggle for independence. He showed favoritism toward those 
comrades by giving them appointments to the civil government 
and especially the military. This shortsighted practice proved fatal. 
Mujib denied himself the skill of many top-level officers formerly 
employed by the Pakistan Civil Service. Bengali military officers 
who did not manage to escape from West Pakistan during the war 
and those who remained at their posts in East Pakistan were dis- 
criminated against throughout the Mujib years. The "repatriates," 
who constituted about half of the army, were denied promotions 
or choice posts; officers were assigned to functionless jobs as 
"officers on special duty." Schooled in the British tradition, most 
believed in the ideals of military professionalism; to them the 
prospect of serving an individual rather than an institution was 
reprehensible. Opposed to the repatriates were the freedom fighters, 
most of whom offered their unquestioning support for Mujib and 
in return were favored by him. A small number of them, associated 
with the radical Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party), 
even proposed that officers be elected to their posts in a "people's 
army." From the ranks of the freedom fighters, Mujib established 
the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force), whose mem- 
bers took a personal pledge to Mujib and became, in effect, his 
private army to which privileges and hard-to-get commodities were 
lavishly given (see Postindependence Period, ch. 5). 

Despite substantial foreign aid, mostly from India and the Soviet 
Union, food supplies were scarce, and there was rampant corrup- 
tion and black marketeering. This situation prompted Mujib to 
issue a warning against hoarders and smugglers. Mujib backed up 
his threat by launching a mass drive against hoarders and smug- 
glers, backed by the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini. The situation only tem- 
porarily buoyed the legitimate economy of the country, as hoarding, 
black marketeering, and corruption in high offices continued and 
became the hallmarks of the Mujib regime. 

Mujib's economic policies also directly contributed to his coun- 
try's economic chaos. His large-scale nationalization of Bangladeshi 
manufacturing and trading enterprises and international trading 
in commodities strangled Bangladesh entrepreneurship in its 
infancy. The enforced use of the Bangla language as a replacement 
for English at all levels of government and education was yet another 
policy that increased Bangladesh's isolation from the dynamics of 
the world economy. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Most Bangadeshis still revered the Bangabandhu at the time of 
the first national elections held in 1973. Mujib was assured of 
victory, and the Awami League won 282 out of 289 directly con- 
tested seats. After the election, the economic and security situa- 
tions began to deteriorate rapidly, and Mujib' s popularity suffered 
further as a result of what many Bangladeshis came to regard as 
his close alliance with India. Mujib 's authoritarian personality and 
his paternalistic pronouncements to "my country" and "my 
people" were not sufficient to divert the people's attention from 
the miserable conditions of the country. Widespread flooding and 
famine created severe hardship, aggravated by growing law-and- 
order problems. 

In January 1975, the Constitution was amended to make Mujib 
president for five years and to give him full executive powers. The 
next month, in a move that wiped out all opposition political parties, 
Mujib proclaimed Bangladesh a one-party state, effectively abolish- 
ing the parliamentary system. He renamed the Awami League the 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, 
Workers, and People's League) and required all civilian govern- 
ment personnel to join the party. The fundamental rights enumer- 
ated in the Constitution ceased to be observed, and Bangladesh, 
in its infancy, was transformed into a personal dictatorship. 

On the morning of August 15, 1975, Mujib and several mem- 
bers of his family were murdered in a coup engineered by a group 
of young army officers, most of whom were majors. Some of the 
officers in the "majors' plot" had a personal vendetta against 
Mujib, having earlier been dismissed from the army. In a wider 
sense, the disaffected officers and the several hundred troops they 
led represented the grievances of the professionals in the military 
over their subordination to the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini and Mujib's 
indifference to gross corruption by his political subordinates and 
family members. By the time of his assassination, Mujib's popu- 
larity had fallen precipitously, and his death was lamented by sur- 
prisingly few. 

The diplomatic status of Bangladesh changed overnight. One 
day after Mujib's assassination President Bhutto of Pakistan 
announced that his country would immediately recognize the new 
regime and offered a gift of 50,000 tons of rice in addition to a 
generous gift of clothing. India, however, under the rule of Indira 
Gandhi, suffered a setback in its relations with Bangladesh. The 
end of the Mujib period once again brought serious bilateral differ- 
ences to the fore. Many Bangladeshis, although grateful for India's 
help against Pakistan during the struggle for independence, thought 
Indian troops had lingered too long after the Pakistan Army was 



35 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

defeated. Mujibist dissidents who continued to resist central author- 
ity found shelter in India (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). 

Restoration of Military Rule, 1975-77 

The assassins of Mujib arrested the three senior ranking officers 
in Mujib 's cabinet but installed as president the fourth in charge, 
a long-time colleague of Mujib and minister of commerce, 
Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed. Mushtaque, a conservative mem- 
ber of the Awami League (the name to which the Bangladesh 
Krishak Sramik Awami League reverted after Mujib 's death), was 
known to lean toward the West and to have been troubled by 
Mujib's close ties with India. Many observers believed him to have 
been a conspirator in Mujib's assassination. Even so, his role in 
the new regime was circumscribed by the majors, who even moved 
into the presidential palace with him. Mushtaque announced that 
parliamentary democracy would be restored by February 1977, and 
he lifted Mujib's ban on political parties. He instituted strong pro- 
grams to reduce corrupt practices and to restore efficiency and pub- 
lic confidence in the government. He also ordered the transfer of 
all the equipment and assets and most of the personnel of the Jatiyo 
Rakkhi Bahini to the army and the eventual abolition of the Jatiyo 
Rakkhi Bahini. Mushtaque promised to dissolve the authoritarian 
powers that Mujib had invested in the office of the presidency, but 
the continuing unstable situation did not improve enough to per- 
mit a significant degree of liberalization. In order to keep Mujib 
supporters under control, Mushtaque declared himself chief mar- 
tial law administrator and set up a number of tribunals that fell 
outside constitutional jurisdiction. 

Despite the economic and political instability during the last years 
of the Mujib regime, the memory of the Bangabandhu evoked 
strong emotions among his loyalists. Many of these, especially 
former freedom fighters now in the army, were deeply resentful 
of the majors. One of these Mujib loyalists, Brigadier Khaled 
Musharraf, launched a successful coup on November 3, 1975. Chief 
Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, who had served Mujib in 
the Supreme Court, emerged as president. Musharraf had him- 
self promoted to major general, thereby replacing Chief of Staff Zia. 

In a public display orchestrated to show his loyalty to the slain 
Mujib, Musharraf led a procession to Mujib's former residence. 
The reaction to Musharraf s obvious dedication to Mujibist ideology 
and the fear that he would renew the former leader's close ties with 
India precipitated the collapse of the new regime. On Novem- 
ber 7, agitators of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, a leftist but decidedly 
anti-Soviet and anti-Indian movement, managed to incite troops 



36 



Historical Setting 



at the Dhaka cantonment against Musharraf, who was killed in 
a firefight. President Sayem became chief martial law administra- 
tor, and the military service chiefs, most significantly the army's 
Zia, became deputy chief martial law administrators. Zia also took 
on the portfolios of finance, home affairs, industry, and informa- 
tion, as well as becoming the army chief of staff. 

It was not long before Zia, with the backing of the military, sup- 
planted the elderly and frail Sayem. Zia postponed the presidential 
elections and the parliamentary elections that Sayem had earlier 
promised and made himself chief marital law administrator in 
November 1976. 

The Zia Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82 

In the opinion of many observers, Zia, although ruthless with 
his opponents, was the nation's best leader since independence. 
A dapper military officer, he transformed himself into a charis- 
matic and popular political figure. Once described as having an 
air of "serene hesitancy and assured authority," Zia had bound- 
less energy and spent much of his time traveling throughout the 
country. Zia preached the "politics of hope," continually urging 
all Bangladeshis to work harder and to produce more. Unlike 
Mujib, Zia utilized whatever talent he could muster to spur on the 
economy, and he did not discriminate, as Mujib had, against civil 
servants who had not fully participated in the freedom struggle. 
Zia was a well-known figure who first emerged nationally during 
the independence struggle. His "Z Force" (Z for Zia) had been 
the first to announce the independence of Bangladesh from a cap- 
tured radio station in Chittagong. 

Zia also tried to integrate the armed forces, giving repatriates 
a status appropriate to their qualifications and seniority. This 
angered some of the freedom fighters, who had rapidly reached 
high positions. Zia deftly dealt with the problem officers by send- 
ing them on diplomatic missions abroad. Zia made repatriate Major 
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad the deputy army chief of staff. 
Having consolidated his position in the army, Zia became presi- 
dent on April 21, 1977, when Sayem resigned on the grounds of 
"ill health." Zia now held the dominant positions in the country 
and seemed to be supported by a majority of Bangladeshis. 

In May 1977, with his power base increasingly secure, Zia drew 
on his popularity to promote a nineteen-point political and economic 
program. Zia focused on the need to boost Bangladeshi produc- 
tion, especially in food and grains, and to integrate rural develop- 
ment through a variety of programs, of which population planning 
was the most important. He heeded the advice of international 



37 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

lending agencies and launched an ambitious rural development pro- 
gram in 1977, which included a highly visible and popular food- 
for-work program. 

Fortified with his manifesto, Zia faced the electorate in a referen- 
dum on his continuance in office. The results of what Zia called 
his "exercise of the democratic franchise," showed that 88.5 per- 
cent of the electorate turned out and that 98.9 percent voted for 
Zia. Although some doubts were cast on how fairly the referen- 
dum was conducted, Zia was, nonetheless, a popular leader with 
an agenda most of the country endorsed. Zia consciously tried to 
change the military bearing of his government, eventually trans- 
ferring most of the portfolios held by military officers to civilians. 
Continuing the process of giving his regime a nonmilitary appear- 
ance, in June 1977 he chose as his vice president Supreme Court 
justice Abdus Sattar, a civilian who had long been involved in 
Bengali politics. 

One of the most important tasks Zia faced was to change the 
direction of the country. Zia altered the Constitution's ideological 
statement on the fundamental principles, in particular changing 
the Mujibist emphasis on secularism to "complete trust and faith 
in almighty Allah." While distancing Bangladesh from India, Zia 
sought to improve ties with other Islamic nations. Throughout his 
regime, Zia pursued an active foreign policy, and the legacy of his 
efforts continued to bear fruit in the late 1980s. In 1980 Zia pro- 
posed a conference for the seven nations of the subcontinent (Ban- 
gladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) 
to discuss the prospects for regional cooperation in a number of 
fields. This initiative was successful in August 1983 when the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC — see Glos- 
sary) was established. 

Zia's administration reestablished public order, which had deteri- 
orated during the Mujib years. Special civil and military tribunals 
dealt harshly with the multitudes of professional bandits, smug- 
glers, and guerrilla bands. A continuing problem with one of these 
armed groups led by Kader "Tiger" Siddiqi, a one-time freedom 
fighter and former enlisted man in the Pakistan Army, was eased 
when the Janata Party came to power in India in early 1977. The 
new Indian prime minister, Morarji Desai, discontinued the assis- 
tance and sanctuary that Indira Gandhi's government had given 
to pro-Mujib rebels working against the government. 

President Zia's efforts to quiet the military — divided and politi- 
cized since independence — were not entirely successful. In late Sep- 
tember 1977, Japanese Red Army terrorists hijacked a Japan Air 
Lines airplane and forced it to land in Dhaka. On September 30, 



38 



Historical Setting 



while the attention of the government was riveted on this event, 
a mutiny broke out in Bogra. Although the mutiny was quickly 
quelled on the night of October 2, a second mutiny occurred in 
Dhaka. The mutineers unsuccessfully attacked Zia's residence, cap- 
tured Dhaka Radio for a short time, and killed a number of air 
force officers at Dhaka International Airport (present-day Zia Inter- 
national Airport), where they were gathered for negotiations with 
the hijackers. The revolts, which attracted worldwide coverage, were 
dismissed by the government as a conflict between air force enlisted 
men and officers regarding pay and service conditions (see Organi- 
zation of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). The army quickly put down 
the rebellion, but the government was severely shaken. The govern- 
ment intelligence network had clearly failed, and Zia promptly dis- 
missed both the military and the civilian intelligence chiefs. Three 
of the aspirants to the army chief of staff post, at the time held 
by Zia, were also removed; in 1981 one of them, Major General 
Muhammad Manzur Ahmed, was to lead the coup that resulted 
in the assassination of Zia. 

After the Dhaka mutiny, Zia continued with his plans for politi- 
cal normalization, insisting on being called "president" rather than 
"major general" and prohibiting his military colleagues from hold- 
ing both cabinet and military positions. In April 1978, Zia 
announced that elections would be held to "pave the way to 
democracy," adding that the Constitution would be amended to 
provide for an independent judiciary as well as a "sovereign parlia- 
ment." Zia also lifted the ban on political parties. He was sup- 
ported by a "national front," whose main party was the Jatiyo 
Ganatantrik Dal (National Democratic Party). As the candidate 
of the Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal-led Nationalist Front, Zia won over- 
whelmingly, taking 76.7 percent of the vote against a front led by 
General M.A.G. Osmany, the leader of the Mukti Bahini during 
the war. Shortly after, Zia expanded the Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal 
to include major portions of the parties in the Nationalist Front. 
His new party was named the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and 
was headed by Sattar. Parliamentary elections followed in Febru- 
ary 1979. After campaigning by Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party won 207 of the 300 seats in Parliament with about 44 per- 
cent of the vote. 

Zia was assassinated in Chittagong on May 30, 1981, in a plot 
allegedly masterminded by Major General Manzur, the army com- 
mander in Chittagong. Manzur had earlier been chief of the general 
staff and had been transferred to Chittagong in the after- 
math of the October 1977 mutiny. He was scheduled for a new 
transfer to a noncommand position in Dhaka and was reportedly 



39 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

disappointed over this. The army, under its chief of staff, Major 
General Ershad, remained loyal to the Dhaka government and 
quickly put down the rebellion, killing Manzur. In the trials that 
followed, a sizable number of officers and enlisted men received 
the death penalty for complicity. 

After Zia's assassination, Vice President Sattar became acting 
president and, as the Constitution stipulates, called for new elec- 
tions for president within 180 days. Although there was some specu- 
lation that Zia's widow, Begum Khaleda Ziaur Rahman, and 
Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, would be candidates, 
Sattar ran against a number of political unknowns in the Novem- 
ber election and won the presidential election with two-thirds of 
the vote. 

Sattar was an elderly man who his critics thought to be ineffec- 
tive, but his greatest weakness, in the eyes of the military, was that 
he was a civilian. Although Zia had downplayed his own military 
background, given up his position of army chief of staff, and adopted 
civilian dress and mannerisms, he maintained strong links with the 
armed services. Immediately following the 1981 election, Ershad 
pushed Sattar for a constitutional role for the military in the gover- 
nance of the country. After initial resistance, Sattar, faced with 
the prospect of a coup, agreed to set up the National Security Coun- 
cil in January 1982 with the president, vice president, and prime 
minister representing the civilian side and the three service chiefs 
representing the military. In a last attempt to limit the influence 
of the military, Sattar relieved a number of military officers from 
duty in the government. 

Sattar' s decision to curtail military influence in the government 
provoked an immediate response from Ershad. On March 24, 1982, 
Ershad dismissed Sattar, dissolved the cabinet and the Parliament, 
and assumed full powers under martial law. Echoing the words 
of many past military leaders, Ershad announced that the military, 
as the only organized power in the nation, had been forced to take 
over until elections could be held. 

Ershad almost immediately assumed the title of "president of 
the ministers," or prime minister, but to many Bangladeshis he 
was a usurper, one who overthrew a legitimately elected president 
and who would reverse the slow liberalization of Bangladeshi 
politics — the "politics of hope" begun earlier by Zia. The events 
of March 1982 reflected much of the tumultuous history of the coun- 
try and, many critics agreed, foreshadowed a turbulent future for 
the struggling nation of Bangladesh (see The Ershad Period, ch. 4). 

* * * 



40 



Historical Setting 



Although Bangladesh is a young nation state, a number of good 
general histories are available that cover the period from its pain- 
ful birth to the late 1980s. These include Charles Peter O'Donnell's 
Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation; Talukder Maniruzzaman's 
The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath; Marcus F. Franda's Ban- 
gladesh: The First Decade; Craig Baxter's concise Bangladesh: A New 
Nation in an Old Setting; and Anthony Mascarenhas's Bangladesh: A 
Legacy of Blood. There are numerous books that deal with Ban- 
gladesh's preindependence past as East Pakistan, as part of the Brit- 
ish and Mughal empires of India, and as the eastern part of Bengal, 
a cultural entity reaching back to antiquity. A sampling of some 
of the excellent general works available might include A.L Basham's 
masterpiece, The Wonder That Was India; Romila Thapar's A His- 
tory of India; Percival Spear's India: A Modern History; Ramesh 
Chandra Majumdar's The History of Bengal; and Shahid Javed 
Burki's Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. For those seeking a com- 
prehensive bibliographic index regarding works covering Ban- 
gladesh and its historic role in South Asia, the Bibliography of Asian 
Studies should be consulted. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



41 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Royal Bengal Tiger— the pride of Bangladesh 's fauna 



BANGLADESH IS NOTED for the remarkable ethnic and cul- 
tural homogeneity of its population. Over 98 percent of its people 
are Bengalis; the remainder are Biharis, or non-Bengali Muslims, 
and indigenous tribal peoples. Bangladeshis are particularly proud 
of their rich cultural and linguistic heritage because their indepen- 
dent nation is partially the result of a powerful movement to up- 
hold and preserve their language and culture. Bangladeshis identify 
themselves closely with Bangla, their national language. 

One of the world's most densely populated nations, Bangladesh 
in the 1980s was caught in the vicious cycle of population expan- 
sion and poverty. Although the rate of growth had declined mar- 
ginally in recent years, the rapid expansion of the population 
continued to be a tremendous burden on the nation. With 82 per- 
cent of its people living in the countryside, Bangladesh was also 
one of the most rural nations in the Third World. The pace of 
urbanization in the late 1980s was slow, and urban areas lacked 
adequate amenities and services to absorb even those migrants who 
trekked from rural areas to the urban centers for food and employ- 
ment. Frequent natural disasters, such as coastal cyclones and 
floods, killed thousands, and widespread malnutrition and poor 
sanitation resulted in high mortality rates from a variety of diseases. 

In the late 1980s, poverty remained the most salient aspect of 
Bangladeshi society. Although the disparity in income between 
different segments of the society was not great, the incidence of 
poverty was widespread; the proportion of the population in extreme 
poverty — those unable to afford even enough food to live a reason- 
ably active life — rose from 43 percent in 1974 to 50 percent in the 
mid-1980s. The emerging political elite, which constituted a very 
narrow social class compared with the mass of peasants and urban 
poor, held the key to political power, controlled all institutions, 
and enjoyed the greatest economic gains. Urban in residence, fluent 
in English, and comfortable with Western culture, they were per- 
ceived by many observers as socially and culturally alienated from 
the masses. At the end of the 1980s, Bangladeshi society continued 
to be in transition — not only from the early days of independence 
but also from the colonial and Pakistani periods as well — as new 
values gradually replaced traditional ones. 

Nearly 83 percent Muslim, Bangladesh ranked third in Islamic 
population worldwide, following Indonesia and Pakistan. Sunni 
Islam was the dominant religion among Bangladeshis. Although 



45 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

loyalty to Islam was deeply rooted, in many cases beliefs and 
observances in rural areas tended to conflict with orthodox Islam. 
However, the country was remarkably free of sectarian strife. For 
most believers Islam was largely a matter of customary practice 
and mores. In the late twentieth century fundamentalists were show- 
ing some organizational strength, but in the late 1980s their num- 
bers and influence were believed to be limited. Promulgated in June 
1988, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution recognizes Islam 
as the state religion, but the full implications of this measure were 
not apparent in the months following its adoption. Hindus con- 
stituted the largest religious minority at 16 percent; other minori- 
ties included Buddhists and Christians. 

Since its birth in 1971, Bangladesh has suffered through both 
natural calamities and political upheavals. In July-September 1987, 
for example, the country experienced its worst floods in more than 
thirty years, and floods during the same period in 1988 were even 
more devastating. In 1987 more than US$250 million of the 
economic infrastructure was destroyed, the main rice crop was 
severely damaged, and an estimated 1,800 lives were lost. The 1988 
floods covered more than two- thirds of the country, and more than 
2,100 died from flooding and subsequent disease. The country also 
underwent a period of political unrest fomented by major oppo- 
sition political parties. Enduring uncertainties as the 1990s 
approached were bound to have an impact on social development, 
especially in the areas of education, development of the labor force, 
nutrition, and the building of infrastructure for adequate health 
care and population control. 

Geography 
The Land 

The physiography of Bangladesh is characterized by two distinc- 
tive features: a broad deltaic plain subject to frequent flooding, and 
a small hilly region crossed by swiftly flowing rivers. The country 
has an area of 144,000 square kilometers and extends 820 kilometers 
north to south and 600 kilometers east to west. Bangladesh is bor- 
dered on the west, north, and east by a 2,400-kilometer land frontier 
with India and, in the southeast, by a short land and water fron- 
tier (193 kilometers) with Burma. On the south is a highly irregu- 
lar deltaic coastline of about 600 kilometers, fissured by many rivers 
and streams flowing into the Bay of Bengal. The territorial waters 
of Bangladesh extend 12 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic 
zone of the country is 200 nautical miles. 



46 



The Society and Its Environment 



Roughly 80 percent of the landmass is made up of fertile allu- 
vial lowland called the Bangladesh Plain. The plain is part of the 
larger Plain of Bengal, which is sometimes called the Lower 
Gangetic Plain. Although altitudes up to 105 meters above sea level 
occur in the northern part of the plain, most elevations are less 
than 10 meters above sea level; elevations decrease in the coastal 
south, where the terrain is generally at sea level. With such 
low elevations and numerous rivers, water — and concomitant 
flooding — is a predominant physical feature. About 10,000 square 
kilometers of the total area of Bangladesh is covered with water, 
and larger areas are routinely flooded during the monsoon season 
(see Climate; River Systems, this ch.). 

The only exceptions to Bangladesh's low elevations are the 
Chittagong Hills in the southeast, the Low Hills of Sylhet in the 
northeast, and highlands in the north and northwest (see fig. 5). 
The Chittagong Hills constitute the only significant hill system in 
the country and, in effect, are the western fringe of the north- south 
mountain ranges of Burma and eastern India. The Chittagong Hills 
rise steeply to narrow ridge lines, generally no wider than 36 meters, 
600 to 900 meters above sea level. At 1,046 meters, the highest 
elevation in Bangladesh is found at Keokradong, in the southeastern 
part of the hills. Fertile valleys lie between the hill lines, which gen- 
erally run north-south. West of the Chittagong Hills is a broad plain, 
cut by rivers draining into the Bay of Bengal, that rises to a final 
chain of low coastal hills, mostly below 200 meters, that attain a 
maximum elevation of 350 meters. West of these hills is a narrow, 
wet coastal plain located between the cities of Chittagong in the 
north and Cox's Bazar in the south. 

About 67 percent of Bangladesh's nonurban land is arable. Per- 
manent crops cover only 2 percent, meadows and pastures cover 
4 percent, and forests and woodland cover about 16 percent. The 
country produces large quantities of quality timber, bamboo, and 
sugarcane. Bamboo grows in almost all areas, but high-quality tim- 
ber grows mostly in the highland valleys. Rubber planting in the 
hilly regions of the country was undertaken in the 1980s, and rub- 
ber extraction had started by the end of the decade. A variety of 
wild animals are found in the forest areas, such as in the Sundarbans 
on the southwest coast, which is the home of the world-famous Royal 
Bengal Tiger. The alluvial soils in the Bangladesh Plain are gen- 
erally fertile and are enriched with heavy silt deposits carried down- 
stream during the rainy season. 

Climate 

Bangladesh has a subtropical monsoon climate characterized by 
wide seasonal variations in rainfall, moderately warm temperatures, 



47 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



and high humidity. Regional climatic differences in this flat coun- 
try are minor. Three seasons are generally recognized: a hot, humid 
summer from March to June; a cool, rainy monsoon season from 
June to October; and a cool, dry winter from October to March. 
In general, maximum summer temperatures range between 32°C 
and 38°C. April is the warmest month in most parts of the coun- 
try. January is the coldest month, when the average temperature 
for most of the country is 10°C. 

Winds are mostly from the north and northwest in the winter, 
blowing gently at one to three kilometers per hour in northern and 
central areas and three to six kilometers per hour near the coast. 
From March to May, violent thunderstorms, called northwesters 
by local English speakers, produce winds of up to sixty kilometers 
per hour. During the intense storms of the early summer and late 
monsoon season, southerly winds of more than 160 kilometers per 
hour cause waves to crest as high as 6 meters in the Bay of Bengal, 
which brings disastrous flooding to coastal areas. 

Heavy rainfall is characteristic of Bangladesh. With the excep- 
tion of the relatively dry western region of Rajshahi, where the 
annual rainfall is about 160 centimeters, most parts of the country 
receive at least 200 centimeters of rainfall per year (see fig. 1). 
Because of its location just south of the foothills of the Himalayas, 
where monsoon winds turn west and northwest, the region of Sylhet 
in northeastern Bangladesh receives the greatest average precipi- 
tation. From 1977 to 1986, annual rainfall in that region ranged 
between 328 and 478 centimeters per year. Average daily humid- 
ity ranged from March lows of between 45 and 71 percent to July 
highs of between 84 and 92 percent, based on readings taken at 
selected stations nationwide in 1986 (see fig. 3; table 2, Appendix). 

About 80 percent of Bangladesh's rain falls during the monsoon 
season. The monsoons result from the contrasts between low and 
high air pressure areas that result from differential heating of land 
and water. During the hot months of April and May hot air rises 
over the Indian subcontinent, creating low-pressure areas into which 
rush cooler, moisture-bearing winds from the Indian Ocean. This 
is the southwest monsoon, commencing in June and usually last- 
ing through September. Dividing against the Indian landmass, the 
monsoon flows in two branches, one of which strikes western India. 
The other travels up the Bay of Bengal and over eastern India and 
Bangladesh, crossing the plain to the north and northeast before 
being turned to the west and northwest by the foothills of the 
Himalayas (see fig. 4). 

Natural calamities, such as floods, tropical cyclones, tornadoes, 
and tidal bores — destructive waves or floods caused by flood tides 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



rushing up estuaries — ravage the country, particularly the coastal 
belt, almost every year. Between 1947 and 1988, thirteen severe 
cyclones hit Bangladesh, causing enormous loss of life and property. 
In May 1985, for example, a severe cyclonic storm packing 154 
kilorneter-per-hour winds and waves 4 meters high swept into 
southeastern and southern Bangladesh, killing more than 11,000 
persons, damaging more than 94,000 houses, killing some 135,000 
head of livestock, and damaging nearly 400 kilometers of critically 
needed embankments. Annual monsoon flooding results in the loss 
of human life, damage to property and communication systems, 
and a shortage of drinking water, which leads to the spread of dis- 
ease. For example, in 1988 two-thirds of Bangladesh's sixty-four 
districts experienced extensive flood damage in the wake of 
unusually heavy rains that flooded the river systems. Millions were 
left homeless and without potable water. Half of Dhaka, includ- 
ing the runways at the Zia International Airport — an important 
transit point for disaster relief supplies — was flooded. About 2 mil- 
lion tons of crops were reported destroyed, and relief work was ren- 
dered even more challenging than usual because the flood made 
transportation of any kind exceedingly difficult. 

There are no precautions against cyclones and tidal bores except 
giving advance warning and providing safe public buildings where 
people may take shelter. Adequate infrastructure and air transport 
facilities that would ease the sufferings of the affected people had 
not been established by the late 1980s. Efforts by the government 
under the Third Five-Year Plan (1985-90) were directed toward 
accurate and timely forecast capability through agrometeorology, 
marine meteorology, oceanography, hydrometeorology, and seis- 
mology. Necessary expert services, equipment, and training facili- 
ties were expected to be developed under the United Nations 
Development Programme (see Foreign Assistance, ch. 3). 

River Systems 

The rivers of Bangladesh mark both the physiography of the 
nation and the life of the people. About 700 in number, these rivers 
generally flow south. The larger rivers serve as the main source 
of water for cultivation and as the principal arteries of commercial 
transportation. Rivers also provide fish, an important source of 
protein. Flooding of the rivers during the monsoon season causes 
enormous hardship and hinders development, but fresh deposits 
of rich silt replenish the fertile but overworked soil. The rivers also 
drain excess monsoon rainfall into the Bay of Bengal. Thus, the 
great river system is at the same time the country's principal 
resource and its greatest hazard. 



49 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



TEMPERATURE 

c Celsius 
r 38 




J FMAMJ JASOND 



Figure 3. Typical Rainfall, Temperature, and Pressure at Dhaka 

The profusion of rivers can be divided into five major networks 
(see fig. 5). The Jamuna-Brahmaputra is 292 kilometers long and 
extends from northern Bangladesh to its confluence with the Padma. 
Originating as the Yarlung Zangbo Jiang in China's Xizang 
Autonomous Region (Tibet) and flowing through India's state of 
Arunachal Pradesh, where it becomes known as the Brahmaputra 
("Son of Brahma"), it receives waters from five major tributaries 
that total some 740 kilometers in length. At the point where the 
Brahmaputra meets the Tista River in Bangladesh, it becomes 
known as the Jamuna. The Jamuna is notorious for its shifting sub- 
channels and for the formation of fertile silt islands {chars). No per- 
manent settlements can exist along its banks. 

The second system is the Padma-Ganges, which is divided into 
two sections: a 258-kilometer segment, the Ganges, which extends 
from the western border with India to its confluence with the 
Jamuna some 72 kilometers west of Dhaka, and a 126-kilometer 
segment, the Padma, which runs from the Ganges-Jamuna con- 
fluence to where it joins the Meghna River at Chandpur. The 



50 



The Society and Its Environment 



Padma-Ganges is the central part of a deltaic river system with 
hundreds of rivers and streams — some 2,100 kilometers in length — 
flowing generally east or west into the Padma. 

The third network is the Surma-Meghna system, which courses 
from the northeastern border with India to Chandpur, where it 
joins the Padma. The Surma-Meghna, at 669 kilometers by itself 
the longest river in Bangladesh, is formed by the union of six lesser 
rivers. Below the city of Kalipur it is known as the Meghna. When 
the Padma and Meghna join together, they form the fourth river 
system — the Padma-Meghna — which flows 145 kilometers to the 
Bay of Bengal. 

This mighty network of four river systems flowing through the 
Bangladesh Plain drains an area of some 1.5 million square kilo- 
meters. The numerous channels of the Padma-Meghna, its dis- 
tributaries, and smaller parallel rivers that flow into the Bay of 
Bengal are referred to as the Mouths of the Ganges. Like the 
Jamuna, the Padma-Meghna and other estuaries on the Bay of 
Bengal are also known for their many chars. 

A fifth river system, unconnected to the other four, is the 
Karnaphuli. Flowing through the region of Chittagong and the 
Chittagong Hills, it cuts across the hills and runs rapidly downhill 
to the west and southwest and then to the sea. The Feni, 
Karnaphuli, Sangu, and Matamuhari — an aggregate of some 420 
kilometers — are the main rivers in the region. The port of 
Chittagong is situated on the banks of the Karnaphuli. The Kar- 
naphuli Reservoir and Karnaphuli Dam are located in this area. 
The dam impounds the Karnaphuli River's waters in the reser- 
voir for the generation of hydroelectric power (see Technological 
Advances, ch. 3). 

During the annual monsoon period, the rivers of Bangladesh 
flow at about 140,000 cubic meters per second, but during the dry 
period they diminish to 7,000 cubic meters per second. Because 
water is so vital to agriculture, more than 60 percent of the net 
arable land, some 9.1 million hectares, is cultivated in the rainy 
season despite the possibility of severe flooding, and nearly 40 per- 
cent of the land is cultivated during the dry winter months. Water 
resources development has responded to this "dual water regime" 
by providing flood protection, drainage to prevent overflooding 
and waterlogging, and irrigation facilities for the expansion of winter 
cultivation. Major water control projects have been developed by 
the national government to provide irrigation, flood control, 
drainage facilities, aids to river navigation and road construction, 
and hydroelectric power. In addition, thousands of tube wells and 
electric pumps are used for local irrigation. Despite severe resource 



51 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Rangpur 



Cyclone 
storm track 



National capital r f 

Populated place 

FLOOD-VULNERABLE AREAS 





Overland flow and 
local rainfall 










Tidal inundation 





Area protected 
by embankment 



Flood-free 
area 



20 40 60 Kilometers 

20 40 60 Miles 



Mymensingh 



Sylhet 



/ 



j)£nges LI 



Faridpur 



A 



s 



/ 



/ 

1970 / 



I Bay //of f <Bengatf 

t ft t / 

f 1960^ 960^ 1963 / 1965 



W Xfirn 



: -rnaptiufi 
ervoir 



hittagong 



t 



Source: Based on information from M. Aminul Islam, et al. (eds.), 
Maps, Dhaka, 1981, 14, 17. 



adesh 



Figure 4. Flood and Cyclone Vulnerability, 1960-80 



52 



The Society and Its Environment 



constraints, the government of Bangladesh has made it a policy 
to try to bring additional areas under irrigation without salinity 
intrusion (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

Water resources management, including gravity flow irrigation, 
flood control, and drainage, were largely the responsibility of the 
Bangladesh Water Development Board. Other public sector insti- 
tutions, such as the Bangladesh Krishi Bank, the Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board, the Bangladesh Bank, and the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Development Corporation were also responsible for 
promotion and development of minor irrigation works in the private 
sector through government credit mechanisms (see Money and 
Banking, ch. 3). 

Population 

Population Structure and Settlement Patterns 

In the 1980s, Bangladesh faced no greater problem than popu- 
lation growth. Census data compiled in 1901 indicated a total of 
29 million in East Bengal (see Glossary), the region that became 
East Pakistan and eventually Bangladesh. By 1951 , four years after 
partition from India, East Pakistan had 44 million people, a num- 
ber that grew rapidly up to the first postindependence census, taken 
in 1974, which reported the national population at 71 million. The 
1981 census reported a population of 87 million and a 2.3 percent 
annual growth rate (see Population Control, this ch.). Thus, in 
just 80 years, the population had tripled. In July 1988 the popula- 
tion, by then the eighth largest in the world, stood at 109,963,551, 
and the average annual growth rate was 2.6 percent. According 
to official estimates, Bangladesh was expected to reach a popula- 
tion of more than 140 million by the year 2000. 

Bangladesh's population density provided further evidence of 
the problems the nation faced. In 1901 an average of 216 persons 
inhabited one square kilometer. By 1951 that number had increased 
to 312 per square kilometer and, in 1988, reached 821 . By the year 
2000, population density was projected to exceed 1,000 persons 
per square kilometer (see fig. 6; table 3; table 4, Appendix). 

The crude birth rate per 1,000 population was 34.6 in 1981. This 
rate remained unchanged in 1985, following a 20-year trend of 
decline since 1961, when it had stood at 47 per 1,000. The rural 
birth rate was higher than birth rates in urban areas; in 1985 there 
were 36.3 births per 1,000 in the countryside versus 28 per 1,000 
in urban areas. The crude death rate per 1 ,000 population decreased 
from 40.7 in 1951 to 12 per 1,000 in 1985; the urban crude death 



53 




Figure 5. Topography and Drainage, 1988 
54 



The Society and Its Environment 



rate was 8.3, and the rural crude death rate was 12.9. The infant 
mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 111.9 in 1985, a distinct 
improvement from as recently as 1982, when the rate was 121.9. 
Life expectancy at birth was estimated at 55.1 years in 1986. Men 
and women have very similar life expectancies at 55.4 and 55, 
respectively. With an average life expectancy of 58.8 years, urban 
dwellers in 1986 were likely to live longer than their rural counter- 
parts (average life expectancy 54.8 years). The sex ratio of the popu- 
lation in 1981 was 106 males to 100 females (see fig. 7; table 5, 
Appendix). 

In the late 1980s, about 82 percent of the population of Ban- 
gladesh (a total of 15.1 million households) resided in rural areas. 
With the exception of parts of Sylhet and Rangamati regions, where 
settlements occurred in nucleated or clustered patterns, the villages 
were scattered collections of homesteads surrounded by trees. Con- 
tinuous strings of settlements along the roadside were also com- 
mon in the southeastern part of the country. 

Until the 1980s, Bangladesh was the most rural nation in South 
Asia. In 1931 only 27 out of every 1,000 persons were urban 
dwellers in what is now Bangladesh. In 1931 Bangladesh had fifty 
towns; by 1951 the country had eighty-nine towns, cities, and 
municipalities. During the 1980s, industrial development began 
to have a small effect on urbanization. The 1974 census had put 
the urban population of Bangladesh at 8.8 percent of the total; by 
1988 that proportion had reached 18 percent and was projected 
to rise to 30 percent by the year 2000. 

In 1981 only two cities, Dhaka and Chittagong, had more than 
1 million residents. Seven other cities — Narayanganj, Khulna, 
Barisal, Saidpur, Rajshahi, Mymensingh, and Comilla — each had 
more than 100,000 people. Of all the expanding cities, Dhaka, the 
national capital and the principal seat of culture, had made the 
most gains in population, growing from 335,928 in 1951 to 3.4 
million in 1981. In the same period, Chittagong had grown from 
289,981 to 1.4 million. A majority of the other urban areas each 
had between 20,000 and 50,000 people. These relatively small cities 
had grown up in most cases as administrative centers and geographi- 
cally suitable localities for inland transportation and commercial 
facilities. There was no particular concentration of towns in any 
part of the country. In fact, the only large cities close to each other 
were Dhaka and Narayanganj. 

Migration 

Although Bangladesh has absorbed several waves of immigrants 
since the onset of the twentieth century, the overall trend has been 



55 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 




56 



The Society and Its Environment 



a steady emigration of people driven out by political and economic 
problems. Following the partition of British India in 1947, more 
than 3 million Hindus may have migrated from East Pakistan; dur- 
ing the same period some 864,000 Muslim refugees immigrated 
to East Pakistan from India. The operation of the Pakistani mili- 
tary in East Pakistan in 1971 caused an estimated 8 to 10 million 
refugees to cross the border into India in one of the great mass 
movements of modern times (see Birth of Bangladesh, ch. 1). After 
the independence of Bangladesh, most of these refugees returned, 
although an undetermined number remained in India. After 
independence, Bangladesh received some 100,000 stranded Ban- 
gladeshis from former West Pakistan. About 600,000 non-Bengali 
Muslims, known as Biharis, who had declared their allegiance to 
Pakistan during the 1971 war, continued to reside in Bangladesh. 

It has been reported that, beginning in 1974, thousands of Ban- 
gladeshis moved to the Indian state of Assam, and, in the 1980s, 
some tribal groups from the Chittagong Hills crossed into the Indian 
state of Tripura for political reasons, contributing to bilateral 
problems with India (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4; Insurgency in the 
Chittagong Hills, ch. 5). Bangladeshis also migrated to the Middle 
East and other regions, where a large number of skilled and 
unskilled persons found work (see table 6, Appendix; Export Sec- 
tors, ch. 3). Bangladesh also lost some highly skilled members of 
the work force to Western Europe and North America. 

Internal migration indicated several recognizable trends. Because 
of increasing population pressure, people in the 1980s were mov- 
ing into areas of relatively light habitation in the Chittagong Hills 
and in parts of the Sundarbans previously considered marginally 
habitable. Agrarian distress caused some movement to urban areas, 
especially Dhaka. Because of the inhospitable urban environment 
and the lack of jobs, many newcomers returned at least tempo- 
rarily to their villages, especially during the harvest season. 
Unemployment, however, was even higher in the countryside and 
was a long-term national problem in the mid-1980s (see table 7, 
Appendix). 

Population Control 

Bangladesh's working-age population was increasing almost 1.5 
million per year in the 1980s. This rate of population growth kept 
the people poor and the country dependent on foreign aid. Popu- 
lation control and family planning, therefore, were a top priority 
of the government and social workers. 

In the mid-1980s, there were indications that government 
and nongovernment agency efforts were beginning to pay off. 



57 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 

70 and over 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 































L~ 


□ 








MALES 






FEMALES 




















I 


I 












I 










I 


I 




















































I 


I 




! 








b 



















7500 5000 2500 2500 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



5000 



7500 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, 
Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of 
Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 40-41. 



Figure 7. Age-Sex Distribution, 1981 Census 



Population growth had declined from 3 percent to 2.3 percent 
between 1961 and 1981. Contraceptive practices increased from 
12.7 percent of eligible couples in 1979 to 25 percent in mid-1985. 
Of the methods available, sterilization was the most commonly 
sought in government plans through fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 
1990. A continuous demographic survey also showed a decline in 
fertility rates and an increase in the female marriage age. But under- 
cutting this progress was the uneven application of the family plan- 
ning program in rural areas, which constituted the most populous 
sections of the nation. 

In 1985 there were reported only 3,716 family planning facili- 
ties in the country and a total of 15,619 family planning person- 
nel, of whom 4,086 were male in a country where the females were 
traditionally reserved when discussing sexual matters with men. 
Even when they were physicians, men were reluctant to discuss 
sexual matters with women. From 1980 to 1985, only about 55 
percent of national family planning goals were achieved. 

Ethnicity and Linguistic Diversity 

Bangladesh is noted for the ethnic homogeneity of its popula- 
tion. Over 98 percent of the people are Bengalis, predominantly 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



Bangla-speaking peoples. People speaking Arabic, Persian, and 
Turkic languages also have contributed to the ethnic characteris- 
tics of the region. 

A member of the Indo-European family of languages, Bangla 
(sometimes called Bengali) is the official language of Bangladesh. 
Bangladeshis closely identify themselves with their national lan- 
guage. Bangla has a rich cultural heritage in literature, music, and 
poetry, and at least two Bengali poets are well known in the West: 
Rabindranath Tagore, a Hindu and a Nobel laureate; and Kazi 
Nazrul Islam, a Muslim known as the "voice of Bengali national- 
ism and independence." Bangla has been enriched by several 
regional dialects. The dialects of Sylhet, Chittagong, and Noakhali 
have been strongly marked by Arab-Persian influences. English, 
whose cultural influence seemed to have crested by the late 1980s, 
remained nonetheless an important language in Bangladesh. 

Biharis, a group that included Urdu-speaking non-Bengali 
Muslim refugees from Bihar and other parts of northern India, 
numbered about 1 million in 1971 but had decreased to around 
600,000 by the late 1980s. They once dominated the upper levels 
of Bengali society. Many also held jobs on the railroads and in heavy 
industry. As such they stood to lose from Bangladesh independence 
and sided with Pakistan during the 1971 war. Hundreds of thou- 
sands of Biharis were repatriated to Pakistan after the war. 

Bangladesh's tribal population consisted of 897,828 persons, just 
over 1 percent of the total population, at the time of the 1981 cen- 
sus. They lived primarily in the Chittagong Hills and in the regions 
of Mymensingh, Sylhet, and Rajshahi. The majority of the tribal 
population (778,425) lived in rural settings, where many practiced 
shifting cultivation. Most tribal people were of Sino-Tibetan descent 
and had distinctive Mongoloid features. They differed in their social 
organization, marriage customs, birth and death rites, food, and 
other social customs from the people of the rest of the country. They 
spoke Tibeto-Burman languages. In the mid-1980s, the percent- 
age distribution of tribal population by religion was Hindu 24, 
Buddhist 44, Christian 13, and others 19. 

The four largest tribes were the Chakmas, Marmas (or Maghs), 
Tipperas (or Tipras), and Mros (or Moorangs). The tribes tended 
to intermingle and could be distinguished from one another more 
by differences in their dialect, dress, and customs than by tribal 
cohesion. Only the Chakmas and Marmas displayed formal tribal 
organization, although all groups contained distinct clans. By 
far the largest tribe, the Chakmas were of mixed origin but reflected 
more Bengali influence than any other tribe. Unlike the other 
tribes, the Chakmas and Marmas generally lived in the highland 



59 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



valleys. Most Chakmas were Buddhists, but some practiced 
Hinduism or animism. 

Of Burmese ancestry, the Marmas regarded Burma as the center 
of their cultural life. Members of the Marma tribe disliked the more 
widely used term maghs, which had come to mean pirates. Although 
several religions, including Islam, were represented among the 
Marmas, nearly all of the Marmas were Buddhists (see Buddhism, 
this ch.). 

The Tipperas were nearly all Hindus and accounted for virtually 
the entire Hindu population of the Chittagong Hills. They had 
migrated gradually from the northern Chittagong Hills. The 
northern Tipperas were influenced by Bengali culture. A small 
southern section known as the Mrungs showed considerably less 
Bengali influence. 

The Mros, considered the original inhabitants of the Chittagong 
Hills, lived on hilltops and often fortified their villages. They had 
no written language of their own, but some could read the Burmese 
and Bangla scripts. Most of them claimed to be Buddhists, but their 
religious practices were largely animistic. 

Tribal groups in other parts of the country included Santals in 
Rajshahi and Dinajpur, and Khasis, Garos, and Khajons in 
Mymensingh and Sylhet regions. Primarily poor peasants, these 
people all belonged to groups in the adjoining tribal areas of India. 

Social System 

Transition to a New Social Order 

Bangladesh did not exist as a distinct geographic and ethnic unity 
until independence. The region had been a part of successive Indian 
empires, and during the British period it formed the eastern part 
of a hinterland of Bengal, which was dominated by the British rulers 
and Hindu professional, commercial, and landed elites. After the 
establishment of Pakistan in 1947, present-day Bangladesh came 
under the hegemony of the non-Bengali Muslim elites of the West 
Wing of Pakistan. The establishment of Bangladesh, therefore, 
implied the formation of both a new nation and a new social order. 

Until the partition of British India in 1947, Hindus controlled 
about 80 percent of all large rural holdings, urban real estate, and 
government jobs in East Bengal and dominated finance, commerce, 
and the professions. Following partition, a massive flight of East 
Bengali Hindus effectively removed the Hindu economic and 
political elite and cut the territory's ties to Calcutta (see Pakistan 
Period, 1947-71, ch. 1). After the emigration of the Hindus, 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



Muslims moved quickly into the vacated positions, creating for the 
first time in East Bengal an economy and government predomi- 
nantly in Muslim hands. These vastly increased opportunities, 
especially in the civil service and the professions, however, soon 
came to be dominated by a West Pakistani-based elite whose mem- 
bers were favored by the government both directly and indirectly. 
Soon after independence in 1971, an ill-prepared Bangladeshi elite 
moved into the areas vacated by West Pakistanis. Except for mem- 
bers of small non-Bengali caste-like Muslim groups known as "trad- 
ing communities," Bangladeshi Muslims almost immediately 
established control over all small- and medium-sized industrial and 
commercial enterprises. The 1972 nationalization of non-Bengali- 
owned large industries accelerated the establishment of control and 
influence by the indigenous community (see The Economic Con- 
text, ch. 3). 

The sudden rise of a new managerial class and the expansion 
of the civil and military bureaucracy upset the balance in both the 
urban and the rural sectors. Party affiliation, political contacts, and 
documented revolutionary service became the main prerequisites 
for admission to the rapidly growing new elite of political and indus- 
trial functionaries; the established middle class and its values played 
lesser roles. In the countryside, new elites with links to the villages 
bought property to establish their socio-political control. Also tak- 
ing advantage of the situation, the rural political elite amassed for- 
tunes in land- and rural-based enterprises. The result was the 
growth of a new, land-based, rural elite that replaced many formerly 
entrenched wealthy peasants (in Bangla, jotedars). 

Rural Society 

The basic social unit in a village is the family (paribar or gushti), 
generally consisting of a complete or incomplete patrilineally 
extended household (chula) and residing in a homestead (pari). The 
individual nuclear family often is submerged in the larger unit and 
might be known as the house (ghar). Above the bari level, patrilineal 
kin ties are linked into sequentially larger groups based on real, 
fictional, or assumed relationships. 

A significant unit larger than that of close kin is the voluntary 
religious and mutual benefit association known as the "the society" 
(samaj or millat). Among the functions of a samaj might be the main- 
tenance of a mosque and support of a mullah. An informal coun- 
cil of samaj elders (matabdars or sardars) settles village disputes. 
Factional competition between the matabdars is a major dynamic 
of social and political interaction (see Dominance of Local Elites, 
ch. 4). 



61 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Groups of homes in a village are called paras, and each para has 
its own name. Several paras constitute a mauza, the basic revenue 
and census survey unit. The traditional character of rural villages 
was changing in the latter half of the twentieth century with the 
addition of brick structures of one or more stories scattered among 
the more common thatched bamboo huts. 

Although farming has traditionally ranked among the most 
desirable occupations, villagers in the 1980s began to encourage 
their children to leave the increasingly overcrowded countryside 
to seek more secure employment in the towns. Traditional sources 
of prestige, such as landholding, distinguished lineage, and reli- 
gious piety were beginning to be replaced by modern education, 
higher income, and steadier work. These changes, however, did 
not prevent rural poverty from increasing greatly. According to 
the FY 1986 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Planning's Bureau of Statistics, 47 percent of the rural 
population was below the poverty line, with about 62 percent of 
the poor remaining in extreme poverty. The number of landless 
rural laborers also increased substantially, from 25 percent in 1970 
to 40 percent in 1987. 

Urban Society 

In 1988 about 18 percent of the population lived in urban areas, 
most of which were villages or trade centers in rural areas. Urban 
centers grew in number and population during the 1980s as a result 
of an administrative decentralization program that featured the crea- 
tion of subdistricts {upazilas — see Glossary; Local Administration, 
ch. 4). In appearance these small urban areas were generally 
shabby. Most of the urban population merely congregated in ram- 
shackle structures with poor sanitation and an almost total lack of 
modern amenities. Towns were populated mostly by government 
functionaries, merchants, and other business personnel. Most dwell- 
ings contained nuclear families and some extended family lodgers. 
A few households or a neighborhood would constitute a. para, which 
might develop some cohesiveness but would have no formal leader- 
ship structure. With the exception of a small number of transients, 
most town populations consisted of permanent inhabitants who 
maintained connections with their ancestral villages through prop- 
erty or family ties. Most towns had social and sporting clubs and 
libraries. Unlike in the rural areas, kinship ties among the town 
population were limited and fragile. 

Family, Household, and Kinship 

Family and kinship were the core of social life in Bangladesh. 
A family group residing in a bari would function as the basic unit 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



of economic endeavor, landholding, and social identity. In the eyes 
of rural people, the chula defined the effective household — an 
extended family exploiting jointly held property and being fed from 
a jointly operated kitchen. A bari might consist of one or more such 
functional households, depending on the circumstances of family 
relationship. Married sons generally lived in their parents' house- 
hold during the father's lifetime. Although sons usually built 
separate houses for their nuclear families, they remained under their 
fathers' authority, and wives under their mothers-in-law's authority. 
The death of the father usually precipitated the separation of adult 
brothers into their own households. Such a split generally caused 
little change in the physical layout of the bari, however. Families 
at different stages of the cycle would display different configura- 
tions of household membership. 

Patrilineal ties dominated the ideology of family life, but in prac- 
tice matrilineal ties were almost as important. Married women 
provided especially important links between their husbands' 
brothers' families. Brothers and sisters often visited their brothers' 
households, which were in fact the households of their deceased 
fathers. By Islamic law, women inherited a share of their fathers' 
property and thus retained a claim on the often scanty fields worked 
by their brothers. By not exercising this claim, however, they did 
their brothers the important service of keeping the family lands 
in the patrilineal line and thus ensured themselves a warm wel- 
come and permanent place in their brothers' homes. 

Marriage is a civil contract rather than a religious sacrament 
in Islam, and the parties to the contract represent the interests of 
families rather than the direct personal interests of the prospective 
spouses (see Islam, this ch.). In Bangladesh, parents ordinarily select 
spouses for their children, although men frequently exercise some 
influence over the choice of their spouses. In middle-class urban 
families men negotiate their own marriages. Only in the most 
sophisticated elite class does a woman participate in her own mar- 
riage arrangements. Marriage generally is made between families 
of similar social standing, although a woman might properly marry 
a man of somewhat higher status. Financial standing came to out- 
weigh family background in the late twentieth century in any case. 
Often a person with a good job in a Middle Eastern country was 
preferred over a person of highly regarded lineage. 

Marriages are often preceded by extensive negotiations between 
the families of the prospective bride and groom. One of the func- 
tions of the marriage negotiations is to reduce any discrepancy in 
status through financial arrangements. The groom's family ordi- 
narily pledges the traditional cash payment, or bride-price, part 



63 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

or all of which can be deferred to fall due in case of divorce initi- 
ated by the husband or in case the contract is otherwise broken. 
As in many Muslim countries, the cash payment system provides 
women some protection against the summary divorce permitted 
by Islam. Some families also adopt the Hindu custom of provid- 
ing a dowry for the bride. 

Of the total population in 1981, an estimated 34 million were 
married. A total of 19 million citizens of marriageable age were 
single or had never married, 3 million were widowed, and 322,000 
were divorced. Although the majority of married men (10 million) 
had only one wife, there were about 580,000 households, between 
6 and 10 percent of all marriages, in which a man had two or more 
wives. 

Although the age at marriage appeared to be rising in the 1980s, 
early marriage remained the rule even among the educated, and 
especially among women. The mean age at marriage in 1981 for 
males was 23.9, and for females 16.7. Women students frequently 
married in their late teens and continued their studies in the house- 
holds of their fathers-in-law. Divorce, especially of young couples 
without children, was becoming increasingly common in Ban- 
gladesh, with approximately one in six marriages ending in this 
fashion in the 1980s. 

Typical spouses knew each other only slightly, if at all, before 
marriage. Although marriages between cousins and other more dis- 
tant kin occurred frequently, segregation of the sexes generally kept 
young men and women of different households from knowing each 
other well. Marriage functioned to ensure the continuity of fami- 
lies rather than to provide companionship to individuals, and the 
new bride's relationship with her mother-in-law was probably more 
important to her well-being than her frequently impersonal rela- 
tionship with her husband. 

A woman began to gain respect and security in her husband's 
or father-in-law's household only after giving birth to a son. Mothers 
therefore cherished and indulged their sons, while daughters were 
frequently more strictly disciplined and were assigned heavy house- 
hold chores from an early age. In many families the closest, most 
intimate, and most enduring emotional relationship was that 
between mother and son. The father was a more distant figure, 
worthy of formal respect, and the son's wife might remain a vir- 
tual stranger for a long time after marriage. 

The practice of purdah (the traditional seclusion of women) varied 
widely according to social milieu, but even in relatively sophisti- 
cated urban circles the core of the institution, the segregation of 
the sexes, persisted. In traditional circles, full purdah required the 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



complete seclusion of women from the onset of puberty. Within 
the home, women inhabited private quarters that only male rela- 
tives or servants could enter, and a woman properly avoided or 
treated with formal respect even her father-in-law or her husband's 
older brother. Outside the home, a woman in purdah wore a veil 
or an enveloping, concealing outer garment. 

The trappings of full purdah required both a devotion to tradi- 
tional practice and the means to dispense with the labor of women 
in the fields. For most rural families the importance of women's 
labor made full seclusion impossible, although the idea remained. 
In some areas, for example, women went unveiled within the con- 
fines of the para or village but donned the veil or the outer gar- 
ment for trips farther from the community. In any case, contact 
with men outside the immediate family was avoided. 

The segregation of the sexes extended into social groups that had 
rejected full purdah as a result of modern education. Although 
urban women could enjoy more physical freedom than was tradi- 
tional and the opportunity to pursue a professional career, they 
moved in a different social world from their husbands and often 
worked at their professions in a specifically feminine milieu. 

Women's Role in Society 

Available data on health, nutrition, education, and economic 
performance indicated that in the 1980s the status of women in 
Bangladesh remained considerably inferior to that of men. Women, 
in custom and practice, remained subordinate to men in almost 
all aspects of their lives; greater autonomy was the privilege of the 
rich or the necessity of the very poor. Most women's lives remained 
centered on their traditional roles, and they had limited access to 
markets, productive services, education, health care, and local 
government. This lack of opportunities contributed to high fertility 
patterns, which diminished family well-being, contributed to the 
malnourishment and generally poor health of children, and frus- 
trated educational and other national development goals. In fact, 
acute poverty at the margin appeared to be hitting hardest at 
women. As long as women's access to health care, education, and 
training remained limited, prospects for improved productivity 
among the female population remained poor. 

About 82 percent of women lived in rural areas in the late 1980s. 
The majority of rural women, perhaps 70 percent, were in small 
cultivator, tenant, and landless households; many worked as 
laborers part time or seasonally, usually in post-harvest activities, 
and received payment in kind or in meager cash wages. Another 
20 percent, mostly in poor landless households, depended on casual 



65 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

labor, gleaning, begging, and other irregular sources of income; 
typically, their income was essential to household survival. The 
remaining 10 percent of women were in households mainly in the 
professional, trading, or large-scale landowning categories, and they 
usually did not work outside the home. 

The economic contribution of women was substantial but largely 
unacknowledged. Women in rural areas were responsible for most 
of the post-harvest work, which was done in the chula, and for keep- 
ing livestock, poultry, and small gardens. Women in cities relied 
on domestic and traditional jobs, but in the 1980s they increas- 
ingly worked in manufacturing jobs, especially in the ready-made 
garment industry (see Ready-made Garments, ch. 3). Those with 
more education worked in government, health care, and teaching, 
but their numbers remained very small. Continuing high rates of 
population growth and the declining availability of work based in 
the chula meant that more women sought employment outside the 
home. Accordingly, the female labor force participation rate doubled 
between 1974 and 1984, when it reached nearly 8 percent. Female 
wage rates in the 1980s were low, typically ranging between 20 
and 30 percent of male wage rates. 

Social Classes and Stratification 

Society in Bangladesh in the 1980s, with the exception of the 
Hindu caste system, was not rigidly stratified; rather, it was open, 
fluid, and diffused, without a cohesive social organization and social 
structure (see Hinduism, this ch.). Social class distinctions were 
mostly functional, however, and there was considerable mobility 
among classes. Even the structure of the Hindu caste system in 
Bangladesh was relatively loose because most Hindus belonged to 
the lower castes. 

Ostensibly, egalitarian principles of Islam were the basis of social 
organization. Unlike in other regions of South Asia, the Hindu 
caste-based social system had a very limited effect on Bangladeshi 
Muslim social culture. Even the low-caste jolhas (weavers) had 
improved their social standing since 1971. Although several hier- 
archically arranged groups — such as the syeds (noble born) and the 
sheikhs, or shaykhs (also noble born) — were noticeable in Bangladesh 
Muslim society, there were no impenetrable hereditary social dis- 
tinctions. Rather, fairly permeable classes based on wealth and 
political influence existed both in the cities and in the villages. 

Traditional Muslim class distinctions had little importance in 
Bangladesh. The proscription against marriage between individuals 
of high-born and low-born families, once an indicator of the social 
gap between the two groups, had long ago disappeared; most 



66 




67 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

matrimonial alliances were based on wealth and power and not 
on the ties of family distinction. Also, many so-called upper class 
families, because of their traditional use of the Urdu language, had 
become alienated in independent Bangladesh. 

Although Hindu society is formally stratified into caste categories, 
caste did not figure prominently in the Bangladeshi Hindu com- 
munity. About 75 percent of the Hindus in Bangladesh belonged 
to the lower castes, notably namasudras (lesser cultivators), and the 
remainder belonged primarily to outcaste or untouchable groups. 
Some members of higher castes belonged to the middle or profes- 
sional class, but there was no Hindu upper class. With the increasing 
participation of the Hindus in nontraditional professional mobility, 
the castes were able to interact in wider political and socioeconomic 
arenas, which caused some erosion of caste consciousness. Although 
there is no mobility between Hindu castes, caste distinctions did 
not play as important a role in Bangladesh as in they did in the 
Hindu-dominated Indian state of West Bengal. Bangladeshi Hindus 
seemed to have become part of the mainstream culture without sur- 
rendering their religious and cultural distinctions. 

Religion 

Religion and Society 

Nearly 83 percent of the population of Bangladesh claimed Islam 
as its religion in the 1980s, giving the country one of the largest 
concentrations of Muslims in the world. Although initially Ban- 
gladesh opted for a secular nationalist ideology as embodied in its 
Constitution, the principle of secularism was subsequently replaced 
by a commitment to the Islamic way of life through a series of con- 
stitutional amendments and government proclamations between 
1977 and 1988 (see Constitution, ch. 4). In spite of a history of 
religious strife, Bangladeshi Muslims tended to be accommodat- 
ing toward adherents of other religions. The Muslim community 
in the Bengal region developed independent of the dominant Islamic 
trends in India. The preservation of pre-Islamic cultural elements 
from Buddhist and Hindu periods made the commitment to Islam 
uniquely Bangladeshi. Features of Bangladeshi Hinduism, which 
differed in some respects from Hinduism in other parts of South 
Asia, influenced both the practices and the social structure of the 
Bangladeshi Muslim community (see table 8, Appendix). 

In spite of the general personal commitment to Islam by the 
Muslims of Bangladesh, observance of Islamic rituals and tenets 
varies according to social position, locale, and personal considera- 
tions. In rural regions, some beliefs and practices tend to incorporate 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



elements that differ from and often conflict with orthodox Islam. 
Islamic fundamentalists, although a rather limited force in the past, 
had begun to gain a following, especially among the educated urban 
youth, by the 1980s. 

Estimated to make up 18.5 percent of East Pakistan's popula- 
tion in 1961, the Hindu proportion of the population had shrunk 
to about 13.5 percent by 1971. Steady Hindu emigration to India 
and Burma throughout the 1960s accounted for most of the decline. 
Although the Hindu population increased in size after 1971 and 
had reached 10.6 million by 1981, its relative proportion of the 
total population continued to decrease. In 1987 Hindus represented 
nearly 16 percent of the population. Other minority religious groups 
counted in the 1981 census included approximately 538,000 Bud- 
dhists, about 275,000 Christians, and nearly 250,00 categorized 
as "others," probably members of tribal religions. 

Islam 

Tenets of Islam 

In the Arabian town of Mecca in A.D. 610, the Prophet 
Muhammad preached the first of a series of divine revelations. 
Muhammad, an uncompromising monotheist, made himself 
unpopular with his fellow Meccans, who benefitted from the town's 
thriving pilgrimage business and numerous polytheist religious sites. 
Censured by Mecca's leaders, in 622 Muhammad and a group of 
his followers were invited to the town of Yathrib, which came to 
be known as Medina (from Madinat an Nabi, meaning the 
Prophet's City), and made it the center of their activities. This 
move, or hijra, marked the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam 
as a historical force. The Muslim calendar, based on a 354-day 
lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to 
preach, eventually defeating his opponents in battle and consoli- 
dating the temporal and spiritual leadership of Arabia before his 
death in 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his divinely 
inspired speeches in the Quran, the scripture of Islam. Other say- 
ings and teachings of Muhammad and the examples of his per- 
sonal behavior became the hadith. Together they form the Muslim's 
comprehensive guide to spiritual, ethical, and social living. 

The shahadah, or testimony, succinctly states the central belief 
of Islam: "There is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is 
his Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many 
occasions; recital in full and unquestioning sincerity makes one a 
Muslim. Islam means "submission to God," and he who submits 



69 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

is a Muslim. The God whom Muhammad preached was not 
unknown to his countrymen, for Allah is the Arabic word for God 
rather than a particular name. Instead of introducing a new deity, 
Muhammad denied the existence of the minor gods and spirits wor- 
shiped before his ministry. 

Muhammad is called the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation 
is said to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations 
received by the Jews and the Christians. Prophets and sages of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus 
(Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa, respectively, in the Arabic Islamic canon) 
are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, 
reveres as sacred only God's message, rejecting Christianity's deifi- 
cation of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, 
the Day of Judgment, the general resurrection, heaven and hell, 
and the immortality of the soul. 

The duties of the Muslim, which form the "five pillars" of the 
faith, are recitation of the shahadah (kalima in Bangla), daily prayer 
{salat; in Bangla, namaj), almsgiving {zakat; in Bangla, jakat), fast- 
ing (sawm; in Bangla, roja), and pilgrimage {hajj). The devout 
believer prays after purification through ritual oblations at dawn, 
midday, mid-afternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflec- 
tions and prostrations accompany the prayers that the worshiper 
recites while facing Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in con- 
gregation at a mosque, led by a prayer leader; on Fridays they are 
obliged to do so. Women may attend public worship at mosques, 
where they are segregated from men, although most women com- 
monly pray at home. A special functionary, the muezzin, intones 
a call to prayer to the entire community at the appropriate hours; 
those out of earshot determine the prayer time from the position 
of the sun. Public prayer is a conspicuous and widely practiced 
aspect of Islam in Bangladesh. 

Almsgiving consists of a variety of donations to the poor, debt- 
ors, slaves, wayfarers, beggars, and charitable organizations. Once 
obligatory, although not strictly a tax, almsgiving in modern times 
is voluntary but usually expected. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt 
of God's revelation. During the month all but the sick, the weak, 
pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travelers on neces- 
sary journeys, and young children are enjoined, as appropriate to 
their state in life, from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual in- 
tercourse during daylight hours. The wealthy usually do little or 
no work during this period, and some businesses close for all or 
part of the day. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



through the solar year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in differ- 
ent years. Summertime fasting imposes considerable hardship on 
those who must do physical work. Id al Fitr, a feast celebrated 
throughout the Islamic world, marks the end of the month of fast- 
ing. Gifts, the wearing of new garments, exchanges of sweetmeats, 
almsgiving, and visits to friends and relatives are some of the cus- 
toms of this great religious festival. 

Islam dictates that at least once in his or her lifetime every Muslim 
should, if possible, make the hajj to Mecca to participate in special 
rites held there during the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar. 
The Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic cus- 
tom to emphasize the significance of the sites associated with the 
history of Abraham, the founder of monotheism and the father of 
the Arabs through his son Ishmail (Ismail in the Arabic Islamic 
Canon). The pilgrim, dressed in a white seamless garment, abstains 
from sexual relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail-paring. High- 
lights of the pilgrimage include kissing a sacred black stone; cir- 
cumambulating the Kaabah shrine (the sacred structure reportedly 
built by Abraham that houses a stone sacred to Islam); running 
between the hills of Safa and Marwa in imitation of Hagar, 
Ishmail' s mother, during her travail in the desert; and standing 
in prayer on the Plain of Arafat. 

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on 
earth — the jihad — represents an additional duty of all Muslims. 
Although this concept continues to be used to justify holy wars, 
modernist Muslims see the jihad in a broader context of civic and 
personal action. In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code 
of ethical conduct that encourages generosity, fairness, honesty, 
and respect and that forbids adultery, gambling, usury, and the 
consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. 

A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is 
neither intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those who lead 
prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of 
their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than any special 
powers or prerogatives conferred by ordination. 

During his lifetime, Muhammad was both spiritual and tem- 
poral leader of the Muslim community. He established the con- 
cept of Islam as a total and all-encompassing way of life for both 
individuals and society. Muslims believe that God revealed to 
Muhammad the rules governing decent behavior. It is therefore 
incumbent on the individual to live in the manner prescribed by 
revealed law and on the community to perfect human society on 
earth according to the holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no dis- 
tinction between religion and state. Religious and secular life merge, 



71 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

as do religious and secular law. In keeping with this conception 
of society, all Muslims traditionally have been subject to religious 
law. 

Early Developments in Islam 

After Muhammad's death in A.D. 632 the leaders of the Muslim 
community chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one 
of his earliest followers, to succeed him as caliph (from khalifa; liter- 
ally, successor of the Prophet). At that time, some persons favored 
Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima, but 
Ali and his supporters recognized the community's choice. The 
next two caliphs, Umar and Uthman, enjoyed the recognition of 
the entire community, although Uthman was murdered. When Ali 
finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, governor of 
Syria, rebelled in the name of his kinsman Uthman. After the 
ensuing civil war Ali moved his capital to Kufa (present-day Karbala 
in Iraq), where a short time later he too was assassinated. 

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates 
and the period in which the entire Islamic community recognized 
a single caliph. Muawiyah then proclaimed himself caliph of Damas- 
cus. Ali's supporters, however, refused to recognize Muawiyah or 
his line, the Umayyad caliphs; they withdrew in the first great 
schism of Islam and established a dissident faction known as the 
Shias (or Shiites), from Shiat Ali (Party of Ali) in support of the 
claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the 
Prophet. The larger faction of Islam, the Sunnis, claims to follow 
the orthodox teaching and example of Muhammad as embodied 
in the Sunna, the traditions of the Prophet. The Sunni majority 
was further developed into four schools of law: Maliki, Hanafi, 
Shafii, and Hanbali. All four are equally orthodox, but Sunnis in 
one country usually follow only one school. 

Originally political in nature, the difference between the Sunni 
and Shia interpretations took on theological and metaphysical over- 
tones. Ali's two sons, killed in the wars following the schisms, 
became martyred heroes to Shia Islam and repositories of the claims 
of Ali's line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis 
retained the doctrine of leadership by consensus. Despite these 
differences, reputed descent from the Prophet still carries great social 
and religious prestige throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile, 
the Shia doctrine of rule by divine right grew more firmly estab- 
lished, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had the 
truer claim to the mystical power of Ali precipitated further schisms. 
Some Shia groups developed doctrines of divine leadership, includ- 
ing a belief in hidden but divinely chosen leaders. The Shia creed, 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



for example, proclaims: "There is no god but God: Muhammad 
is the Prophet of God, and Ali is the Saint of God." 

Islam in Bangladesh 

The wholesale conversion to Islam of the population of what was 
to become Bangladesh began in the thirteenth century and con- 
tinued for hundreds of years (see Islamization of Bengal, 1202-1757, 
ch. 1). Conversion was generally collective rather than individual, 
although individual Hindus who became outcastes or who were 
ostracized for any reason often became Muslims. Islamic egalitari- 
anism, especially the ideals of equality, brotherhood, and social 
justice, attracted numerous Buddhists and lower caste Hindus. 
Muslim missionaries and mystics, some of whom were subsequently 
regarded as saints (usually known as pirs in Bangladesh) and who 
wandered about in villages and towns, were responsible for many 
conversions. 

Most Muslims in Bangladesh are Sunnis, but there is a small 
Shia community. Most of those who are Shia reside in urban areas. 
Although these Shias are few in number, Shia observance com- 
memorating the martyrdom of Ali's sons, Hasan and Husayn, is 
widely observed by the nation's Sunnis. 

The tradition of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism appeared 
very early in Islam and became essentially a popular movement 
emphasizing love of God rather than fear of God. Sufism stresses 
a direct, unstructured, personal devotion to God in place of the 
ritualistic, outward observance of the faith. An important belief 
in the Sufi tradition is that the average believer may use spiritual 
guides in his pursuit of the truth. These guides — friends of God 
or saints — are commonly called fakirs or pirs. In Bangladesh the 
term pir is more commonly used and combines the meanings of 
teacher and saint. In Islam there has been a perennial tension 
between the ulama — Muslim scholars — and the Sufis; each group 
advocates its method as the preferred path to salvation. There also 
have been periodic efforts to reconcile the two approaches. Through- 
out the centuries many gifted scholars and numerous poets have 
been inspired by Sufi ideas even though they were not actually 
adherents. 

Sufi masters were the single most important factor in South Asian 
conversions to Islam, particularly in what is now Bangladesh. Most 
Bangladeshi Muslims are influenced to some degree by Sufism, 
although this influence often involves only occasional consultation 
or celebration rather than formal affiliation. Both fakirs and pirs 
are familiar figures on the village scene, and in some areas the 
shrines of saints almost outnumber the mosques. In some regions 



73 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

the terms fakir and pir are used interchangeably, but in general 
the former connotes an itinerant holy man and the latter an estab- 
lished murshid, a holy man who has achieved a higher spiritual level 
than a fakir and who has a larger following. 

Ever since Sufism became a popular movement, pious men of 
outstanding personality reputed to have gifts of miraculous powers 
have found disciples (murids) flocking to them. The disciple can be 
a kind of lay associate earning his living in secular occupations, 
consulting the pir or murshid at times, participating in religious 
ceremonies, and making contributions to the support of the murshid. 
In addition, he may be initiated into a brotherhood that pledges 
its devotion to the murshid, lives in close association with him, 
and engages in pious exercises intended to bring about mystical 
enlightenment. 

The Qadiri, Naqshbandi, and Chishti orders were among the 
most widespread Sufi orders in Bangladesh in the late 1980s. The 
beliefs and practices of the first two are quite close to those of 
orthodox Islam; the third, founded in Ajmer, India, is peculiar to 
the subcontinent and has a number of unorthodox practices, such 
as the use of music in its liturgy. Its ranks have included many 
musicians and poets. 

Pirs do not attain their office through consensus and do not 
normally function as community representatives. The villager may 
expect a pir to advise him and offer inspiration but would not expect 
him to lead communal prayers or deliver the weekly sermon at the 
local mosque. Some pirs, however, are known to have taken an 
active interest in politics either by running for public office or by 
supporting other candidates. For example, Pir Hafizi Huzur ran 
as a candidate for president in the 1986 election. The pirs of Atroshi 
and Sarsina apparently also exerted some political influence. Their 
visitors have included presidents and cabinet ministers. 

Although a formal organization of ordained priests has no basis 
in Islam, a variety of functionaries perform many of the duties con- 
ventionally associated with a clergy and serve, in effect, as priests. 
One group, known collectively as the ulama, has traditionally 
provided the orthodox leadership of the community. The ulama 
unofficially interpret and administer religious law. Their authority 
rests on their knowledge of sharia, the corpus of Islamic juris- 
prudence that grew up in the centuries following the Prophet's 
death. 

The members of the ulama include maulvis, imams (see Glos- 
sary), and mullahs. The first two titles are accorded to those who 
have received special training in Islamic theology and law. A maulvi 
has pursued higher studies in a madrasa, a school of religious 



74 








31% 



TTz^ Star Mosque in Dhaka 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 
example of colonial-era architecture, a house in old Dhaka 

Courtesy Siria Lopez 



75 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

education attached to a mosque (see Religious Education, this ch.). 
Additional study on the graduate level leads to the title maulana. 

Villagers call on the mullah for prayers, advice on points of reli- 
gious practice, and performance of marriage and funeral cere- 
monies. More often they come to him for a variety of services far 
from the purview of orthodox Islam. The mullah may be a source 
for amulets, talismans, and charms for the remedying of every- 
thing from snakebite to sexual impotence. These objects are also 
purported to provide protection from evil spirits and bring good 
fortune. Many villagers have implicit faith in such cures for dis- 
ease and appear to benefit from them. Some mullahs derive a sig- 
nificant portion of their income from sales of such items. 

In Bangladesh, where a modified Anglo-Indian civil and crimi- 
nal legal system operates, there are no official sharia courts (see 
Judiciary, ch. 4). Most Muslim marriages, however, are presided 
over by the qazi, a traditional Muslim judge whose advice is also 
sought on matters of personal law, such as inheritance, divorce, 
and the administration of religious endowments (waqfs). 

In the late 1980s, the ulama of Bangladesh still perceived their 
function as that of teaching and preserving the Islamic way of life 
in the face of outside challenges, especially from modern socio- 
political ideas based on Christianity or communism. Any effort at 
modernization was perceived as a threat to core religious values 
and institutions; therefore, the ulama as a class was opposed to any 
compromise in matters of sharia. Many members of the ulama 
favored the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Bangladesh 
and were deeply involved in political activism through several 
political parties. Most members of the ulama were also engaged 
in carrying on the tabliqh (preaching movement), an effort that 
focuses on the true sociopolitical ideals of Islam and unequivocally 
discards all un-Islamic accretions. Tabliqh attracted many college 
and university graduates, who found the movement emotionally 
fulfilling and a practical way to deal with Bangladesh's endemic 
sociopolitical malaise. 

A number of Islamic practices are particular to South Asia, and 
several of them have been subject to reforms over the years. For 
example, the anniversary of the death of a pir is observed annually. 
Popular belief holds that this anniversary is an especially propi- 
tious time for seeking the intercession of the pir. Large numbers 
of the faithful attend anniversary ceremonies, which are festive 
occasions enjoyed by the followers of the pir as well as orthodox 
Muslims. The ceremonies are quite similar in form and con- 
tent to many Hindu festivals. Several nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century fundamentalist reform movements, aimed at ridding Islam 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



of all extraneous encroachments, railed against these and similar 
practices. Nevertheless, the practice of pir worship continued 
unabated in the 1980s. 

Nonorthodox interpretations of Islamic beliefs and practices per- 
vaded popular religion in Bangladesh in the 1980s. Hindu influences 
can be seen in the practice of illuminating the house for the celebra- 
tion of Shabi Barat (Festival of the Bestowal of Fate), a custom 
derived from the Hindu practices at Diwali (Festival of Lights). 
Rituals to exorcise evil spirits (jinni) from possessed persons also 
incorporated Hindu influence. Often, villagers would fail to dis- 
tinguish between Hindu and Muslim shrines. For example, shrines 
called satyapir, which dot rural Bangladesh, are devoted to a Hindu- 
Muslim synthesis known as Olabibi, the deity for the cure of 
cholera. This synthesis is an intriguing superimposition of the 
Hindu concept of divine consort on the stern monotheistic percep- 
tion of Allah. 

Post- 1971 regimes sought to increase the role of the government 
in the religious life of the people. The Ministry of Religious Affairs 
provided support, financial assistance, and endowments to religious 
institutions, including mosques and community prayer grounds 
(idgahs). The organization of annual pilgrimages to Mecca also came 
under the auspices of the ministry because of limits on the num- 
ber of pilgrims admitted by the government of Saudi Arabia and 
the restrictive foreign exchange regulations of the government of 
Bangladesh. The ministry also directed the policy and the program 
of the Islamic Foundation, which was responsible for organizing 
and supporting research and publications on Islamic subjects. The 
foundation also maintained the Bayt al Mukarram (National 
Mosque), and organized the training of imams. Some 18,000 imams 
were scheduled for training once the government completed estab- 
lishment of a national network of Islamic cultural centers and 
mosque libraries. Under the patronage of the Islamic Foundation, 
an encyclopedia of Islam in the Bangla language was being com- 
piled in the late 1980s. 

Another step toward further government involvement in reli- 
gious life was taken in 1984 when the semiofficial Zakat Fund Com- 
mittee was established under the chairmanship of the president of 
Bangladesh. The committee solicited annual zakat contributions on 
a voluntary basis. The revenue so generated was to be spent on 
orphanages, schools, children's hospitals, and other charitable insti- 
tutions and projects. Commercial banks and other financial insti- 
tutions were encouraged to contribute to the fund. Through these 
measures the government sought closer ties with religious estab- 
lishments within the country and with Islamic countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 



77 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Although Islam played a significant role in the life and culture 
of the people, religion did not dominate national politics because 
Islam was not the central component of national identity. When 
in June 1988 an "Islamic way of life" was proclaimed for Ban- 
gladesh by constitutional amendment, very little attention was paid 
outside the intellectual class to the meaning and impact of such 
an important national commitment. Most observers believed that 
the declaration of Islam as the state religion might have a signifi- 
cant impact on national life, however. Aside from arousing the sus- 
picion of the non-Islamic minorities, it could accelerate the 
proliferation of religious parties at both the national and the local 
levels, thereby exacerbating tension and conflict between secular 
and religious politicians. Unrest of this nature was reported on some 
college campuses soon after the amendment was promulgated. 

Hinduism 

Unlike Islam, Hinduism lacks a single authoritative scripture 
and a historically known founder. In a sense Hinduism is a syn- 
thesis of the religious expression of the people of South Asia and 
an anonymous expression of their worldview and cosmology, rather 
than the articulation of a particular creed. The term Hinduism 
applies to a large number of diverse beliefs and practices. Although 
religion can best be understood in a regional context, the caste sys- 
tem, beliefs, rituals, and festivals of the Hindus in Bangladesh — 
about 16 percent of the population — are peculiarly Bengali. 

A distinction has sometimes been made between the religion of 
the "great tradition" and the popular religion of the "little tradi- 
tion." The great (or Sanskritic) tradition, sometimes called Brah- 
manism, developed under the leadership of Hinduism's highest 
caste group, the Brahmans, who as the traditional priests, teachers, 
and astrologers enjoy numerous social privileges. The great tradi- 
tion preserves refined and abstract philosophical concepts that 
exhibit very little regional variation. At this level, there is empha- 
sis on unity in diversity and a pervasive attitude of relativism. 

Hindu philosophy recognizes the Absolute (Brahma) as eternal, 
unbounded by time, space, and causality and consisting of pure 
existence, consciousness, and bliss. The highest goal is release 
(moksha) from the cycle of birth and rebirth and the union of the 
individualized soul (atman) with Brahma. To attain this goal, a per- 
son may follow one of several methods or paths of discipline 
depending on his or her own temperament or capacity. The first 
of these paths is known as the way of works (karma marga). Fol- 
lowed by most Hindus, it calls for disinterested right action — the 
performance of one's caste duties and service to others — without 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



personal involvement in the consequences of action. The way of 
knowledge (jnana marga) stresses union by eliminating ignorance; 
mental error rather than moral transgression is considered the root 
of human misery and evil. The way of devotion (bhakti marga) advo- 
cates union by love; its essence is a complete and passionate faith 
in a personal deity. 

For most of its adherents, Hinduism encompasses a variety of 
devotions and sects that center on one or more of the great gods 
and are expressed at least partly in a regional context. The great 
tradition recognizes a trinity of gods, who are actually forms of 
absolute Brahman: Brahma the creator, Vishnu the preserver, and 
Shiva the destroyer. Brahma receives little notice; everyday devo- 
tion tends to center on the worship of Vishnu and Shiva (known 
by a variety of names) and their countless respective consorts. 

The worship of Shiva has generally found adherents among the 
higher castes in Bangladesh. Worship of Vishnu more explicitly 
cuts across caste lines by teaching the fundamental oneness of 
humankind in spirit. Vishnu worship in Bengal expresses the union 
of the male and female principles in a tradition of love and devo- 
tion. This form of Hindu belief and the Sufi tradition of Islam have 
influenced and interacted with each other in Bengal. Both were 
popular mystical movements emphasizing the personal relation- 
ship of religious leader and disciple instead of the dry stereotypes 
of the Brahmans or the ulama. As in Bengali Islamic practice, wor- 
ship of Vishnu frequently occurs in a small devotional society 
(samaj). Both use the language of earthly love to express communion 
with the divine. In both traditions, the Bangla language is the vehicle 
of a large corpus of erotic and mystical literature of great beauty 
and emotional impact. 

On the level of the little tradition, Hinduism admits worship of 
spirits and godlings of rivers, mountains, vegetation, animals, 
stones, or disease. Ritual bathing, vows, and pilgrimages to sacred 
rivers, mountains, shrines, and cities are important practices. An 
ordinary Hindu will worship at the shrines of Muslim pirs, with- 
out being concerned with the religion to which that place is 
supposed to be affiliated. Hindus revere many holy men and 
ascetics conspicuous for their bodily mortifications. Some people 
believe they attain spiritual benefit merely by looking at a great 
holy man. 

Hindu ethics generally center on the principle of ahimsa, non- 
injury to living creatures — especially the cow, which is held sacred. 
The principle is expressed in almost universally observed rules 
against eating beef. By no means are all Hindus vegetarians, but 
abstinence from all kinds of meat is regarded as a "higher" virtue. 



79 




80 




81 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

High-caste Bangladeshi Hindus, unlike their counterparts elsewhere 
in South Asia, ordinarily eat fish. 

Common among Hindus is the acceptance of the caste system 
as the structure of society. For virtually all Hindus, even those in 
revolt against some aspects of the system, caste is taken for granted 
as the way of life. To be considered Hindu, a group must identify 
itself in some way as a unit in the caste hierarchy. One cannot join 
a caste; one is born into it and lives, marries, and dies in it. 

Hindus in Bangladesh in the late 1980s were almost evenly dis- 
tributed in all regions, with concentrations in Khulna, Jessore, 
Dinajpur, Faridpur, and Barisal. The contributions of Hindus in 
arts and letters were far in excess of their numerical strength. In 
politics, they had traditionally supported the liberal and secular 
ideology of the Awami League (People's League) (see Early Inde- 
pendence Period, 1971-72, ch. 1; Party Politics, ch. 4). Hindu insti- 
tutions and places of worship received assistance through the 
Bangladesh Hindu Kalyan Trust (Bangladesh Hindu Welfare 
Trust), which was sponsored by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
Government- sponsored television and radio also broadcast read- 
ings and interpretations of Hindu scriptures and prayers. 

Buddhism 

Buddhism in various forms appears to have been prevalent at 
the time of the Turkish conquest in 1202 (see Islamization of Bengal, 
1202-1757, ch. 1). The invading armies apparently found numerous 
monasteries, which they destroyed in the belief that they were mili- 
tary fortresses. With the destruction of its centers of learning, Bud- 
dhism rapidly disintegrated. In subsequent centuries and up through 
the 1980s nearly all the remaining Buddhists lived in the region 
around Chittagong, which had not been entirely conquered until 
the time of the British Raj (1858-1947; see Glossary). In the 
Chittagong Hills, Buddhist tribes formed the majority of the popu- 
lation, and their religion appeared to be a mixture of tribal cults 
and Buddhist doctrines. According to the 1981 census, there were 
approximately 538,000 Buddhists in Bangladesh, representing less 
than 1 percent of the population. 

The ethical teachings of the Buddha, Siddartha Gautama (ca. 
550-486 B.C.), stress a middle path between physical indulgence 
and ascetic mortification. The practice of Buddhism is concerned 
with salvation rather than with metaphysical speculation. Salva- 
tion consists of freeing oneself from the cycle of rebirth into lives 
of evil, pain, and sorrow; to accomplish this, one must renounce 
society and live a simple life of self-discipline. Those who renounce 
society often are organized into one of the many monastic orders. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



There are several monasteries in the Chittagong Hills area, and 
in most Buddhist villages there is a school (kyong) where boys live 
and learn to read Burmese and some Pali (an ancient Buddhist scrip- 
tural language). It is common for men who have finished their 
schooling to return at regular intervals for periods of residence in 
the school. The local Buddhist shrine is often an important center 
of village life. 

Essentially tolerant, Buddhism outside the monastic retreats has 
absorbed and adapted indigenous popular creeds and cults of the 
regions to which it has spread. In most areas religious ritual focuses 
on the image of the Buddha, and the major festivals observed by 
Buddhists in Bangladesh commemorate the important events of his 
life. Although doctrinal Buddhism rejects the worship of gods and 
preserves the memory of the Buddha as an enlightened man, popu- 
lar Buddhism contains a pantheon of gods and lesser deities headed 
by the Buddha. 

The Ministry of Religious Affairs provides assistance for the 
maintenance of Buddhist places of worship and relics. The ancient 
monasteries at Paharpur (in Rajshahi Region) and Mainamati (in 
Comilla Region), dating from the seventh to ninth century A.D., 
are considered unique for their size and setting and are maintained 
as state-protected monuments. 

Christianity 

Christianity's first contact with the Indian subcontinent is 
attributed to the Apostle Thomas, who is said to have preached 
in southern India. Although Jesuit priests were active at the Mughal 
courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the first Roman 
Catholic settlements in what became Bangladesh appear to have 
been established by the Portuguese, coming from their center in 
Goa on the west coast of India. During the sixteenth century the 
Portuguese settled in the vicinity of Chittagong, where they were 
active in piracy and slave trading. In the seventeenth century some 
Portuguese moved to Dhaka. 

Serious Protestant missionary efforts began only in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Baptist missionary activities beginning 
in 1816, the Anglican Oxford Mission, and others worked mainly 
among the tribal peoples of the Low Hills in the northern part of 
Mymensingh and Sylhet regions. Many of the Christian churches, 
schools, and hospitals were initially set up to serve the European 
community. They subsequently became centers of conversion 
activities, particularly among the lower caste Hindus. 

The Ministry of Religious Affairs provided assistance and sup- 
port to the Christian institutions in the country. In the late 1980s, 



83 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



the government was not imposing any restrictions on the legiti- 
mate religious activities of the missions and the communities. Mis- 
sion schools and hospitals were well attended and were used by 
members of all religions. The Christian community usually enjoyed 
better opportunities for education and a better standard of living. 
In the late 1980s, Christianity had about 600,000 adherents, mainly 
Roman Catholic, and their numbers were growing rapidly. 

Education 

The British Legacy 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century a system of liberal 
English-language schools based on the British model was instituted 
in the region that now constitutes Bangladesh. The emphasis on 
British education led to the growth of an elite class that provided 
clerical and administrative support to the colonial administration 
but did not develop practical skills or technical knowledge. The 
new elite became alienated from the masses of the people, who had 
no access to the new education system. 

During the Pakistan period, there was a general awareness 
of the need to restructure the education system to meet the 
needs of the new nation. A 1959 report by Pakistan's National Com- 
mission on Education recommended a series of reforms that would 
reorganize the structure of education. These reforms included 
emphasis on broad-based and technical education. In the succes- 
sive five-year plans and other national economic policy documents 
developed during the Pakistan period, a need was articulated to 
shift the focus of education away from rote memorization and to 
expand facilities for scientific and technological education (see The 
Economic Context, ch. 3). But the impact of such policies was not 
felt in East Pakistan, and, with only a few exceptions, a liberal elite- 
based education system with very little awareness of life in the 
countryside was in place when Bangladesh became independent. 

Education System 

In the 1981 census only 19.7 percent of the total population was 
counted as literate. The literacy rate was 17 percent in rural areas 
and 35 percent in urban areas. The urban-rural gap shrank slightly 
between 1961 and 1981, primarily because of the influx of rural 
Bangladeshis to urban areas. The adult literacy rate in 1988 
remained about equal to the 1981 level, officially given as 29 per- 
cent but possibly lower. The education system also had had a 
discriminatory effect on the education of women in a basically patri- 
archal society. The female literacy rate in 1981 (13.2 percent) was 



84 



Nakshi kantha- style embroidered quilt from Chapai, Nawabganj 

Courtesy Joyce Rahim 

about half the literacy rate among men (26 percent) nationally. The 
gap was even greater in rural areas, where 11.2 percent women 
and 23 percent of men were literate. (In 1988 the literacy rate was 
18 percent for women and 39 percent for men.) The national school 
attendance rate in 1982 was 58.9 percent for ages 5 to 9; 20.9 per- 
cent for ages 10 to 14; and 1.9 percent for ages 15 to 24. The esti- 
mated 1988 student-teacher ratio was fifty-four to one in primary 
schools, twenty-seven to one in secondary schools, and thirteen to 
one in universities. Approximately 10 million students of all ages 
attended school in 1981. 

The base of the school system was five years of primary educa- 
tion. The government reported a total of nearly 44,000 primary 
schools enrolling nearly 44 million students in 1986. Recognizing 
the importance of increasing enrollments and improving quality, 
the government made universal primary education a major objec- 
tive of its educational development plans, which focused on increas- 
ing access to school, improving teacher training, and revising the 
primary school curricula. As a result, the share of primary educa- 
tion by the mid-1980s increased to about 50 percent of the public 
education expenditure. Although enrollment in the entry class rose 
over time, the ability of the primary education sector to retain 
students in school and increase the literacy rate did not match 



85 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

government goals. Throughout the system a high annual dropout 
rate of 20 percent existed in 1988. Studies suggested that no more 
than 10 to 15 percent of those attending primary schools retained 
a permanent ability to read and write. The Third Five- Year Plan 
(1985-90) envisaged reducing the rural-urban gap in education, 
establishing facilities for the enrollment of 70 percent of children 
of primary-school age, and placing emphasis on keeping children 
in school longer. 

Bangladesh had 8,790 secondary schools with 2.7 million stu- 
dents in 1986. Secondary education was divided into two levels. 
The five years of lower secondary (grades six through ten) con- 
cluded with a secondary school certificate examination. Students 
who passed this examination proceeded to two years of higher 
secondary or intermediate training, which culminated in a higher 
secondary school examination after grade twelve. Higher second- 
ary school was viewed as preparation for college rather than as the 
conclusion of high school. Development efforts in the late 1980s 
included programs to provide low-cost vocational education to the 
rural populace. Efforts also focused on the establishment of science 
teaching facilities in rural schools, as compulsory science courses 
were introduced at the secondary level. The government also had 
provided training for science teachers and supplies of scientific 
equipment. In spite of many difficulties over the years, the number 
of both secondary schools and students, particularly females, 
increased steadily. For example, whereas there were 7,786 second- 
ary schools for boys and 1,159 for girls in 1977, the number of 
boys' schools had decreased to 7,511 while girls' schools had 
increased to 1,282 by 1986. The number of students increased as 
well. In 1977 there were 1.3 million boys and 450,000 girls in 
secondary schools; by 1986 there were 1 .9 million boys and 804,000 
girls. Enrollment in technical and vocational schools increased in 
a similar manner. Secondary education for the most part was private 
but was heavily subsidized by the state budget. Nationalization of 
private schools was a standing government policy. 

Development of the education system depended largely on the 
supply of trained teachers. In 1986 about 20 percent of the esti- 
mated 190,000 primary- school teachers were adequately trained; 
at the secondary-school level, only 30 percent of the teachers were 
trained. Contributing to the shortage of trained teachers was the 
low socioeconomic standing of educators. The social image of 
teachers had been gradually eroded, making it difficult to recruit 
young graduates to the profession. The high proportion of poorly 
trained teachers led to lower standards of instruction. Despite these 
problems, the number of secondary-school teachers increased from 
83,955 in 1977 to 99,016 in 1986, according to government figures. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



In 1986 there were forty-nine primary-school teacher training 
institutes and ten secondary-school teacher training colleges. In 
addition to regular degree, diploma, and certificate programs, vari- 
ous crash programs and correspondence courses also were avail- 
able. The Bangladesh Institute of Distance Education also had 
started an experimental program of teacher training under the 
auspices of Rajshahi University. 

At the postsecondary level in 1986, there were 7 universities, 
758 general colleges, and 50 professional (medical, dental, engineer- 
ing, and law) colleges. More than 25 percent of the colleges were 
government managed; the rest were private but received substan- 
tial government grants. The private colleges were gradually being 
nationalized. In the 1980s, emphasis was being placed on the 
development of science teaching facilities in nongovernment col- 
leges. Twelve government colleges were selected to offer graduate 
courses during the Third Five- Year Plan. 

In addition to four general-curriculum universities — the Univer- 
sity of Dhaka, Rajshahi University, Chittagong University, and 
Jahangir Nagar University — there were the University of Engi- 
neering and Technology in Dhaka, the Agricultural University 
in Mymensingh, and the Islamic University in Tongi (near 
Dhaka). The total enrollment in the 7 universities in 1986 was 
estimated at 27,487, of which 80 percent were male. Universities 
were self-governing entities with 95 percent of their total expen- 
ditures paid through government block grants. The University 
Grants Commission, created in 1973, coordinated the funding and 
activities of the universities. A large number of scholarships and 
stipends were offered to students in education institutions at all 
levels. 

The number of college students increased from 238,580 in 1980 
to 603,915 in 1986, according to government statistics. During that 
period, female enrollment increased from 29,000 to 115,000. 
Qualitative improvement, enrollment stabilization, interuniversity 
rationalization of departments, and controlled expansion were some 
of the government objectives for college education in the mid- and 
late 1980s. 

Curricula in nongovernment institutions of higher education 
focused mostly on the humanities and social sciences. Many govern- 
ment colleges and universities, however, offered advanced courses 
in natural, physical, and biological sciences. Sophisticated courses 
in language and literature, philosophy and philology, fine arts, and 
folk culture also were offered at the universities. Advanced research 
degrees, including doctorates, were offered in several disciplines 
of science, the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences. Faculty 



87 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

members at the government colleges and universities were usually 
well qualified, but research facilities were limited. 

To remove the heavy bias toward liberal arts education, greater 
attention was being focused in the late 1980s on technical educa- 
tion, which received the third highest allocation, after primary and 
secondary education, in the Third Five- Year Plan. In addition to 
four engineering colleges, Bangladesh had eighteen polytechnic 
institutes, four law colleges, two agricultural colleges, a graphic 
arts institute, an institute of glass and ceramics, a textile college, 
a college of leather technology, sixteen commercial institutes, and 
fifty-four vocational institutes in 1986. The nation also had ten 
medical colleges and one dental college, offering both graduate and 
postgraduate training. In addition, there were twenty-one nurs- 
ing institutes, a music college, and a college of physical education. 

Because secondary and higher education benefited the small 
middle and upper classes and because the government defrayed 
a portion of the costs of private higher institutions through grants, 
the poor in effect subsidized the education of the affluent. This 
situation was most evident at the university level, where about 15 
percent of the education budget was devoted to less than 0.5 per- 
cent of the student population. The technical education sector, 
which experienced some growth in the late 1980s, nevertheless failed 
to provide the numbers and kinds of personnel required for eco- 
nomic development. Most university training also failed to equip 
its recipients with marketable professional skills. 

Religious Education 

The national government supported Islamic education at several 
levels. In the late 1980s, efforts were being made to modernize the 
madrasa (school of religious education attached to a mosque) sys- 
tem and to introduce secular subjects in the madrasa curriculum 
under the Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board. In 1986 there 
were 4,118 madrasas and 638,926 students under the aegis of the 
government-supervised system. By 1985 forty madrasas had been 
established for female students. There were primary, secondary, 
and postsecondary madrasas, which, except for one in Sylhet run 
directly by the government, were attached to mosques and depen- 
dent on public charity and endowments. Most of these institutions 
had poor physical facilities and equipment. The objective of madrasa 
education during the Third Five-Year Plan was to modernize the 
system through the introduction of science courses. The program 
included the provision of science laboratories and equipment to 
200 madrasas as part of the ongoing scheme for development of 
secondary education. In addition, similar facilities were to be 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



provided in a limited way to another 125 madrasas. Furthermore, 
financial benefits to the madrasa teachers were raised so they would 
achieve parity with teachers at secular secondary schools. 

Madrasa graduates usually assumed posts as imams at mosques 
or became teachers at nominally secular schools. Traditionally, they 
often would take up both occupations, since many primary schools 
were located in village mosques. 

Role of English and Arabic in Education 

Following the birth of Bangladesh, Bangla came to replace 
English as the medium of instruction. Bangla also became the sole 
national language and the standard language of communications. 
The initial shortage of Bangla textbooks and other instructional 
materials was alleviated by the accelerated production of textbooks 
in the vernacular under the patronage of government education 
departments. The Bangla Academy also played a pioneering role 
in this area. In the 1980s, British education was maintained 
marginally through private English-language institutions attended 
by upper class children. English continued to be offered as an elec- 
tive subject in most institutions of higher education and was offered 
as a subject for bachelor's and master's degrees. 

Initially, Arabic also lost ground in independent Bangladesh. 
This trend ended in the late 1970s, however, after Bangladesh 
strengthened its ties with Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich, Arabic- 
speaking countries. An unsuccessful attempt was made in 1983 to 
introduce Arabic as a required language in primary and secondary 
levels (see The Ershad Period, ch. 4). In the late 1980s, Arabic 
was studied in many Muslim homes in Bangladesh as an integral 
part of religious instruction. Aside from courses in religious schools, 
however, Arabic was not a popular subject at the college and univer- 
sity level. 

Education Planning and Policy 

Public expenditures for education were very low in Bangladesh. 
As a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary), the level of expenditure for education in 1983 was approxi- 
mately 1.3 percent, a figure that did not rise substantially through 
1988. On the average, the sectoral share of education in the total 
development expenditure of the government between 1973 and 1983 
was only 4.1 percent; in 1985 it was only 3.1 percent. 

The Third Five-Year Plan included efforts to improve quality 
by restructuring higher secondary and college education, making 
it more cost effective, and introducing management controls and 
performance evaluations. Community-based nonformal education 



89 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

approaches seemed to hold promise as an alternative means of 
providing basic arithmetic and reading skills. For instance, the Ban- 
gladesh Rural Development Board has been able to achieve low 
dropout rates, especially for females, in nonformal primary school- 
ing, keeping operating costs fairly low and capital expenditures at 
a minimum. 

The Ministry of Education and Culture was responsible for plan- 
ning, financing, and managing education at all levels. The ad hoc 
Bangladesh Education Commission was appointed in 1972 to inves- 
tigate and report on all major aspects of education. In 1987 another 
high-level body — the National Education Commission — was insti- 
tuted. Its August 1988 recommendations were for compulsory free 
education; reforms in madrasa, medical, and law education; and 
removal of student politics from the campus. It was expected that 
the commission's recommendations would be addressed in the 
fourth and fifth five-year plans covering the period up to the year 
2000. 

Health 

Although Bangladesh had a basic health care infrastructure in 
the 1980s, much remained to be done, particularly in rural areas, 
where the majority of the people faced critical health problems. 
The main dangers to health in the late 1980s were much the same 
as they were at the time of independence. The incidence of com- 
municable disease was extensive, and there was widespread mal- 
nutrition, inadequate sewage disposal, and inadequate supplies of 
safe drinking water. The fertility rate was also extremely high. Only 
30 percent of the population had access to primary health care ser- 
vices, and overall health care performance remained unacceptably 
low by all conventional measurements (see table 9, Appendix). Life 
expectancy at birth in FY 1985, according to official Bangladesh 
statistics was estimated at 55.1 years, as opposed to 61 years in 
comparable developing countries. Morbidity and mortality rates 
for women and children were high. Infant mortality rates exceeded 
125 deaths per 1,000 live births, the maternal mortality rate was 
6 per 1,000 live births, and 56.1 percent of infants suffered from 
chronic malnutrition. More than 45 percent of rural families and 
76 percent of urban families were below the acceptable caloric intake 
level. About two-thirds of all families received insufficient protein 
and vitamins. 

Disease and Disease Control 

Communicable diseases were the major health hazards in 
the 1980s. Poor nutrition and sanitation fostered the spread of 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



infections. Infectious diseases — cholera, dysentery, diarrhea, 
measles, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, and poliomyelitis — and 
parasitic diseases such as malaria, filariasis, and helminthiasis — 
were responsible for widespread illness and numerous deaths. 
Although not reported among government statistics, tuberculosis 
was believed to be an increasingly serious health problem, with 
90,000 deaths and 1 10,000 new cases occurring annually. Disease 
in the late 1980s was most prevalent in rural areas; treatment was 
more readily available in the cities. A mid-1980s survey indicated 
that deaths due to diarrheal diseases, malnutrition, and pneumonia 
accounted for 16.3 percent, 13.1 percent, and 10.8 percent of all 
deaths, respectively. The percentages for other diseases were as 
follows: prematurity and birth injury (8.6 percent), cardiovascular 
accidents (4.5 percent), tetanus (4.4 percent), pulmonary tuber- 
culosis (3.3 percent), measles (2.7 percent), and other causes (36.3 
percent). 

Young children suffered disproportionately from diseases, and 
they accounted for 40 percent of deaths annually. Major killers of 
young children were severe diarrhea and neonatal tetanus caused 
by unsanitary treatment of the umbilicus. Until the mid-1980s, only 
3 percent of Bangladeshi children received immunization against 
common infectious diseases. Consequently, potentially avoidable 
illnesses like tetanus, pertussis, and measles accounted for nearly 
half of infant deaths and more than a third of childhood deaths. 

By the late 1980s, a massive immunization program had elimi- 
nated smallpox, and highly effective treatments had contained 
cholera. Malaria, however, once thought to have been eradicated, 
again had became a major health problem by 1988. The ongoing 
malaria control program needed to be strengthened by improving 
indigenous scientific knowledge of the disease and by spraying wider 
areas with effective chemicals. Several national and international 
research facilities were involved in disease control research. 

Noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular dis- 
eases, mental illness, gastrointestinal disorders, cancer, rheuma- 
toid arthritis, respiratory disease, and urogenital diseases were 
increasing in frequency in the 1980s. Cases of vitamin A deficiency 
causing night blindness and xerophthalmia, iron deficiency anemia, 
iodine deficiency, protein-calories deficiency, and marasmus also 
were on the increase. 

Although no incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) had been reported in Bangladesh through mid- 1988, the 
National Committee on AIDS was formed in April 1986. The com- 
mittee drew up a short-term action plan that called for public aware- 
ness programs, augmented laboratory facilities, training of relevant 



91 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



personnel, publication of informational booklets, and health 
education programs. 

Before the mid-1980s, disease control programs focused mainly 
on Western- style curative services, but the emphasis was shifting 
in the late 1980s toward a larger role for prevention. The govern- 
ment's main preventive health program — the Universal Immuni- 
zation Program — was initiated in 1986 with the assistance of the 
World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's 
Fund in eight pilot subdistricts (upazilas; see Local Administration, 
ch. 4). The government aimed to provide protection through 
immunization against six major diseases for children under two 
years of age and to vaccinate women of childbearing age against 
tetanus. The program helped to increase the rate of full immuni- 
zation of children below 1 year of age from less than 3 percent to 
36.5 percent, and of children between 12 and 24 months from less 
than 3 percent to 55.8 percent. 

In the case of maternal health care, a national program to train 
and supervise traditional birth attendants (dhais) was started in 1987. 
In addition, a long-range program to improve maternal and 
neonatal care, which addressed issues of health care delivery and 
referral on a national scale, was approved in 1987. The govern- 
ment in 1988 upgraded its nutrition policy-making capacity by 
creating the National Nutrition Council, but planning and imple- 
mentation of specific programs remained insufficient. Other pro- 
grams with nutrition implications include food-for-work, 
" vulnerable -group feeding," and vitamin A distribution programs. 

Alternative systems of medicine, including the traditional Hindu 
ayurvedic medical system based largely on homeopathy and natu- 
ropathy, the Muslim unani (so-called "Greek" medicine) herbal 
medical practice, and Western allopathic medicine were available. 
For most villagers, the most accessible medical practitioner was 
the village curer (kobiraj). It is estimated that 70 percent of the rural 
population did not have access to modern medical facilities in the 
late 1980s. 

Health Care Facilities 

The Ministry of Health and Family Planning was responsible 
for developing, coordinating, and implementing the national health 
and mother- and- child health care programs. Population control also 
was within the purview of the ministry (see Population Control, 
this ch.). The government's policy objectives in the health care sec- 
tor were to provide a minimum level of health care services 
for all, primarily through the construction of health facilities in rural 
areas and the training of health care workers. The strategy of 



92 



A rural family planning center 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 
An operating table at a 
voluntary sterilization clinic in Sylhet 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 

universal health care by the year 2000 had become accepted, and 
government efforts toward infrastructure development included the 
widespread construction of rural hospitals, dispensaries, and clinics 
for outpatient care. Program implementation, however, was limited 
by severe financial constraints, insufficient program management 
and supervision, personnel shortages, inadequate staff performance, 
and insufficient numbers of buildings, equipment, and supplies. 

In the late 1980s, government health care facilities in rural areas 
consisted of subdistrict health centers, union-level health and family 
welfare centers, and rural dispensaries. A subdistrict health center 
in the mid-1980s typically had a thirty-one-bed hospital, an out- 
patient service, and a home- service unit staffed with field workers. 



93 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Some of the services, however, were largely nonoperative because 
of staffing problems and a lack of support services. Health services 
in urban areas also were inadequate, and their coverage seemed 
to be deteriorating. In many urban areas, nongovernment organi- 
zations provide the bulk of urban health care services. Program- 
ming and priorities of the nongovernment organizations were at 
best loosely coordinated. 

A union-level health and family welfare center provided the first 
contact between the people and the health care system and was the 
nucleus of primary health care delivery. As of 1985 there were 341 
functional subdistrict health centers, 1,275 rural dispensaries (to 
be converted to union-level health and family welfare centers), and 
1,054 union-level health and family welfare centers. The total num- 
ber of hospital beds at the subdistrict level and below was 8,100. 

District hospitals and some infectious-disease and specialized 
hospitals constituted the second level of referral for health care. 
In the mid-1980s, there were 14 general hospitals (with capacities 
ranging from 100 to 150 beds), 43 general district hospitals (50 beds 
each), 12 tuberculosis hospitals (20 to 120 beds each), and 1 mental 
hospital (400 beds). Besides these, there were thirty-eight urban 
outpatient clinics, forty-four tuberculosis clinics, and twenty-three 
school health clinics. Ten medical college hospitals and eight post- 
graduate specialized institutes with attached hospitals constituted 
the third level of health care. 

In the mid-1980s, of the country's 21,637 hospital beds, about 
85 percent belonged to the government health services. There 
was only about one hospital bed for every 3,600 people. In spite 
of government plans, the gap between rural and urban areas in 
the availability of medical facilities and personnel remained wide. 
During the monsoon season and other recurrent natural disasters, 
the already meager services for the rural population were severely 
disrupted. 

Medical Education and Training 

In 1986 Bangladesh had about 16,000 physicians, 6,900 nurses, 
5,200 midwives, and 1,580 "lady health visitors," all registered 
by the government. The annual output of new physicians (both 
graduate and postgraduate) and dentists, despite some annual fluc- 
tuations, helped improve health care in the 1978-86 period. In 1978 
there were 822 graduates. A high of 1,848 was reached in 1982, 
but the number of graduates slumped to 985 in 1986. 

Medical education and training was provided by ten medical 
colleges and eight postgraduate specialized medical institutes. One 
dental college, twenty-one nursing institutes, eight medical assistant 
training schools, and two paramedical institutes trained ancillary 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 

medical personnel. The quality of medical education and training 
was considered satisfactory by observers. The Third Five- Year Plan 
incorporated several measures to expand facilities for the training 
of specialists and for in-service training of health administrators 
in management skills. For example, eight field-training subdistrict 
health complexes had been developed to impart education and train- 
ing in community medicine. Schemes for improving education in 
indigenous systems of medicine were taken up, and their implemen- 
tation was continued as the 1990s approached. The general short- 
age of physicians and nurses was aggravated by their emigration 
to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East and to the industrial- 
ized countries of the West. Immediately after independence, about 
50 percent of the medical graduates sought employment abroad; 
this trend was later arrested, but special incentives had to be 
provided to keep medical professionals in the country. 

Medicinal Drugs and Drug Policy 

The per capita consumption of Western drugs in Bangladesh was 
about US$1 per year in the late 1980s. According to a government 
statement in 1982, although most people had no access to life-saving 
drugs, a large number of wasteful and undesirable medicinal 
products were manufactured and marketed mostly under commer- 
cial pressure. A national drug policy promulgated in 1982 was aimed 
at simplifying the range of drugs available and at improving the 
logistics of drug distribution at reasonable prices. The policy iden- 
tified sixteen guidelines for the evaluation of medicinal products 
for the purpose of registration. The registration of more than 1,700 
products was canceled and these were gradually withdrawn from 
use. Unani, ayurvedic, and other homeopathic medicines were also 
brought under this policy. 

Under the new policy, in order to promote local enterprise, for- 
eign companies were no longer allowed to manufacture antacid and 
vitamin preparations. The policy identified 150 essential drugs for 
therapeutic purposes. Attempts to increase local production of drugs 
continued, and the government provided Bangladeshi firms with 
generous industrial loans and other assistance. Some essential drugs 
were also being manufactured at government plants. 

As the 1980s came to a close, Bangladeshi society had made some 
remarkable advances in social development, education, and health 
care. Severe national disasters, however, in addition to political 
discontent, contributed to the negation of any net advances. Ever 
optimistic, Bangladeshis continued their age-old struggle against 
the land and sought ways to accommodate the burgeoning society. 



95 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Nafis Ahmad 's An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, although 
outdated, remains the most useful broad survey of the geography 
of Bangladesh. It can be supplemented by Ahmad 's A New Eco- 
nomic Geography of Bangladesh, Haroun er Rashid's An Economic 
Geography of Bangladesh, and O . H . K . Spate and A . T . A . Learmonth ' s 
standard work, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography. 

The most useful sources on population are the Bangladesh 
government's Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, Statistical Pocketbook 
of Bangladesh, and Third Five- Year Plan, 1985-1990, and the World 
Bank's World Development Report on Bangladesh. 

Despite a general dearth of writing on Islam in Bangladesh, works 
worth considering include Rafiuddin Ahmed's Islam in Bangladesh 
and Essays on the Muslims of Bengal. Peter J. Bertocci's "Bangladesh: 
Composite Cultural Identity and Modernization in a Muslim- 
Majority State" is also helpful. 

The standard work on the Bangladeshi social system is A.K. 
Nazmul Karim's The Dynamics of Bangladesh Society. Mohammad 
Afsaruddin's Rural Life in East Pakistan provides insight into rural 
social dynamics. Much of this book remains relevant to the changing 
society of Bangladesh. A collection of readings, edited by Robert 
D. Stevens, Hamzi Alavi, and Peter J. Bertocci, Rural Development 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan, examines changes in rural society. 
A.K.M. Aminul Islam's A Bangladesh Village is a study of change 
and tension in a village society in the process of transformation. 

Shamsul Huque's Education in Bangladesh briefly reviews educa- 
tion issues. Disaster in Bangladesh, edited by Lincoln C. Chen, deals 
with several health, nutrition, and work force issues. Family Plan- 
ning Program in Bangladesh, published by the Ministry of Health and 
Family Planning, is a useful review of family planning initiatives 
and programs. The annual Bibliography of Asian Studies, published 
by the Association for Asian Studies, has entries for numerous useful 
studies on Bangladesh since independence. Bangladesh: A Select 
Bibliography of English Language Periodical Literature, 1971-1986 by 
Joyce L. and Enayetur Rahim provides a comprehensive survey 
of periodical literature since independence. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



96 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Drying and sifting rice, Bangladesh } s main staple 



IN THE LATE 1980s, Bangladesh continued to be called the 
"largest poorest" country and to be singled out as "the test case 
for development. ' ' A great deal that had happened in the economy 
since independence in 1971 supported the hope that the country 
would eventually overcome its dependence on foreign aid and would 
approach relative self-sufficiency. In the meantime, success was 
measured in more limited and immediate accomplishments: greater 
production of food grains year by year, greater vigor shown by 
the private sector in generating investment capital and using it 
productively, and measurable growth and diversification of exports. 
The government continued to depend on the donor community 
to provide the bulk of the resources needed to promote human 
development in the form of nutrition, health, and education pro- 
grams. The most active donors continued to give Bangladesh good 
marks for its economic performance. 

In 1971, the year Bangladesh achieved independence from 
Pakistan, the new nation was referred to in foreign circles as an 
"international basket case, ' ' a wounded combatant almost beyond 
hope of recovery. Bangladeshis themselves, recalling the "inter- 
national basket case" characterization, often choose the metaphor 
"bottomless basket," implying that no matter how much assistance 
is given to the economy, there will always be a need for more. It 
is a tribute to the Bangladeshi people, to the constructiveness and 
generosity of other nations, and to the strength of the human spirit 
that the gloomiest fears have not materialized. The first-time 
observer of Bangladesh may still perceive the country as poverty 
stricken, overpopulated, and with little prospect for a sunnier future. 
In its first seventeen years of independence, Bangladesh did not 
prosper, nor was it able to improve substantially the quality of life 
for its huge population, but it did not lose ground either. If the 
prospects for rapid economic development were not noticeably better 
in 1988 than they were in 1972, it was encouraging that Bangladesh 
was active in economic fields that were not foreseen even a few 
years earlier — e.g., as a major producer and exporter of ready- 
made garments and frozen seafood. And if the economy still seemed 
dangerously poised on the brink of disaster — a drought, a typhoon, 
or excessive flooding threatens every year — the government, the 
people, and the international community had combined to limit 
the scope of disasters, and the economy of Bangladesh had con- 
tinued to struggle upward. 



99 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

The Economic Context 
Historical Perspective 

East Bengal — the region that was to become East Pakistan and 
later Bangladesh — was a prosperous region of South Asia until 
modern times. It had the advantages of a mild, almost tropical 
climate, fertile soil, ample water, and an abundance of fish, wild- 
life, and fruit. The standard of living compared favorably with other 
parts of South Asia. As early as the thirteenth century, the region 
was developing as an agrarian economy. It was not entirely without 
commercial centers, and Dhaka in particular grew into an impor- 
tant entrepot during the Mughal Empire (see Islamization of 
Bengal, 1202-1757, ch. 1). The British, however, on their arrival 
in the early seventeenth century, chose to develop Calcutta as their 
commercial and administrative center in South Asia. The develop- 
ment of East Bengal was thereafter limited to agriculture. The 
colonial infrastructure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
reinforced East Bengal's function as the primary producer — chiefly 
of rice and jute — for processors and traders in Calcutta and beyond. 

Some of the same factors that had made East Bengal a prosper- 
ous region became disadvantages during the nineteenth and twen- 
tieth centuries. As life expectancy increased, the limitations of land 
and the annual floods increasingly became constraints on economic 
growth. Traditional agricultural methods became obstacles to the 
modernization of agriculture. Geography severely limited the 
development and maintenance of a modern transportation and com- 
munications system (see Geography, ch. 2). 

The partition of British India and the emergence of India and 
Pakistan in 1947 severely disrupted the former colonial economic 
system that had preserved East Bengal (now East Pakistan) as a 
producer of jute and rice for the urban industrial economy around 
Calcutta. East Pakistan had to build a new industrial base and 
modernize agriculture in the midst of a population explosion. The 
united government of Pakistan expanded the cultivated area and 
some irrigation facilities, but the rural population generally became 
poorer between 1947 and 1971 because improvements did not keep 
pace with rural population increase. Pakistan's five-year plans opted 
for a development strategy based on industrialization, but the major 
share of the development budget went to West Pakistan, that is, 
contemporary Pakistan. The lack of natural resources meant that 
East Pakistan was heavily dependent on imports, creating a balance 
of payments problem. Without a substantial industrialization pro- 
gram or adequate agrarian expansion, the economy of East Pakistan 
steadily declined. Blame was placed by various observers, but 
especially those in East Pakistan, on the West Pakistani leaders 



100 




A traditional method of irrigation 
still used in the water-rich countryside 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 

who not only dominated the government but also most of the fledg- 
ling industries in East Pakistan. 

Economic Reconstruction after Independence 

The economic situation facing Bangladesh as it emerged from 
the war of independence in 1971 included the highest rural 



101 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

population density in the entire world, an annual population growth 
rate between 2.5 and 3 percent, chronic malnutrition for perhaps 
the majority of the people, and the dislocation of between 8 and 
10 million people who had fled to India and returned to indepen- 
dent Bangladesh by 1972 (see Migration, ch. 2). The new nation 
had few experienced entrepreneurs, managers, administrators, engi- 
neers, or technicians. There were critical shortages of essential food 
grains and other staples because of wartime disruptions. External 
markets for jute had been lost because of the instability of supply 
and the increasing popularity of synthetic substitutes. Foreign 
exchange resources were minuscule, and the banking and mone- 
tary system was unreliable. Although Bangladesh had a large work 
force, the vast reserves of undertrained and underpaid workers were 
largely illiterate, unskilled, and underemployed. Commercially 
exploitable industrial resources, except for natural gas, were lack- 
ing. Inflation, especially for essential consumer goods, ran between 
300 and 400 percent. The war of independence had crippled the 
transportation system. Hundreds of road and railroad bridges had 
been destroyed or damaged, and rolling stock was inadequate and 
in poor repair. The new country was still recovering from a severe 
cyclone that hit the area in 1970 and caused 250,000 deaths. India, 
by no means a wealthy country and without a tradition of giving 
aid to other nations, came forward immediately with massive eco- 
nomic assistance in the first months after the fighting ended. 
Between December 1971 and January 1972, India committed 
US$232 million in aid to Bangladesh, almost all of it for immedi- 
ate disbursement. The largest single element in Indian aid was 
900,000 tons of food grains. The United States and the World Bank 
(see Glossary) thereafter became leading foreign aid donors, and 
the World Bank organized a consortium known as the Bangladesh 
Aid Group, comprising twenty-six international financial institu- 
tions and foreign governments interested in assisting Bangladesh's 
development. 

Managing the Economy 

Economic Policy and Planning 

After West Pakistani owners of industrial enterprises fled in 1971, 
the government of Bangladesh seized their plants as abandoned 
properties. The government suddenly found itself managing 
and operating more than 300 medium- and large-scale industrial 
plants, which represented nearly 90 percent of the value of all such 
enterprises in the new nation. It organized public corporations to 
oversee the major industries: jute, textiles, sugar, steel, paper and 



102 



The Economy 



paperboard, fertilizer, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, engineering and 
shipbuilding, minerals, oil and gas, food and allied products, and 
forest products. With government control over major industries 
and massive inputs of foreign aid, the economy gradually returned 
to the levels of the late 1960s, but it was still among the world's 
poorest and least developed countries. 

The main government institution responsible for coordinating 
national rehabilitation and development was the Planning Com- 
mission. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the first president of 
Bangladesh, led the formation of the national-level Planning Com- 
mission, which prepared plans that directed economic priorities for 
five-year periods. The First Five- Year Plan covered the period July 
1973 to June 1978. It was succeeded by a two-year plan, covering 
the period July 1978 to June 1980, which was followed by a year- 
long hiatus. The Second Five- Year Plan (1981-85) and the Third 
Five-Year Plan (1985-90) put the planning process back on track. 
The broad objectives of the Third Five-Year Plan were to reduce 
poverty, bring down the rate of population growth to 1.8 percent 
annually, increase exports by 5.9 percent and domestic savings by 
10 percent, attain self-sufficiency in food production, and realize 
an annual growth of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) of 5.4 percent. These ambitious goals went well beyond the 
previous actual performance of the economy. 

Five-year plans are financed through the development, or capi- 
tal budget, which was separate from the government's revenue, 
or administrative, budget. The Third Five-Year Plan envisaged 
a total outlay of more than US$12 billion, approximately 65 per- 
cent of which was destined for public sector projects. About 55 per- 
cent of the needed funds were to come from foreign sources, 
including private investment, the aid programs of international 
financial institutions, and bilateral donor nations. Foreign com- 
mitments in the early and mid-1980s were around US$1.7 billion 
per year (exclusive of external private investment, which in any 
case was not significant). The portion of the development budget 
to come from domestic sources (45 percent) represented a substantial 
increase from the 15 to 20 percent of earlier development budgets. 

The Planning Commission translates the multiyear development 
plan into public investment through the Annual Development 
Programme. The commission also ensures that public programs 
and policies are in conformity with its long-term strategy through 
its project approval process and through its advisory position 
on the country's highest economic decision-making bodies, the 
National Economic Council and its Executive Committee. The 
National Economic Council in the late 1980s was chaired by the 



103 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

president of Bangladesh and included all government ministers plus 
the governor of the Bangladesh Bank and the deputy chairman and 
members of the Planning Commission. The Executive Committee 
of the National Economic Council made most of the decisions on 
major development projects and development issues in general. The 
committee included the ministers of key economic sectors (finance, 
planning, industries, commerce, and public works) and, accord- 
ing to the agenda, any other sectors concerned. A third organi- 
zation involved in the planning mechanism is the Project Evaluation 
Committee, which monitors the progress of five-year-plan 
programs. 

Government Budget Process 

Revenue Budget 

The annual budget is prepared by the Ministry of Finance and 
presented to Parliament for approval each year, except during 
periods of martial law, when the budget has been announced by 
the martial law administration. It is divided into a revenue budget 
and a development budget, on both the receipts and the expendi- 
tures sides. 

The revenue budget pays for the normal functioning of the 
government and is intended to be fully financed from domestically 
generated sources. The fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1988 revenue 
budget was based on anticipated receipts of about US$1 .6 billion, 
or approximately Tk48.9 billion (for value of the taka — see Glos- 
sary). Expenditures were to be US$1.5 billion, leaving a surplus 
of US$130 million for development. The previous year a revenue 
surplus of US$246 million was applied to the development budget. 

Tax revenues, almost half of them from customs duties, 
accounted for about 80 percent of revenue receipts. Excise duties 
and sales taxes also were important, each producing more revenue 
than taxes on income, which yielded only about US$150 million 
according to the revised budget in FY 1985. That amount repre- 
sented less than US$2 per capita income tax. The largest part of 
the nontax revenue — making up 20 percent of the revenue budget 
in the late 1980s — came from the nationalized sector of the 
economy, including industrial enterprises, banks, and insurance 
companies. 

Even by the standards of developing countries, Bangladesh's ratio 
of taxes to GDP, and of direct tax revenue to total tax revenue, 
was very low. In 1984 taxes amounted to only 8.1 percent of 
GDP, just half the percentage for India, less than half the average 
for 82 other developing countries, and far below the average of 



104 



Country boats on the Buriganga River; 
larger craft can be seen in the background 
Courtesy Biman Bangladesh Airlines 

29.7 percent for the developed countries. Similarly, the 20.1 per- 
cent of tax revenue coming from direct taxation was one of the 
lowest in the world (the average for developing countries was 29.3 
percent, for industrialized countries 34.2 percent). Most of the 
population was exempted from direct taxation because its income 
fell below the poverty line; the cost of collection probably would 
have exceeded the revenue potential. For higher incomes, the sys- 
tem provided incentives for savings and investment, rather than 
seeking to maximize tax revenue. The central government oper- 
ated on revenue of less than US$20 per person. 

The expenditures side of the revenue budget put the largest single 
block of funds into education, totaling 17.3 percent of the FY 1988 
budget. Defense spending took 17.2 percent of the budget; if 
expenditures for paramilitary forces and the police are added to 
the portion for defense, the figure rises to nearly 23.8 percent of 
the budget (see Defense Spending, ch. 5). Debt service, general 
administration, and health, population, and social planning each 
accounted for about 20 percent of expenditures. 

Development Budget 

The development budget is presented to Parliament at the same 
time as the revenue budget each year. The FY 1988 development 



105 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

budget called for resource mobilization of US$1.6 billion, the 
majority of which — more than 85 percent — was to be provided by 
foreign grants and loans. The great bulk of capital expenditures 
went to the Annual Development Programme. 

The FY 1988 Annual Development Programme provided financ- 
ing for 818 projects, including 684 investment projects, 80 techni- 
cal assistance projects, and 54 public sector-funded projects. Almost 
all the projects were carryovers continued from previous years. The 
Annual Development Programme directed new project financing 
to particular sectors, consistent with the goals of the five-year plans. 
For example, large portions of the FY 1988 Annual Development 
Programme were earmarked for power projects (17.5 percent of 
expenditures), water resources development (11 percent), and 
infrastructure (23.4 percent). Looked at from another perspective, 
the FY 1988 program called for overall expenditures 11.3 percent 
higher than the previous year, but certain sectors were to receive 
much greater increases than the average: agriculture, 40.7 per- 
cent; rural development, 32.3 percent; water resources, 26.5 per- 
cent; health, 28.8 percent; family planning, 23.1 percent; education, 
33.6 percent; and oil, gas, and natural resources, 26.5 percent. 
Since independence these trends changed annually because demands 
of particular projects absorbed disproportionate amounts of capi- 
tal and because some sectors were more capital intensive than 
others. 

Joint Ventures and Foreign Investment 

Despite its early concentration on developing a socialist economy, 
the government became increasingly open to private investment. 
The 1974 New Investment Policy restored certain rights to private 
and foreign investors. In December 1975, President Ziaur Rahman 
promulgated the Revised Investment Policy, which allowed greater 
private sector activity and authorized joint ventures with public 
sector corporations in a number of previously reserved areas, 
provided that the government retained 51 percent ownership. The 
Dhaka Stock Exchange was reactivated in 1976, and the Bangladesh 
Investment Corporation was established the same year to provide 
financing for bridge construction and underwriting facilities to the 
private sector. Investment ceilings for private industry were 
abolished in 1978. Then, in 1980, the government delineated a 
more liberal attitude toward foreign direct investment in the For- 
eign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act. Growth 
of investment nonetheless remained slow, and industry was still 
dominated by relatively inefficient public enterprises and governed 
by an elaborate system of administrative controls. 



106 



The Economy 



In June 1982, the new government of Hussain Muhammad 
Ershad introduced its own New Industrial Policy, calling for a sig- 
nificant increase in private sector activity and denationalization of 
selected public sector enterprises. The government transferred 650 
industrial enterprises to private hands, leaving only 160 under public 
ownership. In 1986 the government announced a comprehensive 
revision of its industrial policy, setting out objectives and strate- 
gies to accelerate the pace of industrialization. The policy also 
emphasized private and foreign investment in high technology, 
export-oriented, and labor-intensive industries. The revised policy 
increased the number of sectors open to private investment, liber- 
alized the tariff structure, reduced quantitative import restrictions, 
and furthered privatization of state-managed enterprises. 

The role of the public sector in the late 1980s was limited to seven 
fields: arms, ammunition, and sensitive defense equipment; elec- 
trical power generation, transmission, and distribution; manage- 
ment and exploitation of reserved forests; telecommunications; air, 
water, and railroad transportation; atomic energy; and currency 
note printing and coin minting. In addition, public sector involve- 
ment was still possible, alone or jointly with private participants, 
in projects where investment was not forthcoming from the private 
sector. The only consistent money-makers among public sector 
industrial corporations were the Bangladesh Petroleum Corpora- 
tion (Tk248 crore in FY 1986; for value of the crore — see Glossary), 
the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (Tkl8.7 crore), 
and the Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation 
(Tk5.8 crore) (see Joint Ventures and Foreign Investment, this ch.). 

In 1987 an amendment to the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalisation) Ordinance was adopted, providing the legal basis 
for plans to sell up to 49 percent of government shares in remain- 
ing nationalized enterprises. The fact that the government would 
retain the majority was understood by some as a political gesture 
to workers and entrenched management opposed to privatization. 

An export processing zone was established officially at the port 
city of Chittagong in 1980 (see fig. 1). But because of political 
controversy and indecision surrounding the project from the 
moment it was proposed, the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones 
Authority did not actually begin functioning until March 1983, 
when a program of inducements was offered to investors opening 
up enterprises. Zone enterprises enjoyed a tax holiday of 5 years 
(10 years for pioneer industries), subsequent rebate of 50 percent 
of income tax on export sales, freedom from duties on both imports 
and exports, and guaranteed full repatriation of profits and capital. 



107 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Additional export processing zones were contemplated for Khulna 
and Dhaka. 

Bilateral Investment 

In addition to the broad policies encouraging foreign investment, 
the government of Bangladesh has entered into bilateral investment 
treaties with eight countries: Belgium, Britain, Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany), France, the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea), Romania, Turkey and the United States. As of early 
1988, similar treaties were at various stages of negotiation with 
ten other countries. These treaties included such assurances as 
unrestricted currency transfers, compensation for expropriation, 
dispute settlement procedures, and taxation treatment. In addi- 
tion, Bangladesh has signed agreements for the avoidance of double 
taxation with Britain, Canada, Sweden, Singapore, and South 
Korea. 

Even with a reasonably attractive framework in place, the flow 
of private capital to Bangladesh has been slow. Estimates from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development indi- 
cated that for the 1980-84 period foreign direct investment in Ban- 
gladesh averaged only US$3.4 million per year. The Bangladesh 
Ministry of Industries listed just sixty-eight existing and forty-one 
"sanctioned" joint venture and multinational companies in Ban- 
gladesh in 1987. The largest amounts of foreign private investment 
were from other Asian countries — Japan foremost, with smaller 
amounts from South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong — and from Britain and other countries in Western Europe. 
American investment of about US$20 million in 1987 was concen- 
trated in the physical assets of a life insurance company, the 
manufacturing operations of three pharmaceutical firms, and a 
vegetable oil processing and storage plant. 

Money and Banking 

Currency Fluctuation 

At independence the value of the taka, Bangladesh's unit of cur- 
rency, was set between 7.5 and 8.0 to US$1. With the exception 
of FY 1978, the taka's value relative to the dollar declined every 
year from 1971 through the end of 1987. To help offset this 
phenomenon, Bangladesh first used the compensatory financing 
facility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) 
in FY 1974. Despite the increasing need for assistance, the Mujib 
government was initially unwilling to meet the IMF's condi- 
tions on monetary and fiscal policy. By FY1975, however, the 



108 



The Economy 



government revised its stance, declaring a devaluation of the taka 
by 56 percent and agreeing to the establishment by the World Bank 
of the Bangladesh Aid Group (see Foreign Assistance, this ch.). 

Between 1980 and 1983, the taka sustained a decline of some 
50 percent because of a deterioration in Bangladesh's balance of 
payments. Between 1985 and 1987, the taka was adjusted in fre- 
quent incremental steps, stabilizing again around 12 percent lower 
in real terms against the United States dollar, but at the same time 
narrowing the difference between the official rate and the preferen- 
tial secondary rate from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. Accompanying 
this structural adjustment was an expansion in the amount of trade 
conducted at the secondary rate, to 53 percent of total exports and 
28 percent of total imports. In mid- 1987, the official rate was rela- 
tively stable, approaching Tk31 to US$1. 

The Banking System 

The banking system at independence consisted of two branch 
offices of the former State Bank of Pakistan and seventeen large 
commercial banks, two of which were controlled by Bangladeshi 
interests and three by foreigners other than West Pakistanis. There 
were fourteen smaller commercial banks. Virtually all banking ser- 
vices were concentrated in urban areas. The newly independent 
government immediately designated the Dhaka branch of the State 
Bank of Pakistan as the central bank and renamed it the Bangladesh 
Bank. The bank was responsible for regulating currency, controlling 
credit and monetary policy, and administering exchange control 
and the official foreign exchange reserves. The Bangladesh govern- 
ment initially nationalized the entire domestic banking system and 
proceeded to reorganize and rename the various banks. Foreign- 
owned banks were permitted to continue doing business in Ban- 
gladesh. The insurance business was also nationalized and became 
a source of potential investment funds. Cooperative credit systems 
and postal savings offices handled service to small individual and 
rural accounts. The new banking system succeeded in establish- 
ing reasonably efficient procedures for managing credit and foreign 
exchange. The primary function of the credit system throughout 
the 1970s was to finance trade and the public sector, which together 
absorbed 75 percent of total advances. 

The government's encouragement during the late 1970s and early 
1980s of agricultural development and private industry brought 
changes in lending strategies. Managed by the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank, a specialized agricultural banking institution, lending to 
farmers and fishermen dramatically expanded. The number of rural 
bank branches doubled between 1977 and 1985, to more than 3,330. 



109 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Denationalization and private industrial growth led the Bangladesh 
Bank and the World Bank to focus their lending on the emerging 
private manufacturing sector. Scheduled bank advances to private 
agriculture, as a percentage of sectoral GDP, rose from 2 percent 
in FY 1979 to 1 1 percent in FY 1987, while advances to private 
manufacturing rose from 13 percent to 53 percent. 

The transformation of finance priorities has brought with it 
problems in administration. No sound project-appraisal system was 
in place to identify viable borrowers and projects. Lending insti- 
tutions did not have adequate autonomy to choose borrowers and 
projects and were often instructed by the political authorities. In 
addition, the incentive system for the banks stressed disbursements 
rather than recoveries, and the accounting and debt collection sys- 
tems were inadequate to deal with the problems of loan recovery. 
It became more common for borrowers to default on loans than 
to repay them; the lending system was simply disbursing grant assis- 
tance to private individuals who qualified for loans more for politi- 
cal than for economic reasons. The rate of recovery on agricultural 
loans was only 27 percent in FY 1986, and the rate on industrial 
loans was even worse. As a result of this poor showing, major donors 
applied pressure to induce the government and banks to take firmer 
action to strengthen internal bank management and credit dis- 
cipline. As a consequence, recovery rates began to improve in 1987. 
The National Commission on Money, Credit, and Banking recom- 
mended broad structural changes in Bangladesh's system of finan- 
cial intermediation early in 1987, many of which were built into 
a three-year compensatory financing facility signed by Bangladesh 
with the IMF in February 1987. 

One major exception to the management problems of Ban- 
gladeshi banks was the Grameen Bank, begun as a government 
project in 1976 and established in 1983 as an independent bank. 
In the late 1980s, the bank continued to provide financial resources 
to the poor on reasonable terms and to generate productive self- 
employment without external assistance. Its customers were land- 
less persons who took small loans for all types of economic activi- 
ties, including housing. About 70 percent of the borrowers were 
women, who were otherwise not much represented in institutional 
finance. Collective rural enterprises also could borrow from the 
Grameen Bank for investments in tube wells, rice and oil mills, 
and power looms and for leasing land for joint cultivation. The 
average loan by the Grameen Bank in the mid-1980s was around 
Tk2,000 (US$65), and the maximum was just Tkl8,000 (for con- 
struction of a tin-roof house). Repayment terms were 4 percent 
for rural housing and 8.5 percent for normal lending operations. 



110 



Rickshaws passing University of Dhaka 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 

The Grameen Bank extended collateral-free loans to 200,000 
landless people in its first 10 years. Most of its customers had never 
dealt with formal lending institutions before. The most remark- 
able accomplishment was the phenomenal recovery rate; amid the 
prevailing pattern of bad debts throughout the Bangladeshi bank- 
ing system, only 4 percent of Grameen Bank loans were overdue. 
The bank had from the outset applied a specialized system of inten- 
sive credit supervision that set it apart from others. Its success, 
though still on a rather small scale, provided hope that it could 
continue to grow and that it could be replicated or adapted to other 
development-related priorities. The Grameen Bank was expand- 
ing rapidly, planning to have 500 branches throughout the coun- 
try by the late 1980s. 

Beginning in late 1985, the government pursued a tight mone- 
tary policy aimed at limiting the growth of domestic private credit 
and government borrowing from the banking system. The policy 
was largely successful in reducing the growth of the money supply 
and total domestic credit. Net credit to the government actually 
declined in FY 1986. The problem of credit recovery remained a 
threat to monetary stability, responsible for serious resource mis- 
allocation and harsh inequities. Although the government had 
begun effective measures to improve financial discipline, the 



111 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

draconian contraction of credit availability contained the risk of 
inadvertently discouraging new economic activity. 

Foreign exchange reserves at the end of FY 1986 were US$476 
million, equivalent to slightly more than 2 months worth of imports. 
This represented a 20-percent increase of reserves over the previ- 
ous year, largely the result of higher remittances by Bangladeshi 
workers abroad. The country also reduced imports by about 10 
percent to US$2.4 billion. Because of Bangladesh's status as a least 
developed country receiving concessional loans, private creditors 
accounted for only about 6 percent of outstanding public debt. The 
external public debt was US$6.4 billion, and annual debt service 
payments were US$467 million at the end of FY 1986. 

Foreign Assistance 

Test Case for Development 

Independent Bangladesh, from the beginning, has been regarded 
as a test case for development by economists, policymakers, and 
program administrators of donor countries and international finan- 
cial institutions. Interest in the area predated political independence, 
as East Pakistan represented the world's most extreme case of popu- 
lation growth outstripping resources. Because Pakistan was a single 
country, project design and approval processes occurred at the 
national level. West Pakistan, also poor, appropriated most com- 
modity aid, capital, and technical and project assistance. The people 
of East Pakistan considered the attention they received to be 
inadequate and inequitable (see Emerging Discontent, 1966-70, 
ch. 1). 

In October 1974, the Bangladesh Aid Group was established 
under the aegis of the World Bank, with twenty-six participating 
governments and institutions. Commitments of the aid group were 
US$551 miUion in FY 1974 and US$1 .2 billion the following year. 
Aid to Bangladesh has remained at a high level since the consor- 
tium came into existence, although with substantial fluctuations 
in new commitments from year to year. After the high initial com- 
mitments, the figure fell to US$964 million in FY 1976 and to 
US$744 million the following year, before turning upward again. 
Fiscal year 1979 was another breakthrough period, with new com- 
mitments of nearly US$1 .8 billion, a figure surpassed 3 years later 
when the level reached US$1.9 billion, the all-time high through 
FY 1987 (see table 10, Appendix). 

In the 1980s, the value of food aid declined to around 11 to 18 
percent of new aid commitments, most of it given on a grant basis. 
Commodity aid — about 25 percent of aid commitments to 



112 



The Economy 



Bangladesh — included key items for increasing productivity, such 
as fertilizer, cement, steel, pumps, and other equipment. Project 
assistance accounted for more than 50 percent of new commitments. 
This form of aid was preferred by the largest donors because their 
funds are put to work in well-defined ways that can be related to 
policy objectives. From the beginning, the Bangladesh government 
has been unable to use project funds at the same rate as they are 
authorized. As a result, a pipeline of authorized but undisbursed 
project funds has grown bigger every year. The undisbursed project 
assistance pipeline was expected to exceed US$5 billion in 1988 
and to continue to grow after that. Not until the 1990s at the earliest 
could Bangladesh hope to begin reducing the backlog of undisbursed 
funds. 

Disbursement figures did not account for Bangladeshi repayments 
of principal and interest on previous loans. In FY 1986, for example, 
Bangladesh paid out US$1 17 million against principal and US$72 
million in interest in connection with earlier aid disbursements. 
Thus the gross US$1.3 billion in disbursement of foreign aid that 
year netted an inflow of US$1 . 1 billion. Although these funds were 
equal to almost 10 percent of Bangladesh's GDP, they averaged 
only about US$12 per person, hardly a scale to bring about dramatic 
improvement in the economy's performance. 

Because much of the funding for the development budget in the 
mid-1980s was financed by external donors, the Bangladesh govern- 
ment had to attract financing for high-priority sectors and projects. 
Coordination was carried on at all times between the government 
and individual donors, but the keynote each year was a meeting 
organized by the World Bank as leader of the Bangladesh Aid 
Group. At these meetings Bangladesh's finance minister presented 
his government's development plans for the coming year and sought 
pledges from the major donors for as much of the Annual Develop- 
ment Programme as possible. The donors also made presentations 
at the meeting, including assessments of the performance of the 
Bangladesh economy in general and of the development plans of 
the government in particular, as background to their views on the 
realism and appropriateness of the priorities adopted in the five- 
year plan. These meetings, alternating between Washington and 
Paris, were the formal culmination of a process that went on year- 
round. In the late 1980s, the main coordination point with foreign 
donors was the External Resources Division of the Ministry of 
Finance, which monitored development projects and administra- 
tive and management aspects of planning. 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Aid Dependence 

International Banks 

The World Bank has taken the lead in addressing some of the 
most deep-seated structural constraints in Bangladesh's economy 
by providing productive employment for those without assets, 
promoting economic opportunities for women, and addressing the 
social and economic inadequacies of education, health, nutrition, 
and population programs. Among aid projects were the Irrigation 
Management Programme, which supports drainage and flood con- 
trol as well as the introduction of pumps and drills; support for 
maintenance of the nation's more than 43,000 primary schools 
(including repairs to existing buildings, additions to accommodate 
larger numbers of pupils, and construction of new schools where 
needed); and the 500,000-ton Ashuganj fertilizer complex, utiliz- 
ing domestic natural gas, which came on stream in 1981 . The World 
Bank has made loans to Bangladesh only from its "soft window," 
the International Development Association. These interest-free 
loans provide for a 10-year grace period before repayment of prin- 
cipal begins and a 40-year repayment schedule, with the addition 
of a service charge of 1.5 percent. 

The Asian Development Bank was the second largest donor, after 
the International Development Association, to Bangladesh's devel- 
opment in the 1980s. As of the end of 1985, the Bank had approved 
66 loans totaling US$1 .8 billion. In 1985 alone, the bank approved 
loans of US$212.3 million for 6 new projects (down from US$306.8 
million for 4 projects the year before). In addition, the bank pro- 
vided local currency financing of US$59.8 million for 3 projects, 
cofmancing of US$10.5 million to projects with other donors, and 
a program loan of US$39 million for provision of fertilizer. About 
half of the Asian Development Bank's financing has gone to agricul- 
ture and agro-industry. The 1985 package, for example, included 
a livestock development project intended to increase food produc- 
tion and improve rural incomes through expansion of veterinary 
services and livestock nutrition. In 1987 the Asian Development 
Bank approved a technical assistance grant (cofmanced by the Nor- 
wegian government) to explore the feasibility of growing rubber 
trees commercially in Bangladesh. The Asian Development Bank 
also has been active in the development of natural gas (see Mineral 
Development, this ch.). In 1987 the bank approved a US$74 mil- 
lion loan for construction and extension of natural gas transmis- 
sion and distribution pipelines to 5 districts in eastern Bangladesh. 
The loan was intended to cover 71 percent of project costs, includ- 
ing all of the foreign exchange requirements for the project. The 



114 



The Economy 



bank has also supported transportation projects (development and 
improvement of feeder roads between local markets and primary 
roads, inland waterways, and railroads) and social welfare schemes 
for population control, health, and education. 

United Nations 

In the mid-1980s, the United Nations Development Programme 
operated its own development projects and coordinated the activi- 
ties of other United Nations (UN) agencies with programs in Ban- 
gladesh, including the World Food Programme, World Health 
Organization, United Nations Industrial Development Organiza- 
tion, and United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Typi- 
cally, these agencies provided technical assistance and training. 
They often functioned as catalysts by doing analytical and policy 
development work alongside Bangladesh government authorities, 
preparing the ground for well-conceived programs requiring capi- 
tal expenditures to be financed by other donors or even by the Ban- 
gladesh treasury. 

Foreign Governments and Private Donors 

The United States aid program to independent Bangladesh began 
even before the United States formally established diplomatic rela- 
tions with the new nation in April 1972. Large quantities of emer- 
gency food aid were sent to help cope with the postwar famine 
situation. Project assistance through the United States Agency for 
International Development (AID) began in 1973 with a major pro- 
gram of reconstruction and infrastructure rehabilitation. In the 
course of time, that emphasis evolved into economic development 
focused primarily on three broad sectors: improved soil fertility, 
food security, and increased off-farm employment. By September 
1987, United States assistance totaled US$2.8 billion. The United 
States was the most important donor until the early 1980s when 
Japanese aid reached similar levels. 

Food aid has been a mainstay of the AID program. Through 
1987 the United States provided more than 6.5 million tons of 
wheat, more than 1 million tons of rice, and some 350,000 tons 
of edible oil. Since 1979 all such aid has been on a grant basis. 
The Public Law 480 (PL-480) program of food and other agricul- 
tural commodity assistance has accounted for half of the dollar value 
of United States government aid over the years. In the mid-1980s, 
the PL-480 program ranged from US$85 million to US$110 mil- 
lion per year. In FY 1986, a high year, the United States provided 
586,000 tons of wheat, 63,000 tons of rice, almost 25,000 tons of 
edible oil, and 58,000 bales of cotton. Commercially procured 



115 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

quantities of those commodities by Bangladesh in that period 
included 1.12 million tons of wheat, 34,000 tons of rice, 146,000 
tons of edible oil, and 179,000 bales of raw cotton. 

The PL-480 program fit into an overall development strategy 
to increase agricultural production and provide rural employment. 
Thus the wheat provided under Title II in the late 1980s was part 
of food-for-work programs, providing payment to workers who 
upgraded local footpaths and seasonal roads. The sales proceeds 
of supplemental PL-480 shipments financed a program of bridge 
and culvert construction on these food-for-work roads. 

The commodities shipped under the larger PL-480 Title III pro- 
gram in the mid-1980s provided support to domestic food produc- 
tion and ensured that food was available to the most nutritionally 
disadvantaged population. Local currency generated from sales 
financed agricultural research, irrigation, and employment — 
projects essential to the Bangladesh government's goal of national 
food self-sufficiency — and increased personal incomes, thereby 
effectively increasing demand for food. 

Other than food aid, the dollar value of United States develop- 
ment assistance stabilized between US$75 million and US$85 mil- 
lion annually in the mid-1980s and declined to US$58.5 million 
for FY 1988, largely because of general pressures on the United 
States budget for foreign development programs. The long-term 
trend remained intact, with the cash value of United States assis- 
tance about evenly divided between food aid and project assistance. 

As the "largest poorest" country, and because its government 
has been hospitable to foreign assistance, Bangladesh has been 
chosen by several of the so-called richer smaller countries as a coun- 
try of concentration for their own efforts. Thus, in addition to the 
programs of Britain, Japan, and West Germany, significant aid 
programs were initiated by Canada, Sweden, Finland, the Nether- 
lands, Switzerland, Australia, and others, in which each country 
concentrated on areas where it possessed special expertise. 

In the mid-1980s, a number of these donor countries — calling 
themselves "the like-minded donors" — jointly studied the trend 
of development assistance in Bangladesh. They concluded that the 
quality of life in Bangladesh was declining for the vast rural 
majority, and they faulted the way the Bangladesh government 
determined and administered its development priorities and the 
way the aid donors organized and carried out their own assistance 
programs. They presented a report to the Bangladesh Aid Group 
in 1986 suggesting changes in emphasis in favor of greater con- 
centration on programs responsive to the deepest needs of the poor: 
better health care, better nutrition, greater literacy, a more effective 



116 



The Economy 



approach to family planning, and greater economic opportunities 
for poor and landless farmers and for women. Although the analysis 
and conclusions engendered some controversy, the report influenced 
the direction of aid efforts by the entire Bangladesh Aid Group, 
including the most important donor and the group's founder, the 
World Bank. 

Economic assistance has come to Bangladesh through the Soviet 
Union and East European countries and through oil-producing 
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Much of 
the aid from these donors has taken the form of construction, equip- 
ment, and training. Moscow committed US$132 million for aid 
to Bangladesh immediately after independence, but disbursement 
proved to be very slow. In subsequent years, the Soviets figured 
prominently in power generation, and as of the end of 1987 
the Soviet Union appeared to have agreed to extend more aid for 
power generation, transmission, and distribution and also for oil 
exploration. 

Although relatively modest in monetary terms, the assistance of 
private voluntary organizations from the United States and else- 
where has also been important. They have offered assistance on 
a grant basis in fields where return-on-investment criteria cannot 
be applied, such as emergency relief, medical services, and basic 
education. In addition, because of their modest scale and insula- 
tion from international politics, these organizations can sometimes 
venture into activities with a high degree of social experimenta- 
tion, sometimes producing models to be replicated on a larger scale 
by official development assistance. Aside from such well-known 
secular organizations as the International Red Cross and CARE, 
most of the private voluntary organizations had religious affiliations. 

Agriculture 

Structure of Agricultural Production 

Despite progress toward greater industrialization, in the late 
1980s agriculture still accounted for nearly 50 percent of the value 
of Bangladesh's GDP. Approximately 82 percent of the country's 
population lived in rural areas, virtually all of them making their 
living exclusively or substantially from agriculture (see Rural 
Society, ch. 2). Domestic production increased at a relatively steady 
rate in the years following independence, but not fast enough to 
close the gap created by the continued rapid growth in population. 
According to official statistics, the real value of all crops and of 
agricultural production rose every year in the 1980s, but except 
for a 6.1 -percent surge in FY 1981, the gains did not exceed 



117 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

3.8 percent, and in 3 of the years it was less than 1 percent. The 
goal of food self-sufficiency by 1990 was asserted as part of the Third 
Five- Year Plan, but it could be achieved only under optimal con- 
ditions. Bangladesh was still importing an average of 2 million tons 
of food grains each year to meet minimum needs for the subsistence 
of the population. Most of the imports were on a grant or conces- 
sional basis from the United States, the World Food Programme, 
or other food aid donors (see Foreign Assistance, this ch.). 

The agricultural year begins in late February, when the weather 
is dry and getting warmer. Over a period of several weeks each 
field is plowed three or four times; using a wooden plow and two 
oxen, one man can plow 0.02 hectares in an eight- to ten-hour work- 
day. In addition to plowing, field preparation for irrigation involves 
construction and maintenance of plot boundaries half a meter high, 
using earth and weeds from the field. These boundaries also serve 
to retain water in the plots when the rains come a few months later. 
Traditional methods of irrigation include pitcher, swing basket, 
and a hollowed-out log fixed on a pivot and fitted with a counter- 
balance. These methods have a natural grace and beauty and are 
still practiced in rural areas throughout Bangladesh. They offer 
the dual advantages of depending entirely on locally available 
materials and on human power for their operation. In those rural 
areas where electricity is available, tube wells with electric pumps 
are becoming an important irrigation device. 

Absolute production has increased, and there has been an impres- 
sive diversification into a wide variety of seeds and new crops, such 
as wheat and vegetables. In fact, the patterns of agriculture have 
been virtually transformed. A previously self-contained and self- 
reliant subsistence economy has given way to one dependent on 
inputs, credit, markets, and administrative support from outside. 
But the price has been high — literally — and in the late 1980s was 
getting higher. Abu Muhammad Shajaat Ali, in his study of the 
agricultural village of Shyampur, describes the local economy as 
a "near- saturated agroecosystem." Continued population pressure 
has led in many areas to increases in output-per-unit area, but at 
very high rates of diminishing returns to inputs. 

Shyampur exemplified the transformation going on in parts of 
the rural countryside affected by a modern market economy. The 
income of farmers in Shyampur, because of its proximity to Dhaka's 
high-demand urban markets, was greater than in more typical vil- 
lages of Bangladesh. According to Ali, 31 percent of Shyampur' s 
families in 1980 had a farm income greater than US$278 (Tk7,500) 
per year; 40 percent earned between US$93 and US$278; and the 
remaining 29 percent earned less than US$93. Eighty-four percent 



118 




119 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

of farmers were also engaged for at least 100 days per year in off- 
farm work in small businesses or industrial occupations, with 70 
percent of them earning between US$75 and US$295 and 23 per- 
cent receiving more than that. Virtually all of this employment was 
for males. As of 1980, it was rare for village females to be employed 
outside the household. The work they did in raising poultry, cul- 
tivating kitchen gardens, husking paddy, collecting fuel, and assist- 
ing neighboring families was not figured into calculations of income. 

The ownership of agricultural land remained one of the most 
difficult problems, in the Bangladesh countryside. During British 
rule, elite large landowners (zamindars — see Glossary), many of 
them absentee landowners, owned most of the land in East Bengal. 
After 1947 new laws abolished large estates and set limits on the 
amount of land one person could own. Many big Hindu landlords 
moved to India, but the wealthy Muslims who bought up their hold- 
ings became a new landlord elite. Legal ceilings on landownership 
resulted in little extra land for distribution to the poor because land- 
lords arranged ways to vest ownership in the names of relatives. 
As a result, in most villages a few families controlled enough land 
to live comfortably and market a surplus for cash, while a large 
percentage of families had either no land or not enough to support 
themselves. Studies have suggested that in the mid-1980s the richest 
10 percent of the village population controlled between 25 and 50 
percent of the land, while the bottom 60 percent of the population 
controlled less than 25 percent. The disparities between the richest 
and poorest villagers appeared to be widening over time. The large 
number of landless or nearly landless peasants reduced the aver- 
age landholding to only less than one hectare, down more than a 
third since 1971. Because Islamic inheritance law as practiced in 
Bangladesh calls for equal division of assets among all the sons, 
the large population increases led to increased fragmentation of 
landholdings and further impoverishment. Inheritance, purchase, 
and sale left the land of many families subdivided into a number 
of separate plots located in different areas of the village. 

The ready availability of large numbers of poor laborers and the 
fragmented character of many landholdings has perpetuated a labor- 
intensive style of agriculture and unequal tenancy relations. At least 
a third of the households in most villages rent land. The renting 
households range from those without any land of their own to those 
middle-level peasants who try to supplement the produce grown 
on their own land with income from produce grown on additional 
land. Sharecropping is the most common form of tenancy agree- 
ment. Traditional sharecropping arrangements heavily favored the 
landlord over the sharecropper, with a fifty-fifty split of the produce 



120 



The Economy 



and the tenant providing all inputs of labor and fertilizer. After 
decades of rural agitation, the 1984 Land Reforms Ordinance finally 
established the rule of three shares — one-third of the produce for 
the owner, one-third for the sharecropper, and one-third split 
according to the costs of cultivation. Poor peasants who could not 
obtain land as tenants had to work as agricultural laborers or find 
nonagricultural jobs. The 1984 Agricultural Labour Ordinance set 
the minimum daily wage for agricultural labor at 3.28 kilograms 
of rice or its cash equivalent. Employers who broke this rule could 
be brought to village courts and forced to pay compensation twice 
the amount of back wages. However, because village courts were 
dominated by landowners, there was still little official redress for 
the grievances of agricultural laborers. In fact, the structure of rural 
land control kept a great deal of power in the hands of relatively 
small groups of landlords (see Local Elites, ch. 4). 

The Comilla Model, which began in 1959, has been the most 
successful and influential example of cooperative agricultural devel- 
opment in Bangladesh. Projects in Comilla District provided more 
modern technologies to farmers: low-lift water pumps; low-cost 
hand-dug six-inch tube wells; pilot research on adapting thirty-five- 
horsepower tractors for rice cultivation; new crop and animal 
varieties; testing and introduction of such inputs as chemical fer- 
tilizers, pesticides, and high-yield varieties of seeds; and new storage 
and processing technology. These innovations attracted resources 
to local rural institutions, against the prevailing urban orientation 
of the leadership elite. They provided some counterweight to the 
trend of ambitious village people seeking to leave the countryside 
in favor of the cities or foreign countries. Comilla, which received 
substantial assistance from Michigan State University and the Ford 
Foundation, remains a widely admired accomplishment, and the 
Bangladesh Academy of Rural Development, which gave broad 
dissemination to published reports on Comilla' s progress, is world- 
renowned because of it. 

Food Crops 

Rice 

The dominant food crop of Bangladesh is rice, accounting for 
about 75 percent of agricultural land use (and 28 percent of GDP). 
Rice production increased every year in the 1980s (through 1987) 
except FY 1981, but the annual increases have generally been 
modest, barely keeping pace with the population. Rice production 
exceeded 15 million tons for the first time in FY 1986 (see table 
1 1 , Appendix). In the mid-1980s, Bangladesh was the fourth largest 



121 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

rice producer in the world, but its productivity was low compared 
with other Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. High- 
yield varieties of seed, application of fertilizer, and irrigation have 
increased yields, although these inputs also raise the cost of produc- 
tion and chiefly benefit the richer cultivators. 

The cultivation of rice in Bangladesh varies according to seasonal 
changes in the water supply. The largest harvest is aman, occur- 
ring in November and December and accounting for more than 
half of annual production. Some rice for the aman harvest is sown 
in the spring through the broadcast method, matures during the 
summer rains, and is harvested in the fall. The higher yielding 
method involves starting the seeds in special beds and transplant- 
ing during the summer monsoon. The second harvest is aus, 
involving traditional strains but more often including high-yielding, 
dwarf varieties. Rice for the aus harvest is sown in March or April, 
benefits from April and May rains, matures during in the sum- 
mer rain, and is harvested during the summer. With the increas- 
ing use of irrigation, there has been a growing focus on another 
rice-growing season extending during the dry season from October 
to March. The production of this boro rice, including high-yield 
varieties, expanded rapidly until the mid-1980s, when production 
leveled off at just below 4 million tons. Where irrigation is feasi- 
ble, it is normal for fields throughout Bangladesh to produce rice 
for two harvests annually. Between rice-growing seasons, farmers 
will do everything possible to prevent the land from lying fallow 
and will grow vegetables, peanuts, pulses, or oilseeds if water and 
fertilizer are available (see fig. 8). 

Wheat 

Wheat is not a traditional crop in Bangladesh, and in the late 
1980s little was consumed in rural areas. During the 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, it was the only commodity for which local 
consumption increased because external food aid was most often 
provided in the form of wheat. In the first half of the 1980s, domestic 
wheat production rose to more than 1 million tons per year but 
was still only 7 to 9 percent of total food grain production. Record 
production of nearly 1.5 million tons was achieved in FY 1985, 
but the following year saw a decrease to just over 1 million tons. 
About half the wheat is grown on irrigated land. The proportion 
of land devoted to wheat remained essentially unchanged between 
1980 and 1986, at a little less than 6 percent of total planted area. 

Wheat also accounts for the great bulk of imported food grains, 
exceeding 1 million tons annually and going higher than 1.8 mil- 
lion tons in FY 1984, FY 1985, and FY 1987. The great bulk of 



122 



The Economy 



the imported wheat is financed under aid programs of the United 
States, the European Economic Community, and the World Food 
Programme. 

Other Food Crops 

Food grains are cultivated primarily for subsistence. Only a small 
percentage of total production makes its way into commercial 
channels. Other Bangladeshi food crops, however, are grown chiefly 
for the domestic market. They include potatoes and sweet potatoes, 
with a combined record production of 1 .9 million tons in FY 1984; 
oilseeds, with an annual average production of 250,000 tons; and 
fruits such as bananas, jackfruit, mangoes, and pineapples. Esti- 
mates of sugarcane production put annual production at more than 
7 million tons per year, most of it processed into a coarse, unrefined 
sugar known as gur, and sold domestically. 

Industrial Crops 

Jute 

The importance of one cash crop overshadows all else as the 
source of Bangladesh's export earnings. Bangladesh is the world's 
largest producer of jute, a fibrous substance used in making burlap, 
sacks, mats, rope and twine, and carpet backing. Jute is sold on 
the international market either raw or in the form of manufactured 
goods. This so-called "golden fiber" is cultivated on the same land 
as rice; thus each season farmers must decide which crop to plant. 

During the colonial period, when East Bengal was used by the 
British to produce primary goods for processing elsewhere, raw jute 
was the main product. Calcutta became the manufacturing center 
where jute was transformed into twine and rope, sacking mate- 
rial, and carpet backing. The partition of British India in 1947 put 
an international boundary between the source of the basic com- 
modity and the manufacturing center and imposed a great bur- 
den on Pakistan to compensate for the disruption of the industry 
that was its greatest source of foreign earnings. Between 1947 and 
1971 jute mills were constructed in East Pakistan, but industriali- 
zation proceeded slowly. 

In the 1960s, petroleum-based synthetics entered the market, 
competing with jute for practically all of its uses. The upheavals 
culminating in the emergence of independent Bangladesh drove 
many traditional buyers of jute to shift to synthetics. World trade 
in jute and jute goods declined absolutely from 1.8 million tons 
in 1970 to 1.5 million tons in 1982. Despite some major year-to- 
year swings, prices fell precipitously through the mid-1980s. Prices 



123 




Figure 8. Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 



124 



The Economy 



were too low to cover the costs of production, but the government 
nonetheless deemed it essential to subsidize growers and industry 
and ensure the continued existence of as large a foreign market 
as possible. Ironically, Bangladesh's indispendable foreigh exchange 
earner was thus itself a drain on the economy (see Foreign Trade, 
this ch.). 

There have been enormous year-to-year fluctuations both of 
producer prices and of production. An extreme example occurred 
between FY 1984 and FY 1986. Carry-over stocks had been run 
down since the previous production surge in FY 1980, and serious 
floods in 1984 resulted in unanticipated production losses. The price 
doubled to US$600 per ton at the export level, which triggered the 
traditional response of farmers; they planted much more of their 
land in jute, and between one year and the next production rose 
more than 50 percent, from 5.1 million bales in FY 1985 to 8.6 
million bales the following year. History proved true to itself yet 
again when export prices then fell by 50 percent at the export level 
and by more than 30 percent at the farm- gate level. The drop would 
have been even greater had the government not intervened. It 
bought 30 percent of the crop through the Bangladesh Jute Cor- 
poration and persuaded private mills to buy more raw jute than 
justified by their own projections of demand. 

Jute is a highly labor-intensive crop, much more so than rice, 
but the yield per hectare is also higher than is generally achieved 
for rice. When the farm-gate price for jute is 50 percent higher 
than the price for rice, farmers respond by planting more land in 
jute at the expense of rice. With the expansion of irrigation facili- 
ties in the 1980s, the economic incentives to stick with rice have 
increased, but there may be scope for increasing jute production 
by substituting it for the low-yield broadcast aus rice grown on 
unirrigated land during the same season as jute. 

The fact that jute production is so labor intensive has played 
to Bangladesh's strength, given the country's large rural under- 
employment. Because wage rates in Bangladesh have been lower 
than in other jute-producing countries and because Bangladesh has 
the ideal growing conditions for jute, the country has benefited from 
encouraging its production even when world price and demand 
projections have offered bleak prospects. High as Bangladesh's share 
of world trade has been — in 1985 it amounted to 77 percent of all 
raw jute trade and 45 percent of jute goods — there are realistic pos- 
sibilities for expanding the share still further. The World Bank has 
estimated that Bangladesh's share could rise to 84 percent for raw 
jute and 55 percent for manufactures. Jute production appeared 
in the late 1980s to be an essential part of the long-term development 



125 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

plan because, for all the troubles and struggles associated with its 
planting and marketing, no alternative activity offered any promise 
of being more profitable. 

Many economists believe the key to preservation of the viability 
of jute as an international commodity lies in maintaining price and 
supply stability. That has proved a difficult task. Of thirty major 
primary commodities traded internationally, only about six have 
as much price and supply instability as jute. Demand is highly sensi- 
tive to price increases, but not nearly as sensitive to decreases; once 
a portion of the market is lost to synthetics, it is very difficult to 
win it back through price competition. For example, in FY 1986 
export sales remained low despite a 35-percent decline in export 
prices; the fall in world oil prices had also resulted in declines in 
the prices of polypropylene substitutes for jute as well, and most 
buyers that had switched to synthetics chose not to return to jute. 
In the late 1980s, there was nothing in the offing to arrest the trend 
of several decades of decreasing global demand for jute and declines 
in the value of jute relative to the goods Bangladesh must import 
to meet the basic needs of a desperately poor economy. 

The government has an ongoing responsibility to monitor the 
jute situation, to intervene when necessary, and to preserve the 
economic viability of the commodity responsible for one-third of 
the nation's foreign trade earnings. It sets floor prices and becomes 
the buyer of last resort. In 1986 buffer-stock operations were 
extended through the Bangladesh Jute Corporation and resulted 
in the government's buying 30 percent of the entire crop. These 
stocks then become available for use by the government-owned Ban- 
gladesh Jute Mills Corporation or for sale to private mills or over- 
seas customers. But in this case, the limitations of this government 
tool were demonstrated the next year, when the jute crop was of 
normal volume but the price of raw jute fell a further 35 percent, 
to the lowest levels in a decade. The government could not arrest 
the decline because its financial resources and storage capacity were 
already stretched to the breaking point. 

Some hope for a better future has been placed in cooperation 
among jute-producing countries through the International Jute 
Organization, based in Dhaka. Member countries in 1988 were 
the producing countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, 
Nepal, and Thailand and more than twenty consuming countries, 
including the United States. The goals of the fledgling International 
Jute Organization were appropriately modest to begin with, cen- 
tering on better dissemination of basic information, coordination 
of agricultural and industrial research and of economic studies, and 
steps toward coordination of marketing. It remained to be seen in 



126 



Bullock cart hauling produce to market 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 
An outdoor market near Chittagong 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 



127 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

mid- 1988 whether this poorly financed new organization, represent- 
ing the first feeble effort at a coordinated approach to the problems 
of jute, would be effective in arresting its long decline as an impor- 
tant international commodity. 

Forestry Products 

Wood is the main fuel for cooking and other domestic require- 
ments. It is not surprising that population pressure has had an 
adverse effect on the indigenous forests. By 1980 only about 16 
percent of the land was forested, and forests had all but disappeared 
from the densely populated and intensively cultivated deltaic plain. 
Aid organizations in the mid-1980s began looking into the possi- 
bility of stimulating small-scale forestry to restore a resource for 
which there was no affordable substitute. 

The largest areas of forest are in the Chittagong Hills and the 
Sundarbans (see The Land, ch. 2). The evergreen and deciduous 
forests of the Chittagong Hills cover more than 4,600 square kilo- 
meters and are the source of teak for heavy construction and boat 
building, as well as other forest products. Domesticated elephants 
are still used to haul logs. The Sundarbans, a tidal mangrove forest 
covering nearly 6,000 square kilometers along the Bay of Bengal, 
is the source of timber used for a variety of purposes, including 
pulp for the domestic paper industry, poles for electric power dis- 
tribution, and leaves for thatching for dwellings. There is also a 
profitable semiwild honey industry based in the Sundarbans for 
those intrepid or desperate enough to risk it. Not only are the 
bees sometimes uncooperative, but the Sundarbans is also the home 
of the Royal Bengal Tiger, and several instances are reported 
each year of honey collectors or lumbermen being killed by these 
man-eaters. 

Fisheries 

More than 80 percent of the animal protein in the Bangladeshi 
diet comes from fish. Fish accounted for 6 percent of GDP in FY 
1970, nearly 50 percent more than modern industrial manufac- 
turing at that time. Most commercial fishermen are low-caste 
Hindus who eke out the barest subsistence working under primi- 
tive and dangerous conditions. They bring a high degree of skill 
and ingenuity to their occupation; a few of the most enterprising 
ones are aided by domesticated otters, which behave like shepherds, 
swimming underwater, driving fish toward the fisherman's net (and 
being rewarded themselves with a share of the catch). Fish for local 
consumption generally are freshwater varieties. 



128 



Employees of Chittagong garment factory 
returning from lunch 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 

As of the end of 1987, prevailing methods for culturing shrimp 
in Bangladesh were still relatively unsophisticated, and average 
yields per hectare were low. In the late 1980s, almost all inland 
shrimping was done by capture rather than by intensive aquacul- 
ture. Farmers relied primarily on wild postlarval and juvenile 
shrimp as their sources of stock, acquired either by trapping in 
ponds during tidal water exchange or by gathering from local 
estuaries and stocking directly in the ponds. Despite the seemingly 
low level of technology applied to shrimp aquaculture, it became 
an increasingly important part of the frozen seafood industry in 
the mid-1980s (see Export Sectors, this ch.), 

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank financed 
projects to develop shrimp aquaculture in the 1980s. Much of the 
emphasis was on construction of modern hatcheries. Private inves- 
tors were also initiating similar projects to increase capacity and 
to introduce modern technology that would increase average yields. 

Industry 

Traditional Sectors 

The industrial sector produces around 10 percent of GDP, and 
long-term national strategies in the late 1980s did not anticipate a 



129 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

major increase in that percentage. The greatest need and the great- 
est opportunities remained predominantly in the agricultural sector. 

Eastern Bengal was known for its fine muslin and silk fabric 
before the British period. The dyes, yarn, and cloth were the envy 
of much of the premodern world. Bengali muslin, silk, and brocade 
were worn by the aristocracy of Asia and Europe. The introduc- 
tion of machine-made textiles from England in the late eighteenth 
century spelled doom for the costly and time-consuming handloom 
process. Cotton growing died out in East Bengal, and the textile 
industry became dependent on imported yarn. Those who had 
earned their living in the textile industry were forced to rely more 
completely on farming. Only the smallest vestiges of a once-thriving 
cottage industry survived. 

At independence Bangladesh was one of the least industrially 
developed of the populous nations. Annual per capita consump- 
tion of steel and cement was only about one-third that of India, 
for example, and electric power consumption per capita was less 
than one-fifth. 

Ready-made Garments 

The ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh is not the 
outgrowth of traditional economic activities but emerged from 
economic opportunities perceived by the private sector in the late 
1970s. Frustrated by quotas imposed by importing nations, such 
as the United States, entrepreneurs and managers from other Asian 
countries set up factories in Bangladesh, benefiting from even lower 
labor costs than in their home countries, which offset the additional 
costs of importing all materials to Bangladesh. Bangladesh-origin 
products met quality standards of customers in North America and 
Western Europe, and prices were satisfactory. Business flourished 
right from the start; many owners made back their entire capital 
investment within a year or two and thereafter continued to realize 
great profits. Some 85 percent of Bangladeshi production was sold 
to North American customers, and virtually overnight Bangladesh 
became the sixth largest supplier to the North American market 
(see Foreign Trade, this ch.). 

After foreign businesses began building a ready-made garment 
industry, Bangladeshi capitalists appeared, and a veritable rush 
of them began to organize companies in Dhaka, Chittagong, and 
smaller towns, where basic garments — men's and boys' cotton 
shirts, women's and girls' blouses, shorts, and baby clothes — were 
cut and assembled, packed, and shipped to customers overseas 
(mostly in the United States). With virtually no government regu- 
lation, the number of firms proliferated; no definitive count 



130 



The Economy 



was available, but there were probably more than 400 firms by 
1985, when the boom was peaking. 

After just a few years, the ready-made garment industry 
employed more than 200,000 people. According to some estimates, 
about 80 percent were women, never previously in the industrial 
work force. Many of them were woefully underpaid and worked 
under harsh conditions. The net benefit to the Bangladeshi economy 
was only a fraction of export receipts, since virtually all materials 
used in garment manufacture were imported; practically all the 
value added in Bangladesh was from labor. 

Other Industries 

Not all industrial growth in Bangladesh was stimulated by 
anticipation of foreign sales. The national economy stood to benefit 
equally from domestic production that could eliminate the need 
for imports of one kind or another. A good example of import- 
substitution manufacturing was the pharmaceutical industry, a field 
that attracted both foreign and domestic investment in the first 
decade of independence, based on the large potential domestic mar- 
ket. The Drug Ordinance of 1982 introduced controversy and 
claims by foreign firms that they were victims of discrimination 
vis-a-vis local pharmaceutical firms. The foreign firms found that 
the ordinance restricted the kinds of drugs they could manufac- 
ture, import, and sell; specifically, foreign pharmaceutical firms 
could no longer manufacture drugs that Bangladeshi-owned com- 
panies were capable of producing. The difficulties foreign inves- 
tors have encountered seem to have been limited essentially to this 
one industry, and even there the foreign firms already established 
have managed to cope more or less successfully. In 1988 one United 
States firm announced a decision to expand its Bangladeshi 
manufacturing operations by moving into production of highly 
specialized medicines with greater profit margins (see Medicinal 
Drugs and Drug Policy, ch. 2). 

Public sector corporations produced a substantial part of the coun- 
try' s paper and newsprint requirements, as well as carrying on 
sugar-refining operations at modest-sized mills in several parts of 
the country. They also produced about 100,000 tons of steel per 
year, 1 million tons of petroleum products, and gasoline pumps, 
radios, television sets, bicycles, paints and varnishes, cement, and 
industrial chemicals (see table 12, Appendix). 

Mineral Development 

Natural Gas 

One of the country's few mineral resources is natural gas, which 
is the basis for nitrogenous fertilizer production sufficient to meet 



131 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

the country's needs. Estimated national reserves range from 182 
billion to 623 billion cubic meters. Deposits lie in more than a dozen 
different locations, six of which were producing in 1986. The coun- 
try's gas production is concentrated in the northeastern part of the 
country (see fig. 9). Reserves also have been discovered offshore, 
but extraction is not yet cost effective. 

Total gas production in FY 1986 was 2.9 billion cubic meters, 
with production rising at least 10 percent per year. All production 
was consumed domestically. About 40 percent of production was 
used for generating power, nearly 40 percent for producing fer- 
tilizer, and the rest divided among industrial, commercial, and 
household uses. Even by conservative estimates of reserves and con- 
sumption trends, the supply was expected to be adequate for Ban- 
gladesh's requirements through the year 2030. 

Coal 

In western Bangladesh there are substantial proven reserves of 
coal, but they remained unexploited in the late 1980s, largely 
because of the absence of major prospective users in the area. The 
options of constructing a large coal-fired power station or export- 
ing coal to India were being considered in the late 1980s. 

Petroleum 

Bangladesh holds unknown quantities of commercially exploitable 
reserves of petroleum, both on land and offshore. In December 
1986, oil was discovered in the Haripur gas field, south of the city 
of Sylhet, in northeastern Bangladesh. Lucky Well Number Seven 
promptly went into production at the rate of several hundred barrels 
per day, the first commercial oil production in Bangladesh. The 
crude was shipped by rail to the Eastern Refinery in Chittagong, 
where it was combined with other lighter imported crude oil for 
refining. The Eastern Refinery had been operating at just 66 per- 
cent of capacity and processing 34,000 barrels of crude per day. 
The domestic addition did not in itself have much of an impact 
on energy use in Bangladesh, but it was a beginning that fed hopes 
for further development. 

In the late 1980s, the Bangladesh Oil, Gas, and Minerals Cor- 
poration was carrying on further test drilling in western Bangladesh 
as well as in the vicinity of the successful Haripur strike. The govern- 
ment formed a high-level committee under the minister of energy 
and mineral resources to formulate recommendations for stimulat- 
ing oil exploration and extraction in Bangladesh. In 1987 the Soviet 
Union reportedly agreed to provide assistance for oil exploration, 



132 



The Economy 



a broadening of its traditional cooperation in the field of power 
generation, transmission, and distribution. 

Electric Power 

Electric power is generated by a hydroelectric complex in the 
Chittagong Hills and thermal plants in Chittagong and several 
locations in central and western Bangladesh. In 1987 the govern- 
ment announced its intention to proceed with construction of its 
first nuclear power facility, having concluded that the country's 
long-term needs could not be met by continued reliance on natural 
gas reserves. They did not announce how the project would be 
financed, but West Germany was considered the most likely source. 
The country's total generating capacity was 1,141 megawatts as 
of 1986, and the proposed nuclear plant would add between 300 
and 400 megawatts. 

Electric power outages and restrictions on peak-period consump- 
tion were a serious problem in the mid-1980s, resulting in sub- 
stantial productivity losses for jute, textile, and other industrial 
concerns. Government and power board authorities worked out 
a strategy of planned brownouts and shutdowns, which were dis- 
tributed geographically as equitably as possible to minimize eco- 
nomic disruption. Some industrial concerns adopted off-peak work 
schedules, operating their factories in the middle of the night instead 
of in the daytime. 

There were also substantial losses in the transmission and dis- 
tribution of electric power, including many unauthorized hookups 
to the system. The urban distribution system found it difficult to 
persuade subscribers, including state-owned industries, to pay their 
bills. In contrast, the system of rural electrification cooperatives, 
established in the late- 1970s with assistance from the United States 
and other donors, and gradually expanding since then, has demon- 
strated that it is possible to deliver electric power effectively to 
nonurban consumers. Rural electrification immediately transforms 
economic life: within weeks a profusion of consumer goods appears, 
night markets open (complete with tiny cinemas for audiences of 
fifteen or twenty people), and demand for electric irrigation pumps 
soars. 

Biofuels 

At the household level, Bangladesh is the prime example of a 
country in which biofuel supplies (chiefly for cooking) come from 
the agricultural sector. According to data gathered for FY 1986, 
61 percent of biomass energy for fuel use comes from crop residues 
(jute sticks, rice straw, rice hulls, sugarcane refuse, and other waste 



133 



® 


National capital 




Textile mill 




Populated place 


I 


Leather 


G 


Gas field 


Q 


Hydroelectric 


ffe 


Petroleum refinery (g) 


Thermal electric 


£ 


Fertilizer plant 





Jute mill 




20 40 


60 Kilometers 




1 1 — H — 

20 


40 


60 Miles 



Sirajganj 



Chhatak 
Q* . Sylhet 
G 

Fenchuganj . £ 



Habiganj 
& • 



Ghorasal 



Narsinghdi 



Kushtia 



Tongi \, 
Dhaka 



Ashuganj 



Narayanganj 



•Sidqmrganj 
'anganj 

<S*Bakhra\ad 





A 



#ai/ <?/ bengal 



Figure 9. Economic Activity, 1988 



134 



The Economy 



products), 24 percent from animal dung, and the remainder from 
firewood, twigs, and leaves. The firewood typically comes from 
village trees. The importance of cereal straws means that house- 
hold energy supply is highly sensitive to changes in agricultural 
practices and economics and that agricultural policies need to take 
this into account. The future availability of these fuels was becoming 
a critical issue in the mid- and late 1980s. Inevitably, new energy 
resources would have to come from commercial sources. The 
government and aid donors were struggling with the dilemma of 
how to provide these needed resources in a manner consistent with 
the rest of Bangladesh's strategy for long-term economic develop- 
ment and growth. 

Technological Advances 

The Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organi- 
sation operates remote sensing facilities using both French and 
American satellites and applying meteorological and geographic 
data to such basic problems as water management, soil fertility, 
forecasting, and agricultural census work. In 1986 it became the 
first non- American organization ever to receive an award for excel- 
lence from the United States National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, which provided training for Bangladeshi scientists 
and grants of equipment and technical assistance. The Bangladesh 
Atomic Energy Commission operates an experimental nuclear 
reactor and also conducts important agricultural research on seeds, 
parasites, storage of harvested crops, and irradiation. 

Foreign Trade 
Export Sectors 

Jute 

Jute has long been Bangladesh's major foreign exchange earner, 
and although other products have become important, in 1987 jute 
still accounted for more than 50 percent of export revenue, with 
manufactures accounting for an increasing portion of the total (as 
compared with raw jute) (see table 13, Appendix; Industrial Crops, 
this ch.). 

Since independence, Bangladesh's largest customer for jute 
products has been the United States; the bulk of sales has been 
divided fairly evenly between burlap and carpet backing. But, con- 
sistent with the global pattern, the United States market has eroded 
fairly steadily over the years. Sales to the United States reached 
a low of US$81 .8 million in 1986 but increased again to US$104.5 
million in 1987, when both prices and volume rose. The market 



135 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



for jute sacking was assisted by the fact that some recipient coun- 
tries of American food aid specified burlap for their United States 
imports because they had a secondary market for the bags. 

Seafood 

In the 1980s, Bangladesh emerged suddenly and dramatically 
as a major producer of shrimp, frog legs, and fish for export. The 
seafood industry's sudden success resulted primarily from private 
entrepreneurial initiatives, in response to a hospitable international 
market. The natural resources to support a growing fisheries sec- 
tor are abundant, including enormous potential to develop inland 
water bodies, as well as even greater productive areas of coastal 
and offshore waters. Coastal brackish- water shrimp farming was 
more developed and was likely to grow further as investment 
increased, higher technology was brought to the activity, and the 
world market continued buoyant. 

The pace of fishery development was impressive in the 1980s. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, frozen seafood was responsible for 
less than 1 percent of exports or US$3.4 million per year. The figure 
rose to US$40 million in FY 1981, US$113 million in FY 1986, 
and US$86 million in the first 6 months of FY 1987. At that point, 
it was suddenly second only to jute as Bangladesh's most valuable 
export. 

Fresh and frozen shrimp accounted for two- thirds of Bangladesh's 
seafood exports in the mid-1980s; Japan purchased more than half. 
The United States, Belgium, and Britain were the other major 
buyers; the United States was the prime customer for frog legs, 
the largest category after shrimp. 

Garments 

The first ready-made garment factories in Bangladesh aimed at 
the export market were opened in the late 1970s by investors from 
other Asian countries whose exports had been restrained by quotas 
imposed by importing nations. By the mid-1980s, the ready-made 
garment industry had become a strong export earner. Garment 
exports brought receipts of only US$3 million in FY 1981, but by 
1984 exports had risen to US$32 million, and the following year 
revenue soared to US$116 million. For FY 1985 and FY 1986, 
ready-made garments were the second biggest foreign exchange 
earner for Bangladesh after jute. 

The surge in Bangladeshi exports eventually caused a reaction 
among some industrial nations. Canada, the European Economic 
Community, and the United States expressed concern that inexpen- 
sive Bangladeshi garments were flooding their markets. In 1985, 



136 



The Economy 



after a series of notices as called for by multilateral agreements, 
the United States — which was the destination of about 25 percent 
of Bangladesh's garment exports — began imposing quotas on Ban- 
gladeshi garments, one category at a time. 

Bangladeshi manufacturers, working with the government, orga- 
nized with remarkable speed and efficiency to adapt to changing 
conditions. They policed themselves to stay within quotas, allocating 
production quotas according to equitable criteria, and began diver- 
sifying their production into categories where there were not yet 
quotas: for example, cotton trousers, knitwear , dresses, and gloves. 
After a period of adjustment, during which some of the least well- 
established firms closed and workers were laid off, the industry 
began stabilizing, and growth continued at a more moderate pace. 
Exports in FY 1986 rose another 14 percent, to US$131 million, 
and prospects were good for continued growth at about that rate. 

Other Export Industries 

The quality of Bangladesh's tea, grown in the Sylhet hills area, 
is not competitive with tea grown elsewhere in Asia, and during 
the Pakistan period sales were increasingly restricted to West 
Pakistan. The war of independence raised a question about whether 
alternative markets could be found for Bangladesh's tea. Produc- 
tion in FY 1973 was 24 million kilograms, down from 31 million 
kilograms in FY 1970. Pakistan remained interested in Bangladeshi 
tea and again became the chief customer, followed by several Arab 
countries. In the 1980s, production returned to the pre-1971 level 
and was relatively stable from year to year, but prices were not. 
Bangladesh received less than half the value in FY 1986 for vir- 
tually the same amount sold in FY 1984 (US$33 million versus 
US$69 million). As with jute, Bangladesh could hope for little more 
than to preserve — but not expand — its small niche in the world's 
tea trade. 

Bangladesh also holds a small place in the international leather 
trade. World prices were somewhat less volatile than for tea, and 
in the 1980s Bangladesh could count on annual earnings of between 
US$56 million and US$90 million, primarily because of the high 
quality and premium prices of skins from Bangladesh. There was 
little scope for increasing production because competition over land 
and feed kept down the population of cattle and goats. 

In the mid-1980s, fruits, vegetables, and spices also began to 
become important export items. Previously negligible in export 
accounts, in FY 1986 this category brought in nearly US$15 million, 
chiefly from Middle Eastern and British customers. Prospects were 
bright for continued growth of this diversification of Bangladeshi 
agriculture, as external demand was expected to remain lively. 



137 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Balance and Terms of Trade 

Bangladesh has had a negative trade balance since independence 
in 1971. In the mid-1980s, the annual pattern was for exports to 
cover only around 30 percent of the cost of imports (see table 14, 
Appendix). Merchandise exports reached the value of US$1 bil- 
lion in FY 1987 for the first time, and in that year import pay- 
ments were US$2.6 billion, leaving a trade deficit of over US$1.5 
billion, about average throughout the 1980s. The annual deficit 
was limited by government controls to between US$600 and 
US$700 million on capital goods and US$500 million on nonagricul- 
tural industrial commodities. The largest component in the latter 
category was crude oil and petroleum products. In addition, Ban- 
gladesh incurred a debt each year for grain and other food needs, 
always higher than US$200 million, and sometimes going to double 
or even more (at least US$607 million in FY 1985). The country 
had a positive balance on nonfood agricultural production, because 
jute and ready-made garment exports eliminated the deficit in fibers, 
textiles, and garments. 

One way the society has been able to turn its economic problems 
and overpopulation to some advantage is by exporting workers to 
wealthy, Islamic countries, chiefly in the Persian Gulf. The remit- 
tances from these workers have come to constitute one of Ban- 
gladesh's greatest sources of foreign exchange. In FY 1986 
remittances were nearly US$575 million, covering 23.5 percent of 
import financing requirements and substantially exceeding the total 
receipts from jute, the chief export. The government maintained 
records only of new recruits working abroad each year — a peak 
of 77,694 in 1985 — but knowledgeable observers believed that pos- 
sibly as many as 450,000 were overseas at any one time. Through- 
out the 1980s, more than a third went annually to Saudi Arabia 
with a peak of 39,350 new recruits in 1987 (see table 6, Appen- 
dix). Other countries receiving large number of Bangladeshi workers 
in 1987 included the United Arab Emirates (9,953), Kuwait (9,559), 
Qatar (5,831), and Iraq (3,847). Such workers normally contracted 
to remain abroad three years and often stayed several years longer. 
They worked as laborers, under terms negotiated government to 
government, and generally lived under segregated conditions that 
effectively prevented Bangladeshi men (who cannot bring their 
families with them) from assimilating with the local population or 
experiencing non-Bangladeshi ways of life. When they have 
returned to Bangladesh with savings and material acquisitions, they 
generally have had no difficulty fitting back into their society. 



138 



A load of earthen pots on a country boat headed downriver 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 

Other remittances have come from the more highly educated elite 
who are able to take advantage of educational resources at home 
or overseas and who advance to high positions in business, the 
professions, the civil service, or even the military. Some have gone 
abroad — mostly to Britain, the United States, and Canada — and 
many remit savings to relatives in Bangladesh. The government 
extends incentives to all expatriate Bangladeshis to send back some 



139 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

of their savings. They are granted a preferential exchange rate, 
and a portion of their remittances can be turned back into foreign 
currency for purchases from abroad. 

Including remittances as a form of export revenue still left Ban- 
gladesh with a deficit ranging between US$1 .5 billion and US$1 .8 
billion each year during the 1980s. Foreign aid was the essential 
element allowing Bangladesh to steer clear of a critical shortage 
of foreign exchange. 

In FY 1986, the United States was the leading buyer of 
Bangladeshi exports, taking some 25 percent of the total. The 
American portion had increased from 16 percent the year before 
and 12 percent the year before that. The dynamic new element 
was ready-made garments; the United States purchased over 80 
percent of this new industry's production, adding to Bangladesh's 
traditional base of jute manufactures (mostly carpet backing) and 
seafood. The next biggest customer for Bangladesh (but with only 
28 percent of the American volume) was Japan, which chiefly pur- 
chased frozen seafood. Other important customers in FY 1986 were 
Britain, Italy, Pakistan, Singapore, and Belgium. Trade with com- 
munist countries was also significant. Almost 10 percent of exports 
were under barter terms with the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. 

The list of suppliers to Bangladesh is eclectic. In FY 1986, Singa- 
pore was the leading supplier, with 14 percent of the total (up from 
12 percent the previous year). Major supplies were petroleum and 
petroleum products and also vegetable oils and fats. Next was Japan, 
with 13 percent of the total, selling iron and steel, transportation 
equipment, and machinery. In third place was the United States 
with 8 percent (food grains and machinery), followed by South 
Korea (textiles), the United Arab Emirates (petroleum), India 
(textiles and machinery), West Germany (machinery and trans- 
portation equipment), China (assorted products), and Britain 
(machinery, equipment, and sugar products). Other major sup- 
pliers were Canada, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the Nether- 
lands, and Iran (see table 15, Appendix). 

Transportation and Communications 

Inland Waterways and Ports 

The primary transportation system of Bangladesh is its exten- 
sive inland waterways. Some 18.9 million tons of cargo (about 21 
percent of the total) were moved by water transportation in FY 
1986. As of early 1988, the country had 8,430 kilometers of 
navigable waterways, of which up to 3,058 were main cargo routes. 



140 



The Economy 



There are seasonal difficulties in the navigability of rivers and canals 
for the traditional country boats that constitute the great bulk of 
the merchant fleet, but geography and history have made these 
craft the preferred means of moving goods between the ports on 
the Bay of Bengal and the interior and between surplus and short- 
age regions of the country. As of 1987, the Bangladesh Inland Water 
Transport Corporation operated a fleet of more than 480 vessels; 
about half were inland and river barges, and the rest were used 
for coastal trade. The size of the corporation's fleet had been steadily 
declining over the years, but they still represented a substantial 
portion of the registered watercraft. 

The total number of passenger- and cargo-carrying country boats 
plying the vast river system was nearly 300,000 and was increas- 
ing in the mid-1980s. Some of the larger boats use a single sail 
to supplement manpower. The larger boats carry loads up to thirty- 
five tons and operate with crews of three or more. Generally, they 
are built with a raised platform at the stern of the vessel, on which 
a man patiently walks back and forth with a large-paddled oar, 
while others may pole in the shallow water or row from the sides. 
At times, the boats are pulled with ropes from along the shore. 
These boats have a shallow draft, necessary for navigating in the 
extensive but very shallow river system. When loaded, the boats 
sit low in the water. Cargoes of raw jute or logs from the man- 
grove forest of the Sundarbans may fill all the interior space and 
project beyond the gunwales of the boat itself. Other cargoes may 
be bagged or covered with cloth or bamboo meshwork. Country 
boats are estimated to move more than 17 million tons of cargo 
yearly, on a system of at least 1 ,400 launch landings and the major 
river ports of Dhaka, Narayanganj, Chandpur, Barisal, and 
Khulna. Country boats are unsuited for the Bay of Bengal or the 
broad Padma-Meghna estuary. Thus coastal traffic of bulk agricul- 
tural goods is much smaller than inland waterway traffic. 

Traditional and modern means of water transportation meet at 
the seaports of Chittagong and Chalna, where most of Bangladesh's 
imports and exports are transferred between dramatically differ- 
ent kinds of vessels (see River Systems, ch. 2; fig. 10). The 
government-owned Bangladesh Shipping Corporation reportedly 
had twenty-one oceangoing ships in its inventory in 1986, and the 
ships of many other nations called at the major ports. Chittagong, 
the principal port, has an excellent natural harbor and anchorage 
on the Karnaphuli River, about five kilometers from the Bay of 
Bengal. The port facilities were developed after 1947, and by 1970 
Chittagong could berth 20 ships at a time and handle 4 million 
tons of cargo annually. In FY 1985, the port at Chittagong handled 



141 




142 



The Economy 



some 1 ,086 vessels and 6.2 million tons of cargo. Chalna is on the 
Pusur River about sixty-four kilometers south of the river port city 
of Khulna. Chalna was still being developed in the late 1980s, but 
it was rapidly gaining on Chittagong in capacity and in traffic, par- 
ticularly as land and inland waterway connections also were being 
improved to reorient the distribution system of the west and north- 
west areas of the country to the newer port. The port at Chalna 
handled 545 vessels and 2.3 million tons of cargo in FY 1985. 

Road Transportation 

As of 1986, there were about 10,890 kilometers of publicly 
maintained motorable roads in Bangladesh. Despite tremendous 
flood-related maintenance problems, road transportation was an 
increasingly important mode of moving goods and people in the 
1980s. In FY 1986, some 69.7 million tons of goods (77 percent 
of the total moved) were carried on Bangladesh's roads. More than 
half of the roads — about 6,690 kilometers — were paved with 
cement, concrete, or bituminous materials. Secondary and tertiary 
byways were paved primarily with mud-baked bricks, stones, or 
gravel or were made of packed earth. Asphalt and even stone (except 
for small amounts quarried in Sylhet) must be imported, and the 
expense can be justified only for urban streets and main roads 
carrying heavy traffic. Unpaved roads require constant maintenance 
because of their instability and the cycle of flood and drought. The 
food-for-work program supported by the United States and other 
food aid donors makes it possible to support highway development 
by creating jobs to upgrade the primary highway system, by gener- 
ating cash for minor bridges and culverts, and by converting 
seasonal tracks into year-round farm-to-market roads. 

Highway transportation is complicated by the deltaic geogra- 
phy, requiring frequent crossings of streams and rivers, especially 
in east-west travel. There are few major bridges, partly because 
of shifting river courses, and the absence of significant topographical 
features makes bridge building costly. The solution is a prolifera- 
tion of ferryboats of varying size and description. The ferry sys- 
tem operates with remarkable reliability, although capsizings 
sometimes occur, with heavy loss of life. 

Because roads are often in poor condition or travel is difficult, 
motor vehicles are not the preferred mode for interurban commerce. 
As of 1986, the government estimated that there were 136,000 motor 
vehicles in the country, and half of those were motorcycles or auto- 
rickshaws. 

Rickshaw taxis — three-wheeled, two-passenger bicycle-like 
vehicles — play an important role in urban transportation in 



143 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Bangladesh. In 1986 there were 29,400 registered rickshaws oper- 
ating in Dhaka alone. Nationally, according to official statistics, 
there were 182,000 rickshaws in 1986, a 20,000 increase in just 
4 years. Rickshaws were introduced in Dhaka in the late 1930s, 
gradually replacing horse-drawn carriages. The rickshaw opera- 
tor is generally a young, illiterate migrant from a rural area seek- 
ing upward social and economic mobility. The work is physically 
demanding, and the profits are often less than US$1 per day. 
Government authorities have indicated that they hope to eliminate 
bicycle rickshaws in Dhaka and gradually to allow only auto- 
rickshaws, which use motorcycles instead of bicycles. Auto- 
rickshaws, commanding higher fares, would represent a social and 
economic transformation, for the crude, inexpensive, and inele- 
gant bicycle rickshaws respond remarkably well to the conditions 
of life in urban areas and fill an important economic function. 

Railroads 

The railroads carry about 2 percent of the nation's cargo. In 
1986 Bangladesh had about 2,818 kilometers of railroad track, all 
of it owned and operated by the government's Bangladesh Rail- 
ways. Two-thirds of the track (1 ,838 kilometers) was meter gauge, 
and the remainder (980 kilometers) was broad gauge. Much of the 
rail system was rehabilitated in the early 1980s with the assistance 
of an Asian Development Bank loan. 

There were 288 locomotives — mostly diesel powered — serving 
the rail system in 1986. This was a significant decline from the more 
than 500 locomotives operating in the early 1970s. The volume 
of freight carried in more than 19,600 cars steadily decreased in 
the 1980s, however, going from more than 3 million tons in FY 
1982 to 2.3 million tons in FY 1986. Most of the bulk cargo was 
wheat, fertilizer, sugarcane, raw jute, rice, and cement. With more 
than 1 ,660 coaches in use, passenger service was available and popu- 
lar between large towns; there were some 82 million passengers 
in FY 1986. In the late 1980s, the government was attempting to 
improve the quality of that service by adding special fast trains, 
particularly between Dhaka and Chittagong. 

Most rail lines in Bangladesh run from north to south, follow- 
ing the north-south river system, and many freight and passenger 
journeys include a combination of rail and water movement. East- 
west lines exist but are a minor part of the total system. Because 
of the nation's numerous waterways, an average of six bridges or 
culverts are required per kilometer of rail line. As a result, Ban- 
gladesh has some 3,630 rail bridges. Railroad beds, built on the 
only high ground in some parts of the country, provide a refuge 



144 



Biman Bangladesh Airlines DC-10-30 
Courtesy Biman Bangladesh Airlines 

in times of flooding. During periods of high water, trains often are 
the major form of mass transportation. 

Civil Aviation 

The government-owned airline — Biman Bangladesh Airlines — 
was established in January 1972, using some 2,500 former officers, 
crew members, and other employees of Pakistan International 
Airlines. Initially, only domestic service was provided, but within 
its first year service was expanded to include regional and inter- 
continental routes. The national prestige of providing premium 
intercontinental service was underscored in the late 1980s when 
President Ershad himself served as president of Biman. In the late 
1980s, 24 cities in 20 countries were served by Biman, and service 
was provided to 101 cities in 48 countries with the combined ser- 
vice of Biman and other international carriers. Distant cities, such 
as London, Paris, Amsterdam, Rome, Athens, various Middle 
Eastern cities, Bangkok, and Singapore, were served by Biman's 
three McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30s. Domestic airports and near- 
by regional centers, such as Calcutta, Kathmandu, and Rangoon, 
were served with four smaller jets (1960s-vintage Boeing 707-35 lCs) 
and five propeller-driven airplanes (Fokker-27s and Fokker-28s). 

An important part of Biman's business in the 1980s came from 
charter passengers making pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia (22,165 
hajj visits were made in FY 1986) and from Bangladeshi workers 
traveling to and from Middle Eastern countries (see Islam, ch. 2). 
Biman was thus an important earner of hard currency. During 



145 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

FY 1986, Biman carried some 879,000 passengers, slightly more 
than half of whom traveled on its international routes. Neverthe- 
less, it expended a substantial amount of foreign exchange in its 
operations, and the airline's management was criticized for 
employing a large number of people — some 4,500 in mid- 1988 — in 
proportion to the number of aircraft it operated. 

In 1986 there were eighteen airports in Bangladesh: fourteen had 
permanent- surface runways, but only four could accommodate large 
jet aircraft. Zia International Airport, twenty kilometers from 
Dhaka, serves as the national air transportation hub; the Patenga 
Airport at Chittagong, Sylhet Osmany Airport, and the airports 
at Jessore, Rajshahi, and Rangpur also are important flight centers. 

Telecommunications 

Nationwide telecommunications services in 1988 were deficient 
in both quality and quantity. Resources available to the Ministry 
of Communications were inadequate. Bangladesh had a ratio of 
less than 1 telephone per 1 ,000 people, one of the lowest telephone 
densities in the world. Telephone facilities were heavily overbur- 
dened, with a waiting list for telephone service approaching 50,000. 
International service improved in the mid-1980s with the introduc- 
tion of satellite connections through facilities at Bethbunia and 
Talibabad. International and direct-dial facilities existed on a limited 
basis. Most district towns had access to an alternative system for 
urgent communications, in the form of a UHF or VHF radio sys- 
tem or radio relay network (see The Media, ch. 4). Bangladesh 
planned to improve its telecommunications during the Third Five- 
Year Plan (1985-90) by the installation of a digital radio relay net- 
work, automation of telephone exchanges, and the installation of 
a mobile telephone network in Dhaka. 

Tourism 

Despite its poor-country status, increasing numbers of tourists 
have visited Bangladesh, a new but minor source of foreign 
exchange earning. Tourism in the early 1980s amounted to some 
49,000 visitors per year, but by 1986 more than 129,000 tourists — 
mostly from India, the United States, Britain, and Japan — visited 
Bangladesh. According to the Bangladesh Parjaton Corporation 
(Bangladesh Tourism Corporation), some Tk44.6 million in for- 
eign exchange was earned in 1986 from the tourism industry. 

Problems and Prospects 

The Bangladesh government and the Bangladesh Aid Group 
have taken seriously the idea that Bangladesh is the test case for 



146 



The Economy 



development. In the late 1980s, it was possible to say, in the some- 
what patronizing tone sometimes adopted by representatives of 
donor organizations, that Bangladesh had generally been a "good 
performer." Even in straitened times for the industrialized coun- 
tries, Bangladesh remained a favored country for substantial com- 
mitments of new aid resources from a strikingly broad range of 
donors. The total estimated disbursement for FY 1988 was esti- 
mated at US$1.7 billion, an impressive total but just US$16 per 
capita. Half of that total was for food aid and other commodities 
of limited significance for economic growth. Even with the greatest 
imaginable efficiency in planning and administration, resource-poor 
and overpopulated Bangladesh cannot achieve significant economic 
improvements on the basis of that level of assistance. 

In examining the economy of Bangladesh, wherever one turns 
the problems crowd in and threaten to overwhelm the analysis. 
Underlying problems that have threatened the young nation remain 
unsolved. These problems include overpopulation and inadequate 
nutrition, health, and education resources; a low standard of living, 
land scarcity, and vulnerability to natural disaster; virtual absence 
of valuable metals; and inadequate government and bureaucratic 
structures. Yet the brief history of independent Bangladesh offers 
much that is encouraging and satisfying. The World Bank, leader 
of the Bangladesh Aid Group, described the country in 1987 as 
a success story for economic development and expressed optimism 
that the goals of the Third Five- Year Plan, and longer term devel- 
opment goals as well, could be attained. Government policies had 
been effective in stimulating the economy. The private sector had 
benefited from an environment of greater economic freedom and 
had improved performance in banking and production of jute, fer- 
tilizer, ready-made garments, and frozen seafood. The average 
growth rate of economy had been a steady, if unspectacular, 4 per- 
cent since the beginning of the 1980s, close to the world average 
for developing countries. 

The picture of day-to-day and even year-to-year performance 
of the economy of Bangladesh is a mixture of accomplishment and 
failure, not significantly different from that of the majority of poor 
Third World countries. The government and people of Bangladesh 
are entitled to take some pride in the degree of success they have 
achieved since independence, especially when one contrasts their 
success with the gloomy forecasts of economists and international 
experts. The international donor community, led by the World 
Bank, similarly can be proud of the role it has played in assisting 



147 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

this "largest poorest" nation to become a respected member of 
the family of nations. 

* * * 

Works that are useful for gaining a basic understanding of the 
Bangladesh economy include Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation by 
A.M. A. Muhith and The Political Economy of Development by Just 
Faaland and J.R. Parkinson. Rehman Sobhan's The Crisis of External 
Dependence provides an insightful critique of the foreign aid sector. 
Kirsten Westergaard's State and Rural Society in Bangladesh provides 
information on agricultural development in the context of the rela- 
tionship between the state and rural society. Articles by Abu 
Muhammad Shajaat Ali and Akhter Hameed Khan provide agricul- 
tural case studies on the village of Shyampur and the Comilla 
Model, respectively. The Far Eastern Economic Review and Economist 
both carry timely reports on the state of the economy. Among the 
most important sources of information on the economy, however, 
is the documentation provided by various agencies of the govern- 
ments of Bangladesh and the United States and the World Bank. 
Important among these is the annual Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 
published by the Ministry of Planning. The Bibliography of Asian 
Studies each year carries numerous reports on the macroeconomy 
of Bangladesh and should be consulted for details. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



148 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




The Shaheed Minar — monument for martyrs of 
the 1952 language movement, Dhaka 



THE QUEST FOR REPRESENTATIVE government has been 
an important feature of the history of Bangladesh. The indepen- 
dence struggle of the eastern Bengali peoples against the British, 
partition from India in 1947, and secession from Pakistan in 1971 
set the stage for the people of Bangladesh to create a democratic 
political system. The Constitution, as it was initially promulgated 
in 1972, embodied the democratic yearnings of the long struggle 
for independence and guaranteed human rights and political free- 
doms within a system of checks and balances similar to those existing 
in the British and United States governments. But later events ended 
these hopes. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), hero of the 1971 
war of independence, amended the Constitution and assumed dic- 
tatorial powers. His successors, most of whom were military men 
who seized power during various times of trouble, also ruled through 
autocratic means. As a result, successive regimes established single- 
party systems representing military interests, with the leader wield- 
ing almost absolute power. 

Yet the struggle for democracy was still alive in Bangladesh as 
of the late 1980s. The single-party system of the 1970s and 1980s 
was unable to satisfy the varied political movements and interest 
groups of the nation. Opposition parties — although they represented 
conflicting views and were as unwilling as the ruling regime to share 
power — remained a vital force that commanded the loyalties of a 
large proportion of the population. 

Socialist and communist parties, centrist parties representing the 
policies of defunct regimes, and conservative Islamic parties — each 
with a completely different vision of the path that Bangladesh should 
follow but united in their opposition to the rule of President Hussain 
Muhammad Ershad — all vied for power in the late 1980s. Their 
refusal to participate in parliamentary politics under Ershad, who 
had seized power in 1982, relegated the opposition to illegal activities 
and demonstrations on campuses and in the streets that periodi- 
cally brought economic life to a standstill in urban areas. The 
ineffectiveness and confrontational position of the opposition only 
strengthened the regime's hold over Parliament and the civil ser- 
vice and allowed the military to continue its strong autocratic rule. 

Remarkably, the policies of Bangladesh's autocratic military 
rulers have been characterized by a commitment to democratic 
ideals and an adherence to the Constitution. Ershad seized power 
in the name of the Constitution, and he sought to legitimize his 



151 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

position by claiming that he brought stability to the country in order 
to guarantee democratic freedom. One of Ershad's most signifi- 
cant moves toward democracy was the establishment of a system 
of local elections that allowed voters to choose members of local 
representative councils. In the short term, this democratic reform 
allowed local elites to control government patronage, and it also 
made them docile supporters of the regime. Nevertheless, by the 
late 1980s the local councils had become training grounds for new 
political leaders and forums for democratic competition through- 
out the nation. 

Bangladesh has pursued a neutralist policy in international rela- 
tions in a continuing effort to secure economic aid from every pos- 
sible foreign source. Bangladesh in 1988 was one of the few countries 
in the world on good terms with both the United States and the 
Soviet Union and their allies and with China, the Islamic world, 
and most Third World nations. Bangladesh has played an active 
role in the United Nations (UN), the Nonaligned Movement, and 
other international groupings, and it was the driving force behind 
the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, which offered promise for economic cooperation. Ban- 
gladesh was neutral, but it was forceful on a number of interna- 
tional issues. The Cambodian, Palestinian, and South African issues 
have elicited strong stands from Dhaka, and complicated bilateral 
problems with India have invoked intense displays of hostility and 
national pride among Bangladeshis in the years since independence. 

Structure of Government 
Constitution 

The Constitution of Bangladesh has formed the basis for the 
nation's political organization since it was adopted on Novem- 
ber 4, 1972. Many abrupt political changes have caused suspen- 
sion of the Constitution and have led to amendments in almost 
every section, including the total revision of some major provisions. 
It is notable, however, that every regime that came to power since 
1972 has couched major administrative changes in terms of the Con- 
stitution and has attempted to legitimize changes by legally amend- 
ing this basic document. 

According to the Constitution, the state has a positive role to 
play in reorganizing society in order to create a free and equal 
citizenry and provide for the welfare of all. The government is 
required to ensure food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, 
work, and social security for the people. The government must also 
build socialism by implementing programs to "remove social and 



152 



Government and Politics 



economic inequality" and "ensure the equitable distribution of 
wealth among citizens." These far-reaching goals represented the 
viewpoints of many members of the 1972 Constituent Assembly 
and the early Awami League (People's League) government, 
who were deeply influenced by socialist ideology (see Fall of the 
Bangabandhu, 1972-75, ch. 1). Another sector of public opinion, 
however, has always viewed private property and private enter- 
prise as the heart of social and economic development. This view- 
point is also part of the constitutional principles of state policy, which 
equally recognize state, cooperative, and private forms of owner- 
ship. The Constitution thus mandates a high degree of state 
involvement in the establishment of socialism, although it explicitly 
preserves a private property system. In practice, the Constitution 
has supported a wide range of government policies, ranging from 
those of the nationalized, interventionist state of Mujib's time to 
the increasing deregulation and reliance on market forces under 
presidents Ziaur Rahman (Zia) and Ershad. 

The framers of the Constitution, after emerging from a period 
of intense repression under Pakistan, took great pains to outline 
the fundamental rights of citizens even before describing the govern- 
ment 's structure. According to the section on fundamental rights, 
all men and women are equal before the law, without discrimina- 
tion based on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The Con- 
stitution also guarantees the right to assemble, hold public meetings, 
and form unions. Freedom of speech and of the press are ensured. 
Persons who have been arrested must be informed of the charges 
made against them, and they must be brought before a magistrate 
within twenty-four hours. The Constitution, however, adds that 
these guarantees are subject to "any reasonable restrictions imposed 
by law," leaving open the possibility of an administrative decision 
to revoke fundamental rights. Furthermore, there is a provision 
for "preventive detention" of up to six months. Those being held 
under preventive detention do not have the right to know the 
charges made against them, nor to appear before a magistrate, and 
a legal advisory board may extend this form of detention after see- 
ing the detainee. The Constitution does not define the circumstances 
or the level of authority necessary for the revocation of constitu- 
tional guarantees or for the enforcement of preventive detention. 
During the many occasions of civil disorder or public protest that 
have marked Bangladeshi political life, the incumbent administra- 
tion has often found it useful to suspend rights or jail opponents 
without trial in accordance with the Constitution. 

The Islamic religion was the driving force behind the creation 
of Pakistan, and it has remained an important component of 



153 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Bangladeshi ideology. The Constitution as originally framed in 1972 
explicitly described the government of Bangladesh as "secular," 
but in 1977 an executive proclamation made three changes in word- 
ing that did away with this legacy. The proclamation deleted 
"secular" and inserted a phrase stating that a fundamental state 
principle is "absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah." The 
phrase bismillah ar rahman ar rahim (in the name of Allah, the benefi- 
cent, the merciful) was inserted before the preamble of the Con- 
stitution. Another clause states that the government should 
"preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim coun- 
tries based on Islamic solidarity." These changes in terminology 
reflected an overt state policy aimed at strengthening Islamic cul- 
ture and religious institutions as central symbols of nationalism and 
at reinforcing international ties with other Islamic nations, including 
wealthy Arab oil-producing countries. Domestically, state support 
for Islam, including recognition of Islam as the state religion in 
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in June 1988, has not 
led to official persecution of other religions. Despite agitation by 
Jamaat e Islami (Congregation of Islam) and other conservative 
parties, there was no official implementation of sharia (Islamic law) 
as of mid- 1988 (see Islam, ch. 2). 

The Constitution is patterned closely on the British and United 
States models inasmuch as it includes provisions for independent 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. When 
it first came into effect, the Constitution established a British-style 
executive, with a prime minister appointed from a parliamentary 
majority as the effective authority under a titular president. In 1975 
the Fourth Amendment implemented "Mujibism" (named for 
Mujib), mandating a single national party and giving the presi- 
dent effective authority, subject to the advice of a prime minister. 
The later governments of Zia and Ershad preserved the powers 
of the presidency and strengthened the office of the chief executive 
through amendments and their personal control of the highest office 
in the land. Because of this concentration of power in individual 
leaders, the Bangladeshi Constitution gives much greater authority 
to the executive branch than does the United States Constitution. 
In fact, the legislature and the courts have few constitutional avenues 
for checking presidential power, while the executive has many tools 
for dominating the other branches of the government. 

Legislature 

The legislative branch of the government is a unicameral Parlia- 
ment, or Jatiyo Sangsad (House of the People), which makes the 
laws for the nation (see fig. 11). Members of Parliament, who must 



154 



Government and Politics 



be at least twenty-five years old, are directly elected from territorial 
constituencies. Parliament sits for a maximum of five years, must 
meet at least twice a year, and must meet less than thirty days 
after election results are declared. The president calls Parliament 
into session. The assembly elects a speaker and a deputy speaker, 
who chair parliamentary activities. Parliament also appoints 
a standing committee, a special committee, a secretariat, and an 
ombudsman. 

Parliament debates and votes on legislative bills. Decisions are 
decided by a majority vote of the 300 members, with the presiding 
officer abstaining from voting except to break a tie. A quorum is 
sixty members. If Parliament passes a nonmoney bill, it goes to 
the president; if he disapproves of the bill, he may return it to Parlia- 
ment within fifteen days for renewed debate. If Parliament again 
passes the bill, it becomes law. If the president does not return a 
bill to Parliament within fifteen days, it automatically becomes law. 
All money bills require a presidential recommendation before they 
can be introduced for debate in Parliament. Parliament has the 
ability to reject the national budget or to delay implementation. 
It is therefore in the best interests of the executive as well as the 
entire nation that budgets submitted to Parliament should be 
designed to please the majority of its members. The legislature is 
thus a potentially powerful force for enacting laws over the objec- 
tions of the president or for blocking presidential financial initia- 
tives. In practice, however, because most members of Parliament 
have been affiliated with the president's party, the legislature has 
typically served the interests of the president (see The Ershad 
Period, this ch.). 

The Bangladeshi and British parliaments have accommodated 
political parties in a similar manner. After elections, a single political 
party or a coalition of parties must form a government — that is, 
they must form a block of votes within Parliament that guarantees 
the passage of bills they may introduce. Once a parliamentary 
majority is formed, the president chooses the majority leader as 
prime minister and appoints other members of the majority as cabi- 
net ministers. Parliament can function for a full five-year term if 
a single party or coalition can continue to guarantee a majority. 
If, however, opposition members attract enough votes to block a 
bill, the president can dissolve Parliament and call for new 
elections. In order to prevent widespread bribing of members, or 
the constant defection of members from one party to another, 
the Constitution declares that party members who abstain, vote 
against their party, or absent themselves lose their seats imme- 
diately. In practice, whenever Parliament has been in session, a 



155 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



PARLIAMENT 



lis* MUNICIPALITIES 



PRESIDENT 



I 



VICE PRESIDENT 



I 



PRIME MINISTER 
COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS 



CIVIL SERVICE 



DIVISIONS 



REGIONS 



DISTRICTS 



SUBDISTRICTS 



UNIONS 



VILLAGES 



SUPREME COURT 



HIGH COURT 
DIVISION 



APPELLATE 
DIVISION 



REGION COURTS 



DISTRICT COURTS 



SUBDISTRICT 
COURTS 



Elects 

Appoints 

- - - — Convenes 

President appoints 
judges through 
Council of Ministers 



Figure 11. Structure of the Government, 1988 



single party affiliated with the president has been able to command 
a solid majority. 

Executive 

Presidency 

The president, who must be at least thirty-five years old, is 
directly elected by all voters for a five-year term, and according 
to the provisions of the Sixth Amendment (1981) he may be 
reelected. He is commander in chief of the armed forces, oversees 
the conduct of all foreign affairs, appoints the vice president 
for a five-year term, and has the power to convene and dissolve 
Parliament. The president also chooses cabinet ministers, who run 



156 



Government and Politics 



the government bureaucracy; heads a secretariat that devises money 
bills for introduction into Parliament; and appoints the members 
of the Elections Commission, who supervise all aspects of elections. 
In addition, the president appoints, without the need for parlia- 
mentary approval, Supreme Court justices and lower court judges. 
Parliament, in turn, can only impeach the president with a two- 
thirds vote and can only remove the president from office because 
of malfeasance or illness with a vote of three-fourths of its members. 

The president has a number of extraordinary constitutional 
means of wielding power and influence. In the case of a constitu- 
tionally defined "grave emergency" threatening "the security or 
economic life of Bangladesh," the president may issue a procla- 
mation of emergency, which eliminates all restrictions on state 
power and the protection of fundamental rights. A state of emer- 
gency may last 120 days, or longer with Parliament's approval. 
If the president determines that "immediate action" is necessary, 
he may promulgate any ordinance he wants, as long as it is laid 
before Parliament for approval at its next session — that is, if it has 
not already been repealed. Added to the considerable power of being 
able to place persons in preventive detention, these are a potent 
array of powers controlled directly, and without means for exter- 
nal control, by the president. The Fifth Amendment (1979) allows 
the president to amend the Constitution, without action by Parlia- 
ment, by conducting a general referendum allowing a majority of 
citizens to approve an amendment. Constitutional amendments 
approved by Parliament must be passed by a two-thirds majority. 

The increase in executive power has been the most important 
trend in the development of the Bangladeshi Constitution. This 
increase has developed because, in practice, even the very large 
scope of presidential authority has proved insufficient to protect 
civilian governments from military coups or to provide military 
leaders with sufficient legitimacy to preserve their power. Thus 
Mujib established a constitutional dictatorship, and both Zia and 
Ershad ruled for extended periods as chief martial law adminis- 
trators in order to consolidate their hold over the country and to 
safeguard their influence by increasing their executive powers. 
Through the extended periods when Parliament was suspended, 
proclamations of the president or the chief martial law adminis- 
trator amended the Constitution, not only to strengthen the office 
of the president but also to legitimize presidential acts. 

Council of Ministers 

The president administers the country through the Council of 
Ministers — the cabinet — which is headed by the prime minister, 



157 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

a presidential appointee. Up to one-fifth of the members of the cabi- 
net may be persons from outside Parliament, allowing experts to 
participate in the administration of the country, and the president 
may attract influential politicians to his party by offering them pres- 
tigious ministerial posts. The number of ministers in the cabinet 
has therefore varied over time, according to presidential political 
strategies. There were nineteen ministers in the 1982, but by 
mid- 1988 Ershad had increased the number to twenty-eight. Varia- 
tions in the number of ministries do not signify the creation or 
cancelation of government programs but simply the reclassification 
of government services. For example, in 1982 finance and planning 
programs were administered by a single ministry with two divi- 
sions, but in 1988 a separate ministry was created for each (see 
table 16, Appendix). In addition to changes in the status of various 
governmental divisions, discontinuities have occurred when the 
president has periodically dismissed ministers or moved them to 
different ministries. In the midst of this flux, administrative conti- 
nuity is provided by the secretariats of the various ministries and 
regions, staffed by senior members of the Bangladesh Civil Service 
(see Civil Service, this ch.). Ministerial secretaries have often wielded 
a great deal of power because they are experienced and have numer- 
ous personal contacts in their fields, whereas ministers are typi- 
cally professional politicians who hold office only for a short time. 

Judiciary 

The government operates courts in the regions, districts, and 
subdistricts that make up the local administrative system (see Local 
Administration, this ch.). The judges in these courts are appointed 
by the president through the Ministry of Law and Justice or the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. Most cases heard by the court system 
originate at the district level, although the newer subdistrict courts 
experienced an increased caseload in the late 1980s. Upon appeal, 
cases may go up to the Supreme Court, but litigation may be very 
slow; in 1987 there were 29 Supreme Court judges dealing with 
21,600 pending cases. The Supreme Court, as of June 1988, had 
permanent benches — called the High Court Division — in Dhaka, 
Comilla, Rangpur, Barisal, Sylhet, Chittagong, and Jessore. It 
hears appeals from district courts and may also judge original cases. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Dhaka reviews 
appeals of judgment by the High Court Division. The judges of 
both divisions are appointed by the president. 

At the grass-roots level, the judicial system begins with vil- 
lage courts. An aggrieved party may make an official petition, 
which requires a fee, to the chairman of the union council (the 



158 



Hussain Muhammad Ershad, president of Bangladesh 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 



159 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

administrative division above the village), who may call a session 
of the village court with himself as chairman and two other judges 
nominated by each of the parties to the dispute. The parties may 
question the impartiality of the chairman and have him replaced. 
The majority of cases end at the village court level, which is inexpen- 
sive and which hands down judgments that reflect local opinion 
and power alignments. There are occasions, however, when the 
union council chairman may reject an official petition to consti- 
tute a village court or when one party desires a higher opinion. 
In these cases, the dispute goes to a government court at the sub- 
district level. Cases may wind their way up from district courts 
to permanent benches of the High Court Division. Once cases leave 
the village courts, they become expensive affairs that may last for 
years, and few citizens have the financial resources to fund a lengthy 
court battle. 

Rapid political changes in independent Bangladesh have com- 
promised the court system. The Constitution originally stated that 
the president could remove members of the Supreme Court only 
if two- thirds of Parliament approved, but the Proclamation (Amend- 
ment) Order of 1977 included a clause that eliminated the need 
for parliamentary involvement. The clause set up the Supreme 
Judicial Council, consisting of the chief justice and the next two 
senior judges. The council may determine that a judge is not 
"capable of properly performing the functions of his office" or is 
"guilty of gross misconduct." On their advice, the president may 
remove any judge. In addition, executive action has completely 
eliminated judicial authority for long periods. For example, under 
martial law regulations enacted in 1982, the Supreme Court lost 
jurisdiction over the protection of fundamental rights, and all courts 
operated under provisions of law promulgated by the chief martial 
law administrator; special and summary martial law courts handed 
down judgments that were not subject to review by the Supreme 
Court or any other court. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment and 
the Seventh Amendment placed martial law proclamations and 
judgments outside the review of the court system. In these ways, 
the courts have been forced to serve the interests of the ruling 
regime, rather than standing as an independent branch of govern- 
ment (see Criminal Justice, ch. 5). 

Civil Service 

The implementation of government policies and projects is the 
duty of the Bangladesh Civil Service, a corps of trained adminis- 
trators who form the nation's most influential group of civilians. 
The importance of the bureaucracy dates back to the colonial period, 



160 



Government and Politics 



when the Indian Civil Service provided an elite, educated, and dedi- 
cated body of professional administrators. After the partition of 
India in 1947, when almost all administrative organs had to be 
created afresh, both East Pakistan and West Pakistan heavily relied 
on the managerial expertise of professional managers from the old 
Indian Civil Service. When Bangladesh became independent in 
1971, the members of the civil service who joined the new nation 
brought with them the heritage of the colonial system. This heritage 
included administrative competence, which proved invaluable in 
running a young Bangladesh, and an expectation by the elite of 
benefits and power. 

In mid- 1988 the civil service was composed of twenty-eight 
separate services. There were twenty grades, with promotion to 
higher grades based on merit and seniority, dependent on annual 
confidential reports filed by the individuals' supervisors. Recruit- 
ment to the civil service occurred through open competition within 
a quota system. Forty percent of all new positions were allotted 
on the basis of merit; 30 percent were reserved for former free- 
dom fighters (Mukti Bahini — see Glossary), and 20 percent were 
allotted to women. The quotas were distributed among districts 
on the basis of population. Eligibility depended on an entrance 
examination, which included English, Bangla, and mathematics 
sections, plus a personal interview. The Public Services Commis- 
sion, as mandated by the Constitution, conducted the examina- 
tions for the civil service. The recruitment system attempted to 
eliminate the entrenched power of the old elites and to decrease 
the bias that favored candidates from wealthy, urban families. 
Although in the late 1980s it appeared that the new rules for recruit- 
ment and promotion might widen the backgrounds of civil service 
personnel and their supervisors, the older, senior members of the 
service continued to dominate the administration. 

Since independence, membership in the civil service has been 
one of the most desirable careers in the country. For senior civil 
servants, benefits included government housing at a standard rate 
of 7.5 percent of base salary, transportation, medical care, and a 
pension. Equally important were the prestige and influence that 
accompanied an administrative career. For example, there was great 
power in directing a division of a ministerial secretariat in Dhaka, 
or one of its attached departments, subordinate offices, or autono- 
mous bodies. Positions in the countryside were less popular, but 
the long tradition of bureaucratic elitism and subservience to 
government officials made the local administrator of the civil service 
an influential person in the community. In the late 1980s, the cen- 
tralization of power and influence within the civil service remained 



161 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



one of the prime targets of administrative changes designed 
to decentralize politics and economic development throughout 
Bangladesh. 

Local Administration 

During the early British period, when modified versions of 
Mughal (1526-1858) and earlier administrations were adopted, the 
closest the government came to the rural society was the zamindar 
(see Glossary), an administrator with concurrent judicial functions, 
who ensured revenue flows from the localities to the central govern- 
ment and handled a wide variety of official business. Government 
from the top down was the general rule for the Indian Civil Ser- 
vice and later the Pakistani and early Bangladeshi civil services. 
After 1971 the government of Bangladesh saw the benefits of 
involving more people in democratic decision-making and develop- 
ment programs, but the progress of reform was slow. In 1959 
General Mohammad Ayub Khan's government inaugurated a 
"basic democracies" program designed to involve villagers in 
development programs, with direct elections to union councils and 
indirect elections to bodies serving larger administrative units. 
Mujib's government held elections for union councils, but the coup 
of 1975 prevented their effective functioning. In 1980 Zia's govern- 
ment announced the Self-Sufficient Village Government Plan, but 
this project ended when Zia was assassinated in 1981. In 1982 
Ershad appointed the Committee for Administrative Reorganiza- 
tion/Reforms, which led to the establishment of the National Imple- 
mentation Committee for Administrative Reorganization. These 
bodies built a comprehensive plan for administrative decentrali- 
zation based on the subdistrict. 

Bangladesh is divided into four main territorial divisions (see 
fig. 1). In the late 1980s, the four divisions were divided into twenty- 
one regions, and the regions were subdivided into sixty-four dis- 
tricts [zilas — see Glossary). Below the district level, there were 
further urban and rural subdivisions. Urban areas include four 
municipal corporations (Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna, 
each of which included several municipalities), eighty-seven munici- 
palities (pourashavas) and thirty townships (thanas). The country- 
side had 460 subdistricts (upazilas — see Glossary), which were 
further divided into 4,401 unions (the rough equivalent of an urban 
ward); these, in turn, contained 60,315 mouzas (groups of two or 
more villages — about 20 percent of the total) and single villages 
(about 80 percent of the total). A further subdivision, equivalent 
to the rural mouza, was the mahalla, which was found in urban areas. 
Each mouza or mahalla, the size of which was determined by census 



162 



Government and Politics 



data- gathering techniques, contained about 250 households. An 
average village in the late 1980s contained 1,300 to 1,400 people. 
An average union contained about 15 villages and a population 
of about 20,000, and an average subdistrict had 8 to 10 unions 
with about 200,000 people. 

Throughout its history, one of the main challenges to the 
Bangladeshi government has been finding ways to involve people 
in democratic politics at every administrative level. 

According to the decentralization plan in effect in mid- 1988, each 
rural mouza had its own council (parishad) of elected representatives 
chosen by local voters (persons aged eighteen and over). At the 
next administrative level, the chairmen of the union councils were 
directly elected by voters within their jurisdictions. The remain- 
ing members of the union council were chosen by the mouza coun- 
cils, with each member of the union council representing three or 
four villages. The chairmen of the union councils formed the vot- 
ing membership of the council at the subdistrict level, along with 
three appointed women and another appointed member, usually 
a former freedom fighter. The chairman of the subdistrict council 
was directly elected by subdistrict voters. Thus the people had a 
direct electoral role at the village level, and they had a voice in 
choosing influential chairmen at the union and subdistrict levels. 
In the late 1980s, plans called for the expansion of representation 
at the district level, and the controversial District Council (Zila 
Parishad) Bill of 1987 was the first step in this direction (see Relaxa- 
tion of Martial Law, 1986-87, this ch.). By mid-1988, however, 
these plans had not been implemented; the region and division levels 
remained administrative units of the civil service and had no political 
significance. 

Local participatory politics met the civil service in the subdis- 
trict council. In the late 1980s, the chief government official in 
charge of local projects and development efforts was the subdis- 
trict project management (upazila nirbahi) officer, who directed a 
staff of about 250 technical and administrative officers. Nirbahi 
officers were part of the staff appointed by central authorities in 
Dhaka, and they received their pay, benefits, and promotion from 
the civil service. Their direct supervisors, however, were the sub- 
district council chairmen. The subdistrict councils, through their 
chairmen, were expected to make plans for public works and 
development projects within their own territories, spend allocated 
government funds, and direct the development activities of nirbahi 
officers and their staff. Nirbahi officers and other subdistrict tech- 
nical personnel were allowed to participate in subdistrict council 
meetings, but only as nonvoting members. Civil service members, 



163 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



heirs of a long tradition of elite government, took orders from 
subdistrict council chairmen because the latter wrote the annual 
evaluations of nirbahi officers which served as the basis for promo- 
tion within the civil service. In this way, elected representatives 
of the people at the local level exercised direct control over civil 
servants and government projects in their own area. 

In the late 1980s, the administrative apparatus at the urban level 
was comprised of a governing council with an elected chairman, 
elected commissioners (no more than 10 percent of whom were 
women), and several ex-officio members. A mayor and deputy 
mayors were elected from among the council members. 

The decentralization scheme implemented under Ershad's 
government was the most ambitious attempt in the history of Ban- 
gladesh to bring responsible government to the local level. The sys- 
tem officially began with elections in 1983 for four-year terms to 
union councils and with elections in 1984 for three-year terms to 
subdistrict councils. However, there were major problems with this 
scheme of decentralized administration. First, the electoral system 
tended to represent only the wealthiest and most influential mem- 
bers of society. These persons made decisions that strengthened 
their own patronage networks and influence at the local level; the 
poorest strata in society had little direct voice in elected committees 
(see Local Elites, this ch.). Second, the subdistrict councils were 
designed to create and implement development activities in their 
areas, but they were typically slow to draft five-year plans or carry 
through broad-based development efforts. Most of their projects 
emphasized construction or public works, (e.g., school buildings 
or irrigation canals, and they sometimes neglected the personnel 
and training components necessary for social involvement (see 
Economic Policy and Planning, ch. 3). Third, civil service mem- 
bers have long lacked respect for local politicians, looking to their 
own advancement from their supervisors in Dhaka. They have often 
been slow to cooperate with elected members of local committees. 
For example, although the subdistrict council chairman was respon- 
sible for writing the nirbahi officer's annual evaluation, the officer 
was expected to submit the evaluation form to the subdistrict council 
chairman, and in many cases these forms did not appear, thus 
preventing the chairmen from exercising control. Finally, the entire 
system of decentralized politics was viewed by opposition politi- 
cians as a patronage network designed to attract local elites to the 
party of the regime in power. Observers tended to conclude that 
instead of furthering decentralized democracy, the system only 
strengthened the national party controlled from Dhaka. 



164 



The Jatiyo Sangsad, Bangladesh's Parliament 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

The Ershad Period 

Achieving Stability, 1982-83 

On March 24, 1982, the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General 
Hussain Muhammad Ershad, seized control of the government in 
a military coup. He proclaimed martial law, made himself chief 
martial law administrator, and dismantled the structures of demo- 
cratic government that the administration of the late president Zia 
had carefully built during the previous five years (see The Zia 
Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82, ch. 1). Ershad suspended the 
Constitution, disbanded Parliament, prohibited all political activi- 
ties, and deprived the president, vice president, and cabinet 
ministers of their offices. Three days after the coup, Supreme Court 
justice Abdul Fazal Muhammad Ahsanuddin Chowdhury became 
interim president. Ershad became chief minister of a new cabinet, 
and by December 1983 he had officially taken over the presidency. 
He declared that he expected a return to democratic rule in about 
two years. In fact, martial law lasted until November 1986. 

Ershad cited as reasons for his coup the growing corruption and 
inefficiency of the civilian government dominated by the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party. After the assassination of President Zia as part 
of a local military rebellion in Chittagong in May 1981, the Ban- 
gladesh Nationalist Party fell into conflicting factions that could 



165 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



not be controlled by Zia's successor, President Abdus Sattar. 
Without Zia at the helm, the powerful leaders of the military dis- 
trusted Sattar's civilian government. Thus, because the major 
political forces in the country could not cooperate with each other, 
there was no resistance to Ershad's takeover. After establishing con- 
trol of the country, he had three main priorities for bringing political 
chaos to an end and for governing Bangladesh. His goals were to 
act against corruption and reorganize the administrative apparatus 
in order to implement overdue reforms, stand as a strong centraliz- 
ing force while keeping his civilian opponents at bay, and placate 
the military so as to prevent further coup attempts. Through 
mid- 1 988 Ershad proved remarkably capable at accomplishing these 
goals, and he had become the longest ruling political leader in the 
history of independent Bangladesh. 

During his tenure as chief martial law administrator, Ershad 
divided the country into five martial law zones, each headed by 
a handpicked senior army officer. Twenty-four special and sum- 
mary martial law courts directly involved the military in local 
administration. Although the civilian court system continued to 
function, violations of martial law ordinances were handled by these 
extraconstitutional martial law tribunals, where active-duty mili- 
tary officers met in secret sessions to try cases ranging from viola- 
tions of press censorship to vaguely defined "antisocial activities." 
Those convicted of political crimes had no right of appeal, and 
defendants were tried in absentia. Martial law deprived the Supreme 
Court of its jurisdiction over the protection of fundamental rights, 
and criticism of martial law was punishable by up to seven years' 
imprisonment. 

Ershad moved forcibly to end corruption and reorganize the 
government. Several hundred politicians, including six former 
cabinet ministers, were jailed on charges of corruption. Ershad 
announced that one of his highest priorities was a reorganization 
of the government in order to decentralize decision making and 
development projects. In order to outline procedures for this 
decentralization project, he appointed the Committee for Adminis- 
trative Reorganization/Reforms, which instituted sweeping changes 
in local administration (see Local Administration, this ch.). The 
Land Reforms Ordinance of 1984 granted important rights to 
tenants for the first time in the history of Bangladesh, and a new 
plan for the divestment of government industries promised to move 
the country away from socialism (see Joint Ventures and Foreign 
Investment, ch. 3). Ershad built on Zia's earlier platform of 
advocating an increased role for Islam in the culture and politics 
of Bangladesh. 



166 



Government and Politics 



Emerging Opposition, 1983-86 

Ershad had a clear political stage for about a year after the coup 
because of his severe repression of opposition parties and because 
of intense factional fighting within all major political groupings (see 
Political Dynamics, this ch.). By early 1983, however, a pattern 
of confrontation politics had emerged. This pattern dominated the 
public life of Bangladesh until the late 1980s. Paradoxically, the 
government's Islamic policies provided a common cause for the 
first large anti-Ershad demonstrations. A proposed education pro- 
gram was designed to introduce English and Arabic as compul- 
sory subjects in primary and secondary schools. This touched 
sensitive nationalist nerves, especially among university students, 
who saw it as a threat to the Bangla language (see Emerging 
Discontent, 1966-70, ch. 1). Several of Ershad's speeches favor- 
ing a stronger Islamic movement provoked riots on university 
campuses, which escalated into battles between students and police 
on February 14 and 15, 1983. Although the government imposed 
a curfew and closed the universities, the student movement stirred 
the opposition into more unified coalitions. 

Dozens of political parties existed in Bangladesh during the 1980s, 
but the two major opposition parties to Ershad's rule were the 
Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (see Party 
Politics, this ch.). The Awami League, which originated in 1949 
and emerged preeminent at the beginning of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman's era, gradually united around the leadership of Sheikh 
Hasina Wajed, Mujib's eldest daughter (see The War for Ban- 
gladeshi Independence, 1971, ch. 1). A fifteen-party alliance led 
by the Awami League began to act in unison during 1983. The 
leadership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party fell to Begum 
Khaleda Zia, the widow of President Zia, and the party became 
the center of a seven-party alliance distinct from the one led by 
the Awami League. The two major alliances distrusted each other 
intensely, but they formed the heart of a larger thirty-two-party 
front, comprising socialist, communist, and Islamic groups, called 
the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. This movement 
adopted a five-point program demanding an end to martial law, 
restoration of fundamental rights, parliamentary elections, release 
of political prisoners, and the trial of persons responsible for police 
brutality in the February student protests. The opposition alliances 
successfully engineered two general strikes in November 1983, the 
second resulting in widespread violence and hundreds of casual- 
ties among demonstrators and security personnel. 

Political events for the next several years revolved around 
attempts by the Ershad government to move from a military 



167 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

dictatorship to a civilian government with the cooperation of the 
political opposition. Ershad's program called for local elections at 
the union and subdistrict levels, followed by presidential and 
parliamentary elections, while a national party supporting the 
government would integrate all political groups in the same way 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party had functioned during Zia's 
regime. Ershad relaxed the ban on political activities in January 
1984 and repeatedly called for dialogue with opposition parties, 
but the major opposition alliances adamantly refused to cooperate 
while martial law remained in effect. The government held elec- 
tions for union and municipal councils between December 1983 
and February 1984, but repeated public demonstrations by oppo- 
sition parties forced the cancellation of subdistrict and parliamentary 
elections. A rising crescendo of violence and civil disobedience led 
Ershad to reimpose harsh martial law restrictions in March 1985 
and to put under house arrest Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and other 
opposition leaders. The government-sponsored party, Jana Dal 
(People's Party), had been formed in November 1983, but it had 
little chance to become organized before the new ban on political 
activity went into effect. 

In 1985 the government went ahead with a "civilianization" pro- 
gram without the participation of the opposition parties. With mar- 
tial law being fully enforced, a referendum was held on March 21, 
asking voters: "Do you support the policies of President Ershad, 
and do you want him to continue to run this administration until 
a civilian government is formed through elections?" The official 
count of "yes" votes amounted to 32,539,264, while "no" votes 
totaled 1,290,217. The opposition had organized a general strike 
on referendum day and subsequently claimed that the results were 
fraudulent. In May the government conducted subdistrict council 
elections. Run on a nonparty, nationwide basis, the elections fea- 
tured 2,300 candidates competing for 458 seats as council chair- 
men. Keen local contests occurred amid widespread violence and 
claims of fraud by the opposition. After these elections, the govern- 
ment released Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and the other opposition 
leaders from house arrest, and on October 1 it canceled the ban 
on indoor meetings and rallies of political parties. Meanwhile, the 
pro-government Jana Dal became the leading component of the 
new Jatiyo Party (National Party), which featured members who 
had played prominent roles in Ershad's cabinet. By late 1985, the 
stage had been set for parliamentary elections. Despite constant 
opposition party pressure, Ershad's regime had used its control over 
the government and the military to maneuver the country toward 
civilian rule. 



168 



Government and Politics 

Relaxation of Martial Law, 1986-87 

In March 1986, Ershad removed military commanders from key 
civil posts and abolished martial law offices and more than 150 mili- 
tary courts in an attempt to ease martial law restrictions. Because 
these moves satisfied some of the demands of the opposition, an 
eight-party alliance comprising the Awami League and some smaller 
parties agreed to participate in parliamentary elections. However, 
the seven-party alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
boycotted the May 1986 elections, and according to the opposi- 
tion parties the elections were marred by extensive fraud, includ- 
ing overt support for Jatiyo Party candidates by Ershad and other 
government officials, theft of ballot boxes, and beatings of opposi- 
tion party workers. Official figures claimed the turnout at the polls 
was between 45 and 50 percent of the electorate, but other observers 
estimated that only 10 to 30 percent participated. The elections 
gave the Jatiyo Party an absolute majority of 153 seats in Parlia- 
ment; its close ally, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist 
Party), took 7 seats. The Awami League gained seventy-six seats, 
the Jamaat e Islami took ten seats, and a number of smaller parties 
and independents won a total of fifty-four seats. All thirty seats 
reserved for women went to supporters of the Jatiyo Party, giving 
Ershad's supporters a comfortable majority (see table 17, Appendix). 

With Parliament under his control, Ershad proceeded with plans 
for a presidential election. He resigned as army chief of staff in 
August 1986 but remained chief martial law administrator and com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces. He officially joined the Jatiyo 
Party in September, was elected its chairman, and became the 
party's candidate for president. The opposition parties did every- 
thing in their power to block these moves, claiming that the trap- 
pings of a democratic process were a sham while martial law was 
in effect. Awami League members of Parliament refused to attend 
its opening session, and in July Parliament adjourned for an 
indefinite period. Leftist parties and the alliances led by the Awami 
League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaat e Islami 
boycotted the elections and organized widespread demonstrations, 
leading to the jailing of many opposition leaders and the house arrest 
of Hasina and Khaleda Zia. Yet the opposition's tactics did not 
prevent the successful completion of the presidential election in 
October. Ershad easily defeated 11 other candidates, officially 
obtaining 22 million votes (84 percent) of the electorate. Opposi- 
tion parties again claimed that the election results were fraudu- 
lent, and they asserted that only 3 percent of the electorate had 
cast ballots. 



169 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Firmly in control of a civilian government as well as the mili- 
tary establishment, Ershad took steps to legitimize his rule of the 
previous four years. He summoned Parliament into session on 
November 10, 1986, to consider a seventh amendment to the Con- 
stitution, which would ratify his assumption of power in 1982 and 
all subsequent actions of his martial law administration. The 
opposition again took to the streets in protest. The Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party, Jamaat e Islami, and a leftist five-party alliance 
led a general strike on November 10. The Awami League, demand- 
ing the lifting of martial law, boycotted Parliament and instead 
held a "parallel parliament" on the stairs of Parliament House. 
Inside, the 223 representatives present for the session voted unani- 
mously in favor of the Seventh Amendment, and hours later Ershad 
announced in a national address the withdrawal of martial law 
and the full restoration of the Constitution. Prime Minister 
Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury proclaimed these events a "glori- 
ous chapter," but Hasina described them as a "black chapter" 
in Bangladesh's history. 

In early 1987, it appeared that Ershad had outmaneuvered his 
opponents and made the transition to a civilian leadership. The 
opposition was in disarray. By the time Awami League had decided 
to participate in Parliament in 1986, its coalition had shrunk from 
fifteen to eight parties. As a result, it had lost any opportunities 
it might have had for immediate cooperation with the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party and other parties, and it forfeited its claims to 
moral leadership in the fight against Ershad 's regime. The rift 
between the Awami League and other opposition parties widened 
during the first half of 1987. For example, the newspapers were 
full of reports of the insults exchanged between Hasina and other 
opposition leaders. Ershad took advantage of the situation by con- 
vening Parliament in June to consider measures to consolidate his 
regime further. The most controversial measure was the District 
Council (Zila Parishad) Bill. This act expanded representative 
government by allowing elected representatives (members of Parlia- 
ment and chairmen of subdistrict and municipality councils) to sit 
on district councils, but it also made provision for members of the 
military to participate as nonvoting members. The opposition 
viewed this move as an attempt to install the armed forces in the 
administration of the country on a permanent basis, thus favoring 
Ershad and his military supporters. The furor raised by the Dis- 
trict Council (Zila Parishad) Bill grew into a storm that reunited 
the opposition and seriously destabilized Ershad' s government from 
mid-1987 to mid-1988. 



170 



Government and Politics 



More Opposition Pressure 

Opposition alliances began public protests against the District 
Council Amendment Bill in June 1987. The five-party alliance 
implemented a half-day general strike in Dhaka on June 23. A week 
later, another half-day general strike supported by the parliamentary 
opposition paralyzed most cities and towns. Nevertheless, on 
July 12, 1987, the Jatiyo Party majority in Parliament passed the 
bill. Two days of strikes and public demonstrations followed. 
Ershad, responding to opposition pressure, sent the bill back to 
Parliament for "reconsideration." The opposition, realizing that 
its disunity would allow Ershad to strengthen his hold over the coun- 
try, intensified its street demonstrations, and its leaders made moves 
toward greater cooperation against the government. The opposi- 
tion parties called for Ershad' s immediate resignation and new elec- 
tions under a caretaker government. On July 24, the longest general 
strike in Bangladesh's history, a 54-hour campaign led by the 
Workers-Employees United Council (Sramik Karmachari Oikkiya 
Parishad), ended after 11 people were killed and 700 injured in 
street violence between demonstrators and security forces. In 
October the Workers-Employees United Council led another 
lengthy strike. The strike lasted for forty-eight hours and ended 
on October 21. 

By the fall of 1987, political events had come to a head. Exten- 
sive flooding from heavy monsoon season rains led to widespread 
misery in the countryside and intense criticism of the government's 
relief efforts (see Climate, ch. 2). Hasina and Khaleda Zia met on 
October 28, signaling a new phase of cooperation between the two 
leading opposition coalitions. A liaison committee of the eight-, 
seven-, and five-party alliances was formed to coordinate the moves 
of the opposition. The "final showdown," known as the Siege of 
Dhaka, occurred between November 10 and 12, when the opposi- 
tion parties brought thousands of supporters into the streets. The 
government was well prepared for the confrontation, arresting 
Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and other leaders and sending thousands of 
security personnel into urban areas to control demonstrations. 

Extensive security measures prevented a complete breakdown 
of public order, and after a week Dhaka was again under control. 
However, continuing agitation prevented a return to normal life 
throughout the country, leading Ershad to declare a state of 
emergency, with familiar restrictions on civil rights, on Novem- 
ber 27. The opposition's tactics had shaken the government, but 
street violence and civil disobedience proved unable to dislodge 
Ershad 's regime. 



171 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

On December 6, 1987, Ershad dissolved Parliament, which had 
not met since July. According to the Constitution, he was required 
to arrange for new elections within ninety days. Also scheduled 
for early 1988 were elections for union councils and for municipal 
officials in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi. These elec- 
tions were occasions for further public agitation by the political 
opposition. In early January, five smaller parties joined the oppo- 
sition coalition, which then implemented a two-day general strike 
on January 20 and 21. Another general strike occurred on Febru- 
ary 6, coinciding with the last date for filing nominations for the 
municipal elections. On February 13 and 14, following the union 
council elections, the opposition held another general strike. None 
of these actions prevented the government from implementing its 
election plans, but they kept the nation in a state of constant pro- 
test; the opposition may have hoped that Ershad 's supporters in 
the military would eventually view him as a political liability and 
force him to resign. 

The elections for union councils on February 10, 1988, were par- 
ticularly hard fought, and they became a major security problem 
for the government. There were 115,000 candidates vying for 
44,000 positions at 20,000 polling stations throughout the country. 
Widespread violence marred the elections. The official count listed 
85 dead and about 500 injured, although opposition figures claimed 
150 had been killed and up to 8,000 had been wounded in street 
battles between demonstrators and security forces. Election violence 
forced re- voting at 5,500 polling centers in early April, bringing 
another round of violence that left 4 dead and 100 more injured. 

After the union council elections, the government deployed 
numerous police and paramilitary personnel and army troops for 
the parliamentary elections held on March 3, 1988. Schools were 
closed March 1-5, and a public holiday was declared during the 
two days before the elections. The Awami League's eight-party 
coalition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party's seven-party coalition, 
the leftist five-party coalition, and Jamaat e Islami led a general 
opposition boycott. There were 1 , 168 candidates competing for the 
300 seats. The Jatiyo Party won 251 seats, and the Jatiyo Samaj- 
tantrik Dal, a close ally of the Jatiyo Party in the preceding Parlia- 
ment, won 21 seats. Other small parties and independents took 
only 27 seats. The opposition again claimed a very small voter 
turnout in these elections — about 1 percent — while the government 
claimed a 50 percent turnout. 

Ershad 's style of democracy — which did not include the partici- 
pation of the opposition — had weathered a long political storm. On 
April 12, 1988, he lifted the state of emergency, and Parliament 



172 



Ballot box at a polling place for the 
February 1988 union council elections 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 

duly convened on April 25 amid another general strike. Ershad 
took the occasion of his opening speech to Parliament to advocate 
Islam as the state religion. This call grew from Ershad' s long-term 
commitment to Islam as an integral part of state ideology, but it 
also brought his party's position closer to that of the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party, Jamaat e Islami, and smaller fundamentalist 
parties. Again Ershad appeared to be making overtures for a recon- 
ciliation with part of the opposition. On June 7, 1988, Parliament, 
dominated by the Jatiyo Party, passed the Eighth Amendment to 
the Constitution, making Islam the state religion and setting up 
six permanent high court benches outside Dhaka. The parlia- 
mentary opposition voted against the measure, and a general strike 
paralyzed Dhaka. 

After six years in power, Ershad could look back on a series of 
major personal achievements. He had reconciled differences in the 
armed forces and prevented further military coups, efficiently 
managed international diplomacy and aid programs, and guided 
the country through a period of modest economic growth. He served 
as chief executive of Bangladesh for a longer period than any leader 
since independence and, in doing so, brought a sense of stability 
to the nation. However, Ershad had also kept opposition politi- 
cians from sharing power, and although he engineered the change 



173 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

from direct military rule to a civilian government, he made no 
progress in reconciling the political opposition to his regime. Despite 
the trappings of a democratic system, the government remained 
a structure for one-man rule, with a packed Parliament, a hand- 
picked judicial system, and questionable election practices. The 
opposition conducted its politics in the streets and refused to grant 
any legitimacy to Ershad. Stability depended on Ershad's personal 
survival and his ability to keep street politics under control. 

Political Dynamics 
Local Elites 

For the vast majority of Bangladeshis, politics revolves around 
the institutions of the village or the union of neighboring villages. 
Traditionally, the main base for political influence in rural areas 
has been landownership. During the British colonial period, 
zamindars controlled huge estates as if they were their personal 
kingdoms (see The British Raj, ch. 1). With the abolition of 
zamindar tenure in 1950, a new local elite of rich Muslim peasants 
developed. The members of the new elite owned far less land than 
the zamindars had once possessed, but they were able to feed their 
families well, sell surplus produce, send their children to school, 
and form new links with the bureaucracy of East Pakistan and later 
Bangladesh. Amid the large majority of poor and generally illiter- 
ate peasants, well-to-do farmers formed a new rural leadership that 
dominated local affairs. 

Village society is often divided into a number of factions that 
follow the lines of kinship (see Rural Society, ch. 2). At the center 
of each faction is a family that owns more land than most of the 
other villagers. In the colonial and Pakistani periods, local leaders 
were old men, but the trend since independence is for younger men 
to head factions as well. The heart of the local elder's authority 
is his control over land and the ability to provide land or employ- 
ment to poorer villagers, who are often his kin. Land control may 
be an ancient prerogative, stretching back to the zamindars, or it 
may be the result of gradual purchases since independence. A vil- 
lage may have only one faction, but typically there will be several 
factions within the village, each competing for influence over vil- 
lagers and struggling for resources from local administrative and 
development offices. 

The leaders of local factions exercise their influence in village 
courts and as managers of village affairs with other administrative 
units. The traditional means for resolving local disputes is through 
the village court, which comprises leaders of village factions and 



174 



Government and Politics 



other members of union councils. Throughout Bangladesh, village 
courts address the vast majority of disputes, but it is rare for the 
courts to decide in favor of a poor peasant over a rich peasant, 
or for the weaker faction over the stronger (see Judiciary, this ch.). 
The relative security of village leaders makes it possible for some 
of their children to attend secondary schools, or even colleges or 
universities; some factions also base much of their authority on their 
knowledge of sharia. Education is much esteemed in Bangladesh, 
and degrees are tickets to highly prized government positions or 
to urban jobs that give the involved families a cosmopolitan out- 
look. These contacts outside the village include necessary links with 
bureaucratic institutions that ultimately bring economic aid and 
patronage jobs to the village. In these ways, the factional leader- 
ship of the village provides vital links to the development process, 
while retaining its traditional position at the top of village society. 

Local leaders who control land, people, and education also tend 
to control the disbursement of rural credit and development funds 
through their positions in union and subdistrict government. Studies 
of the leadership of union council members have demonstrated this 
dominance of local elites over rural political and economic life. 
Among the chairmen of union councils in 1984, over 60 percent 
owned more than 3 hectares of land, with an average of almost 
8 hectares. Sixty percent were primarily engaged in agriculture, 
30 percent were businessmen, and 75 percent had a marketable 
surplus each year. Eighty percent had incomes greater than 
TK40,000 (for value of the taka — see Glossary) per year, and 50 
percent had incomes greater than Tk 100, 000. Almost all union 
council leaders took part in village courts as judges, and most were 
heavily involved in the support of local mosques and madrasa (reli- 
gious school attached to a mosque) committees (see Religious Edu- 
cation, ch. 2). For victorious campaigns for union council 
chairmanships, winners spent an average of more than Tkl mil- 
lion in 1978; most of them mobilized at least 25 people for their 
campaigns, and 20 percent mobilized between 200 and 2,000 sup- 
porters. In 1978 only 7 percent of the chairmen of union councils 
had college degrees, but the percentage of graduates had increased 
to 50 percent by 1984. 

Political elites were more varied in urban environments. The 
metropolitan areas of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi 
had large numbers of conflicting constituencies and political 
machines linked to national parties. In smaller cities and towns 
serving as district and subdistrict administrative centers, some 
leaders emerged directly from the local social system, whereas others 
became politically established as a result of their professional 



175 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

activities. Members of the government bureaucracy and the mili- 
tary, for example, form an important part of a district town's leader- 
ship, but they typically have roots, and connections to land, in other 
parts of the country. Members of the permanent local elite, such 
as businessmen, union leaders, lawyers, or religious figures, are 
more concerned with strictly local issues and have strong support 
from family networks stretching into the nearby countryside. One 
of the outstanding characteristics of the urban leadership is its rela- 
tively short history. In the late 1980s, it was clear that many had 
emerged from middle-class or rich peasant backgrounds since 1947 
or, in many cases, since 1971 . Most retained close links with their 
rural relatives, either locally or elsewhere. Urban elites included 
professional politicians of national parties, and the entire social 
group that made up the urban leadership — military, professional, 
administrative, religious, and business personnel — interacted in a 
hotbed of national politics. 

The National Party 

One of the most salient characteristics of Bangladeshi politics 
has been the drive toward the concentration of power in a single 
party headed by a strong executive. This process began in 1975 
when the Awami League, even with a huge mandate from the 
people, proved incapable of governing the country, prompting 
Mujib to form a monolithic national party, the Bangladesh Krishak 
Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and 
People's League). After Zia consolidated his military dictatorship, 
he formed his own Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which took con- 
trol of Parliament and attracted opportunistic politicians from the 
opposition to a strong, centrist platform. Ershad's regime followed 
Zia's model, with martial law succeeded by the formation of a cen- 
trist party — the Jatiyo Party — and the orchestration of a civilian 
government supporting a strong executive (see The Zia Regime 
and Its Aftermath, 1977-82, ch. 1). Each time a new national party 
came to power, it banished the opposition into illegal status or 
manipulated the administrative machinery for its own advantage, 
driving the opposition into the streets. Parliamentary elections mir- 
rored this process. The Awami League, which was dominant in 
the early 1970s, progressively moved to the periphery of the elec- 
toral process in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, despite 
continuing support for its programs from large segments of the 
population. The same fate was in store for the Bangladesh Nation- 
alist Party, which thrived while Zia lived but was reduced to boy- 
cotting the electoral process after 1981. The Jatiyo Party, created 
by Ershad and his colleagues, became stronger over time as it 



176 



Government and Politics 



attracted increasing numbers of politicians. This process continued 
into the late 1980s because the strong executive, who con- 
trolled the country's administration, media, and security forces, 
was able to keep opposition parties off balance with a "carrot and 
stick" strategy. 

The party in power periodically offered attractive government 
posts to opposition leaders in return for political loyalty or neu- 
trality. During the presidencies of Zia and Ershad, the number of 
cabinet positions steadily expanded, as potentially influential poli- 
ticians received rewards for cooperating with the party in power. 
Before elections, or at about the time of major parliamentary votes, 
newspapers have carried stories about entire labor unions or blocs 
of opposition workers who joined the president's party. Reverse 
currents were observed in the mid-1980s, as individual leaders 
fell from favor and lost their cabinet posts or else left the national 
party to form their own political factions, but the overall trend was 
toward a steady increase in the membership and influence of the 
dominant party. 

Ershad, following the example of Zia's Self- Sufficient Village 
Government Plan, used administrative decentralization to allocate 
resources to the grass-roots level, bypassing the local opposition 
party apparatus and providing a strong incentive for leaders at the 
village level to support his party. This strategy isolated the oppo- 
sition parties in urban areas, while the national party disbursed 
patronage in rural areas. The local elites were opportunistic, chang- 
ing their affiliations in order to obtain the largest amount of aid 
for their constituencies. A study of union council chairmen after 
the 1984 elections revealed that 38 percent had changed party affilia- 
tions within the previous 10 years; 53 percent supported the Jana 
Dal, which had been in existence for 12 months, while only 19 per- 
cent supported the Awami League and 8 percent backed the Ban- 
gladesh Nationalist Party. In the 1985 subdistrict elections, after 
the Jana Dal had existed for 2 years, 207 of 460 chairmen sup- 
ported Ershad's party, and the Jana Dal exercised political con- 
trol over 44 percent of the nation's districts. This was notable 
progress for a party with a program essentially the same as that 
of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the party in total control only 
five years earlier), which controlled only 34 (7.4 percent) of the 
subdistrict chairmanships. The Awami League, which had domi- 
nated the nation 10 years earlier, controlled only 53 (11.5 percent) 
of the chairmanships. 

Military support has been a crucial component of the success 
of the national party. In the 1970s, observers were unwilling to 
predict the actions of the military because it was torn by internal 



177 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

divisions between freedom fighters and returnees from West 
Pakistan, political groups of the far left and the right, and factional 
infighting among leftist factions. Zia moved to stabilize the mili- 
tary through a purge of unreliable personnel, more than 1,100 of 
whom were executed, and through steady progress in profession- 
alizing the services, incorporating elements from both freedom fight- 
ers and returnees (see Recruitment, ch. 5). The strong trend under 
Zia and Ershad away from the Awami League and the Soviet Union 
decreased communist and Maoist influences, which had been very 
strong during the 1970s. By the 1980s, it appeared that military 
officers were the most interested in adequate financial support for 
the armed forces and limitation of civilian political turmoil. The 
slow expansion of the military and the opportunity for military 
leaders to gain administrative positions under Ershad convinced 
potential military rivals that he represented their interests. Ershad 
at first followed up on his promises to include the military in civil 
administration through legislative means, but when he later backed 
away from the District Council Bill, there were no major stirrings 
within the military. A more difficult challenge was the Siege of 
Dhaka in late 1987, with massive street violence, but again the mili- 
tary did not act. Apparently, Ershad and his Jatiyo Party were able 
to keep political disorder within bounds acceptable to the military 
leadership. 

Party Politics 

The government estimated in 1988 that there were 102 differ- 
ent political parties in Bangladesh. The majority of these parties 
were based solely in urban areas and had tiny constituencies. Many 
of them were formed by small cliques of like-minded intellectuals 
or by political leaders who, with their small followings, had broken 
away from larger political groups. There was a steady turnover 
in the composition of the smaller fringe groups, which neverthe- 
less continued to organize periodic demonstrations and issue press 
releases. Amid the welter of conflicting groups, there were five main 
political forces in the country that had long histories or some claim 
to support from wide constituencies. At the center in 1988 was the 
pro- government Jatiyo Party. Opposing it were two centrist parties, 
the Awami League, led by Mujib's daughter, Hasina, and the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Khaleda Zia. To the left were 
the pro-Soviet Bangladesh Communist Party, factions of the Jatiyo 
Samajtantrik Dal, and other socialist groups advocating revolu- 
tionary change. To the right was a group of parties, including 
Jamaat e Islami and the Muslim League, that called for an increased 
role for Islam in public life. All of the minor political parties in 



178 



Government and Politics 



Bangladesh clustered around the policies and the activities of these 
five main political forces. 

Aw ami League 

The Awami League, which was consistently split during the Zia 
regime, underwent further turmoil in the aftermath of Ershad's 
March 1982 coup before achieving a new level of unity. In the 
1982-83 period, there were two main groups within the Awami 
League, one headed by Hasina as president and another headed 
by Abdur Razzak as secretary general. In October 1983, Abdur 
Razzak left the party to form the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik 
Awami League. This group was modeled on the national party of 
the same name that briefly held power before Mujib's death in 1975. 
Hasina proved to be a formidable politician and retained absolute 
control over the Awami League through the 1980s, becoming the 
major leader of the political opposition in Bangladesh. For several 
years, the Awami League headed a fifteen-party alliance, but its 
decision to participate in the 1986 parliamentary elections alienated 
some leftist parties. This development left the Awami League at 
the head of an eight-party alliance whose membership was in a state 
of flux but at one point included the Bangladesh Communist Party, 
the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League, the Gana Azadi 
League (two factions), the National Awami Party, the Samajbadi 
Dal (Socialist Party), and the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (Sultan Raja 
faction). 

The Awami League traces its descent from the party of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, and in the late 1980s it continued to advocate 
many of the socialist policies of the early 1970s. The Awami League 
condemned the denationalization and militarization of Bangladesh 
that occurred after 1976, and it leaned toward a pro-Soviet stance. 
These policies often made it the target of opponents, even those 
within the alliance, who, in linking its policies to a pro-Indian pro- 
gram, easily attacked it with nationalist rhetoric. The Awami 
League has been the most outspoken of the opposition parties 
against the role of the military in government, and in the late 1980s 
it was doubtful whether military leaders would allow it to achieve 
a large degree of political influence without a direct military 
response. Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Ershad regime 
and the military, the Awami League has remained one of the few 
parties with a substantial following throughout the country and 
with action wings in rural areas. In 1988 its student wing was 
the Bangladesh Chhatro League (Bangladesh Students League), 
and its workers' front was the Jatiyo Sramik League (National 
Workers' League). 



179 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Bangladesh Nationalist Party 

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party received a heavy blow as a 
result of Ershad's March 1982 coup. From a position of control 
under Zia, it was thrown into the political wilderness, with many 
of its leaders prosecuted for corruption. During the 1982-83 period, 
the party was divided into two groups, one headed by Abdus Sattar, 
the deposed president, with Khaleda Zia as senior vice chairman, 
and the other headed by former Minister of Information Shamsul 
Huda Chowdhury. The latter group quickly disappeared, and the 
dominant faction found a popular leader in Khaleda Zia. She 
became party chairman and was reelected unopposed in 1986. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party led a 
seven-party alliance that consistently refused to recognize the Ershad 
regime. The price it paid for this stance was an inability to partici- 
pate in the government. In fact, the policies advocated by the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party differed little from those of the Jatiyo 
Party once it was in power, for both groups were descended from 
the military rule of Zia's time. Although the Bangladesh Nation- 
alist Party generally ranked behind the Awami League in terms 
of public support, it had a presence in the countryside through its 
peasants' wing, the Jatiyobadi Krishak Dal (Nationalist Peasants 
Party), formed in October 1987. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
also backed a student wing called the Jatiyobadi Chhatro Dal 
(Nationalist Students Party) and a workers' front called the Jatiyo- 
badi Sramik Dal (Nationalist Workers Party). 

Leftist Parties 

The political left in Bangladesh, represented by a number of 
socialist and communist parties, has remained numerically small 
and divided by internal dissension. Yet the left has always been 
a potent force. The economic difficulties facing workers and peasants 
and the persistent alienation of the intellectual community have 
provided fertile ground for the growth of radical politics, and such 
problems always hold out the potential of massive civil unrest. The 
socialist policies of the Awami League during the early 1970s 
brought the small Bangladesh Communist Party, with its pro-Soviet 
tendencies, very close to attaining political power. More radical 
groups advocating total revolution based on the Maoist model were 
major elements behind the growing chaos that brought Mujib down. 
Under martial law regimes, revolutionary organizational activi- 
ties became very difficult, and the decline of Maoist ideology in 
China left Bangladeshi revolutionaries without major ideological 
support from abroad. During the 1980s, leftist parties were forced 



180 



Government and Politics 



into supporting roles within alliances with the major opposition 
parties, although some created their own coalitions centered pri- 
marily on urban bases. 

The Bangladesh Communist Party continued a generally pro- 
Soviet policy in the late 1980s, and it was part of the eight-party 
alliance headed by the Awami League. The Bangladesh Communist 
Party operated a student wing called the Chhatro Union (Students 
Union) and a workers' front called the Trade Union Centre. 

A more significant socialist party in the late 1980s was the Jatiyo 
Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party). This party began oper- 
ating in 1972 after the defection of radical elements from the Awami 
League. It organized an armed opposition to Mujib's regime in 
the mid-1970s and became very influential among the military dur- 
ing the late 1970s (see Postindependence Period, ch. 5). The party 
also had some success in parliamentary elections and became 
important in labor unions through its action wing, the Jatiyo Sramik 
Jote (National Workers Alliance). By the 1980s, however, it had 
split into a number of factions with different strategies. The poli- 
cies of one wing, headed by A.S.M. Abdur Rab, were almost indis- 
tinguishable from those of the Jatiyo Party. It cooperated with 
Ershad's government, praised his martial law rule, supported the 
move to include the armed forces in district councils and the 
denationalization bill of June 1987, and participated in the parlia- 
ments elected in 1986 and 1988. Another faction, led by Shajahar 
Siraj, was the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (Siraj), which participated 
in the 1986 Parliament but consistently voted against the govern- 
ment, calling for "unity of left democratic forces." Still another 
faction, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (Inu), headed by Hasan Huq 
Inu, refused to cooperate with the government and became part 
of a highly visible five-party alliance along with the Sramik Krishak 
Samajbadi Dal, (Workers and Peasants Socialist Party); the 
Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (Bangladesh Socialist Party), which 
comprised two factions; and the Workers Party. The Jatiyo Samaj- 
tantrik Dal (Inu) operated a radical student front called the Jatiyo 
Chhatro Samaj (National Students Society). In short, this inability 
of the various leftist factions and parties to form a consensus ensured 
that they would be kept out of power. 

Islamic Parties 

At the other end of the political spectrum were a number of 
political organizations that based their platforms on Islamic issues. 
The group with the oldest tradition was the Muslim League (estab- 
lished in 1906 as the All-India Muslim League), which had been 
the main force behind the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Because 



181 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

it favored continued union with Pakistan, the Muslim League was 
almost eliminated from the political stage during and after the inde- 
pendence struggle. It began to stage a comeback during the 1980s 
and gathered four seats in the 1986 Parliament. The Muslim League 
supported complete denationalization and opposed the retention 
of a 51 -percent share of public industries by the government. Its 
policies closely resembled those that led to the formation of Pakistan. 
Among other things, the party accused the government of a sub- 
servient foreign policy toward India, especially in the matter of water 
disputes, and it repeatedly called for Islamic rule in Bangladesh 
(see Foreign Policy, this ch.). 

A more important Islamic party during the 1980s was Jamaat 
e Islami. This party was temporarily banned in the 1970s because 
of its opposition to independence, but it returned in the 1980s as 
the premier Islamic party among the opposition. Jamaat e Islami 
called for a theocracy, not Western-style democracy, but it simul- 
taneously advocated the resignation of Ershad and the restoration 
of democracy. The party drew much of its strength from dedicated 
bands of madrasa students and graduates. As of 1988, its unofficial 
but militant student front was the Islami Chhatro Shibir (Islamic 
Students Camp). It also had a workers' front called the Sramik 
Kalyan Federation (Workers Welfare Federation). 

Besides the Muslim League and Jamaat e Islami, there were a 
number of small parties, possessing little influence, that were 
oriented toward a poorly defined Islamic state and an anti-Indian 
foreign policy. For example, the Bangladesh Khalifat Andolan 
(Bangldesh Caliphate Movement) wanted to launch a "holy war" 
(jihad) to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh and called for a 
government based on the Quran and Sunna (see Islam, ch. 2). In 
1986 another one of these parties, the Islamic United Front, 
demanded scrapping the 1972 Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Cooper- 
ation, Friendship, and Peace. 

Alliances 

The disruptive nature of the Bangladeshi political process was 
the result of a lack of consensus as to national direction even among 
the major political forces. In the late 1980s, for example, the Awami 
League viewed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party as a military-based 
faction that climbed to power over the bodies of Mujib and his 
family. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party saw Ershad' s regime as 
the usurper of Zia's legacy, and both the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party and the Jatiyo Party feared a return to socialism and the anti- 
military stance of the Awami League. Meanwhile, the radical left 
and the Islamic-oriented right held diametrically opposed views of 



182 



Government and Politics 



social organization. Observers believed that any one of these groups, 
if it were established in power, would do everything it could to 
eliminate its rivals. 

Control of the political process and its resources is a life-and- 
death proposition for vast numbers of poor people in the urban 
slums and villages of Bangladesh, and in many cases crucial politi- 
cal decisions, such as local elections or major parliamentary votes, 
precipitate massive violence. In the midst of this struggle for exis- 
tence, politicians of all persuasions publicly advocate democratic 
freedoms but exhibit authoritarian viewpoints and high levels of 
distrust for their colleagues. Within their own parties, leaders such 
as Hasina and Khaleda Zia have often behaved in a manner as 
dictatorial as that for which they have criticized Ershad. In addi- 
tion, factional divisions have been a constant feature of party life, 
as political opponents excluded from decision making have "headed 
to the streets" with their followers. The call for a restoration of 
democracy, echoed by all groups out of power, therefore has seemed 
to be a call for a political opening through which one of the 
opposition parties could seize power. Unhappiness with this state 
of near- anarchy has kept the military in power and attracted many 
middle-of-the-road politicians to a strong executive that could con- 
trol political competition. 

Workers and Students 

The most important political organ among Bangladeshi workers 
in the late 1980s was the Workers-Employees United Council 
(Sramik Karmachari Oikkiya Parishad), an organization of six- 
teen workers' federations composed of two factions that represented 
almost the entire labor front. When the Workers-Employees United 
Council decided to act, it could paralyze urban areas throughout 
the country. In May 1984, the government avoided a major con- 
frontation by agreeing to several points set forth by the council, 
including a call for no further privatization of industry or banks, 
freedom of labor union activities, and a 30-percent raise in the mini- 
mum wage. When the government later reneged on some of 
these points, a council-led general strike occurred in November 
1984, which led to government repression. Further strikes in 1987 
were coordinated with anti-Ershad opposition parties. The coun- 
cil developed a platform calling for restrictions on the import 
of luxury goods, land reform, and government support for handi- 
craft industries. 

The universities have also been a major proving ground for 
political parties since the student protests that led to the war 
of independence (see Emerging Discontent, 1966-70, ch. 1). 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Beginning with major riots in 1983, universities during the Ershad 
regime were the site of repeated antigovernment demonstrations 
and government repression. The Central Students Action Com- 
mittee, a coalition of student political groups, coordinated a num- 
ber of political actions in support of the opposition's demands, which 
culminated in a series of general strikes in 1987. During the Siege 
of Dhaka, from November 10 to 12, the government closed the 
University of Dhaka, and it shut down all education institutions 
in the country later in the month during continuing unrest. Because 
the major parties — including the Jatiyo Party and its Jatiyo Chhatro 
Samaj — had student wings, there were often violent confrontations 
on college and university campuses between rival party members. 
Gun battles broke out in June 1987 between the supporters of the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party's Chhatro Dal (Students Party) and 
the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (Inu)'s Students League over control 
of dormitories. Periodic closings of universities after demonstra- 
tions or political riots often kept institutions shut down for a good 
part of the year during the late 1980s. 

Women in Politics 

Women participated extensively in anti-British agitations during 
the 1930s and 1940s and were an active force during the indepen- 
dence struggle. Since 1972 the Constitution and the legal system 
have guaranteed equal rights for women to participate in all aspects 
of public life. The prominence of the well-known opposition party 
leaders Hasina and Khaleda Zia at first sight indicated a national 
openness to women's political power. Both, however, were excep- 
tional in Bangladeshi politics. They originally owed their positions 
to family connections and only later skillfully built their own fol- 
lowings and platforms. Women candidates for political office were 
a rarity in the 1970s and 1980s, and female participation was labeled 
anti-Islamic by conservative men throughout the country. Secular 
provisions in Bangladeshi laws safeguarded the equality of women 
while "protecting" them and assuming their dependence. 

Women running for office have had little success. In the 1979 
parliamentary elections, for example, only 17 women were among 
2,125 candidates for 300 seats; none of the women won, and only 
3 polled over 15 percent of the vote. At the union council level, 
the 1973 elections returned only one woman chairman, and the 
1977 and 1984 elections each returned only four female chairmen. 
The leaders running the country, recognizing that women suffer 
disabilities when competing for office against men, reserved thirty 
seats for women in Parliament. The profiles of the women occupy- 
ing these seats exemplied the subordinate positions of women in 



184 




The National Martyrs ' Monument at Savar, near Dhaka 
Courtesy Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington 

Bangladesh, even those occupying public offices. In the 1979 Parlia- 
ment, fifteen women members were formerly housewives, and 
twenty-seven had no prior legislative experience. A study of women 
nominated to union councils revealed that 60 percent were less than 
30 years of age, only 8 percent were over 40 years of age, and only 
4 percent had college degrees. 

Prior to the 1988 parliamentary elections, the provision for 
reserved seats for women had been allowed to lapse. The result 
was that women were left practically without representation at the 
national level, although there were other forums for political involve- 
ment at the local level. In mid- 1988 three women sat on union and 
subdistrict councils. Municipal councils also included women, but 
the law precluded women from exceeding 10 percent of council 
membership. Some women's groups, such as the Jatiyo Mohila 
Sangstha (National Organization for Women), have held major 
conferences to discuss women's problems and mobilization strate- 
gies. Although these women's organizations were the province of 
middle-class women, they served as training grounds, as did local 
councils, for a new generation of politically active women. 

The Media 

One of the most effective means for the ruling political party 
to control the nation was through manipulation of the news media. 



185 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

In the 1980s, the government's National Broadcasting Authority 
monopolized telecommunications within the country. Thus the 
party that controlled the government effectively decided the con- 
tent of the country's broadcasts. Until the early 1980s, the govern- 
ment also ran a number of daily and weekly newspapers. Such 
newspapers printed the ruling party's version of the news. As part 
of Ershad's policy of divesting government-owned properties, 
however, these official sources of propaganda were removed from 
government control, thus ending a legacy left over from the Mujib 
period. Each major political party in the late 1980s had one or more 
newspapers that supported it, and each used its own newspapers 
to publish its official views. 

Bengali society has the longest tradition of freedom of the press 
in South Asia, and its dozens of weekly and daily newspapers, press 
associations, and publishers guarantee that almost any opinion finds 
expression. Ruling regimes have countered this independence by 
exercising press censorship. Repression of the media has varied 
from banning certain publications for extended periods of time to 
officially pressuring publishers to regulate the content of news 
articles. For example, the English-language Bangladesh Observer was 
banned for three months in 1987, and the weekly Banglar Bant 
(Bengal's Message) was banned through much of 1987 and 1988. 
The weekly Joyjatra (Victory March) was banned in February 1988 
for publishing "objectionable comments" referring to the possi- 
bility of Ershad's resignation. In 1988 the government closed the 
Dainik Khabor (Daily News) for ten weeks under the Special Powers 
Act of 1974 because the newspaper had released an article with 
a map making Bangladesh look like part of India, thus inflicting 
"injury to the independence and sovereignty of the country." In 
addition, the operations of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
were banned under the Special Powers Act from December 14, 
1987, to May 2, 1988, and one of its correspondents was jailed 
for allegedly having manufactured "continuing hostile and tenden- 
tious propaganda." 

Bangladeshi journalists are unionized, and they sometimes strike 
back at government censorship. During the 1988 parliamentary 
elections, journalists staged a walkout to protest attempts by the 
government's Press Information Department to restrict news and 
photographic coverage of election violence and opposition demon- 
strations. The continuing struggle between the press and the govern- 
ment regularly kept at least six newspapers on the list of banned 
publications in the late 1980s. 

With a 29-percent literacy rate, newspapers and journals are not 
widely read in Bangladesh. For example, despite the publication 



186 



Government and Politics 



of 62 daily newspapers, only 22 percent of all urban households 
in 1982 reported regularly reading them; a dismal 2.5 percent was 
reported for rural areas. 

Both Radio Bangladesh and Bangladesh Television were estab- 
lished in 1971, and both came under state control in 1972. In 1984 
they merged to form the National Broadcasting Authority. In 1988 
the twelve home service stations and twelve FM stations of Radio 
Bangladesh offered a total of eighty-five hours of daily program- 
ming. Radio Bangladesh also transmitted to Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, and Western Europe via its shortwave station 
at Dhaka. Seven and one-half hours of daily programming were 
broadcast in six languages: Bangla, English, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, 
and Nepali. The television service operated two channels, with eight 
and one-half hours of daily programming, relayed by twelve stations 
for reception throughout the country. However, outside Dhaka the 
number of television sets was very small, and television was not 
yet a significant medium when compared with radio, press, and 
word-of-mouth communications. Statistics from the early 1980s 
indicated that about 29 percent of the country's urban households 
had radios, and only 6.7 percent had television sets. In the coun- 
tryside, broadcast communications were even less available: 13 per- 
cent of all rural households had radios, and only 0.2 percent had 
televisions (see Telecommunications, ch. 3). 

Foreign Policy 

The foreign policy of Bangladesh is tied closely to the realities 
of its economic condition. Since independence the country has 
required a great deal of foreign assistance in the effort to keep its 
people fed and to build, for the first time, a modern society. Under 
these circumstances, it has been important for successive regimes 
to seek good relations with all nations and to attract economic aid 
from every possible source (see Foreign Assistance, ch. 3). 
Bangladesh has therefore cultivated good relations with both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies, 
but it has remained unaligned with either superpower. In an attempt 
to stimulate regional development plans, Bangladesh has been 
instrumental in organizing regional economic cooperation in South 
Asia. It has also been active in international organizations, espe- 
cially in those dedicated to solving the economic problems of the 
poorer countries of the world. 

Despite its poverty and small military capability, Bangladesh has 
not hesitated to defend its sovereignty and to take strong stands 
on many international issues. Any hint that India might try 
to intimidate Bangladesh or encroach on its territorial rights has 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

quickly elicited a powerful, nationalistic response from all levels 
of society. Furthermore, Bangladesh has annoyed both superpowers 
by standing against them on various major issues, and relations 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union have gone through 
difficult periods. A major component of Bangladesh's self- 
assertiveness has been evident in its efforts to focus on its Islamic 
heritage and its quest for fraternity with the worldwide Muslim 
congregation. The friendly relations it has enjoyed with Islamic 
nations have led to the receipt of economic aid from wealthy Arab 
countries. 

South and Southeast Asia 

India 

Relations between Bangladesh and India have often been difficult. 
There was considerable hostility on both sides of the border when 
East Pakistan was established in 1947 in the midst of intense com- 
munal struggles among various ethnic groups. As part of Pakistan, 
East Pakistan was at war with India in 1947 and 1948 and again 
in 1965. During the 1971 war of independence, Bangladeshi free- 
dom fighters were aided by India, but the country's distrust of its 
giant neighbor reemerged as soon as the fighting ended. In general, 
a considerable body of Bangladeshi public opinion has viewed India 
as a bully, throwing its weight around and threatening the 
sovereignty of its smaller neighbors. The fact that the two nations 
are so closely intertwined — with 2,400 kilometers of border, com- 
mon river systems, and numerous transborder cultural or economic 
contacts — has provided numerous opportunities for bilateral dis- 
putes that often reinforce Bangladeshi fears. Conversely, the fact 
that the two countries are so closely interconnected has sometimes 
forced them to come to terms with each other, and as of mid- 1988 
bilateral problems had not escalated into a major armed conflict. 
Indeed, relations between Bangladesh and India have been diplo- 
matically proper, with a trend toward increasing cordiality and 
cooperation over time. 

Mujib's government, which lasted from 1971 to 1975, owed a 
large debt to India for aid to Bangladesh during its independence 
struggle, and relations were initially positive. In March 1972, the 
Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship, and Peace 
pledged each nation to consultations if either were attacked. This 
was an important safeguard for the new nation, but critics have 
pointed out that the treaty does not specify the external threats to 
either nation, suggesting the possibility that India could use the 
treaty as an excuse for intervention in Bangladesh. The series of 



188 



Government and Politics 



coups that replaced Mujib's government brought bilateral relations 
to their lowest level and led many Bangladeshis to fear Indian 
intervention. The Indian government, then controlled by Indira 
Gandhi's Indian National Congress, looked with misgivings on the 
anti-Indian and anti-Soviet stance of the new military regimes. For 
several years, pro-Mujib guerrilla forces operating along the Indian 
border reportedly received covert support from Indian sources. In 
1977, however, Gandhi's government fell, the new Janata Party 
leadership took a more accommodating stance toward Bangladesh, 
and Zia's government stabilized. Indian forces cooperated with the 
Bangladesh military in disarming Bangladeshi rebels in the sum- 
mer of 1977, and a number of bilateral agreements were signed 
shortly thereafter. When Gandhi again became prime minister in 
1979, she continued a policy of accommodation with Zia's regime. 
Subsequently, she recognized Ershad's government, and she met 
with Ershad in October 1982. After Gandhi's assassination in 1984, 
her son and successor as prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, encouraged 
cooperative agreements with Bangladesh and enjoyed a good rela- 
tionship with Ershad. 

Events during the 1980s suggested the prospect of a new era in 
Indo-Bangladeshi relations. In 1981 both countries drew up the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation. In 
1982 the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission was held, 
and in 1987 the bilateral Cultural and Exchange Programme was 
renewed for two years. A bilateral trade pact was extended from 
1986 until October 1989. In addition, an inland trade and transit 
protocol, allowing Indian vessels to pass through Bangladesh, 
exemplified a maturing cooperative relationship, necessitated by 
Bangladesh's geographical position. The original protocol was 
signed in November 1972, renewed in 1984, and extended in 1986 
on a quarterly basis. The agreement was later renegotiated and, 
according to its provisions, stayed effective until October 1989. India 
agreed to pay transit charges and port fees, while Bangladesh agreed 
to maintain its own waterways. The ability of both governments 
to compromise on economic issues boded well for the possibility 
of future bilateral agreements. 

Despite considerable progress in expanding contacts between 
the two countries, a number of serious issues concerning river waters 
and borders continued to stir up anti-Indian emotions in Bangladesh 
during the late 1980s. These issues involved national honor and 
sovereignty — strongly charged topics in both nations — and progress 
toward resolving them was extremely slow . Every delay in resolv- 
ing bilateral problems provided fuel for a steady stream of anti- 
Indian editorials in the Bangladeshi press and for statements by 



189 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



political parties of all persuasions condemning Indian foreign policy. 
The most difficult long-term bilateral problems revolved around 
water disputes. These problems surfaced during the 1950s and 
1960s, when the major Indian port of Calcutta on the Hooghli River 
experienced siltation problems. The Indian government decided 
that the solution was to divert the Ganges River water into the 
Hooghli River during the dry season, from January to June, in 
order to flush out the accumulating silt. By 1974 the Indians had 
built a major barrage, or dam, across the Ganges at Farakka, near 
the Bangladeshi border. Before the Farakka Barrage went into 
operation, the Bangladeshi government repeatedly expressed con- 
cern that the diversion would adversely affect water resources along 
the course of the Ganges through Bangladesh. After the Farakka 
Barrage began operating in 1975, dry-season water levels dropped 
precipitously in western Bangladesh, and studies showed that 
salinized water from the Indian Ocean was creeping inland. In 1976, 
despite Indian opposition, Bangladesh managed to place the dis- 
pute on the agenda of the UN General Assembly; this strategy 
resulted in a consensus statement in which both parties agreed to 
resolve the issue according to international law. 

A bilateral agreement signed in 1977 set up a schedule for sharing 
the dry-season flow of water controlled by the Farakka Barrage, 
and it arranged for continuing consultations by the Joint Rivers 
Commission. The mandate of the commission was to monitor the 
water availability and needs of the two countries and to study 
proposals for a more comprehensive plan for water control in 
Bangladesh and northeast India. A Bangladeshi proposal concen- 
trated on the enormous potential of untapped rivers in Nepal; dams 
there, it was argued, could provide adequate hydroelectric power 
well into the twenty-first century and regulate water levels through- 
out northeastern India and Bangladesh. The Indian proposal con- 
centrated on controlling the wild Brahmaputra River and called 
for a major canal to divert water from the Brahmaputra to the 
Ganges, west of the Farakka Barrage; this, the Indians claimed, 
would help to regulate water levels throughout Bangladesh. India 
was slow to involve Nepal in what it viewed as a bilateral issue, 
while Bangladesh refused to agree to the construction of a large 
canal that would obliterate valuable land and dislocate hundreds 
of thousands of people. In the absence of an agreement on a com- 
prehensive plan, the two nations were forced to renew previous 
agreements on the flow of the Ganges at Farakka for periods of 
six months or two years at a time. In 1986, however, Indian negoti- 
ators invited Nepali officials to tripartite planning conferences, open- 
ing up the possibility of a future agreement. 



190 



Government and Politics 



Water-sharing disputes have arisen with regard to other rivers 
as well. India has constructed and operated on the Tista River a 
barrage similar to the one on the Ganges. India and Bangladesh 
drew up interim agreements on the sharing of Tista River waters 
beginning in July 1983. These agreements were renewed in 1985 
and 1987, without a final allocation of waters to either party. 

In 1974 the borders between India and Bangladesh were settled 
in a treaty that became the Third Amendment to the Bangladesh 
Constitution. Since that time, questions over small pieces of terri- 
tory not covered by the 1974 treaty — such as silt-formed islands 
{chars) that have emerged in frontier waters and Bangladeshi 
enclaves accessible only from India — have grown into minor mili- 
tary confrontations (see Security Environment, ch. 5). 

In the late 1980s, the unauthorized movement of people across 
Indo-Bangladeshi borders continued to cause tensions. In 1979 two 
days of communal rioting in the Indian state of West Bengal forced 
20,000 Indian Muslims to flee into Kushtia District in Bangladesh. 
Although they were later repatriated, the incident rekindled 
transborder communal hatreds. During the 1980s, attempts by 
Bangladesh military and paramilitary forces to pacify tribal groups 
in the Chittagong Hills forced thousands of Chakmas to flee into 
Indian territory (see Ethnicity and Linguistic Diversity, ch. 2). 
Bangladesh accused India of sheltering tribal guerrilla forces and 
preventing the voluntary return of the Chakmas. India, in turn, 
accused Bangladesh of harboring guerrilla bands of the Tripura 
National Volunteers, a secessionist organization fighting for inde- 
pendence from India. A more significant long-term movement of 
people across the Indo-Bangladeshi border has involved thousands 
of Bangladeshis who have illegally moved to neighboring Indian 
states in search of land and employment. By 1982 the steady influx 
of Bangla speakers sparked a major ethnic backlash in the Indian 
state of Assam, leading to the slaughter of thousands of non- 
Assamese. In order to placate Assamese public opinion, the 
governments of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi promised to stem illegal 
immigration, and in order to do so India constructed barbed-wire 
fencing along the Indo-Bangladeshi border in the area. The fence 
was seen as an outrage among the Bangladeshi public, and the 
government of Bangladesh has made repeated protests to the Indian 
government over the matter (see Insurgency in the Chittagong Hills, 
ch. 5). 

Pakistan 

Pakistan was hostile to Bangladesh in the early 1970s, but by 
1974 it was apparent that the new nation would stand on its own, 



191 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



and in February Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. Diplomatic 
relations were established in January 1976, followed by the reestab- 
lishment of communications and transportation links later in the 
year. As Bangladesh subsequently adopted a cooler stance toward 
India, began to move closer to China and the West, and stressed 
its Islamic cultural heritage, its interests became increasingly similar 
to those of Pakistan. 

Throughout the 1980s, Bangladesh consistently supported Paki- 
stan's policy of opposing Soviet actions in Afghanistan. In 1983 
Pakistan's foreign minister signaled the end of an era of animosity 
when he visited Bangladesh's National Martyrs' Monument at 
Savar, near Dhaka, which commemorates those killed by Pakistan's 
armed forces during the war of independence. Pakistan's Presi- 
dent Mohammad Zia ul Haq later presented Ershad with the coun- 
try's highest civil award during the Bangladeshi president's visit 
to Islamabad in 1986. 

After the establishment of diplomatic ties, Bangladesh and Paki- 
stan entered into a wide variety of bilateral agreements. A 1979 
cultural agreement arranged for the exchange of teachers, scholars, 
musicians, folklore troupes, art works, films, and books. Joint eco- 
nomic, commercial, and technical pacts signed after 1978 provided 
for the exchange of major exports of both countries: jute and tea 
from Bangladesh, and cotton and cloth from Pakistan. 

Two major areas of disagreement remained between Bangladesh 
and Pakistan as of mid- 1988, and both stemmed from the disloca- 
tions resulting from the independence struggle. The first issue con- 
cerned the finances of united Pakistan. After the war, Bangladesh 
claimed that it deserved a share of the US$4 billion worth of preinde- 
pendence exchange, bank credit, and movable assets protected in 
West Pakistan during the war. In a 1975 agreement, Bangladesh 
accepted half of Pakistan's pre- 1971 external debt, but asset-sharing 
issues remained unresolved. The second issue concerned the emigra- 
tion of large numbers of people, mostly Biharis (non-Bengali 
Muslims), to Pakistan. After the war, the International Red Cross 
registered nearly 540,000 people who wanted to emigrate to Paki- 
stan. By 1982 about 127,000 had been repatriated, leaving about 
250,000 people still demanding repatriation. Thousands of people 
who desired to emigrate lived in poor conditions in so-called 
"Pakistani Relief Camps," where they received monthly food allot- 
ments. In 1985 there was some progress in this area when Zia ul 
Haq agreed to accept the "stranded Pakistanis." In 1986 Pakistan 
arranged for their immigration as soon as Ribatat al Alam al Islami 
(Union of the Islamic World), a voluntary organization based in 
Saudi Arabia, could mobilize sufficient funds. 

192 



Government and Politics 



Other Nations 

Bangladesh has enjoyed good relations with the other small 
nations of South Asia — Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives — 
and those of Southeast Asia, except for Vietnam. Bangladesh has 
made strenuous efforts to extend cooperation with these nations 
through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC — see Glossary) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (see International Organizations, this ch.). 

Burma is the only nation besides India that shares a border with 
Bangladesh. Relations between the two countries have generally 
been cordial, but relations deteriorated in 1978 and 1979 when 
150,000 Bengali-descent Muslims flooded into Bangladesh from 
Burma. This exodus was the result of Burmese attempts to combat 
Muslim guerrillas fighting for an independent homeland, and 
it brought to light anti-Bengali feelings in western Burma. Inter- 
vention by the UN and the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Dhaka 
led to a negotiated repatriation of the refugees and the reestab- 
lishment of good relations. Later talks led to the demarcation of 
the land boundary between the two countries. Bangladesh and 
Burma settled their maritime boundary during a 1986 visit by the 
Burmese president. 

China and Other Asian Nations 

China firmly supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's war of 
independence, and for several years thereafter it remained, along 
with Pakistan, hostile to the new state. In the years immediately 
following independence, Bangladesh was close to India and the 
Soviet Union — two foes of China — and as a result it was grouped 
with them by Beijing as an enemy state. In 1972, for example, a 
Chinese veto blocked Bangladesh's entry into the UN, but by the 
mid-1970s China and Bangladesh had developed proper relations. 
When Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh in 1974, the 
Chinese were able to move closer to Bangladesh without antagoniz- 
ing their ally. After Mujib's death in 1975, when Bangladesh dis- 
tanced itself from India and the Soviets, it left the camp of China's 
adversaries. A preliminary agreement to establish relations in late 
1975 led to an exchange of diplomatic missions in 1976. The trend 
in China toward a more open foreign policy during the 1970s also 
paralleled the Bangladeshi move toward neutralism under Zia, who 
visited Beijing in 1977. 

By the 1980s, the domestic and foreign policies of China and 
Bangladesh had become somewhat similar. The governing parties 
of both countries opposed ultra-left and ultra- right political systems, 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

while at the same time opposing "bourgeois" economics. Each 
country called for an international dialogue on debt problems 
between the developed and developing nations, and each expressed 
concern over Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Cambodia. By the 
mid-1980s, China had become the staunchest international friend 
of Bangladesh, cementing the relationship with numerous trade 
and cultural agreements, construction projects, and military trans- 
fers (see Foreign Acquisitions and Ties, ch. 5). In addition, Ershad 
was warmly received during his visit to Beijing in July 1987. 

Friendly political relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) accompanied steadily increasing economic ties with 
both nations. Bilateral trade and joint economic projects with South 
Korea increased during the late 1980s (see Foreign Assistance, 
ch. 3). Japan was a prominent source of economic aid as early as 
1973, when Mujib traveled to Tokyo to conclude arrangements 
for a substantial loan and to discuss trade issues. By 1980 Japan 
had become the largest aid donor to Bangladesh. After the devastat- 
ing floods of 1988, Japan was a major relief contributor, provid- 
ing an emergency contribution for food assistance of US$13 million. 

The Islamic World 

In the immediate aftermath of the war of independence, the 
Muslim nations of the world mourned the blow to the sundered 
Pakistan, an avowedly Islamic state. For several years thereafter, 
Pakistan threatened to cut off diplomatic relations with nations that 
recognized Bangladesh, thus discouraging other Muslim states from 
helping the new nation. Mujib's socialist policies were not in tune 
with the viewpoints of most Muslim states, especially the conser- 
vative Arab states of the Middle East. Malaysia and Indonesia 
recognized Bangladesh in 1972, and after Pakistan did so in 1974, 
other Muslim countries eventually granted recognition and provided 
aid. The growing role of Islam in Bangladesh, symbolized by the 
adoption in 1988 of a constitutional amendment recognizing it as 
the state religion, indicated a major effort to widen ties with the 
Islamic world. 

Bilateral ties between Bangladesh and the oil-rich Arab states 
were becoming increasingly important in the mid- and late 1980s. 
These ties had both economic and political components. The Arab 
states, especially Saudi Arabia, had become a growing source of 
development funds (mostly loans) since 1975, with much of the aid 
channeled into Islamic education and culture. The Saudis donated 
money for the construction of an Islamic university, mosques, and 
other religious centers, and Bangladesh exported labor to several 
Middle Eastern countries (see Balance and Terms of Trade, ch. 3). 



194 



Government and Politics 



Politically, Bangladesh supported the international policies of the 
Islamic nations of the Middle East. For example, Bangladesh 
strongly condemned Israeli policies and favored the creation of a 
Palestinian state. It supported the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, whose visit to Bangladesh 
in 1987 elicited a warm welcome from Ershad and other major 
government figures, as well as favorable press coverage. In 1987 
the government reported that 8,000 Bangladeshi youths had volun- 
teered to fight for the Palestine Liberation Organization. The 
government of Bangladesh, however, had made no official moves 
to send arms or personnel to Palestine as of mid- 1988. 

Bangladesh has expanded its ties with the worldwide Islamic com- 
munity through the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a 
group of forty-five Muslim countries and eleven other nations with 
Muslim minorities. Bangladesh became a member of the confer- 
ence in February 1974 and thereafter played a prominent role in 
setting up economic programs. The sixth annual meeting of the 
Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Finance Ministers' Con- 
ference were held in Dhaka in 1985. In addition, Ershad attended 
the 1987 meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
in Kuwait, where nineteen Bangladeshi economic initiatives were 
accepted as joint ventures. Bangladesh was also part of a three- 
member committee trying to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq War, 
and Ershad made several trips to the Middle East in an attempt 
to achieve peace. 

The Superpowers 

Soviet Union 

Relations with the Soviet Union were cordial in the years imme- 
diately following independence. The Soviet Union supported Indian 
actions in aiding the war of independence, and after the war the 
Soviet Navy sent a floating workshop to Bangladesh for clearing 
Pakistani mines from the Chittagong and Chalna harbors. Mujib 
visited Moscow in 1972, and high-level officials from both coun- 
tries made numerous reciprocal visits until 1975. The Soviets sup- 
ported the socialist programs of the Mujib government and its close 
ties with India. Early Soviet aid was limited, however. During the 
first four months of its existence, Bangladesh received economic 
aid worth US$142 million from India, but only US$6 million from 
the Soviet Union. 

After the 1975 coup, relations with the Soviet Union rapidly 
cooled. The military regimes of Zia and Ershad deemphasized 
socialist policies and encouraged closer ties with the United States, 



195 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Arab states, Pakistan, and China — all of which were politically 
distant from the Soviet Union. Bangladesh condemned Soviet sup- 
port for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and Soviet military 
actions in Afghanistan. A low point in Bangladeshi-Soviet relations 
came after the expulsion of nine Soviet diplomats from Dhaka in 
December 1983 and January 1984. Moscow, in turn, refused to 
accept the new Bangladeshi ambassador and canceled a Bangladeshi 
trade mission visit to Moscow. 

Bangladeshi-Soviet relations rapidly improved in 1984 and 
regained a level of cordiality in the mid- and late 1980s. In 1985 
the Soviet Cultural Centre reopened in Dhaka. In 1986 a Soviet 
special envoy visited Dhaka, and later the Bangladeshi foreign 
minister visited Moscow. Although Soviet aid to Bangladesh was 
still small compared with assistance from Japan, the United States, 
or even China, by 1987 Bangladesh had entered into sixteen differ- 
ent economic accords with the Soviet Union. Soviet assistance has 
concentrated on the energy sector, especially several power plants 
at Ghorasal, near Dhaka. 

United States 

The United States and Pakistan were allies when Bangladesh 
became independent in 1971. The Pakistan Army used United 
States-supplied military equipment, and the movement of the 
United States Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal during the war 
signaled support for Pakistan (see The War for Bangladeshi Inde- 
pendence, 1971, ch. 1). Because Pakistan was closely tied to the 
economic policies of the United States and its allies, the Awami 
League saw a link between the economic collapse of East Pakistan 
and United States policies. Under these circumstances, the United 
States had a negative image in independent Bangladesh. After April 
1972, when the United States formally recognized Bangladesh, rela- 
tions remained cool, and there were frequent public anti- American 
demonstrations, including the burning of the United States Infor- 
mation Service library in Rajshahi in December 1972. 

After Mujib's asassination, the government of Khondakar 
Mushtaque Ahmed was closely tied to the United States, and there 
was increased cordiality during the Zia and Ershad administrations, 
as denationalization widened the economic linkages between the 
two nations. Bangladesh's positions on some international issues, 
including the China- Vietnam border war of 1978, Cambodia, and 
Afghanistan, came to resemble those of the United States. In 1979 
Bangladesh signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, clearing the way for United States help in setting up 
a nuclear research reactor near Dhaka. During the 1980s, a new 



196 



Government and Politics 



level of cooperation began, signaled by the visits to Washington 
of Zia in 1980 and Ershad in 1983. 

By the late 1980s, the United States had become one of the closest 
international friends of Bangladesh, a major international donor, 
and a partner in 133 different accords. United States agencies 
operated a wide variety of development projects in Bangladesh, 
including programs to increase agricultural production, create new 
employment opportunities, and reduce population growth. Only 
disagreements on Bangladeshi garment exports to the United States 
clouded bilateral relations. 

Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 

Bangladesh has cultivated close ties with West European nations, 
which have been major sources of economic aid. Britain continued 
to be its most important friend in Western Europe. Britain has sup- 
ported a number of transportation and communication projects, 
educational exchange programs, and the activities of several British 
voluntary aid organizations. Two examples of the close state of 
Bangladeshi-British relations were the 1983 visit to Bangladesh by 
Queen Elizabeth II and Britain's speedy pledge of US$750,000 in 
emergency assistance after the 1988 floods. After Britain, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Italy were Bangladesh's 
most important trading partners in Western Europe. Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand also provided economic aid and 
engaged in educational exchange programs with Bangladesh. 

International Organizations 

After Pakistan and China entered into friendlier relations with 
Bangladesh in 1974, the way was open for its admission into the 
UN in September of that year. In 1978 Bangladesh was elected 
to a two-year term on the Security Council, and during this period 
it took strong stands, reiterated on many occasions, concerning Viet- 
nam's involvement in Cambodia, Soviet intervention in Afghani- 
stan, Israeli policies in the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq War, and 
apartheid in South Africa. Bangladesh was elected as a member 
of the Security Council's Human Rights Commission in 1985 and 
as president of the forty-first session of the UN General Assembly 
(1986-87). In 1987 Ershad received the UN Population Award on 
behalf of his government. 

Before its formal admission into the UN, Bangladesh had been 
admitted to all of its specialized agencies, and after formally join- 
ing the world body, it adopted a high profile in these agencies. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has operated projects 
in Bangladesh since 1975, in areas ranging from irrigation to rubber 



197 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

production to mangrove afforestation. Bangladesh became a mem- 
ber of the forty-nine-member FAO Council in 1977, served on the 
FAO's Finance Committee from 1975 to 1979, and has partici- 
pated in a number of FAO commissions. It was elected vice chair- 
man of the FAO in November 1987. Representatives of Bangladesh 
also have participated in various specialized UN conferences. 
Bangladesh joined the Commonwealth of Nations in 1972 — a move 
that prompted Pakistan to withdraw from the organization — and 
has remained prominent at its meetings ever since. Along with other 
South Asian members of the Commonwealth, Bangladesh has used 
its meetings to push for sanctions against apartheid and South 
African's occupation of Namibia, and it has even offered military 
training facilities to anti-South African guerrillas. 

Keenly aware of his nation's economic problems and observing 
the benefits of regional economic cooperation in Western Europe, 
Zia began to seek opportunities for multilateral development among 
the nations of South Asia in 1977. In 1981 the foreign secretaries 
of the seven nations of South Asia met in Sri Lanka to set up the 
basic framework of a regional development organization that was 
formally founded in New Delhi in August 1983. With continuous 
effort by Bangladeshi diplomats, these preliminary steps culminated 
in December 1986 in the first summit conference of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was con- 
vened in Dhaka. The choice of this site was in recognition of 
Bangladesh's crucial role in forming the SAARC. Subsequent sum- 
mits in Bangalore, India, in 1986 and in Kathmandu, Nepal, in 
1987 established the SAARC as a functioning international body. 

The agenda of the SAARC specifically removes bilateral issues 
and political programs from the organization's debates, confining 
committee and summit discussions to areas where member nations 
may find common ground for achieving mutual economic benefit. 
However, no large-scale economic projects had emerged from 
SAARC discussions as of mid- 1988. Because many of the most 
difficult economic problems in South Asia involve long-standing 
political differences at the bilateral level (for example, Bangladesh's 
Ganges water dispute with India), the SAARC has not been an 
effective mechanism for solving problems. Nevertheless, through 
the mid- and late 1980s, the SAARC 's summits have provided its 
members with a forum in which to exchange ideas and positions 
and discuss bilateral issues. 

Bangladesh's presence in the Nonaligned Movement has pro- 
vided it with an international reputation as a voice of modera- 
tion and compromise. Bangladesh's prime minister, Mizanur 
Rahman Chowdhury, was elected vice chairman of the Nonaligned 



198 



Government and Politics 



Movement summit held in Havana in 1986. This international 
reputation served Bangladesh well in courting the goodwill of poten- 
tially hostile neighbors and attracting economic aid from donor 
countries with diverse political systems. Although the Ershad regime 
was politically repugnant to many opposition leaders and was looked 
at critically by some foreign governments, the regime had brought 
a new sense of stability to Bangladesh as it made a tenuous transi- 
tion to civilian rule in the late 1980s. 

* * * 

A good overview of Bangladesh and its role in South Asian politics 
until the mid-1980s is Government and Politics in South Asia by Craig 
Baxter et al. The text of the Bangladesh Constitution can be found 
in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz's Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World. General introductions to the administrative 
organization of Bangladesh are Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and 
John P. Thorp's Bangladesh: Society, Politics, and Bureaucracy and 
A.M.M. Shawkat Ali's Politics, Development and Upazila. Harry W. 
Blair's article, "Participation, Public Policy, Political Economy, 
and Development in Rural Bangladesh, 1958-85," gives a good 
introduction to administrative decentralization. Among a number 
of studies on Bangladeshi politics are E.W. Timm's Power Rela- 
tions in Rural Development, Betsy Hartmann and James K. Boyce's 
A Quiet Violence, Kirsten Westergaard's State and Rural Society in 
Bangladesh, and Atiur Rahman's Peasants and Classes. 

General foreign policy issues are covered by Emajuddin Ahamed 
in Foreign Policy of Bangladesh and by M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur 
Rab Khan in Nation Building in Bangladesh. Bilateral relations 
are summarized in Kuldeep Singh's India and Bangladesh, Ishtiaq 
Hossain's "Bangladesh-India Relations," Jayasree Biswas' 
US-Bangladesh Relations, and Waliur Rahman's Bangladesh and the 
United Nations. 

For reportage on Bangladeshi politics and international affairs, 
the Far Eastern Economic Review's Asia Yearbook, annual essays 
on Bangladesh in February issues of Asian Survey, and the Europa 
Year Book are good sources. More detailed daily chronicles can be 
found in Public Opinion Trends Analyses and News Service: Bangladesh 
Series and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near 
East and South Asia. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 5. National Security 



Bangladesh's ground, navy, and air forces 



BORN FROM THE CHAOS of civil war, steeped in a praetorian 
tradition of military supremacy over the civilian political process, 
and racked by internal dissension, the armed forces created by 
Bangladesh were not disciplined during the first years after indepen- 
dence. By the mid-1980s, however, the armed forces had evolved 
into a more cohesive and professional organization. The military — 
particularly the army — continued to play a critical role in guiding 
or controlling the political process in Bangladesh. 

Since formally declaring independence from Pakistan in April 
1971, Bangladesh has not experienced an orderly transfer of power. 
Every Bangladeshi ruler initially assumed power in the aftermath 
of extraordinary and often bloody events, such as civil war, a mili- 
tary coup, or the assassination of his predecessor. Without excep- 
tion, every national election staged between 1973 and 1988 was 
intended to legitimize the rule of a nonelected leader already in 
power. During the same fifteen years, there were four successful 
military coups, in addition to a string oijawan (soldier) uprisings, 
assassination plots, and abortive rebellions. As of mid-1988, 
Bangladeshi military authorities had been in power, either directly 
or as guarantor of a nominally civilian regime, for over two-thirds 
of the country's independent existence. 

Army involvement in politics during this time followed four dis- 
tinct patterns. The first pattern — characterized by the military's 
subordination to an elected civilian government — is that which 
prevailed between 1971 and 1975 when the Aw ami League (People's 
League) was in power. During this formative stage, Awami League 
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), a civilian, kept a tight 
rein on his military commanders, some of whom were suspected 
of political disloyalty. After declaring a national emergency in 
December 1974, however, Mujib assumed dictatorial powers. 
Mujib's inability to address the military's grievances, limit cor- 
ruption, and restore law and order in the country triggered 
Bangladesh's first military coup in August 1975. With Mujib's 
assassination and the eclipse of the Awami League, civilian con- 
trol over the military was effectively ended. 

A second pattern of army involvement in politics is the classic 
martial law dictatorship led by a junta or a military strongman. 
Regimes of this type included a short-lived "revolutionary" govern- 
ment headed by power-seeking army officers, November 3-7, 1975, 
and periods of authoritarian rule under Ziaur Rahman (Zia), from 



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April 1977 to June 1978 and under Hussain Muhammad Ershad 
from March 1982 to May 1986. 

The third pattern is a transitional regime in which power is 
nominally held by a civilian figurehead who depends on army 
backing for political survival. Regimes of this type have been headed 
by Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed from August 15 to Novem- 
ber 3, 1975; Abu Sadat Muhammad Sayem from November 7, 
1975, to April 1977; and the legally constituted civilian govern- 
ment of Abdus Sattar from May 1981 to March 1982. 

A fourth type of political arrangement is a quasi-military regime 
headed by a military strongman who retired from the army while 
still in power, assembled a personal political party, and engineered 
his own election as a civilian president. There have been two such 
regimes in Bangladesh: Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party govern- 
ment between June 1978 and May 1981 and Ershad 'sjatiyo Party 
(National Party) government, elected to a parliamentary majority 
in May 1986, confirmed with Ershad's election as president in 
October 1986, and reaffirmed in parliamentary election in March 
1988. Although each of these governments won resounding elec- 
toral mandates against a weak and divided opposition, most 
observers of the Bangladeshi political scene agreed that the armed 
forces remained the real guarantors of the government's power. 

Civilian control over the military has always been weak under 
elected civilian governments and nonexistent under martial law 
regimes. Since the early 1970s, the armed forces have distrusted 
civilian politicians and sought to prevent their "meddling" in the 
military's vital interests, such as resource allocations, pay and 
benefits, and promotions. 

Armed Forces and Society 

Colonial Origins 

The military history of Bangladesh before independence is part 
of that of the Indian subcontinent, particularly of British India and 
then of Pakistan from 1947 through 1971. The period having the 
greatest influence on the military establishments of the subconti- 
nent began with the arrival of the Europeans at the start of the 
sixteenth century and, more particularly, Queen Elizabeth Fs grant- 
ing of a charter to the British East India Company in 1600 (see 
European Colonization, 1757-1857, ch. 1). As European settle- 
ments were established, locals were employed as guards to protect 
company trading posts and participate in ceremonials. As the num- 
ber of trading posts increased, these guards were more formally 
organized into companies led by British officers. Three independent 



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forces emerged and became known as presidency armies and the 
troops as sepoys (a corruption of the Hindi sipahi, or soldier). 
Regular British troops also were incorporated into the presidency 
armies. In 1748 the three armies were grouped under a single com- 
mander in chief and organized, armed, uniformed, and trained 
by British officers. 

The rapid expansion of British control of the Indian subconti- 
nent during the early nineteenth century was accompanied by 
mounting resistance. Political, social, religious, and ethnic tensions 
led to four eruptions in the army in the years between 1844 and 
1857, although these incidents were considered minor by the British 
authorities. The long pent-up discontent of the sepoys then broke 
into open revolt at Meerut, near Delhi on May 10, 1857, starting 
the Sepoy Rebellion (see The Uprising of 1857, ch. 1). 

The uprising, regarded by the British as a mutiny but by later 
South Asian nationalists as the "first war of independence," was 
largely confined to Bengalis in the British Indian Army, but it grew 
into a major conflict in northern and central India. The British 
used loyal Indian troops and reinforcements from Britain to crush 
the rebellion by 1858. A proclamation by Queen Victoria termi- 
nated the British East India Company government, India became 
a British colony, and the role of Indian military forces was reevalu- 
ated. Because the uprising was limited almost entirely to the Bengali 
troops and to the regions of north-central India and Bengal (see 
Glossary), the British not only disbanded the Bengali army but also 
became distrustful of Bengalis and concentrated military recruit- 
ment among the more favored Punjabis and Pathans of north- 
western India. Additionally, a complete reorganization of the Indian 
forces followed. By 1895 the army was put under the central 
authority of the army headquarters at Delhi and was divided into 
four territorial commands at of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and 
Punjab, each commanded by a lieutenant general. 

After the 1857-58 uprising, the British developed a recruitment 
policy that was to shape the Pakistani military and later that of 
Bangladesh. Recruitment was based on the "martial races" myth, 
according to which the inhabitants of certain areas or members of 
certain castes or tribes were reputed to make more fearless and dis- 
ciplined soldiers than others. Popularization of this concept is usually 
attributed to Lord Frederick Roberts, commander in chief of the 
British Indian Army from 1885 to 1893. Roberts believed that the 
best recruits were found in northwestern India, including Punjab 
and parts of what later became West Pakistan. Because recruit- 
ment was based on these theories, the period from 1890 to 1914 
sometimes is referred to as "the Punjabization of the army." 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Roberts also favored staffing certain units or subunits with mem- 
bers of the same caste, tribal, or religious group from within the 
so-called martial races, a practice that became fairly common. These 
methods produced an apolitical, professional force responsive to 
British command, but one that accentuated regional and communal 
distinctions. Nevertheless, the British never organized a combat 
unit of battalion size or larger that was entirely composed of 
Muslims. Consequently, when the Muslim majority state of 
Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, existing British Indian 
Army formations that were transferred to the new state were 
severely understrength. 

Bengali participation in the military services was much lower 
than that of other groups, and a number of reasons have been 
advanced for this fact. In the 1920s, Punjab, with about 20 million 
people, contributed some 350,000 recruits to the British Indian 
Army, whereas Bengal, with a population base at least twice as 
large, contributed only 7,000 recruits during the same period. 

Pakistan Era 

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 to form India 
and Pakistan also entailed the division of the units and equipment 
of the British Indian Army. Under a partition formula announced 
on July 1, 1947, existing military forces were divided on the basis 
of religious identification; units with a Muslim majority were trans- 
ferred to Pakistan with their records and unit designations more 
or less intact. Individual Muslim servicemen who were from the 
areas that were to become India were given the option of remain- 
ing with the Indian armed forces or going to Pakistan. Hindus in 
the Muslim majority units could stay with those units when they 
transferred to Pakistan or be reassigned to Indian units. In both 
countries the newly formed armed forces continued to be organized, 
trained, and employed along the familiar lines of British practice. 

The armed forces that Pakistan inherited in 1947 from the divi- 
sion of the British Indian Army included Bengali Muslims, and 
there was always a small minority of them in the Pakistani armed 
services. These Bengalis served with their units as a matter of course 
in the 1947-48 and 1965 wars with India and in the numerous secu- 
rity operations in Pakistan up to 1971 (see Pakistan Period, 
1947-71, ch. 1). 

Despite the participation of these Bengalis, East Pakistani spokes- 
men vigorously denounced East Pakistan's lack of military represen- 
tation and influence in military policy. All senior military 
headquarters were located in West Pakistan, and almost all regular 
Pakistani forces were stationed there. Defense expenditures from 



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indigenous revenue and foreign military aid in the 1950s and 1960s 
constituted the largest single item of the country's budget. But 
because of the force-stationing policy and associated allocation prac- 
tices, the economic benefits from defense spending — in contracts, 
purchasing, and military support jobs — went almost entirely to West 
Pakistan. Pay and allowances to members of the armed forces also 
largely benefited only the West Pakistanis. 

Pakistani recruiters claimed difficulty in securing volunteers 
in East Pakistan. West Pakistanis held that Bengalis were not 
"martially inclined" — especially in comparison with Punjabis and 
Pathans, among whom military orientation was deeply embedded. 
East Pakistanis asserted, however, that as active participants in the 
movement to create an Islamic homeland they had a right and 
obligation to participate more extensively in the armed forces and 
should be represented in about the same ratio as their numbers 
in the total population. They assailed the old, entrenched doctrine 
of the "martial races" as ridiculous and humiliating. Arguing from 
the standpoint of security, they pointed out that the force-stationing 
policy left East Pakistan virtually defenseless against rival India 
and that no planning was under way to remedy this situation. 

All these arguments, although frequently and eloquently 
advanced, had little effect. Pakistan president Mohammad Ayub 
Khan (1958-69) held that East Pakistan was indefensible without 
the prior development of strong forces and bases in West Pakistan. 
On this principle he continued existing practices. In 1956 the 
Pakistan Army had a total of 894 officers in the grades of major 
through lieutenant general. Of this number only 14 (1.6 percent) 
were of East Pakistani origin. Of these, only one was of brigadier 
rank, the highest rank held until then by a Bengali. Naval officers 
of all ranks numbered 593, but only 7 (1.2 percent) of them were 
of Bengali origin. Bengalis fared slightly better in the air force, which 
had a total of 640 officers, 40 (6.3 percent) of whom were Bengalis. 

By 1965 the participation ratio had improved slightly, although 
it was still far from East Pakistani desires and expectations. Among 
the total of 6,000 army officers, 5 percent were Bengalis. Only one 
of them had become a major general. In the navy and air force, 
with officer totals of 800 and 1,200, respectively, the overall per- 
centages of Bengalis had increased more than in the army but were 
still at a distinct minority level. Most Bengali officers in the navy 
and air force were in technical or administrative rather than com- 
mand positions. 

In February 1966, Mujib, head of the East Pakistani Awami 
League, announced a six-point program calling for East Pakistani 
provincial autonomy with a federated Pakistan (see Emerging 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Discontent, 1966-70, ch. 1). Significantly, the sixth point of this 
program held that the federating units should each "be empowered 
to maintain a militia or paramilitary force in order to contribute 
effectively toward national security." This point was, in time, 
expanded to encompass the attainment by East Pakistan of self- 
sufficiency in defense matters. Specific actions called for under the 
sixth point included establishment of an ordnance factory, a mili- 
tary academy, and the federal naval headquarters in East Pakistan. 

Mujib's six-point package was unacceptable to the central govern- 
ment, but in July 1969 General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, 
who had succeeded Ayub as president earlier that year, announced 
a major policy change. The recruitment of Bengalis into the mili- 
tary services was to be doubled. Among steps taken to improve 
recruitment of East Pakistanis were establishing new recruiting 
centers in East Pakistan, giving greater publicity to the recruit- 
ment process, making promises (albeit vague ones) of promotions 
for Bengalis, and reducing the minimum height for enlistment by 
5 centimeters to 162 centimeters. (Bengalis are, on the average, 
smaller than Punjabis and Pathans, and the old height require- 
ment had excluded many Bengalis from military service.) East 
Pakistani participation in the armed forces increased, but Bengalis 
were still heavily underrepresented when the civil war that led to 
the partition of Pakistan erupted in March 1971 (see The War for 
Bangladeshi Independence, 1971, ch 1). 

On the eve of the civil war, there were only two military units 
specifically identified with East Pakistan. One of these was the lightly 
armed paramilitary border security force called the East Pakistan 
Rifles; the other was the East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistan 
Army. The East Bengal Regiment had been established soon after 
the division of the British Indian Army in 1947. The First Battal- 
ion of the East Bengal Regiment was raised in February 1948 and 
the Second Battalion in December of the same year. Thereafter 
six more battalions were formed. The Ninth Battalion was being 
raised at the East Bengal Regiment center in Chittagong when the 
civil war broke out in March 1971. 

The Liberation War 

In the fall of 1970, a powerful opposition movement emerged 
in East Pakistan. During the 1971 civil war, a number of factional 
paramilitary bands, which included communist forces dedicated 
to a rural-based revolution along Maoist lines, fought against each 
other and engaged in terrorism. The strongest of the new paramili- 
tary bands, and the one that would have the greatest impact on 
future events, was organized under the Awami League's military 



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committee headed by Colonel M.A.G. Osmany, a retired Pakistan 
Army officer. This band was raised as Mujib's action arm and 
security force. As the political struggle between East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan intensified, the Awami League's military arm 
assumed the character of a conventional, albeit illegal, armed force. 

At first, Osmany recruited his force from three main sources: 
the East Pakistan Students League (the Awami League's youth 
branch); the security militia called Ansars (ansar is Arabic for helper) 
and Mujahids (mujahid is Arabic for holy warrior), who were 
trained, respectively, by the police and the army; and urban toughs 
known throughout the subcontinent as goondas. Osmany' s group 
collected arms and ammunition and conspired with Bengali-origin 
officers and troops in the regular Pakistani forces and the East 
Pakistan Rifles. Initially, Osmany' s band was called Sevak Bahini 
(Service Force); after its expansion, it became known as the Mukti 
Fauj (Liberation Force; more loosely, freedom fighters), a name 
that evolved into Mukti Bahini, a term of more common Bengali 
usage having the same meaning as Mukti Fauj. The very existence 
of an underground army responsive to Awami League directives 
convinced West Pakistani leaders that Mujib was intent on lead- 
ing the secession of East Pakistan. 

On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan armed forces launched a cam- 
paign to suppress the resistance movement. During the ensuing 
month, military operations spread throughout East Pakistan. The 
East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles, and most of the 
East Pakistani police and their auxiliaries joined the revolt. They 
seized West Pakistani officers serving with these units and killed 
some of them. The wholesale, planned defection of the Bengalis 
from the Pakistan Army in the early weeks of the war came as a 
surprise to the Pakistani command and was of supreme importance 
to the Bangladesh cause. The Bengali units, after fighting numer- 
ous actions against West Pakistani regulars, gradually withdrew 
and merged with the Mukti Bahini, providing the essential core 
of leadership and organizational basis for the rest of the war. 

Gradually this amalgamation of forces grew into a unified mili- 
tary as it confronted the Pakistanis. Retired officers and troops 
helped train the revolutionary forces. On April 14, Osmany offi- 
cially became the commander in chief of the Mukti Bahini. 
Although most of this force, estimated at over 100,000 strong at 
the height of the conflict, maintained unswerving allegiance to 
Mujib and the Awami League, many partisan bands operated inde- 
pendently. East Pakistani civilian members of the resistance oper- 
ated out of Calcutta. The high command divided the country into 
eight military sectors, each commanded by a Pakistan Army major 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

who had defected. India granted sanctuary to the Mukti Bahini 
and provided bases and substantial materiel and training. The initial 
operations by the Pakistan Army failed to destroy the Mukti Bahini 
or to prevent its expansion and development, but by late May 1971 
Pakistani authority had been widely reasserted. Rebel forces were 
largely confined to the areas near the Indian border states of West 
Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. Pakistani forces received reinforce- 
ments and the assistance of an internal security force called Razakars 
(Keepers of Public Order) and other collaborators that had been 
raised in East Pakistan by the Pakistani administration. Denounced 
by the resistance for collaborating with Pakistani authorities, most 
Razakars were Urdu-speaking Muslims who had emigrated from 
the Indian state of Bihar at the time of partition. The weary 
Pakistani regulars, however, were able to contain a July monsoon 
offensive by the Mukti Bahini. 

Despite the setback, the Mukti Bahini had gained valuable 
experience and shown increased capability. Back in their border 
base area, they regrouped. Recruitment was never a serious 
problem, and numerical losses were easily replaced. Indian aid and 
participation materially increased, and the tempo of fighting again 
picked up by October, when Pakistan had raised its army troop 
strength to about 80,000. Border clashes between the Indian and 
Pakistani armies became frequent. 

In response to Indian military incursions into East Pakistan in 
late November, Pakistan launched a series of preemptive air strikes 
against Indian airfields on December 3, 1971 . Indian prime minister 
Indira Gandhi then ordered national mobilization, and Indian forces 
launched a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan the next day. The 
initial Pakistani air strikes had been ineffective, and the Indian Air 
Force attained air superiority within the next twenty-four hours 
and held it. The Pakistan Air Force detachment in East Pakistan 
was destroyed, and supply and escape routes were cut off; in West 
Pakistan the Indian Air Force systematically struck aircraft and 
airfields, base installations, communication centers, and troop con- 
centrations. At sea an Indian Navy task force immobilized East 
Pakistani port facilities and landed an amphibious force to cut off 
escape routes to Burma. At the same time, an Indian task force 
contained Pakistan's fleet and bombarded port installations at 
Karachi, West Pakistan. 

On the ground the Indian strategic plan was aimed at East 
Pakistan as first priority, while simultaneously containing West 
Pakistan. The Indian force that invaded East Pakistan consisted 
of nine infantry divisions with attached armor units and support- 
ing arms. Separated into five invasion columns, Indian forces 



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advanced rapidly, bypassing intermediate cities and obstacles and 
pressing relentlessly toward the capital at Dhaka. At the same time, 
guerrilla attacks intensified, and at least three brigades of the Mukti 
Bahini fought in conventional formations with the Indian forces. 
Overwhelmed by the speed and power of the Indian advance, 
Pakistan's four divisions and smaller separate units fought a number 
of hard actions but soon had their escape routes cut off and were 
without air support. On December 16 Dhaka fell, and Pakistan's 
commander, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, with about 75,000 
troops, surrendered to Lieutenant General J. S. Aurora, the Indian 
commander of the combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces. On 
the western front, India's forces had effectively contained Pakistani 
attacks and had made limited advances into West Pakistan. 

Postindependence Period 

Indian military forces initially remained in newly independent 
Bangladesh to consolidate their victory and to assist in stabilizing 
the new government, but they completed their withdrawal on 
March 12, 1972. A flotilla of Soviet minesweepers arrived in 
Bangladesh shortly thereafter, ostensibly to clear Pakistani mines 
from Chittagong harbor. The prolonged Soviet presence, a source 
of suspicion among Awami League critics, ended in 1975 when 
Mujib's successors requested the Soviets to leave. 

Regular Bangladeshi armed forces were quickly established but, 
because of budgetary constraints, on an extremely limited scale. 
The organization of these armed forces reflected not only that of 
the colonial British Indian Army, especially as it had continued 
under the Pakistan Army, but also the experience of the Mukti 
Bahini in the 1971 war of independence. Most of the guerrilla 
fighters reverted to civilian status, although some were absorbed 
into the regular armed forces. Countrywide, vast but undetermined 
numbers of small arms and automatic weapons remained at large 
in the population, presaging trouble in the years ahead. 

A difficult residual issue was prisoner exchanges. India held about 
90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees, while 
Bangladesh retained 195 Pakistanis (mostly military) with the 
intent — later put aside — of bringing them to trial for war crimes. 
Pakistan also held some 28,000 Bengali military personnel stranded 
in West Pakistan. Under agreements reached by the governments 
of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan in August 1973 and April 1974, 
prisoner release and repatriation in all categories were completed 
by April 30, 1975. 

The bitter rift between military personnel who returned to 
Bangladesh after liberation and freedom fighters who had fought 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

in the war was to have profound consequences for the new nation. 
The repatriates, who had languished in West Pakistani jails during 
the civil war, were absorbed into an army dominated by former 
guerrillas, some of whom were civilians inducted as a reward for 
their sacrifices. Repatriates, by and large, felt no personal loyalty 
to Mujib and viewed the freedom fighters as a undisciplined and 
politicized element. Repatriate officers bridled under Mujib's use 
of the army in disarming the civilian population and taming his 
political opponents. Moreover, repatriates were suspicious of the 
regime's pro-Indian sympathies, its rhetorical support for the Soviet 
Union, and its efforts to circumscribe the role of Islam in national 
affairs. The rift between repatriates and freedom fighters worsened 
considerably when Mujib formed the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini 
(National Defense Force), an elite parallel army intended to insulate 
the regime against military coups and other armed challenges to 
its authority. By 1975 the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini had swelled to 
an estimated 30,000 troops. Repatriates complained that Mujib 
destroyed the army's integrity by disbanding the East Bengal Regi- 
ment, which was composed primarily of repatriates; funneling all 
new recruits to the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini; favoring freedom fighters 
in matters of pay and promotions; and slashing the army's budget 
in order to sustain the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini. 

Other armed elements that supported Mujib roamed the coun- 
tryside searching out and punishing Pakistani collaborators, oppo- 
nents of the regime, and, as was often the case, anyone who offered 
resistance to their warlord-style rule. For instance, freedom fighter 
leader Kader 4 'Tiger" Siddiqi and his estimated 3,000 armed sup- 
porters virtually ruled Mymensingh District while Mujib was in office. 

Other, more radical factions within the army viewed the libera- 
tion movement as unfinished until the "petit bourgeois" Awami 
League government was swept aside and replaced by a Maoist 
"people's government." The central figure among these factions 
was Abu Taher, a former Pakistan Army colonel who had been 
trained in commando operations in the United States and was later 
cashiered by Mujib because of his radical views. Taher and an inner 
circle of radical freedom fighters belonged to the Jatiyo Samajtantrik 
Dal (National Socialist Party) and its armed wing, the Biplabi Sainik 
Sangstha (Revolutionary Soldiers Organization). The Jatiyo Samaj- 
tantrik Dal developed deep roots in the military and among radi- 
cal students connected with the Chhatro Union (Students Union) 
of the Bangladesh Communist Party. The Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal 
tailored its appeal to lower level officers and jawans. By 1975 Jatiyo 
Samajtantrik Dal sympathizers within the military and police were 
estimated to number 20,000. 



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Tensions within the military exploded on August 15, 1975, when 
thirty middle-ranking army officers, many of whom were repatri- 
ates, staged a coup. With the support of troops from the First Bengal 
Lancers and the Second Field Artillery Regiment, the mutineers 
assassinated Mujib and members of his family and called on Ziaur 
Rahman (Zia) to become army chief of staff. Osmany, the former 
Mukti Bahini chief, lent respectability to the emerging military- 
political order by agreeing to serve as defense adviser to the new 
figurehead president, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed. 

Freedom-fighter elements within the army countered this 
so-called "majors' plot" by staging a coup of their own on Novem- 
ber 3, 1975. Following the murder of prominent Awami League 
officials detained in Dhaka Central Jail, troops commanded by 
Brigadier Khaled Musharraf dismissed the government, placed Zia 
under arrest, created a vaguely defined revolutionary council, and 
exiled the ringleaders of the original coup to Libya. A total break- 
down in discipline within the military occurred shortly after this 
second coup, as junior army officers and jawans took to the streets 
to defend themselves against anticipated assaults from rival army 
factions. Simultaneously, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal called on 
jawans to kill their commanding officers. On November 7, Zia 
secured his release from house arrest, reportedly with Jatiyo Samaj- 
tantrik Dal backing, and staged a third coup. Musharraf was killed, 
Zia and other senior officers restored a semblance of army unity, 
and the jawans returned to barracks. 

As Zia attempted to consolidate power under his new title of chief 
martial law administrator, additional challenges to his authority 
occurred. In April 1976, conservative officers led by Air Vice 
Marshal M.G. Tawab attempted to overthrow Zia after recalling 
four of the "killer majors" from exile. The conspirators called for 
the creation of an Islamic state and demanded a share of political 
power. After officers of the two armored regiments, the First Bengal 
Cavalry and the First Bengal Lancers, refused to turn over the 
rebels, troops loyal to Zia descended on Bogra cantonment to put 
down the mutiny. In the aftermath of the failed coup, Tawab was 
exiled, the Twenty-second East Bengal Regiment was disbanded, 
Taher was hanged, and over 200 servicemen were tried in mili- 
tary courts on disciplinary charges. 

An even more serious breach of discipline occurred on Septem- 
ber 29, 1977, when Japanese Red Army terrorists landed a hijacked 
aircraft at Dhaka International Airport (present-day Zia Inter- 
national Airport). While Zia and his senior staff officers were busy 
negotiating with the hijackers, an entire army battalion mutinied 
in Bogra. As the hostage drama continued, the revolt spread to 
Dhaka cantonment and to air force units at the airport itself. 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 

The uprising was the handiwork of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, 
which again exhorted jawans to kill their commanding officers. Their 
slogan was "All soldiers are brothers; blood of officers wanted; no 
ranks above [low-ranking] subedar." The mutineers' goal was to 
create a "classless army" that would act as a revolutionary van- 
guard in remaking Bangladeshi society in a Maoist mold. Alarmed 
by the spreading disorder within the ranks, senior army officers 
rallied behind Zia's leadership. After several days of heavy fight- 
ing that killed an estimated 200 soldiers, loyal troops succeeded 
in suppressing the rebellion. Zia then moved swiftly to purge 
mutinous elements from the military. Within a span of 2 months, 
more than 1,100 had been executed for involvement in the upris- 
ing. According to a well-informed observer, "it was the most 
devastating punishment exercise in the history of Bangladesh, car- 
ried out with the utmost speed and with total disregard for justice 
and the legal process." As additional precautions, Zia reorganized 
the three service branches, disbanded mutinous units, shuffled his 
senior commanders, and banned the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal. 

During his six-year tenure in office, Zia implemented a num- 
ber of strategies to instill discipline in the armed forces and broaden 
the political base of his regime. Zia recognized that officers and 
jawans alike nursed serious grievances against their military and 
civilian superiors, such as low pay, lack of promotions, corruption 
and political machinations. He set out to professionalize the mili- 
tary by promoting repatriates, increasing military pay and benefits, 
and building up the defense budget. Zia also co-opted the officer 
corps by expanding the armed forces, appointing both active-duty 
and retired military cronies to lucrative positions in the civil 
bureaucracy, and exiling potential challengers to diplomatic posts 
abroad. Simultaneously, Zia militarized the national police sys- 
tem by firing thousands of police on charges of corruption and 
appointing army officers to oversee the system. 

Despite his efforts to curb the army's appetite for power, Zia 
fell victim to assassination. On the night of May 30, 1981, Major 
General Muharnmed Manzur Ahmed, commander of the Twenty- 
fourth Infantry Division and a hero of the war of independence, 
led troops to the government rest house in Chittagong where Zia 
was staying. After murdering the president and his bodyguards, 
Manzur seized the local radio station and called on troops else- 
where in the country to support his coup. 

Manzur announced the formation of a "revolutionary council," 
dismissed senior officers from their posts in Dhaka, dissolved Parlia- 
ment, and abrogated the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship, 
and Peace with India. Manzur apparently was convinced that 



214 



Late President Ziaur Rahman presenting the Bangladesh flag 

to an air force honor guard 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 

freedom fighters — estimated at 20 percent of the army — would rally 
behind him, despite the fact that the leader he murdered was a 
venerated freedom fighter himself. Fearing that a successful coup 
might trigger another intramilitary bloodletting, senior commanders 
in Dhaka lined up behind Zia's aging and infirm constitutional 
successor, Supreme Court justice Abdus Sattar. Loyal army units 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 



converged on Chittagong, and the coup attempt was crushed within 
forty-eight hours. According to a government white paper pub- 
lished after the episode, Manzur was apprehended after fleeing 
to the Indian border, and he was shot "while attempting to 
escape." Thirty-one officers were subsequently tried for mutiny, 
twelve of the thirty-one were hanged, and fifty-four senior officers 
were dismissed. 

Zia's most impressive achievement — the creation of a viable 
institutional framework for promoting political stability and 
economic growth — did not survive long after his death. "One of 
Zia's strongest points," according to commentator Ashish Kumar 
Roy, "was the stability he symbolized in a state that seemed to 
have become a victim of chronic violence, both civilian and mili- 
tary. By assassinating him, the military itself destroyed all that Zia 
had sought to prove: that the army could be contained, and that 
genuine power could be handed back to civilians through a 
democratic process." Sattar lacked Zia's charisma, and the coun- 
try was soon subjected to mounting political and monetary crises. 
Although Sattar and his inherited Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
won an electoral mandate in November 1981, most political 
observers believed another army coup was only a matter of time 
(see The Zia Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82, ch. 1). To com- 
pound matters, Sattar was extremely vulnerable because of the 
political debt he owed the army for quashing the coup and guaran- 
teeing constitutional order. The generals, nevertheless, were reluc- 
tant to seize power immediately because of the fear that public 
opinion might turn against the military. 

Army Chief of Staff Hussain Muhammad Ershad pressured 
Sattar to grant the military a formal, constitutional role in governing 
the state. During a press interview in November 1981, Ershad 
offered "some straight talk about a very grave and deep-seated 
politico-military problem." According to him, the military was an 
"efficient, well-disciplined and most honest body of a truly dedi- 
cated and organized national force. The potentials of such an 
excellent force in a poor country like ours can effectively be utilized 
for productive and nation-building purposes in addition to its role 
of national defense." Ershad denied any personal political ambi- 
tions but lamented the shabby treatment civilian politicians accorded 
the military. "Our rank-and-file do not want military adventurism 
in politics, nor do they want political adventurism in the military," 
he declared to his political opponents, thus setting the stage for the 
coup he was to engineer later. To remedy the problems he saw, 
Ershad put forward a concept that "requires us to depart from con- 
ventional Western ideas of the role of the armed forces. It calls for 



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National Security 



combining the roles of nation building and national defense 
into one concept of total national defense." Ershad denied that 
"total national defense" amounted to military interference in 
the democratic process, but his contention was hotly disputed by 
civilian politicians. 

Sattar responded to Ershad' s challenge by trying to establish a 
National Security Council in January 1982, comprising the three 
service chiefs and seven civilians. Ershad rejected the plan. Sattar, 
hoping to forestall an army takeover, reorganized his crumbling 
cabinet the following month and reconstituted the National Secu- 
rity Council with the three service chiefs and only three civilians. 
Despite this concession, which was opposed by opposition politi- 
cians and by some members of Sattar' s own party, Ershad staged 
a coup on March 24, 1982. Unlike previous coups, there was no 
bloodshed, senior military commanders acted in unison, and the 
population accepted the military takeover, albeit sullenly. Ershad 
cited the political and social evils that necessitated drastic action 
on the part of the "patriotic armed forces" and again denied any 
personal political ambitions (see The Ershad Period, ch. 4). 

Organization of the Armed Forces 
Legal Basis 

Under the Constitution, promulgated in 1972, the president is 
the commander in chief of the armed forces (see Constitution, ch. 
4). The services are divided into the army, navy, and air force. In 
theory, the three service chiefs are coequals in the national command 
structure; in practice, the army dominates the defense establishment 
because of its imposing size and its historic role in monitoring or 
commandeering the political process. In mid- 1988 the army con- 
stituted 88 percent of the nation's service personnel; the navy and 
air force accounted for only 7 and 5 percent, respectively. 

In mid- 1988, each service maintained separate headquarters and 
was solely responsible for its own training and recruitment pro- 
grams. There was no joint-service command element to promote 
interservice cooperation and combined-arms operations. Histori- 
cally, command- and-control arrangements at the national level have 
been dominated by the army chief of staff (a lieutenant general; 
see table 18, Appendix A). In the past, coup leaders such as Zia 
and Ershad consolidated control over the country by assuming the 
powers of the army chief of staff, the president, and the extracon- 
stitutional position of chief martial law administrator. During 
periods of direct military rule, the navy and air force chiefs of staff 
(rear admiral or major general, respectively) served as deputy chief 



217 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



martial law administrators, subordinate to the army chief of staff 
strongman. In the absence of a formal interservice command struc- 
ture, the cohesion of the Bangladeshi military depends on infor- 
mal, shifting alliances among senior commanders, most notably 
within the inner circle of army generals who command the coun- 
try's six divisions. The military chain of command has broken down 
on numerous occasions and at every level of command since the 
country achieved independence in 1971 (see Postindependence 
Period, this ch.). 

Following the British pattern, there is a Ministry of Defence, 
wmich is technically responsible for overseeing the military. Even 
though the Ministry of Defence bureaucracy is predominantly 
civilian, the military exerts substantial influence over its operations. 
After seizing power in March 1982, President Ershad followed the 
practice of his military predecessors by reserving the Ministry of 
Defence cabinet portfolio for himself. Through the appointment 
of military retirees and active-duty officers to the Ministry of 
Defence the military indirectly controls the ministry. Parliament 
is constitutionally responsible for working with the president and 
the service chiefs in ensuring the nation's defense. In practice, 
however, members of Parliament have never played a significant 
role in either national defense planning or defense budgeting. 

The administration of military justice and the military court sys- 
tem is based on three separate but substantively similar service laws 
that were framed during the united Pakistan era. These laws, in 
turn, were modifications of British military justice codes, such as 
the Indian Army Act of 1911. The operative Bangladeshi laws 
include the Army Act of 1954. the Air Force Act of 1957, and the 
Navy Ordinance of 1961. These statutes, as amended since their 
enactment and modified in terminology by Bangladesh, are 
administered by the respective services. The nomenclature and com- 
position of military courts vary slightly according to service, but 
court procedures, types of offenses, scales of punishment, juris- 
dictional authority , appeal and review procedures, and procedures 
for commutation and suspension of sentences are almost identical 
for all the services. The military justice system is used for the mili- 
tarv in war and peace and is separate from the functions of mili- 
tarv personnel acting as civil administrators during periods of 
martial law. 

Recruitment 

The three services are staffed by volunteers: there is no com- 
pulsory service system, and Bangladesh has a large pool of appli- 
cants from which to select. Moreover, the country's high rate of 



218 



National Security 



unemployment has always made relatively secure positions in the 
military attractive career options. In the late 1980s, approximately 
15.4 million of the 25.7 million Bangladeshi males between the ages 
of 15 and 49 were fit for military service. Drawing from a male 
population with a literacy rate of 39 percent, however, the armed 
forces suffered severe shortages of technically skilled manpower. 
The shortage was particularly acute for the navy and air force 
because of their need for skilled maintenance personnel. Low educa- 
tional requirements for enlisted ranks imposed additional handicaps. 
Recruits often lacked basic skills such as reading, driving, and using 
a telephone — skills that had to be taught as part of basic training. 

As in most aspects of professional life in Bangladesh, women 
played a marginal role in the armed forces. Women, however, had 
been instrumental in the nine-month liberation struggle against 
Pakistan. Although some female partisans were trained in weapons 
handling and participated in Mukti Bahini ambushes, their primary 
role was to support guerrilla operations by transporting food and 
weapons and acting as informers behind Pakistani lines. Follow- 
ing independence, Bangladeshi women receded into the back- 
ground. Except for a small number of nurses and physicians in 
all three services and some army switchboard operators, woman 
were excluded from the regular armed forces. Bangladesh's para- 
military and police forces did recruit some women, primarily for 
the purpose of searching and processing female criminal suspects. 
Women in Bangladesh nonetheless have limited opportunities, as 
their roles are circumscribed by Islamic and South Asian customs, 
which tend to limit a woman's station in life to raising children, 
maintaining the home, and performing agricultural or handicraft 
labor (see Women's Role in Society, ch. 2). 

Mission 

National Defense 

The primary mission of the regular armed forces is the classic 
one of defending the nation's territorial integrity against external 
attack. During wartime, the armed forces are responsible for 
mobilizing the nation's resources by assuming direct control over 
paramilitary and police forces, civilian transportation, and defense- 
related industries. Since achieving independence in 1971, Ban- 
gladesh has never ordered national mobilization because it has not 
faced an invasion. In addition, the armed forces have never con- 
ducted military operations beyond the country's land or sea bound- 
aries. None of Bangladesh's three services has reserve components 
to call on during wartime, but the country could employ thousands 
of military veterans in a protracted guerrilla struggle. 



219 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Aid-to- Civil Roles 

The armed forces back up local authorities in maintaining public 
order and ensuring internal security. An "aid-to-the-civil-power" 
function, based on the British colonial code, was used extensively 
during the united Pakistan era and has been employed by civilian 
and military governments since 1971. 

Military deployments in aid-to-civil roles fall into three categories. 
The first and most pervasive use of the military is to assist local 
authorities and police in putting down riots and conducting coun- 
terinsurgency operations. Following the British pattern, the mili- 
tary is customarily used only as the "force of last resort" in domestic 
peacekeeping because it is not trained in routine police functions, 
such as crowd control. Ordering troops to use force against their 
own countrymen, moreover, invites public criticism of the armed 
forces, tarnishes their image as the "defenders of the nation," and 
undermines military morale. For these reasons, Bangladeshi 
authorities have traditionally preferred to rely on police and 
paramilitary forces to quell disturbances. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi 
regimes have occasionally resorted to using the military for domestic 
peacekeeping, sometimes for extended periods. Although the army 
ordinarily bears the heaviest burden in aid-to-civil operations, the 
air force and navy can also be called on to transport troops to the 
scene of a disturbance or to patrol areas near ports or air bases. 

The military's second aid-to-civil mission entails running essential 
services or industries whenever public sector employees stage a 
strike. The military performed this function in the latter half of 
1987 when opposition political parties staged a series of general 
strikes and work stoppages to pressure Ershad to resign. To keep 
the country running, the military took over a variety of civilian 
duties, such as managing port facilities, airports, and power plants 
(see More Opposition Pressure, ch 4). 

A third aid-to-civil mission — the only one the military willingly 
performs — is disaster relief. Bangladesh has suffered repeated 
natural calamities which caused thousands of deaths and displaced 
millions of citizens (see Climate, ch. 2). The military is routinely called 
upon to transport food and medicine to refugees, as they did during 
the 1987 and 1988 monsoon floods that inundated more than 50 per- 
cent and 66 percent of the country, respectively. The military, 
however, does not usually perform so-called "civic action" duties, 
such as building roads, canals, and dams. Following the British 
pattern of civil-military relations, the Bangladesh armed forces 
prefer to engage in these activities only when they directly support 
the military's national defense mission or during extreme emergencies. 



220 



Jawan on a civilian relief operation 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 

Intelligence and Security 

The military has been deeply involved in gathering domestic and 
foreign intelligence. All three services have their own intelligence 
directorates, which collect tactical intelligence to support military 
operations. The Directorate General of National Security Intelli- 
gence is a separate civilian organization but traditionally is headed 
by a senior military officer. It is responsible for collecting foreign 
intelligence and monitoring internal political affairs. The pivotal 
intelligence agency, however, is the Directorate General of Forces 
Intelligence. It monitors disaffection within the ranks and runs coun- 
terintelligence operations. The heads of the Directorate General 
of National Security Intelligence and the Directorate General of 
Forces Intelligence are usually the president's closest advisers. The 
Police Special Branch also operates an intelligence wing, which 
augments both directorates' intelligence capabilities. Since assuming 
power in 1982, Ershad has exercised tight control over the intelli- 
gence establishment. 

Another security organization is the Presidential Security Force. 
Formed by Ershad while he was chief martial law administrator, 
the organization's mission is to ensure the physical security of 
Ershad and his family. Because two of Ershad's predecessors were 
gunned down during army rebellions, Ershad was undoubtedly 



221 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

concerned over threats to his life. The commander of the Presi- 
dential Security Force is an army brigadier who reports directly 
to the president. 

Security Environment 

Bangladeshi defense planners have long regarded India as a 
regional bully, a perception shared by the Bangladeshi public in 
the late 1980s. According to this perception, governments in New 
Delhi continued to regard South Asia as an integral security unit 
in which India played the dominant role because of its size and 
resources. Thus, New Delhi's ability to project power gave India 
a self-assigned responsibility for ensuring the security of smaller 
states and maintaining stability and peace in the area. Aside from 
the potential threat of direct military intervention, Bangladeshi 
leaders also believed India had the capacity to destabilize the country 
by extending covert assistance to tribal insurgents, the Bangladeshi 
Hindu minority, or the regime's domestic political opponents. 

Bangladesh has been the object of three main Indian security 
concerns since independence: Bangladeshi internal stability, its stra- 
tegic position in relation to China, and Dhaka's alleged involve- 
ment with Indian tribal insurgents. India denied any intention or 
desire to destabilize Bangladesh and argued that a stable Bangladesh 
is a critical component of India's eastern defenses. Bangladesh was 
strategically located near the India-China disputed frontier in the 
north. In the event of a border clash with China, Indian lines of 
communication would be restricted to the narrow Siliguri corridor 
between Bangladesh and Nepal. Moreover, as a worst-case scenario, 
Indian defense planners feared that a desperate regime in Dhaka 
might grant military base rights to the United States or China. 
These security concerns were compounded by Indian charges that 
Dhaka turned a blind eye to Indian tribal insurgents using safe 
havens in eastern Bangladesh and allowed a tide of Bangladeshi 
emigrants to move into the Indian states of Tripura and Assam. 
India also expressed the concern that serious instability in Ban- 
gladesh could trigger another exodus of refugees into India. 

Bangladesh's capacity to mount a conventional defense against 
India was extremely limited. India supported the world's fourth 
largest army, a sophisticated arsenal of weapons for all three service 
branches, and a population and economy larger than those of the 
six other states of South Asia combined. By necessity, any govern- 
ment in Dhaka had to rely primarily on diplomacy to deter India. 

Bangladesh's only military defense against a potential Indian 
attack was based on limited deterrence. Bangladesh's armed forces 
would try to stall an Indian advance until international pressures 



222 



Bangladesh student officers at the Defence Services 
Command and Staff College pose with colleague from Nepal 

Courtesy James Dunn 



could be mobilized to bring about a cease-fire and a return to the 
status quo. 

Geography also limited Bangladesh's capacity to mount a con- 
ventional defense of the nation. A paucity of roads, bridges, and 
railroads impeded cross-country military movements, particularly 
during the monsoon months of June through September. The 
army's lack of bridging equipment was a severe liability, especially 
for the armor brigades. In the mid-1980s, there were eighteen air- 
ports suitable for military transport operations, although the lift 
capacity of the Bangladesh Air Force was extremely limited. As 
Indian, Pakistani, and Bengali partisan forces discovered in 1971, 
however, Bangladesh provides ideal terrain for conducting guerrilla 
warfare. The country's primitive lines of communication would 
slow an enemy advance and frustrate an occupying force. Jungles, 
rivers, and isolated villages would allow locally based guerrillas to 
hold out almost indefinitely. There were no indications, however, 
that Bangladesh had developed a guerrilla war fighting doctrine; 
the nation's defense rested primarily on a strategy of deterrence 
by conventionally equipped regular forces. 

The 2,400-kilometer border with India was patrolled by a 
paramilitary force called the Bangladesh Rifles (see Auxiliary 
Forces, this ch.). During peacetime, Bangladesh Rifles commanders 



223 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

have authority to conduct "flag meetings" with their Indian 
paramilitary counterparts whenever stray firing incidents occur. 
For instance, in April 1984 a Bangladesh Rifles jawan was killed 
when India began construction of a barbed wire fence along the 
Indo-Bangladeshi border as part of a campaign to curb illegal 
immigration into Assam (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). After conduct- 
ing several flag meetings, Bangladesh Rifles commanders and their 
Indian counterparts agreed to withdraw some of their forces from 
the border area and submit the legality of the fence to a bilateral 
committee. Under this mechanism, Indian and Bangladeshi regu- 
lar forces avoided a confrontation that could have escalated. 

Throughout its existence, the Bangladesh Army has had to con- 
tend with severe shortages of weapons, communications equipment, 
spare parts, and transport vehicles. One 1982 report maintained 
that target practice — a basic military skill — was restricted because 
of ammunition shortages. Under these conditions, it is doubtful 
the army could fight a conventional war for more than a few days 
without massive assistance from a foreign power. 

The country's 600-kilometer coastline was patrolled by the tiny 
Bangladesh Navy, whose missions were to protect Bangladeshi 
fishermen, ward off foreign poachers, and assert sovereignty over 
the nation's territorial waters. A potential challenge to the Ban- 
gladesh Navy occurred in 1983, when a char — a speck of land formed 
by alluvial deposits — emerged in the Bay of Bengal along the mari- 
time boundary with India. Both India and Bangladesh dispatched 
patrol boats to stake their claims to the island and to the expanded 
200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone that went with it. The 
two sides avoided a military confrontation, and the matter was 
remanded to diplomatic negotiations. It was clear, however, that 
Bangladesh's coastal defense force was not in a position to challenge 
the Indian Navy. As part of its policy of nonalignment, Bangladesh 
allowed foreign naval vessels to conduct routine port visits at 
Chittagong. Bangladesh has not granted naval base rights to any 
foreign power. 

Defense Spending 

Because it has been in power almost continuously since 1975, 
the military has been in position to channel resources to the defense 
sector. According to A.M. A. Muhith, a former Bangladeshi finance 
minister and a critic of the military, "the defense establishment 
has become virtually unaccountable and has appropriated a dis- 
proportionate share of resources for its perpetuation and enrich- 
ment." Muhith asserts that whereas public spending increased 
ninefold between 1974 and 1986, defense spending during that same 



224 



National Security 



period increased more than twentyfold. The army has received the 
best treatment. According to 1985 data, the army received over 
50 percent of defense outlays. Moreover, army personnel strength 
has tripled since 1975. Navy and air force expansion has been less 
spectacular, although their capital outlays for such high-cost items 
as ships and aircraft represented an onerous economic burden. 
Analysts calculate that actual outlays for defense were considerably 
higher than published government budgets suggested. 

Nevertheless, the armed forces continued to experience severe 
economic constraints. The defense budget for fiscal year (FY — 
see Glossary) 1989 totaled US$290 million and was the largest 
budget item, accounting for 17.2 percent of the national budget. 
In per capita terms, Bangladesh spent about US$3 per year, or 
about 2 percent of its gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), 
on defense. By any standard, this was a small sum for a military 
establishment numbering just over 100,000 personnel under arms. 
Foreign procurement took 15 to 20 percent of the defense budget. 
Recurring costs, such as training and pay, accounted for more than 
50 percent. 

Foreign Acquisitions and Ties 

Bangladesh's primary concerns since its establishment have 
been internal security and economic survival. In mid- 1988 no 
Bangladeshi military personnel were operationally deployed abroad. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, when united Pakistan was formally 
aligned with the United States, a number of Bengali officers in the 
Pakistan military received advanced training in the United States 
(see The Superpowers, ch. 4). By 1988 those officers who had started 
their careers during the heyday of United States- sponsored security 
pacts occupied the most senior positions in the Bangladeshi military. 

Since 1975 Bangladesh has cultivated close relations with China. 
Although Sino-Bangladeshi security relations have remained infor- 
mal, the two sides have regularly exchanged high-level military dele- 
gations to review relations, negotiate weapons transfers, inspect 
military facilities, and cement personal contacts. For instance, 
Chinese advisers and technicians have periodically served in 
Chittagong and Dhaka to assist with making Chinese equipment 
operational in the Bangladeshi armed forces. In January 1987, Yang 
Dezhi, chief of the general staff of China's People's Liberation 
Army, conducted a five-day goodwill visit to Bangladesh. While 
in Dhaka, the Chinese delegation met with Ershad and the three 
service chiefs. Three months later, the Bangladesh Navy chief of 
staff, Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmad, conducted a six-day visit to 
China. Press reports noted the two sides shared "similar views on 



225 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



all important matters." Most of Bangladesh's inventory of fighter 
aircraft, coastal patrol boats, and tanks were supplied by China. 

Bangladesh has had to court a variety of states for weapons and 
training support. The country's only defense production facility 
was a munitions factory built during the Pakistan era with Chinese 
assistance. Because it depended on foreign sources for most of its 
military equipment, Bangladesh had a diverse weapons inventory. 
However, most of the inventory was obsolete, even by Third World 
standards. The diversity of equipment imposed severe maintenance 
problems for a military that lacked technical sophistication. Most 
overhauls of major equipment items had to be performed by for- 
eign technicians or in the country of origin. Whenever these ser- 
vices have not been available — for instance when Soviet military 
assistance ended after the 1975 coup — foreign- supplied weapon sys- 
tems have become inoperable. In extreme cases Bangladesh has 
had to cannibalize weapon systems, such as older MiG-21 aircraft, 
to keep some of the inventory in operation. 

The Bangladeshi military began its development with weapons 
surrendered by Pakistani forces and small arms supplied by India 
to the Mukti Bahini. After Indian forces left the country in October 
1972. Mujib turned to India and its primary supplier, the Soviet 
Union, for military equipment and training. The Soviets supplied 
MiG-21 aircraft, An-26 transports, and some miscellaneous equip- 
ment items. In addition. Egypt transferred thirty Soviet-built (Type 
54/55) tanks, and Yugoslavia donated a small naval patrol craft. 
Following Mujib" s assassination, the military looked elsewhere for 
basic equipment items. Britain sold three aging frigates to 
Bangladesh, and the United States transferred limited quantities 
of small arms, mostly for police and paramilitary use. A major 
breakthrough occurred in 1975, when China extended diplomatic 
recognition to Bangladesh following the normalization of relations 
between Dhaka and China's longtime ally, Pakistan. By the early 
1980s, China had become Bangladesh's primary supplier of mili- 
tary equipment. 

Since the mid-1970s, Bangladesh has sought close relations with 
oil-rich x\rab states, most notably with Saudi Arabia. Shortly after 
staging the 1982 coup, Ershad traveled to Riyadh to meet with the 
Saudi leadership. Nine months later, a ten-member Saudi mili- 
tary delegation arrived in Dhaka for talks with their Bangladeshi 
counterparts and for an inspection tour of military facilities. Press 
accounts reported that the Saudis were considering a plan to station 
a Bangladesh Army division (some 15.000 personnel) in the king- 
dom. The proposal was originally suggested by Zia, according to 
these reports. Although both governments have consistently denied 



226 



National Security 



reports of an impending Bangladeshi troop presence in Saudi 
Arabia, rumors to this effect persisted in 1988. 

In addition to relying on foreign weapons supplies, Bangladesh 
has looked to other countries for advanced officer training and for 
education in specialized military skills, such as repairing aircraft 
engines. Under Mujib, many Bangladeshi officers, including then- 
Brigadier Ershad, attended Indian military schools and academies. 
India was largely responsible for training and organizing the Jatiyo 
Rakkhi Bahini, an elite parallel army raised by Mujib in an effort 
to insulate his regime from coups (see Postindependence Period, 
this ch.). After Mujib's death and the absorption of the Jatiyo 
Rakkhi Bahini into the regular army, training in India ended, and 
Indian military advisers were sent home. Bangladeshi military per- 
sonnel started attending courses in China on a regular basis in the 
late 1980s. Starting in the late 1970s, the United States annually 
appropriated International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) funds to train limited numbers of Bangladeshi officers in 
the United States. In FY 1988, these IMET funds totaled 
US$300,000. In return, foreign officers regularly attend one-year 
courses offered at the Bangladesh Military Academy near 
Chittagong. The United States, Britain, Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and several small 
Asian and African states have sent military personnel to Bangladesh 
for staff courses. 

The Three Services 
Army 

The army is the dominant service in Bangladesh. Because of its 
historic role in influencing civilian governments and taking over 
the administration of the country, the army is also a critical politi- 
cal institution (see Armed Forces and Society, this ch.; Political 
Dynamics, ch. 4). 

Starting with a nucleus of Bengali deserters from the Pakistan 
Army — paramilitary personnel, police, and civilians who had fought 
with the Mukti Bahini — the Bangladesh Army has expanded con- 
siderably although erratically since its formation on December 26, 
1971. Between 1973 and 1975, the army absorbed many of the 
28,000 personnel who had been detained in Pakistani jails for the 
duration of the war of independence. Following the 1975 coup, addi- 
tional personnel were absorbed into the regular army when the mar- 
tial law government abolished the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (see 
Postindependence Period, this ch.). Under Zia's rule, army expan- 
sion slowed, in part because of his campaign to purge mutinous 



227 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 





1 1 

I | ARMY 

■ NAVY 

■ AIR FORCE 



























































































































































































1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 

YEARS 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, London, 1973-88 



Figure 12. Growth of the Armed Forces, 1973-87 

elements and collaborators from the ranks. When Ershad assumed 
power in 1982, army strength had stabilized at about 70,000 troops. 
Starting in 1985, Ershad accelerated the transition from martial 
law to elected civilian government. The army then experienced 
another spurt in growth. As of mid- 1988, it had about 90,000 troops 
(although some observ ers believed the number was closer to 80,000), 
triple the 1975 figure (see fig. 12). 

Zia reorganized the army following the military upheavals of the 
mid-1970s, in part to prevent coups and jawan uprisings. Under 
Zia's program, the reorganization was intended to neutralize rival 
factions of freedom fighters and repatriates. Bangladesh was divided 
into five military regions. The army — cooperating with civilian 
authorities while maintaining autonomy — preserved internal secu- 
rity and resisted possible Indian domination. Divisions coordinated 
their operations with paramilitary groups in their respective areas 
of command, and they mobilized mass support of the government. 

The army in 1988 was divided into six strategically located divi- 
sions. The location of these divisions' headquarters, five of which 
were formerly brigade headquarters, underscored the army's 
primary mission of internal security rather than defense against 
external threats. The most powerful and prestigious commands were 
the Ninth Infantry Division, headquartered at Savar on the out- 
skirts of Dhaka, and the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, head- 
quartered in the city of Chittagong. Elements of both divisions have 
been involved extensively in the military upheavals that have 



228 



National Security 



plagued Bangladesh since independence (see Restoration of Mili- 
tary Rule, 1975-77, ch. 1). Although the Ninth Infantry Division 
has an armor regiment, the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division does 
not. The Ninth Infantry Division has played a central role in stag- 
ing coups and maintaining military governments once they were 
in power. According to one observer of the Bangladesh Army, "the 
role of the Savar division would be crucial in any military coup." 
The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, with four brigades, has con- 
ducted counterinsurgency operations against tribal guerrillas in the 
Chittagong Hills since the late 1970s. The army garrison at 
Chittagong was the site of the coup of May 30, 1981, that resulted 
in Zia's murder. Other infantry divisions were headquartered at 
Jessore (the Fifty-fifth), Bogra (the Eleventh), and Comilla (the 
Thirty-third). Each of these divisions has an armor regiment. In 
April 1988, a sixth infantry division (the Sixty-sixth) was formally 
established with headquarters at Rangpur, and plans were in place 
to raise its armor regiment. The major generals who commanded 
the six divisions, along with the army chief of staff, formed the center 
of power within the army and, by extension, within the govern- 
ment, in the late 1980s. 

Army formations subordinate to the six division headquarters 
included fifteen infantry brigades, four armor regiments, nine 
artillery regiments, six engineering battalions, and various sup- 
port elements, such as signals, medical services, and ordnance. In 
addition to the six division headquarters, major army cantonments 
(barracks and housing areas that serve as the focal point of army 
life) were at Saidpur, Tangail, Khulna, Jalalabad, and elsewhere. 
The army also has a small fixed- wing regiment stationed in Dhaka. 
Army units are not known to operate with the navy in an amphibi- 
ous assault capacity, although an amphibious assault map exer- 
cise is done at the staff college. The army's lack of bridging 
equipment was a severe liability, especially for its armor regiments. 
Unlike armies in Pakistan and India, the Bangladesh Army did 
not have a specially designated "para" (airborne assault) brigade 
but in 1988 was planning to develop such a capability. In mid- 1988 
the army reportedly was planning to raise a seventh infantry divi- 
sion to be held in reserve. 

The army adopted and has retained the British Indian Army 
system of ranks. As of mid- 1988, Lieutenant General Atiqur 
Rahman, the army chief of staff, was the only three-star general 
in the army. Immediately below him were twenty-one two-star 
generals, eighteen of whom were from the more prestigious combat 
arms (fourteen of the generals were infantry officers). The remaining 
officers ranged in rank from brigadier to newly commissioned 



229 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

second lieutenants. Between the commissioned officers and the 
enlisted ranks is a separate category of junior commissioned officers 
(JCOs), who act as a bridge between the officers and their troops. 
Borrowed from the colonial commissioned officer system of the 
British Indian Army, JCOs are roughly equivalent to United States 
Army warrant officers (although few JCOs are technical specialists). 
JCOs are selected from noncommissioned officer ranks and advance 
through a three-tier ranking system (naib subedar, subedar, and subedar 
major). At the bottom of the hierarchy are the jawans, or common 
soldiers, who make up the bulk of the army (see fig. 13; fig. 14). 

Recruitment into the all-volunteer army is open to all male 
citizens of Bangladesh. There are no restrictions based on religious 
or ethnic affiliation, though the army is composed almost entirely 
of Bangla-speaking Sunni Muslims. The language of the military 
is Bangla. All officers are required to have at least a working 
knowledge of English. Army officer recruits must be between the 
ages of seventeen and twenty-one. Before 1980 the maximum age 
for both officer and enlisted recruits who had fought in the war 
of independence as civilian irregulars was twenty- three years. With 
the aging of the liberation generation, however, the army discon- 
tinued preferential recruitment of freedom fighters. 

Officer candidates must be unmarried and have a high school 
diploma or the equivalent. The minimum height requirement is 
160 centimeters; the minimum weight is 49.8 kilograms. Promis- 
ing candidates attend a two-year officer training course at the Ban- 
gladesh Military Academy at Bhatiary, near Chittagong. After 
successful completion of the course, graduates receive commissions 
in the army as second lieutenants. The academy graduated its first 
class in 1977. Advanced military training is offered at the Defence 
Services Command and Staff College, founded in Dhaka in 1977. 
Attendance at the staff college is a preferential assignment for mid- 
career officers. In addition, the army operates a number of com- 
bat schools, such as the School of Infantry and Tactics in Sylhet. 
The only advanced training beyond the staff college point is in for- 
eign military schools, primarily in the United States or Britain. 
These choice assignments are reserved for a few select officers. An 
officer usually serves from fifteen to twenty-five years, after which 
he is eligible to receive a pension, as well as perquisites such as 
preferential hiring in the civil service, reduced-price housing, and 
free land on or near military cantonments. 

Military pay and allowances are fixed by the National Pay 
Commission into ten grades with a total of seventeen steps, or 
pay scales. Nevertheless, the range in pay between the upper and 
lower strata of the officer corps remained basically the same in 1988 
as in earlier years. 



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The army's armor regiments in the mid-1980s were equipped 
with Type 59, Type 54/55, and, its most recent acquisition, Type 
62 light tanks (not to be confused with Soviet Type 62 medium 
tanks). The Type 59 main battle tank and Type 62 light tanks were 
supplied directly by China. Details regarding the terms of purchase, 
the training of Bangladeshi tank crews, and maintenance arrange- 
ments were never publicized. Following the series of coups and 
mutinies that erupted between 1975 and 1977, Zia removed the 
army's tanks from Dhaka in order to guard against further coups. 
The appearance of Type 59 and Type 62 tanks at the Victory Day 
parade in Dhaka in 1987, however, marked the first time that any 
tanks had appeared in a Victory Day parade and suggested that 
tanks may again be deployed in the vicinity of the capital. Other 
army weapons included 105mm and 122mm howitzers, 60mm and 
120mm mortars, and 57mm, 76mm, and 106mm antitank weapons. 
The weapons had been acquired from a variety of sources, includ- 
ing as spoils of war from the Pakistan Army. 

Navy 

The three primary missions of the Bangladesh Navy are to main- 
tain sovereignty over the nation's territorial waters, to safeguard 
Bangladesh's economic interest and exercise maritime control within 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and to pro- 
tect Bangladeshi shipping. During the Pakistan era (1947-71), the 
navy was accorded a low priority. Pakistani leaders were pre- 
occupied with maintaining the West Wing's land defenses against 
India. The Mukti Bahini did not have a naval force, other than 
a few frogmen who sabotaged Pakistani merchant ships. Wartime 
naval operations, including an amphibious landing near Chit- 
tagong, were left entirely to the Indian Navy. As a result, at inde- 
pendence, Bangladesh inherited virtually nothing in the way of 
naval equipment or personnel. 

Founded as a separate military service on April 7, 1972, the Ban- 
gladesh Navy started with a nucleus of twelve officers and 1,000 
seamen, most of whom had served in the Pakistan Navy. Their 
equipment included six captured speedboats and some miscel- 
laneous small arms. From these humble beginnings, the Bangladesh 
Navy grew into a coastal and riverine defense force estimated 
in 1988 to include 600 officers and 6,900 enlisted personnel. The 
navy's center of operations and training was at the country's 
major port, Chittagong, where, in 1988, the new Bangladesh 
Naval Academy began its first academic year. Navy headquarters 
was in Dhaka. Smaller naval facilities were located at Kaptai 
and Khulna. 



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Bangladesh: A Country Study 




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233 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

The most formidable ships in the navy were three vintage frigates 
purchased from Britain in the late 1970s. These included two 
Leopard-class Type 41 frigates, renamed Abu Bakr and AH Haider, 
and one Salisbury-class Type 61 frigate, renamed Umar Farooq. The 
most modern craft in the inventory were twenty-four patrol boats 
purchased from the Chinese between 1982 and 1984. These 
included four Hegu-class fast attack craft, armed with missiles; four 
P4-class fast-attack craft, armed with torpedoes; and eight Hainan- 
class and eight Shanghai II-class fast attack patrol craft. These 
vessels patrolled coastal waters and rivers to interdict foreign fish- 
ing vessels and assert Bangladeshi sovereignty over its territorial 
waters. Other vessels in the Bangladeshi inventory included vintage 
patrol craft purchased from China, Yugoslavia, India, Japan, and 
Singapore; a recommissioned Pakistani patrol boat; a similar craft 
converted from a Thai fishing boat; and five indigenously built 
Pabna-class riverine patrol craft. Bangladesh also maintained a mer- 
chant fleet comprising 274 vessels. Since all were government 
owned, merchant vessels could be pressed into service during hos- 
tilities. In the late 1980s, the Bangladesh Navy had no air wing, 
marine corps, or reserves. 

Air Force 

The Bangladesh Air Force, descended from the Pakistan Air 
Force, had a 1988 personnel strength of 5,000, including more than 
400 officers, of whom about 175 were pilots. Like the navy, it started 
from humble beginnings, inheriting destroyed aircraft, damaged 
runways, looted stores, and neutralized maintenance facilities. After 
its formation as a separate service in April 1972, the air force 
acquired various fighters and transport aircraft from the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets also trained some air force pilots. Following 
the political turmoil of the mid-1970s, the air force looked to China 
for the bulk of its aircraft, as well as for training. 

As of mid- 1988, the air force inventory included three squadrons 
of combat aircraft, some of which were probably unserviceable. 
These squadrons included vintage MiG-21 interceptors supplied 
by the Soviet Union during the Mujib period. In 1978 China sup- 
plied fifteen F-6s (the Chinese version of the Soviet MiG-19) and 
sixteen A-5s in 1986. The Chinese-supplied fighter inventory in 
early 1988 totaled two squadrons, or about thirty A-5s and F-6s. 
Transport aircraft included one An-26 squadron supplied by the 
Soviets. Helicopters, used in disaster relief and troop transport 
operations, included thirteen American-made Bell 212s (twin-engine 
Hueys) and eleven Soviet-supplied Mi-8s. The air force's main 



234 



Bangladesh Air Force ground crew 
maintains a Chinese-made Xian F- 7 fighter 
Courtesy Bangladesh Ministry of Information 
Defence Services Command and Staff College 
student officers pose with Bangladesh Air Force Mi-8 helicopter 

Courtesy James Dunn 



operating base and headquarters were in Dhaka. Other air force 
bases were located at Jessore, also the site of the Bangladesh Air 
Force Academy, and Chittagong. Small satellite airfields, all of 



235 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



which doubled as civilian airports, were dispersed throughout the 
country. The government-owned passenger airline, Biman Ban- 
gladesh Airlines, could also be considered an air force asset dur- 
ing emergencies (see Civil Aviation, ch. 3). Aside from conducting 
relief operations, the air force's main mission is to transport troops 
and equipment to isolated army outposts in the tribal insurgent 
belt in the Chittagong Hills. 

Auxiliary Forces 

In addition to the three service branches, Bangladesh supports 
an internal security establishment that numbered approximately 
55,000 personnel in mid- 1988. These formal auxiliaries included 
two paramilitary forces — the 30,000-member Bangladesh Rifles 
and the 20,000-member Ansars — and a 5,000-member specialized 
police unit known as the Armed Police. Although large — there 
were 10 million members in 1988 — a fourth paramilitary/police 
element, the Village Defence Party, played a marginal internal 
security role. 

Bangladesh Rifles 

The country's first line of defense, the Bangladesh Rifles, is 
descended from the East Pakistan Rifles formed during the period 
of a united Pakistan (see Pakistan Era, this ch.). The mission of 
the force includes patrolling borders, interdicting smugglers, investi- 
gating transborder crimes, and extending governmental authority 
in isolated areas. In addition, paramilitary forces provide backup 
to the army during wartime. 

The Bangladesh Rifles came into existence shortly after indepen- 
dence. The original complement of 9,000 personnel were mostly 
East Pakistan Rifles deserters who had fought with the Mukti 
Bahini. By 1973 a vigorous recruiting campaign had swelled 
Bangladesh Rifles ranks to about 20,000 personnel. For budget- 
ing purposes, the Bangladesh Rifles are subordinate to the Minis- 
try of Home Affairs. The army, however, plays a major role in 
staffing, training, and directing the force. Most Bangladesh Rifles 
officers are seconded from the regular army. For instance, the army 
chief of staff, Lieutenant General Atiqur Rahman, served as director 
general of the Bangladesh Rifles for four and one-half years. In 
addition, retired JCOs and jawans are often assigned to the 
Bangladesh Rifles in recognition of long years of service. Although 
Bangladesh Rifles units can be called upon to assist the police in 
putting down domestic disturbances, their primary role is to guard 
the nation's frontiers. The force is organized into battalions along 
military lines. During wartime or declared national emergencies, 



236 



National Security 



the president, in his role as commander in chief, can authorize 
the military to assume direct control over all paramilitary and 
police forces. 

Ansars 

The Ansars, formed in 1948, are a lightly armed auxiliary force 
that assists the police in maintaining law and order, participates 
in civic action projects in rural areas, and performs rear area mis- 
sions in conjunction with the army during wartime. The word ansar 
(Arabic for helper) alludes to the companions of the Prophet 
Muhammad who traveled with him during his exile from Mecca. 

After independence, Mujib suspected Ansars personnel of being 
disloyal to his regime and a potential armed threat in the country- 
side and so played down their role. After Mujib was killed and the 
Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini was disbanded, however, army leaders resus- 
citated the Ansars in an effort to improve rural security, which had 
deteriorated sharply under Awami League rule. In 1976 the Ansars 
were designated a "people's defence force," reorganized into bat- 
talions, and placed under the direction of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. Army personnel are routinely posted for duty with Ansars 
battalions. In 1980 the Ansars raised four coastal battalions and 
made plans to post female Ansars contingents to each district. 
Ansars headquarters and its National Training Centre are located 
at Gazipur, about thirty kilometers north of Dhaka. 

Police 

The Armed Police is an elite unit of the national police system 
that is specifically charged with responding to violent disturbances 
and threats to public order whenever local police units prove 
unequal to the challenge. Functioning under the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Armed Police responds to emergencies anywhere in 
the country. The unit ordinarily cooperates closely with the army 
and paramilitary forces. It also operates an intelligence wing. Except 
for perhaps its elite Presidential Security Force, the army does not 
acknowledge having any specialized counterterrorist squad for pro- 
tecting dignitaries, thwarting hijackings, and rescuing hostages. 
These functions are probably handled by units of the Armed Police. 

The police, or local constabulary, are the lowest echelon of Ban- 
gladesh's security forces. The upper echelons of the police, or 
"gazetted officers," rank high in the civil service and are relatively 
well trained and well paid. By contrast, the lower ranks are often 
poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly paid. In the subordi- 
nate grades, whose numbers account for about 90 percent of the 
police, advancement is slow and educational levels low. In addition, 



237 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

the police are overworked. Further, the police are often viewed by 
the public as an oppressive arm of government characterized by 
widespread petty corruption and political manipulation. Accord- 
ing to scholar Craig Baxter, "the police have much more contact 
with citizens than the army, and therefore take the brunt of criticism 
when they are called upon to quell disturbances." Despite their 
reputation for corruption, inefficiency, and occasional brutality, 
the police remain the most vital component of domestic security. 
Total police strength in 1988 was estimated between 40,000 and 
50,000 personnel. 

The police services have had to be rebuilt by the new Bangladeshi 
government because during the independence war the police sys- 
tem of East Pakistan broke down and there was, in effect, no police 
system except that maintained by the combatant armies in the areas 
they controlled. The senior police posts had been held by officers 
of the elite Police Service of Pakistan, most of whom were from 
West Pakistan. Lower ranking officers and the police rank and file 
were Bengalis. When the war of independence broke out in March 
1971, most of the East Pakistani police defected and either joined 
the Mukti Bahini or simply disappeared. 

Under administrative decentralization programs first introduced 
by Zia and later implemented and expanded by Ershad, police 
administration is headed by the inspector general of police, the 
equivalent of an army lieutenant general and popularly and offi- 
cially referred to as the IG. He is responsible to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. At the district level there is a superintendent of police, 
and at the subdistrict level, an inspector of police. Commissioners 
of police direct the work in major urban areas and report directly 
to the inspector general. As part of Ershad 's political strategy of 
moving decision-making power closer to the grass-roots level, police 
administration in 1988 generally paralleled the administrative 
reorganization introduced by the Ershad regime (see The Ershad 
Period, ch. 4). 

Police officers are categorized as gazetted and subordinate, 
roughly analogous to commissioned and noncommissioned officers 
in the military services. The top four gazetted police grades, in 
descending order, are those of inspector general, deputy inspector 
general, superintendent, and assistant superintendent. Below these 
gazetted ranks are the upper subordinate positions of inspector, 
subinspector, and assistant subinspector. Below them are the bulk 
of police in the lower subordinate grades of head constable and con- 
stable. 

The inspector general supervises staff departments handling crim- 
inal investigation, identification, communications, administration, 



238 



Bangladesh Army Type 59 tank in a tactical field exercise 

Courtesy James Dunn 

and supply. He is further responsible for supervision over the police 
"ranges," each of which includes a number of districts and is under 
a deputy inspector general. Within the ranges, police superinten- 
dents control districts and supervise one or more assistant superin- 
tendents, a number of inspectors, and other personnel. The station 
house, at the subdistrict {upazila — see Glossary) level, is supervised 
by one of the upper subordinate officers, called the station house 
officer, with about ten head constables and constables at the station. 
Assisting the regular police are part-time village constables and Vil- 
lage Defence Party volunteers, who report violations to the nearest 
police station or apprehend offenders on police orders. These vil- 
lage constables are recruited locally and receive a very small salary. 

At all levels the senior police officer responds to the chain of com- 
mand within the police organization, but he is also responsible in 
many matters to the general direction of designated civil govern- 
ment officials. These multiple lines of command sometimes cause 
confusion and disagreement, but the principle of ultimate civilian 
control has remained dominant since the colonial period. At the 
national level the inspector general reports to the home secretary; 
at the range level the deputy inspector general answers to the divi- 
sion commissioner; and at the district level the police superinten- 
dent is subordinate to the deputy commissioner, who is in charge 
of tax collection, law and order, and administration of justice. 



239 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Although the deputy commissioner has no authority to interfere 
directly in the internal organization and discipline of the police, 
one of his duties is to inspect the police stations of his district at 
regular intervals. If the deputy commissioner and the police chief 
disagree on issues relating to police functioning, the deputy com- 
missioner's judgment prevails, but he is dependent upon police 
cooperation. In case of serious differences, however, both may refer 
the disputed matter to higher authorities for reconciliation; the 
deputy commissioner to his commissioner and the superintendent 
to his deputy inspector general. 

Village Defence Party 

A fourth auxiliary force, known as the Village Defence Party, 
was formed by Zia in 1976. As its designation indicates, the Vil- 
lage Defence Party was charged with routine village security duties, 
in addition to its primary mission of promoting rural improvement 
projects, such as digging canals. Under Zia's 1980 Self-Sufficient 
Village Government Plan, 6 million men and 4 million women were 
enrolled in local Village Defence Party units. The organization, 
overseen by the Ministry of Home Affairs, played a peripheral role 
in village security. After Zia's assassination in 1981, the Village 
Defence Party plan became less visible, though many of the rural 
development aspects of the program were continued as part of 
Ershad's decentralization effort (see Local Administration, ch. 4). 

Public Order and Internal Security 
Violence and Crime 

Bengalis have been opposing governments since those imposed 
by the Mughals in the sixteenth century (see Islamization of Bengal, 
1202-1757, ch. 1). Bengali secession movements, first from Britain 
and then from Pakistan, were violent struggles that exacted an enor- 
mous human toll. This legacy of violence, coupled with the propen- 
sity to organize the population into mass movements to overthrow 
governments, carried over into the postindependence era. 

A number of fringe parties that embrace violence as an accept- 
able political tactic existed. In the mid-1970s, Maoist splinter groups 
such as the Bangladesh Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist carried 
on a rural-based insurrection. Acting under the direction of two 
renowned freedom fighters, Mohammed Toaha and retired Colonel 
M. Ziauddin, guerrilla bands executed landlords and moneylenders 
and staged hit-and-run raids on police stations and government 
armories. By the late 1970s, however, Maoism had lost much of 
its appeal in the countryside, and most guerrilla factions sought 



240 



National Security 



to become legal organizations. The Bangladesh Communist Party/ 
Marxist-Leninist, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, and dozens of other 
left-wing parties all followed this route. The country's mainstream 
Marxist party, the pro-Soviet Bangladesh Communist Party, did 
not promote organized antigovernment violence, although its stu- 
dent and labor union fronts have been suspected of engaging in 
violent acts (see Party Politics, ch. 4). 

Government officials tend not to make a sharp distinction 
between ordinary crime and political crime or subversion but 
describe it all as destructive to the country. Customarily, authori- 
ties speak of criminal and subversive elements as "antisocial forces" 
or "miscreants" and frequently describe them as composed of 
persons who oppose independent Bangladesh. Similarly, Ershad 
has condemned democratic opposition parties for engaging in 
"terrorism and hooliganism" in their campaigns to unseat him. 

Insurgency in the Chittagong Hills 

Probably the longest running source of domestic violence has 
been the tribal insurgency that has festered in the remote Chit- 
tagong Hill Tracts (see Glossary) since the late 1970s (see Ethnicity 
and Linguistic Diversity, ch. 2). Spearheaded by the predominantly 
Chakma guerrilla band known as the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), 
in the late 1980s the rebels were still seeking autonomous status 
for the Chittagong Hills, the expulsion of Bengali settlers from tradi- 
tional tribal lands, the restoration of tribal rights and privileges 
enjoyed under British and Pakistani rule and subsequently repealed 
by the Mujib government, and the withdrawal of the army from 
the Chittagong Hills. With an estimated strength of 2,000 lightly 
armed guerrillas, the Shanti Bahini carried out attacks against 
Bengali settlers, government facilities, and army convoys. 

Through the late 1980s, military pacification efforts had been 
ineffective and often brutal. The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, 
headquartered in Chittagong, was the army's largest formation with 
four infantry brigades and a specialized counterinsurgency unit 
based at Khagrachari. It mounted reprisal raids against civilian 
tribespeople as warnings against further attacks. Observers through 
1986 estimated that about 400 security personnel had lost their lives 
in the Chittagong Hills; the civilian death toll was estimated at 
around 2,000. According to a September 1986 report by Amnesty 
International, the army regularly engaged in "unlawful killings 
and torture," acts that are specifically prohibited under the Con- 
stitution and various international accords to which Bangladesh 
is a party. Another human rights organization termed the army's 
Chittagong Hills campaign "genocide." Some commentators allege 



241 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

that the army has been overly zealous in stamping out the insur- 
gency because the tribespeople are not Muslims. 

In the late 1980s, the Chittagong Hills remained off-limits to all out- 
siders without a special permit. Details of the fighting therefore have 
been sketchy. Ershad, like his predecessors, denied reports of hu- 
man rights violations and maintained that tribal rights would be 
safeguarded if the Shanti Bahini laid down their arms, accepted gov- 
ernment offers of amnesty and rehabilitation, and participated in 
elections. Aside from the domestic implications of widespread violence 
in the Chittagong Hills, the fighting also had serious regional conse- 
quences. Bangladesh has frequently asserted that India has aided the 
Shanti Bahini by offering arms assistance, military training, and 
bases. India has denied the charges and has countered that Ban- 
gladesh Army operations in the Chittagong Hills have precipitated 
a massive exodus of Chakma refugees into the Indian state of Tripura. 

Criminal Justice 

In general, the criminal codes and procedures in effect in Ban- 
gladesh derive from the period of British rule, as amended by 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. These basic documents include the Penal 
Code, first promulgated in 1860 as the Indian Penal Code; the 
Police Act of 1861; the Evidence Act of 1872; the Code of Crimi- 
nal Procedure of 1898; the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908; 
and the Official Secrets Act of 1911. 

The major classes of crimes are listed in the Penal Code, the 
country's most important and comprehensive penal statute. Among 
the listed categories of more serious crimes are activities called 
"offenses against the state." The Penal Code authorizes the govern- 
ment to prosecute any person or group of persons conspiring or 
abetting in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. 
An offense of this nature is also defined as "war against the state." 
Whether or not an offense constitutes a conspiracy is determined 
by the "intent" of the participant, rather than by the number of 
the participants involved, so as to distinguish it from a riot or any 
other form of disturbance not regarded as antinational. Section 121 
of the Penal Code makes antinational offenses punishable by death 
or imprisonment for twenty years. The incitement of hatred, con- 
tempt, or disaffection toward a lawfully constituted authority is also 
a criminal offense punishable by a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment. Among other categories of felonies are offenses 
against the public tranquillity (meaning unlawful assembly), rioting, 
and public disturbances; offenses relating to religion; and offenses 
against property, such as theft, robbery, and dacoity (robbery by 
a group of five or more persons). 



242 




Dhaka Central Jail 
Courtesy Siria Lopez 

Punishment is divided into five categories: death; banishment, 
ranging from seven years to life; imprisonment; forfeiture of prop- 
erty; and fines. The imprisonment may be "simple" or "rigorous" 
(hard labor), ranging from the minimum of twenty-four hours for 
drunken or disorderly conduct to a maximum of fourteen years 
at hard labor for more serious offenses. Juvenile offenders may be 
sentenced to detention in reform schools for a period of three to 
seven years. For minor infractions whipping, not exceeding fifteen 
lashes, may be prescribed as an alternative to detention. 

Preventive detention may be ordered under the amended Secu- 
rity of Pakistan Act of 1952 and under Section 107 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure when, in the opinion of the authorities, there 
is a strong likelihood of public disorder. Bangladeshi regimes have 
made extensive use of this provision. Similarly, Section 144 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, frequently invoked by magistrates 
for periods up to two months, prohibits assembly of five or more 
persons, holding of public meetings, and carrying of firearms. In 
addition, the Disturbed Areas (Specral Powers) Ordinance of 1962 
empowers a magistrate or an officer in charge of a police contin- 
gent to open fire or use force against any persons breaching the 
peace in the disturbed areas and to arrest and search without a 
warrant. The assembly of five or more persons and the carrying 
of firearms may also be prohibited under this ordinance. 



243 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Persons charged with espionage are punishable under the Official 
Secrets Act of 1911, as amended in 1923 and 1968. As revised in 
May 1968, this statute prescribes death as the maximum penalty 
for a person convicted of espionage. In 1966, in an effort to prevent 
information leaks, the central government passed a regulation pro- 
hibiting former government officials from working for foreign diplo- 
matic missions. In general, all persons seeking employment with 
foreign embassies or any foreign government agencies were also 
required to obtain prior permission from Bangladeshi authorities. 

The custody and correction of persons sentenced to imprison- 
ment is regulated under the Penal Code of 1860, the Prisons Act 
of 1894, and the Prisoners Act of 1900, as amended. The prison 
system has expanded but in 1988 was basically little changed from 
the later days of the British Raj (see Glossary). The highest jail 
administration official is the inspector general of prisons or, if this 
office is not separately assigned, the inspector general of police. 
At the division level or the police range level, the senior official 
is called director of prisons; at the district level, he is the jail super- 
intendent. Below the district jail level are the subdistrict and vil- 
lage police lockups. Dhaka Central Jail is the largest and most secure 
prison and has more extensive facilities than those at the succes- 
sive lower echelons. All installations are staffed by prison police 
usually permanently assigned to this duty. In general, prisons and 
jails have low standards of hygiene and sanitation and are seriously 
overcrowded. Rehabilitation programs with trained social workers 
were rudimentary or nonexistent through the late 1980s. Over- 
crowding — the most serious basic problem — was likely to worsen 
as the 1990s approached because of the mounting number of arrests 
connected with opposition campaigns to oust Ershad from office. 

The Military in the Late 1980s 

According to senior Bangladeshi commanders in the late 1980s, 
the military was the only institution capable of providing the nation 
with honest and efficient administration. In their view, civilian poli- 
ticians were obsessed with settling political scores, undercutting the 
influence of the armed forces, and downplaying the military's role 
in leading the nation to victory in 1971. Moreover, most officers 
regarded politicians as hopelessly corrupt and incapable of creat- 
ing confidence in the government's capacity to make the best use 
of vitally needed foreign assistance. The military disregarded sug- 
gestions made by the opposition to curtail its power, such as the 
formation of a "people's army," the outright abolition of the mili- 
tary, or various constitutional provisions that would circumscribe 
the military's political influence. 



244 



National Security 



Many Bangladeshi officers asserted that they would prefer to limit 
their role in administering the country and concentrate on their 
traditional role of maintaining defense preparedness. They feared, 
however, that if the military were not in a position to safeguard 
the national interest, a government controlled by the opposition 
would mortgage the country's future and, conceivably, destroy the 
armed forces. Civilian political leaders did not reassure the mili- 
tary on this score. For instance, Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow 
of Ziaur Rahman and the head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 
has called on freedom fighters in the armed forces to take matters 
into their own hands and join with her party in ousting Ershad. 
Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the daughter of Mujib and the head of the 
Awami League, has campaigned against "corrupt generals" and 
threatened to reduce the army to an internal police force if she came 
to power. Faced with these kinds of threats, the military has con- 
sistently supported Ershad' s cautious program of retaining the 
army's watchdog political role in a nominally civilian government. 

Scholarly works on the role of the military in Bangladeshi society 
include Ashish Kumar Roy's Nation Building and the Army in 
Bangladesh and journalist Anthony Mascarenhas's Bangladesh: A 
Legacy of Blood. "Bangladesh in the Early 1980s: Praetorian Politics 
in an Intermediate Regime" by Peter J. Bertocci and "Politiciza- 
tion of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived 
Shortcomings of Civilian Government" by Zillur R. Khan also 
provide useful insights. Basic information on personnel strengths, 
organization, and weapons can be found in the annual Military 
Balance. Craig Baxter's Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting 
is particularly useful. 

There is a rich literature dealing with the organizational history 
of the Bangladesh military. Included among these are Stephen P. 
Cohen's The Indian Army and The Pakistan Army, Rounaq Jahan's 
Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, and Subrata Roy Chow- 
dhury's The Genesis of Bangladesh. Details of the internal security 
problems during the first years of independence are found in 
Talukder Maniruzzaman's article "Bangladesh: An Unfinished 
Revolution?" The Hoover Institution's Yearbook on International Com- 
munist Affairs is also a useful source on left-wing political violence 
in Bangladesh. 

Censorship restrictions make the coverage of military affairs in 
the Bangladeshi press less than enlightening. The English-language 
Bangladesh Observer and the Illustrated Weekly of Bangladesh are useful. 



245 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



The Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Near East 
and South Asia and the weekly Far Eastern Economic Review are 
probably the best resources for military affairs. Although the 
Bangladeshi armed forces journal Senani is accessible only to those 
who read Bangla, it contains useful photographs of senior officers, 
weapons systems, and military installations. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



246 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Climatic Statistics, Selected Stations, 1986 

3 Population Density, Selected Years, 1881-2000 

4 Area, Population, and Density by Region, 1981 and 1985 

5 Population by Age-Group, Sex, and Urban-Rural Distribu- 

tion, 1981 Census 

6 Foreign Employment of Bangladeshi Nationals by Country, 

Selected Years, 1979-87 

7 Unemployed Persons by Age-Group, Sex, and Urban-Rural 

Distribution, Fiscal Year 1984 

8 Major Religious Communities, Selected Years, 1901-81 

9 Health Care Indicators, Fiscal Years 1980, 1985, and 1990 

10 Major Aid Donors, Fiscal Years 1981 and 1986 

11 Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, Selected 

Fiscal Years, 1981-87 

12 Production of Selected Industrial Commodities, Selected Fiscal 

Years, 1981-87 

13 Exports, Selected Fiscal Years, 1981-87 

14 Imports, Selected Fiscal Years, 1981-87 

15 Major Trading Partners, Fiscal Year 1986 

16 Government Ministries, 1982 and 1988 

17 Parliamentary Election Results, 1973-88 

18 Army Chiefs of Staff, 1971-88 



247 



Appendix 



1 aoie 1 . 


Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




0.04 


inches 




0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 






miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 






gallons 




2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Climatic Statistics, Selected Stations, 1986 







Temperature 


Humidity 






(in 


degrees 


(average daily, 




Precipitation 


Celsius) 


in 


percent) 


Station 


(in centimeters) 


Min. 


Max. 


Min 


Max. 




211 


10.0 


38.4 


71 


92 




215 


9.5 


39.5 


51 


87 


Chittagong 


278 


12.4 


35.4 


63 


84 




205 


10.0 


36.6 


65 


86 


Cox's Bazar 


286 


13.5 


34.5 


62 


89 


Dhaka 


248 


10.6 


39.5 


52 


84 




198 


8.8 


40.5 


45 


87 




232 


10.5 


40.5 


52 


86 




210 


9.4 


40.2 


52 


88 


Khulna 


242 


8.0 


38.7 


66 


88 




298 


10.6 


36.5 


67 


88 


Mymensingh 


305 


11.1 


36.2 


57 


86 


Rajshahi 


152 


7.8 


41.5 


47 


86 




244 


12.5 


37.4 


57 


86 


Rangpur 


231 


9.0 


39.1 


53 


89 


Sylhet 


329 


10.6 


36.7 


54 


88 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 
23-27. 



249 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Table 3. Population Density, Selected Years, 1881-2000 



Density 

Population (per square 

Year (in thousands) 1 kilometer) 2 



1881 25,086 187 

1891 27,103 202 

1901 28,928 216 

1911 31,555 235 

1921 33,255 248 

1931 35,602 266 

1941 41,997 313 

1951 44,832 312 

1961 50,840 379 

1974 71,478 533 

1981 87,129 650 

1988 109,964 821 

1990 3 112,865 842 

1995 3 127,086 948 

2000 3 142,141 1,060 



1 Some years include enumerated census population data. 

2 Calculation based on land area of 133,910 square kilometers. 

3 Projected. 

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 
38, 71; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 1988, 
Washington, May 1988, 20. 



250 



Appendix 

Table 4. Area, Population, and Density 
by Region, 1981 and 1985 



Area Population Density 





(in square 


(in thousands) 


(per square 


kilometer 


Region 


kilometers) 


1981 


1985 


1981 


1985 


n a k 


4 499 


180 


200 


40 


44 




7 295 


4,819 


5,385 




/ JO 


Bogra 


3,886 


2,814 


3,245 


724 


835 


C^. Vii t fa an n cr 


7,453 


5,664 


6,329 


759 


849 


r^hittacrnncr T— T ill TYartQ * 

V_JllAl.La.«iUlIei 11 111 1 1 alio 


8,675 


602 


674 


69 


77 


Comilla. 


6,596 


7,103 


7,937 


1,076 


1,203 


Dhaka 


7,466 


10,340 


11,554 


1,384 


1,547 


Dinajpur 


6,563 


3,300 


3,687 


502 


561 


Fandpur 


6,878 


4,918 


5,496 


715 


799 


Jamalpur 


3,347 


2,527 


2,823 


755 


843 


Jessore 


6,570 


4,145 


4,632 


630 


705 


Khulna 


12,163 


4,469 


4,993 


367 


410 


Kushtia 


3,405 


2,365 


2,642 


694 


775 




9,664 


6,779 


7,575 


701 


783 


Noakhali 


5,457 


3,938 


4,401 


721 


806 


Pabna 


4,730 


3,534 


3,948 


747 


834 




4,093 


1,897 


2,120 


463 


517 


Rajshahi 


9,452 


5,440 


6,078 


575 


643 




9,592 


6,716 


7,505 


700 


782 


Sylhet 


12,714 


5,835 


6,520 


461 


512 




3,401 


2,527 


2,823 


743 


830 


BANGLADESH 


143,899 


89,912 


100,567 


624 


698 



* As of January 1988, known as Rangamati Region. 

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh, 1986, Dhaka, 1987, 117-38. 



251 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



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252 



Appendix 



Table 6. Foreign Employment of Bangladeshi Nationals by Country, 
Selected Years, 1979-87 



Country 


1979 


1981 


1983 


1985 


1987 




25 














Bahrain 


827 


1,392 


2,473 


2,965 


2,055 


Ethiopia 


20 














Iran 


4 








144 





Iraq 


2,362 


13,153 


4,932 


5,051 


3,847 




73 


66 


42 








Kuwait 


2,289 


5,461 


10,283 


7,384 


9,559 


Libya 


1,967 


4,162 


2,209 


1,514 


2,271 




o 

u 


n 


o 
i. 


7Q9 


4-4-0 


Nigeria 


51 


17 


41 










3,777 


7,351 


10,351 


9,218 







1,383 


2,268 


7,541 


4,751 


5,831 


Saudi Arabia 


6,490 


13,384 


11,462 


37,111 


39,350 




110 


1,083 


211 








Uganda 


50 














United Arab Emirates 


5,055 


6,418 


6,615 


8,336 


9,953 


Lebanon, Syria, and other . . . . 





1,029 


2,279 


428 


711 


TOTAL 


24,483 


55,784 


58,441 


77,694 


74,017 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 114. 



253 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



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« m in O) <7i 



O Ol N O) M CM 



* N MN O N 



CM Ol CO 



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CM CM CO 



m in o n ffi * 



CM CM CO 



254 



Appendix 



Table 8. Major Religious Communities, 
Selected Years, 1901-81 
(in percentages) 



Year Muslim Hindu Other * Total 



1901 66.1 33.0 0.9 100.0 

1911 67.2 31.5 1.3 100.0 

1921 68.1 30.6 1.3 100.0 

1931 69.5 29.4 1.1 100.0 

1941 70.3 28.0 1.7 100.0 

1951 76.9 22.0 1.1 100.0 

1961 80.4 18.5 1.1 100.0 

1971 85.4 13.5 1.1 100.0 

1981 86.6 12.2 1.2 100.0 



* Buddhist, Christian, and "others." 

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 46. 



Table 9. Health Care Indicators, 
Fiscal Years 1980, 1985, and 1990 



Indicator 


Unit 


1980 


1985 


1990 * 


Infant mortality 


per 1,000 live births 


140.0 


125.0 


100.0 


Maternal mortality 


-do- 


7.0 


6.0 


4.0 


Crude birth rate 


per 1,000 population 


43.3 


39.0 


31.0 




-do- 


16.8 


15.8 


13.0 


Life expectancy at birth . . 


years 


56.9 


55.1 


54.0 


Kospital beds 


number 


21,141.0 


21,637.0 


40,734.0 


Population per hospital bed 


-do- 


4,128.0 


3,589.0 


2,712.0 


Coverage of population by 










primary health care 










services 


percentage of population 


25.0 


30.0 


65.0 




number 


11,000.0 


16,000.0 


22,500.0 


Population per physician . . 


-do- 


8,810.0 


6,640.0 


4,755.0 



* Target. 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 
59, 372, 376, 378. 



255 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Table 10. Major Aid Donors, Fiscal Years 1981 and 1986 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



1981 1986 



Donor Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 



Asian Development 

Bank 164 46 177 159 

Britain 6 51 87 42 

Canada 40 70 101 98 

International Development 

Association 334 178 489 348 

Japan 232 162 63 139 

United Nations system ... 65 38 148 66 

United States 191 134 232 104 

Other 630 469 365 347 



TOTAL 1,662 1,148 1,662 1,303 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 
408-9. 



256 



Appendix 



n CO ■+ 



OO — Or-OOO 



M 

oo m 10 

CM od CO 



o o o 
in ~ o 



o o 

CO 



O <£> O t-~ in 



cm co 



CO N CO 



* " o m 



_ o 

co 
co 



CO N N 



CO O 

CD 



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u ^ ^ oq 

o 
o 



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. . 

o • • 

o • • 

© W CO 

v ^ CJ O 



bo « 
3 £ 
C/3 C/D 



O w 

o o 



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v o 



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257 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Table 12. Production of Selected Industrial Commodities, 
Selected Fiscal Years, 1981-87 
(in millions of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Commodity 


1981 


1983 


1985 


1987 1 


Textiles 2 










Cotton cloth (1,000 meters) 


78,612 


59,741 


62,590 


59,410 


Cotton yarn (1,000 kilograms) 


46,235 


45,237 


48,139 


45,141 


Sacking 


. . 309, 535 


241 ,647 


nnn rrir 

222,595 


248,020 






93,966 


oa no o 

80,9/2 


on o no 

80,308 


C 1 , 1 • / h AAA 1 '1 \ 

Synthetic varn (1,000 kilograms) . . . 


. . 1,499 


1 ,381 


1 ,546 


1 ,059 


Paper products 












qa aao 


26,741 


45,972 


46,643 


Particle board 


. . 1,228 


543 


2,308 


2,502 


Chemicals and fertilizers 












34.1 734. 


371 OfiR 
oil ,UUo 


74.1 4.fi3 


QAf. 4.^0 
OtD ,tJO 




Q 933 


1 9 989 


Q £34. 


Q 3 1 f, 

j, JlD 


Caustic soda 


5,984 


5,685 


6,81 1 


8,331 






412 


1 O KO 

1 ,2jz 


(11 1 
911 


Paints and varnish (gallons) 




a r\£ no a 
4-Uj, /o4- 


COQ AOO 

joj,Uoo 


roc CAO 
DJJ, J(J2 




if. 


1 9 £91 
1 Z ,OZ 1 


9ft 93fi 
Zo, ZjO 


9Q fiP.3 


Cement 


O A A 09H 

. . 344,830 


306,688 


240, 1 76 


AA CT7 

309,6/ / 




139,343 


47,401 


101,149 


82,081 




83,760 


93,694 


128,045 


122,998 


Television sets 










Black and white (units) 


26,314 


33,452 


56,316 


60,730 







174 


706 


14,341 


Transportation equipment (units) 












1,297 





257 


456 


Buses 


508 


56 


54 


400 


Automobiles 











50 


Jeeps 


451 





226 


180 




6,122 


3,167 


17,334 


10,469 


Bicycles 


28,214 


13,338 


14,712 


16,917 



1 Projected. 

2 Includes ready-made garment production 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1987, Dhaka, July 1988, 
246-49. 



258 



Appendix 



Table 13. Exports, Selected Fiscal Years, 1981-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Commodity 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987 * 



Jute 

Raw jute 119 110 151 124 92 

Jute manufactures 357 320 390 293 306 

Total jute 476 430 541 417 398 

Frozen seafood 40 72 87 113 165 

Garments 3 11 116 131 150 

Leather goods 56 58 70 61 90 

Petroleum products 49 31 21 17 15 

Tea 41 46 61 33 38 

Other 46 38 39 47 44 



TOTAL 711 686 935 819 900 



* Projected. 

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh Bank, Statistics Department, Annual Export 
Receipts, 1985-86, Dhaka, 1986, 173-77. 



Table 14. Imports, Selected Fiscal Years, 1981-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Commodity 



Food 

Rice 

Wheat 

Edible oil and oilseeds . . . 
Total food 

Intermediate goods 

Crude petroleum 

Petroleum products 

Fertilizer 

Cement 

Raw cotton 

Other 2 

Total intermediate goods 

Capital goods 

TOTAL 



1981 


1983 


1985 


1986 


1987 1 


40 


97 


176 


8 


21 


210 


288 


322 


212 


267 


103 


88 


109 


147 


109 


353 


473 


607 


367 


397 


343 


240 


226 


178 


137 


160 


171 


133 


176 


128 


104 


68 


137 


103 


22 


33 


44 


26 


40 


55 


108 


56 


106 


52 


85 


749 


539 


796 


757 


851 


1,497 


1,118 


1,424 


1,306 


1,278 


683 


655 


616 


691 


725 


2,533 


2,246 


2,647 


2,364 


2,400 



1 Projected. 

2 Includes minor imports of food. 

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh Bank, Statistics Department, Annual Im- 
port Payments, 1985-86, Dhaka, 1986, 135-41. 



259 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Table 15. Major Trading Partners, Fiscal Year 1986 
(in millions of takas) * 



Percentage 
of Total 



Country 


Exports 


Imports 


Total 


Trade 


Belgium 


1,015 


347 


1,362 


1.5 


Britain 


1,569 


2,360 


3,929 


4.3 


Canada 


453 


2,260 


2,713 


3.0 


China 


747 


2,370 


3,117 


3.5 




76 


3,038 


3,114 


3.4 


Iran 


959 


1,078 


2,037 


2.2 


Italy 


1,488 


336 


L824 


2.0 


Japan 


1,946 


8,233 


10,179 


11.3 


Malaysia 


99 


1,277 


1,376 


1.5 


Netherlands 


477 


1,106 


1,583 


1.8 




1,464 


2,045 


3,509 


3.9 


Saudi Arabia 


190 


1,716 


1,906 


2.1 


Singapore 


1,272 


9,071 


10,343 


11.5 


South Korea 


235 


3,700 


3,935 


4.4 


United Arab Emirates . . . 


195 


3,222 


3,417 


3.8 


United States 


6,862 


5,088 


11,950 


13.2 


West Germany 


716 


2,623 


3,339 


3.7 


Other 


7,633 


13,059 


20,692 


22.9 


TOTAL 


27,396 


62,929 


90,325 


100.0 



* For value of the taka — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Bureau of Statis- 
tics, Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh. 1987, Dhaka, July 1988. 
329-32. 



260 



Appendix 



Table 16. Government Ministries, 1982 and 1988 



December 1982 


July 1988 


Agriculture 


Agriculture 


Chief Martial Law Administrator's 


Civil Aviation and Tourism 


Secretariat* 


Communications 


Commerce and Industries 


Cultural Affairs 


Defence and Civil Aviation 


Defence 


Education, Religious Affairs, Sports, 


Education and Culture 


and Cultural Affairs 


Energy and Mineral Resources 


Finance and Planning 


Establishment and Reorganization 


Flood Control, Energy, and 


Finance 


Mineral Resources 


Fisheries and Livestock 


Food and Relief 


Food 


Foreign Affairs 


Foreign Affairs 


Health and Population Control 


Health and Family Planning 


Home Affairs 


Home Affairs 


Information and Broadcasting 


Industries 


Labour and Manpower 


Information 


Law, Land Administration, and Land 


Jute 


Reforms, 


Labour and Manpower 


Local Government, Rural 


Land 


Development, and Cooperatives 


Law and Justice 


President's Secretariat* 


Local Government, Rural 


Public Works and Urban 


Development, and Cooperatives 


Development 


Planning 


Social Welfare and Women's Affairs 


Religious Affairs 


Transport and Communication 


Shipping 




Social Welfare and Women's Affairs 




Textiles 




Works and Urban Development 




Youth Development and Sports 



* Ministerial-level organization 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate 
of Intelligence, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, Washing- 
ton, December 1982, 6; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Direc- 
torate of Intelligence, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, 
Washington, July-August 1988, 5-6. 



261 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Table 17. Parliamentary Election Results, 1973-88 



Number of Seats Won 



Party 


1973 


1979 


1986 


1988 






A 1 1 
11 


/O 




Bangladesh Nationalist Party 




207 






Jamaat e Islami 






10 




Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal 


1 


8 


7 2 


21 


Jatiyo Party 






153 


251 








4 




Muslim League — Islamic 










Democratic League 




20 






Other parties 


1 


8 


18 


2 




5 


16 


32 


25 


TOTAL 


289 


300 


300 


299 



— means did not participate. 

1 Abdul Malik Ukil faction thirty-nine seats; Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury faction two seats. 

2 A.S.M. Abdur Rab faction four seats; Shajahan Siraj faction three seats. 

3 Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal three seats; Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (A.S.M. Abdur Rab) eighteen seats. 



Table 18. Army Chiefs of Staff , 1971-88 



Name and Rank 



Appointed by 



Tenure 



M.A.G. Osmany 
(General) 



Bangladesh 

government-in-exile 



December 1971 -April 1972 
(commander in chief of 
armed forces) 



K.M. Shafiullah 
(Colonel) 



Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman 



April 1972-August 1975 
(dismissed after coup) 



Ziaur Rahman (Major 
General) 



Khondakar Mushtaque 
Ahmed 



August-November 1975 
(dismissed in November 3 
coup) 



Khaled Musharraf 
(Brigadier) 



Self 



November 3-7, 1975 

(ringleader of short-lived 
coup; killed on November 7) 



Ziaur Rahman (Major 
General) 



-Do- 



November 7, 1975- 
November 1980 



Hussain Muhammad 
Ershad (Major 
General, later 
Lieutenant General) 



Ziaur Rahman 



December 1980- 
August 1986 



Atiqur Rahman 

(Lieutenant General) 



Hussain Muhammad 
Ershad 



September 1, 1986- 



262 



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Bangladesh Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency, Pt. 2. 

(American Universities Field Staff, Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia 
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Ghoshal, Baladas. "Bangladesh: Passage to Military Rule," For- 
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Hoque, M. Sayedul, and James A. Dunn, Jr. "Among the Tigers 
of Bengal," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, 13, No. 1, Summer 1988, 
2-7. 

Huque, Ahmed Shafiqul. "The Army and the State: Military 
Intervention in the Politics of Bangladesh and Pakistan," 
Indian Political Science Review [Delhi], 16, No. 1, January 1982, 
80-93. 

Islam, A.T.M. Kamrul (ed.). A Manual of Defence Laws in Bangladesh, 

2. Dhaka: Khoshroz Kitab Mahal, 1976. 
Islam, Syed Serajul. "The Rise of the Civil-Military Bureaucracy 

in the State Apparatus of Bangladesh," Asian Thought and Society, 

10, No. 31, March 1986, 28-36. 
Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1972. 
Khan, A. A. (ed.). Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act No. V of 

1898 as Modified Up-to-Date). Dhaka: Khoshroz Kitab Mahal, 

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Khan, Zillur Rahman. "Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: 
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Khanduri, Chandra B. "The Developments in Bangladesh," 
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LaPorte, Robert. "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a 
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Lifschultz, Lawrence. Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution. Lon- 
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Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies. Boulder: Westview Press, 
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Makeig, Douglas C. "Bangladesh." Pages 166-69 in Richard F. 
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Maniruzzaman, Talukder. "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolu- 
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Mascarenhas, Anthony. Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood. London: 
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Muhith, A.M. A. Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation. Dhaka: Ban- 
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Naqvi, M.B. "Martial Law in Bangladesh," Defence Journal 
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O'Donnell, Charles Peter. Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation. 
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Rahim, Joyce L., and Enayetur Rahim. Bangladesh: A Select 
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Rashid, Haroun er. Geography of Bangladesh. Boulder: Westview 
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Rashiduzzaman, M. "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Mili- 
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Rizvi, Hasan Askari. Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's 
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. The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86. Lahore: 

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Roy, Ashish Kumar. Nation Building and the Army in Bangladesh: A 
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Siddiqi, Abdul Rahman. "The Militarization of Bangladesh," 
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Singh, Kushwant. "The Freedom Fighters of Bangladesh, " Illus- 
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Sinha, P.B. Armed Forces of Bangladesh. (Occasional Papers, No. 1.) 
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(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
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288 



Glossary 



Awami League (People's League) — Political party of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. Founded in 1949; won absolute majority 
in putative Pakistan Constituent Assembly in 1970, an event 
leading to 1971 civil war and Bangladesh independence. 

Bangla — Official language of Bangladesh; often referred to as 
Bengali before 1971. An Indo-European language. 

Bangladesh National Party — Political party of Ziaur Rahman (Zia). 
Founded in 1978 and became majority party during Zia's 
presidency. 

Bengal — Formerly province of British India, now encompasses 
India's state of West Bengal and all of Bangladesh (formerly 
East Pakistan— q.v.) During Mughal period (1526-1858) a 
province, later governed by a president of the British East India 
company, and during the British Raj (q.v.), a state. 

Bengali calendar — Year begins on April 15 of the Gregorian calen- 
dar; based on Muslim, or hijra (q. v. ) calendar and used widely 
in religious life. 

British Raj — Period of British colonial rule (1858-1947) over India, 
including those parts of British India that were to become 
Pakistan (on August 15, 1947) and Bangladesh (on Decem- 
ber 16, 1971). 

Chittagong Hill Tracts — Commonly used name for area compris- 
ing Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban regions in south- 
eastern Bangladesh. 

crore — In Bangladesh, as elsewhere in South Asia, large numeri- 
cal units are usually expressed in crores; a crore is 10 million. 

Delhi Sultanate — period of early Indian-based Islamic rule of Bengal 
(1206-1341). The Delhi Sultanate continued in India proper 
until 1526. 

district — zila in Bangla (q. v.). One of major administrative subdivi- 
sions in Bangladesh; an average of three districts make up each 
of the twenty-one regions of Bangladesh. In 1988 there were 
sixty-four districts in Bangladesh. 

East Bengal — Eastern part or East Wing of Pakistan from Au- 
gust 15, 1947, to December 16, 1971. Another name for East 
Pakistan (q.v.). 

East Pakistan — From August 15, 1947, to December 16, 1971, the 
eastern part, or East Wing, of united Pakistan. Seceded in 1971 
to become Bangladesh. 

East Wing — See East Pakistan. 



289 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



fiscal year (FY) — July 1 through June 30. 
freedom fighters — See Mukti Bahini. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and investment are included because the 
values of primary and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the 
result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deduc- 
tions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. 
See also gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (q. v. ) plus 
the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign 
countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of 
goods and services of an economy. It can be calculated at market 
prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because 
indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP 
is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and 
subsidies. 

hadith — Tradition, based on the precedent of the Prophet Muham- 
mad's nondivinely revealed deeds and words, that serves as 
one of the sources of Islamic law (sharia — q.v.). 

hijra — Literally, to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. 
Throughout the Muslim world, hijra refers to the migration 
of Muhammad and his followers to Medina in A.D, 622, mark- 
ing the start of the Muslim era. In this sense, the word has 
come into European languages as "hegira" and is usually and 
somewhat misleadingly translated as "flight." 

imam — In general use, means the leader of congregational prayers, 
implying no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- 
cient education to carry out this function. The word is also used 
figuratively by many Sunni Muslims to mean the leader of the 
Islamic community. Among Shia Muslims, it indicates the par- 
ticular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to have 
been God's designated repository of the spiritual authority 
inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and the 
means of ascertaining his identity have been the major issues 
causing divisions among the Shias (q.v.). 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange loans to its members (including 



290 



Glossary 



industralized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- 
ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

Jatiyo Party — Political party of Hussain Muhammed Ershad. 
Established in 1985 and won majority control of Parliament 
in 1986 and 1988 elections. 

jihad — The struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often inter- 
preted to mean "holy war." 

Mukti Bahini — Literally, liberation force, frequently taken to mean 
freedom fighters; the pro-Awami League (q. v.) military forces 
that led civil war against the Pakistani Army in 1971. 

sharia — Islamic law. 

Shia (or Shiite, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of 
the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shias sup- 
port the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the 
caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on 
this issue they remain divided from the Sunnis (q.v.). Shias 
revere twelve imams, the last of whom is believed to be hidden 
from view. 

Shiite — See Shia. 

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) — 
comprises the seven nations of South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; founded at 
a meeting of foreign ministers in New Delhi on August 1-2, 
1983; inaugural meeting of heads of state and government in 
Dhaka on December 7-8, 1986. The goal is to effect economic, 
technical, and cultural cooperation and to provide a forum for 
discussion of South Asian political problems. 

subdistrict — upazila in Bangla (q.v.). A rural administrative sub- 
division of a district (q.v.). In 1988 there were 460 subdistricts 
in Bangladesh. 

Sufi — Comes from suf, the Arabic word for "wool." The term 
derives from the practice of wearing a woolen robe, a sign of 
dedicating oneself to the mystical life, known in Islam as 
becoming a Sufi. Sufis seek mystical union with God and were 
condemned by some Sunni (q.v.) legal schools. 

Sufism — See Sufi. 

Sunni — Comes from sunna meaning "custom," giving connota- 
tion of orthodoxy. A member of the larger of the two great 
divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the traditional method 
of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. 
On this issue they divided from the Shias (q. v. ) in the first great 
schism within Islam. 



291 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 

Sunni Islam — See Sunni. Sometimes given as Sunnite Islam. 

taka — Bangladesh's unit of currency adopted in 1971, derives from 
the word tonka, the Iranian coinage used during the Delhi 
Sultanate (q.v.). In September 1988, the official exchange rate 
was US$1 equals Tk34.20. One hundred paisas constitute 1 
taka; there are 1-, 5-, 10-, 25-, 50-, and 100-paisa coins and 
banknotes in 1-, 10-, 20-, 50-, 100-, and 500-taka denomina- 
tions. Ten million takas equals 1 crore (q.v.) takas. 

ulama — Man trained in Islamic theology. 

union — A rural administrative unit, subdivision of a subdistrict 
(upazila--q.v.). In 1988 there were 4,401 unions in Bangladesh. 
upazila — See subdistrict. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 
easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q.v.). 

zamindar — Landlord, but particularly of the group of landlords 
and the zamindar system that emerged after the British Per- 
manent Settlement (Landlease) Act of 1793. In essence, the 
former tax collectors of the Mughal period (1526-1858) became 
landlords under the British. Zamindar tenure was abolished 
in 1950. 

zila — See district. 



292 



Index 



Abu Bakr, 72 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 91-92 
Adamjee family, 20 

administrative divisions, 162-63; at local 

level, 163-64 
Afghanistan, 4, 192, 194, 196 
Agricultural Labour Ordinance of 1984, 

121 

Agricultural University, 87 

agriculture {see also Comilla Model; food 
crops; industrial crops; land owner- 
ship): development of, xxviii-xxix, 6, 
121; production in, 117-20 

Ahmad, Sultan, 225 

aid-to-civil role, 220 

air force, xxxiv, 217-18, 223, 225; de- 
velopment and duties of, 234 

Air Force Act of 1957, 218 

airports, 146, 223 

Akbar, 5-6, 7 

Ali, Abu Muhammad Shajaat, 118 

Alivardi, 6 

Allahabad, 16 

alliances, 178-81, 182-83 

All-India Muslim League. See Muslim 

League 
Ambedkar, B.R., 16 
Amnesty International, 241 
Annual Development Programme, 103, 

106, 113 

Ansar National Training Centre, 237 
Ansars, 209, 236-37 
Appellate Division, 158 
Arabic language, 89, 167, 187 
Arafat, Yasir, 195 

armed forces, 204-17; aid-to-the-civil- 
power role of, 220; limitations, 222-23; 
organization of, 217; recruitment sys- 
tem of, 218-19; women in, 219 

Armed Police (see also Presidential Secu- 
rity Force), 236, 237 

army, xxxiv, 32, 217-18, 224-25; as polit- 
ical institution, 227; ranking system of, 
229-30; recruitment policy, 205; reorga- 
nization and consolidation under British 
India, 205; resource allocation of, 228 

Army Act of 1954, 218 



Arunachal Pradesh, 50 
Ashuganj fertilizer complex, 114 
Asian Development Bank, 114, 129, 144 
Asoka, 4 

Assam, 12, 31, 57, 191, 210, 224 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), 193 

Aurangzeb, 6 

Aurora, J.S., 211 

Australia, 116, 197 

aviation, civil, 145-46 

Awami League (People's League) (see also 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami 
League), 176, 177, 178, 196, 245; after 
independence, 35; after lifting of mar- 
tial law, 169-70; in alliances with other 
parties, 169, 172, 179; in East Pakistan, 
24, 29, 207; factions within, 179; for- 
mation and decline, 203; Hindus in, 
82; opposition to Ershad administration 
by, 167, 170, 172; political position of, 
153; role in civil war, 208-9 

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, xxx, 23-25, 
27, 28, 207, 208; democratic reform of, 
162; position on unity in Pakistan, 
27-28 

ayurvedic medical system, 92, 95 

Bahadur Shah, 10 
balance of payments, 138 
Baluchistan, 16 
bamboo, 47 

Bangabandhu. See Mujibur Rahman, 
Sheikh 

Bangla Academy, 89 

Bangla language, xxvii, xxx, 3, 22, 45, 
59, 60, 77, 79, 161, 187, 191; in army, 
230; enforced use of, 34; replacement 
of English by, 89 

Bangladesh Academy of Rural Develop- 
ment, 121 

Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Board, 53 

Bangladesh Aid Group (World Bank mem- 
bers), 102, 109, 112-13, 116-17, 146-47 

Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, 
135 



293 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Bangladesh Bank, 53, 104, 109-10 

Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corpo- 
ration, 107 

Bangladesh Chhatro League (Bangladesh 
Students League), 179 

Bangladesh Civil Service, 158, 160-62 

Bangladesh Communist Party, 178, 179, 
180-81, 212, 241 

Bangladesh Communist Party/Marxist- 
Leninist, 240-41 

Bangladesh Export Processing Zones 
Authority, 107 

Bangladesh Forest Industries Develop- 
ment Corporation, 107 

Bangladesh Hindu Kalyan Trust (Ban- 
gladesh Hindu Welfare Trust), 82 

Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Na- 
tionalisation) Ordinance, 107 

Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Cor- 
poration, 141 

Bangladesh Institute of Distance Educa- 
tion, 87 

Bangladesh Investment Corporation, 106 
Bangladesh Jute Corporation, 125, 126 
Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation, 126 
Bangladesh Khalifat Andolan (Ban- 
gladesh Caliphate Movement), 182 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami 
League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers 
and People's League), 35, 176, 179 
Bangladesh Krishi Bank, 53, 109 
Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board, 
88 

Bangladesh Military Academy, 230 

Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 39, 165, 
169-70, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 180, 
182, 204, 216, 245; opposition to 
Ershad administration by, 167 

Bangladesh Naval Academy, 231 

Bangladesh Observer, 186 

Bangladesh Oil, Gas, and Minerals Cor- 
poration, 132 

Bangladesh Parjaton Corporation (Ban- 
gladesh Tourism Corporation), 146 

Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation, 107 

Bangladesh Plain, 47, 51 

Bangladesh Railways, 144 

Bangladesh Rifles, 223-24, 236-37 

Bangladesh Rural Development Board, 
53, 90 

Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (Ban- 
gladesh Socialist Party), 181 
Bangladesh Shipping Corporation, 141 



Bangladesh Space Research and Remote 

Sensing Organization, 135 
Bangladesh Television, 187 
Bangladesh Water Development Board, 

53 

Banglar Bani, 186 
banking system, 109 
Barisal, 55, 82, 141 
Baxter, Craig, 238 

Bay of Bengal, 28, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 128, 
141, 196, 224 

Bayt al Mukarram, 77 

Belgium, 108, 136, 140 

Bengal (see also East Bengal), 4-6, 9, 19; 
under British rule, 8-9; division and re- 
unification of, xxix, 12-14; early his- 
tory, xxviii, 4; as Mughal province, 5 

Bengali language. See Bangla language 

Bengalis: in Bangladesh, 45, 58-59; in 
British Indian Army, 11, 206; Hindu, 
20; historical opposition of, 240; in 
Pakistan armed forces, 34, 207; sup- 
pression of 30; unity of 28 

Bentham, Jeremy, 9 

Bethbunia, 146 

Bhatiary, 230 

Bhutan, xxxv, 3, 126, 193 

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 25, 28, 29, 32, 35 

Bihar, 7, 19, 20, 210 

Biharis in Bangladesh, 20, 45, 57, 59, 192 

Biman Bangladesh Airlines, 145, 236 

biomass energy, 133, 135 

Biplabi Sainik Sangstha (Revolutionary 
Soldiers Organization), 212 

Bogra, 39, 229 

Bogra, Mohammad Ali, 23, 24 
Bombay, 20 
Brahmans, 78 

Brahmaputra River, 50, 190 

Britain, 108, 116, 136, 139, 140, 226, 

227; Bangladesh relations with, 197; 

development of government in India, 

7-10; influence of military in India, 

204-5 

British East India Company: develop- 
ment and dissolution, xxviii, 7-11; 
influence in India of, 204-5 

British India (British raj): capital at 
Calcutta, 12; effect on East Bengal of 
rule by, 7-10, 18, 100, 120 

British Indian Army, 205-6; effect of par- 
tition of India on, 206; mutiny by sol- 
diers of, 10, 11 



294 



Index 



Buddhism, xxviii, 4, 82-83 
Buddhists: in Bangladesh, 46, 83 
budget process, government, 104-6 
Bulgaria, 140 
Burke, Edmund, 9 
Burma, 46, 47, 60, 193 
Buxar, 7 



cabinet. See Council of Ministers 

Calcutta, xxviii, 7, 11, 19, 123, 190; cap- 
ital of West Bengal and British India, 
12, 100 

Cambodia, 194, 196 

Canada, xxxiii, 108, 116, 136, 139, 140, 
197 

CARE, 117 

caste system, 66, 68, 78, 82 
Central Students Action Committee, 184 
Chakmas, 59-60, 191, 241-42 
Chalna, 141, 143 
Chandpur, 50, 141 
chars, 50, 51, 191, 224 
Chhatro Dal (Students Party), 184 
Chhatro Union (Students Union), 181, 
212 

China, xxxiii, xxxv, 126, 140, 196, 197, 
234; Bangladesh relations with, 193-94, 
225; decline of Maoism in, 180; mili- 
tary supplies and training provided by, 
226, 227 

Chittagong, 47, 51, 55, 59, 82, 107, 130, 
132, 133, 141, 144, 146, 162, 175, 208, 
211, 216, 221, 224, 228, 231, 235 

Chittagong Hills, xxxiv, 47, 51, 57, 60, 
82-83, 128, 133, 191, 229, 236, 241-42 

Chittagong Hill Tracts (see also Chittagong 
Hills), 241 

Chittagong University, 87 

Choudry Mohammad Ah, 23, 24 

Chowdhury, Abdul FazaJ Muhammad 
Ahsanuddin, 165 

Chowdhury, Shamsul Huda, 180 

Chowdhury, Mizanur Rahman, 170, 198 

Christianity, 46, 83-84 

chula, 61, 63, 66 

civil service, 160-62, 163-64 

civil war: between East and West 
Pakistan, 30-32, 208-11; effect on Ban- 
gladesh of, 101-2 

class distinctions, 66-68 

climate (see also weather-related problems), 
47-49 



Clive, Robert, 7 
coal, 132 

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, 242, 
243 

Comilla, 55, 229 
Comilla Model, 121 
Commonwealth of Nations, xxxiii, 198 
Congress, 13, 14, 18, 189 
Congress-Muslim League Pact, 14 
Constituent Assembly, 18, 23-24 
Constitution of 1972, 3, 32, 151; 
amended: (1974), 191; (1975), 35, 153; 
(1977), 160; (1979), 157; (1981), 156; 
(1983), 191; (1988), 153, 173; compo- 
nents of, 152-53; executive power 
under, 157; military authority under, 
217 

Constitution of Pakistan (1957), 24-25; 

(1962), 25-26 
Cornwallis, Charles, 8 
Council of Ministers, 157-58 
Courts. See judiciary 
Cox's Bazar, 47 

credit system: cooperative, 109; lending 

activity of, 109-12 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, 

242 

Cultural and Exchange Programme 

(India and Bangladesh), 189 
Curzon, George, 12, 13 
cyclones. See weather-related problems 
Czechoslovakia, 140 

Dainik Khabor, 186 

decentralization (see also electoral system; 

political activity; representation; Zia 

administration): effect of, 174-75, 177, 

240; plan for, 162-64, 166 
Defence Services Command and Staff 

College, 230 
defense, national, xxiv, 219; limitations 

to, 222-23; spending for, 105, 224-25 
Delhi (see also New Delhi), 5-6, 10, 19 
Delhi Sultanate, 5 
denationalization. See privatization 
Desai, Morarji, 38 

Dhaka (see also Siege of Dhaka), 5, 6, 9, 
28, 39, 48, 50, 55, 57, 83, 108, 130, 
141, 144, 146, 162, 171, 175, 184, 192, 
195, 196, 211, 229, 230, 231, 235; cap- 
ital of East Bengal, 12; importance as 
entrepot, 100; urban markets in, 118 



295 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Dhaka International Airport (see also Zia 
International Airport), 39, 213 

Dinajpur, 60, 82 

"direct action" day, 19 

Directorate General of Forces Intelli- 
gence, 221 

Directorate General of National Security 
Intelligence, 221 

disease and disease control, 90-92 

District Council (Zila Parishad) Bill of 
1987, 163, 170-71, 178 

Disturbed Areas (Special Powers) of 1962, 
243 

diwan, 7 

Drug Ordinance of 1982, 131 
drug policy (medicinal drugs), 95 

East Bengal {see also Bengal; East 
Pakistan), 9, 12, 61; agricultural soci- 
ety, xxviii; historical prosperity of, 100; 
as part of Pakistan, xxix; population of, 

53 

Eastern Refinery, 132 

East European countries, 117 

East Pakistan: and Bangladeshi attitude 
toward India, 188; decline in economic 
growth in, 26-27; desire for indepen- 
dence, 24, 25, 27-29; effect of partition 
of India on, 20, 100; Jinnah visit to, 22; 
Muslim League in, 24; population of, 
53; proposed economic and political 
reform program for, 27 

East Pakistan Rifles, 236 

East Pakistan Students League, 209 

East Wing. See East Pakistan 

economic development: after indepen- 
dence of Pakistan, 100-102; in India 
under British, 11-12 

economic planning {see also Annual De- 
velopment Programme; education 
system; National Economic Council; 
Project Evaluation Committee): de- 
velopment and financing of, xxxvi, 
103; five-year plans, 103; for future, 
89-90; Third Five-Year Plan 
(1985-90), 49, 86, 87, 88, 89. 95, 103, 
118, 146, 147 

education {see also madrasa), 9, 175; med- 
ical, 94-95; present system, 84-88; pro- 
posed reforms for, 84, 88-90, 167; 
religious, 88-89; spending for, 89-90 

Egypt, 226 



elections: after lifting of martial law, 169; 
during Ershad administration, 172 

Elections Commission, 157 

electoral system, 163-64 

electric power, 51, 133 

electronic components industry, xxxvi 

Elizabeth I (queen of England), 7, 204 

Elizabeth II (queen of England), 197 

emigration (see also immigration; migra- 
tion; refugees), 20, 57, 60, 69, 191, 
192, 222 

English language, 59, 89 

Ershad, Hussain Muhammad, 37, 40, 107, 
145, 151, 153, 157, 192, 195, 197, 216, 
225, 226; advocates Islam as state reli- 
gion, 173; consolidates executive power, 
165-66, 169-70, 172; control over in- 
telligence organizations, 221; decentrali- 
zation scheme of, 162-64, 240; forms 
national party, 176; gains power with 
coup, xxxi, 217; opposition to, 151, 167- 
69; 185, 244-45; trained in India, 227 

Ershad administration: administrative re- 
forms of, xxxi-xxxii, 238; democratic 
reform policy of, 152, 166, 167-68, 
177; effect of, 173-74, 177-78; martial 
law under, 165-69; opposition to, xxxi, 
167-69, 171-72; transition from mar- 
tial law by, 228 

European Economic Community, 123, 
136 

European settlement, 6-7 
Evidence Act of 1872, 242 
exclusive economic zone, 46 
executive power {see also president), 154, 
156-57 

export processing zones, 107-8 
exports, xxxiii, 135-40 

fakir(s), 73-74 
family planning, 57-58 
family society, 62-65 
FAO. See Food and Agricultural Organi- 
zation (FAO) 
Farakka Barrage, 190 
Faridpur, 82 
Feni River, 51 
fertilizer industry, 131 
Finland, 116 

fiscal policy, government. See Annual Devel- 
opment Programme; budget process; rev- 
enues; spending, government; taxation 



296 



Index 



fisheries: production of, 128-29; products 
for export of, xxxiii, xxxvi, 99, 136, 140 
five-year plan. See economic planning 
flood control projects. See water control 
projects 

floods. See weather-related problems 

food aid, 115-16, 147 

Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO): Bangladesh role in, 197-98 

food crops, 121-23 

Ford Foundation, 121 

foreign aid, xxxiii, xxxv, 34, 57, 99, 102, 
103, 112-17, 147, 187; food aid as, 
115-16; from India, 34, 102, 195; from 
Japan, 115, 116, 194; from Soviet 
Union, 117, 132-33, 195, 196 

foreign policy, xxxiii, 187-99; of Zia, 38 

Foreign Private Investment (Promotion 
and Protection) Act, 106 

forest products, 128 

France, 108 

freedom of the press, 186 
fruits, 137 

Gana Azadi League, 179 
Gandhi, Indira, 30, 35, 38, 189, 191, 210 
Gandhi, Mahatma, 15, 16, 18, 24 
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand. See 

Gandhi, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Rajiv, 189, 191 
Ganges River {see also Mouths of the 

Ganges), 50, 190 
garment industry: export, 99, 136-37, 

140, 197; production in, xxxiii, xxxvi, 

130-31; women in, 66 
Garos, 60 

Gautama, Siddartha (the Buddha), 82 
Gazipur, 237 

geography, xxvii-xxviii, 46-47, 223; 

limiting factors of, 100, 189, 223 
Ghorasal, 196 

Ghulam Mohammad, 23, 24 
Gopala, 4 

Government of India Act of 1935, 23 

Grameen Bank, 110-11 

Great Mutiny, 10, 11 

guerrilla activity, xxxiv, 38, 219, 223, 

241-42 
Gupta Empire, 4 

Haq, Fazlul, 24 
Haripur gas field, 132 



Harsha Empire, 4 

Hasina Wajed, Sheikh, 40, 167, 168, 169, 
170, 171, 178-79, 183, 184, 245 

health. See health care facilities; public 
health 

health care facilities, 93-94 

High Court Division, 158, 160 

Himalayas, xxxv, 48 

Hinduism {see also Brahmans; caste sys- 
tem; Shiva worship; Vishnu worship), 
xxix, 78-79, 82; caste system of, 66, 68; 
influence in Bangladesh form of Islam, 
76-77 

Hindus, xxix, 4, 6, 20; in Bangladesh, 46, 
69, 78; in British Indian Army, 206; 
dominance in Bengal of, 12, 60; 
emigration from East Bengal and East 
Pakistan, 57, 60-61, 69; as large land- 
owners, 120 

homogeneity, ethnic, 45, 58 

Hong Kong, xxxvi, 108 

Hooghly River, 7, 190 

Hungary, 140 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 

immigration, 55-57 

imports, 118, 122-23, 140 

independent status, 3, 26, 31, 60, 151 

India: aid to Bangladesh, 34, 102, 182, 
188; Bangladesh relations with, xxxiii, 
3, 187-91; borders with Bangladesh, 
xxxv, 47, 140, 234; invades East 
Pakistan (1971), 35, 210-11; as mem- 
ber of International Jute Organization, 
126; as member of South Asian Associ- 
ation for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), 38; political opposition to, 
36; as threat to security, xxxiv, 187-88, 
222 

India Act of 1919, 15 
India Independence Act, 19 
Indian Air Force, 210 
Indian Army, 31 
Indian Army Act of 1991, 218 
Indian Councils Act of 1909, 14-15 
Indian National Congress. See Congress 
Indian Navy, 210, 224, 231 
Indian Ocean, 48, 190 
Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Cooperation, 
Friendship, and Peace, 182, 188, 214 
Indonesia, 122, 194, 227 



297 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



industrial crops, 123, 125-26, 128 

industrial policy, 107 

industry: nationalization of, 34, 61, 

102-3; public sector money-makers, 

107 

industry, private, xxxiii 

infrastructure: damage in weather- 
related events, xxxv-xxxvi, 28, 46, 
48-49, 99, 143, 220; effect on East 
Bengal of colonial, 100; limitations of, 
3, 223 

insurance industry: nationalization of, 
109 

intelligence operations, 221 
International Development Association 

(World Bank): loans to Bangladesh by, 

114 

International Jute Organization, 126 

International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), 227 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
compensatory financing facility of, 
xxxii, 108-9, 110 

International Red Cross, 117, 192 

Inu, Hasan Huq, 181 

investment (see also Foreign Private Invest- 
ment (Promotion and Protection) Act), 
106; treaties for, 108 

investment treaties, 108 

Iqbal, Muhammad, 16 

Iran, 140 

Iraq, 138 

irrigation, xxix, xxxii, 51, 53 

Irrigation Management Programme, 114 

Islam (see also Muslims; Shia Islam; 
Sufism; Sunni Islam), xxvii, xxix, 4, 
24, 68-69; in Bangladesh, 46, 66, 
73-74, 75-78; becomes state religion, 
46, 153, 173, 194; ideological founda- 
tion in Constitution, 153-54; role in 
culture and politics of, 166, 181-82; 
tenets of, 25, 69-73 

Islam, Kazi Nazrul, 59 

Islami Chhatro Shibir (Islamic Students 
Camp), 182 

Islamic Development Bank, ) 95 

Islamic Finance Ministers' Conference, 
195 

Islamic Foundation, 77 
Islamic revival (see also Khalifat Move- 
ment), xxix 
Islamic United Front, 182 
Islamic University, 87 



Italy, 140, 197 
Jahangir, 6 

Jahangir Nagar University, 87 
Jalalabad, 229 

Jamaat e Islami, 154, 169-70, 172, 173, 
178, 182 

Jamuna-Brahmaputra river system, 50 

Jana Dal (People's Party), 168, 177 

Janata Party (in India), 38, 189 

Japan, xxxiii, 108, 115, 116, 136, 140, 
234; Bangladesh relations with, 194 

Japanese Red Army, 38, 213 

Jatiyo Chhatro Samaj (National Students 
Society), 181, 184 

Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal (National Demo- 
cratic Party), 39 

Jatiyo Mohila Sangstha (National Or- 
ganization for Women), 185 

Jatiyo Party (National Party), xxxi, 168, 
169, 172, 178, 181, 182, 184, 204; for- 
mation and development, 176-77 

Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense 
Force), 34, 35, 36, 212, 227, 237 

Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National 
Socialist Party), 34, 36, 169, 172, 
178, 181, 212, 213, 214, 241; Inu fac- 
tion, 181, 184, 212-13, 214, 241; 
Siraj faction, 181; Sultan Raja fac- 
tion, 179 

Jatiyo Sramik Jote (National Workers 
Alliance), 181 

Jatiyo Sramik League (National Workers' 
League), 179 

Jatiyobadi Chhatro Dal (Nationalist Stu- 
dents Party), 180 

Jatiyobadi Krishak Dal (Nationalist 
Peasants Party), 180 

Jatiyobadi Sramik Dal (Nationalist Work- 
ers Party), 180 

Jessore, 82, 146, 229, 235 

Jesuits, 83 

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, xxx, 17, 18-19, 
20, 22 

Joint Economic Commission (India and 

Bangladesh), 189 
Joint Rivers Commission, 190 
Jordan, 227 
Joyjatra, 186 
judiciary, 158, 160 

jute: as export commodity, 135-36, 140; 
nationalization of industry, xxxii; 



298 



Index 



production of, xxviii, xxix, xxxvi, 20, 
123, 125-26, 128 

Kalipur, 51 
Kaptai, 231 
Karachi, 9, 20 

Karnaphuli river system, 51, 141 
Kemal, Mustapha (Mustapha Kemal 

Atatiirk), 15 
Keokradong, 47 
Khagrachari, 241 
Khajons, 60 

Khaleda Zia. See Ziaur Rahman, Begum 

Khaleda 
Khalifat Movement, 15, 17 
Khasis, 60 

Khulna, 55, 82, 108, 141, 143, 162, 175, 

229, 231 
Kipling, Rudyard, 11 
Korea, South, 108, 140, 194 
Krishak Sramik Samajbadi Dal (Peasants 

and Workers Socialist Party), 24 
Kushtia, 191 
Kuwait, 138 

Lahore Resolution, 17-18 

land ownership, 120-21; development of, 

61; importance at local level of, 174-75 
land reclamation, xxix 
Land Reforms Ordinance of 1984, 121, 

166 

Landlease Act, 8 
leather industry, xxxvi, 137 
legislative branch. See Parliament 
lending. See credit system 
Liaquat Ali Khan, 22-23 
Libya: officers exiled to, 213 
Low Hills, 47, 48, 83 
Lower Gangetic Plain, 47 
Lucknow Pact, 14 

madrasa, 74, 88-90 
Mahinda, 4 
Mahmud of Ghazni, 5 
Mainamati, 83 
Malaysia, 122, 140, 194 
Maldives, 38, 193 
Malik, Abdul, 31 
Mansur Ali, 12 

Manzur Ahmed, Muhammad, 39, 
214-16 



Maoist splinter groups, 178, 180, 208, 

214, 240 
Marathas, 6 

Marmas (Maghs), 59-60 

marriage customs, 63-64, 76 

martial law: in Bangladesh, 165-69; 

government under, xxxi, 203-4; in 

Pakistan, 25 
martial races concept, 11, 205-6, 207 
Martyrs' Day, xxx 
Mascarenhas, Anthony, 30 
Matamuhari River, 51 
Mauryan Empire, 4 
Mecca, 69 

media: power of, 185; repression of, 186; 

use of, 187 
medical education. See education 
Medina, 69 
Meerut, 10, 205 
Meghna River, 50 

Memorandum of Understanding on 
Technical Cooperation, 189 

Michigan State University, 121 

migration (see also refugees), 20, 57 

military courts, 218 

military equipment, 225 -27 , 231, 234 

military history, 204-11 

military personnel, 225; conflict after civil 
war among, 211-12; officer training 
for, 227; under Zia's reorganization of, 
214 

military power, 177-78, 203-4 
military relations with China, 225-26, 
234 

military service, 218-19 

military suppliers, 226, 234 

military training, 230 

military units (see also Ansars; Armed 
Police; Bangladesh Rifles; East Paki- 
stan Rifles; Village Defence Force): 
East Bengal Regiment, 208; First Ben- 
gal Cavalry, 213; First Bengal Lancers, 
212,213; Second Field Artillery Regi- 
ment, 213; Ninth Infantry Division, 
228-29; Eleventh Infantry Division, 
229; Twenty-second East Bengal Regi- 
ment, 213; Twenty-fourth Infantry 
Division, 228-29; Thirty-third Infan- 
try Division, 229; Fifty-fifth Infantry 
Division, 229; Sixty-sixth Infantry Di- 
vision, 229 

Mill, James, 9 

Ministry of Communications, 146 



299 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Ministry of Defence, 218 
Ministry of Education and Culture, 90 
Ministry of Finance, 104, 113 
Ministry of Health and Family Planning, 

92 

Ministry of Home Affairs, 158, 236, 237, 

238, 240 
Ministry of Industries, 108 
Ministry of Law and Justice, 158 
Ministry of Planning, 62 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, 77, 82, 83 
Mirza, Iskander, 23, 25 
monetary policy, 111 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, 15 
morbidity rate, 54-55, 90 
Morning News, 30 
mortality rate, 54-55, 90, 91 
Mountbatten, Louis, 19 
Mouths of the Ganges, 51 
Movement for the Restoration of 

Democracy, 167 
Mros (Moorangs), 59-60 
Mrungs, 60 

Mughal Empire, xxviii, 5-7, 10, 162, 240 
Muhammad (Prophet), 69-70, 236 
Muhammadan- Anglo Oriental College. 

See Muslim University of Aligarh 
Muhith, A.M. A., 224-25 
Mujahids, 209 

Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh (Mujib) {see also 
Awami League (People's League)), 3, 
22, 26-27, 151, 157, 179, 194, 227; 
assassination of, 3, 35-36, 205, 213; as 
Bangabandhu, 3, 35, 36; forms 
national party, 176, 179; and indepen- 
dence movement, 28-29, 162, 207-8; 
and military power, 203, 212; nation- 
alizes industry, 34; power increased, 
35; proposed economic and political re- 
form program, 27, 103; role in creation 
of Bangladesh, xxxi, 30-32 

Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force), 31, 32, 
39, 209-11, 219, 226, 227 

Mukti Fauj (Liberation Force), 209 

mullahs, 74, 76 

multilateral development plans (see also 
South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC)), 198 

Murshidabad, 6 

Musharraf, Khaled, 36, 213 

Mushtaque Ahmed, Khondakar, 36, 196, 
204, 213 

Muslim League, xxix, xxx, 14-19, 24, 



25, 178, 181-82; Jinnah as leader of, 
17 

Muslim state, proposed, 16 
Muslim University of Aligarh, 12 
Muslims: in British Indian Army, 205-6; 
in economy of East Bengal, 60-61; in 
Indian society and economy, 11-12, 
191; as landowners, 120; in minority 
position in Bengal, 12-13 
Mymensingh, 55, 59, 60, 83, 212 



Narayanganj, 20, 55, 141 
National Assembly, 22, 25, 28, 29 
National Awami Party, 179 
National Broadcasting Authority, 186-87 
National Commission on Education 

(Pakistan), 84 
National Commission on Money, Credit 

and Banking, 110 
National Committee on AIDS, 91 
National Economic Council, 103-4 
National Education Commission, 90 
National Nutrition Council, 92 
National Martyrs' Monument, 192 
National Pay Commission, 230 
National Security Council, 40 
Nationalist Front, 39 
nationalist movement, 14-15 
nationalization (see also privatization), 

xxxii, 34, 61, 102-3, 109 
natural gas, 102, 114, 131-32 
navy, xxxiv, 217-18, 224-25; develop- 
ment and duties of, 231, 234 
Navy Ordinance of 1961, 218 
Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 23 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 16, 19 
Nepal, xxxv, 38, 126, 190, 193 
Netherlands, 116, 140 
New Delhi, 14 

New Industrial Policy of 1982, 107 
New Investment Policy of 1974, 106 
New Zealand, 197 
Niazi, A.A.K., 31, 211 
Noakhali, 59 

Nonaligned Movement, xxxiii, 152, 
198-99 

North-West Frontier Province, 16, 24-25 
nuclear research reactor, 196 



Official Secrets Act of 1911, 242, 244 
Oil. See Petroleum 



300 



Index 



One Unit government, 24, 28 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

117, 195 
Orissa, 7 

Osmany, M.A.G., 39, 209, 213 
Osmany Airport, 146 
Ottoman Empire, 15 
Oxford Mission, 83 

Padma-Ganges river system, 50-51 
Padma-Meghna river system, 51, 141 
Paharpur, 83 

Pakistan, 77, 140; Bangladesh relations 
with, xxxiii, 191-92; boundaries, 20; 
creation and division of, 3, 27; estab- 
lished as independent state, 19; as 
member of South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 38; 
proposal to create, 16-18 

Pakistan Air Force, 210 

Pakistan Army, 196; Bengalis in, 206; 
repression in East Pakistan by, 29-31 

Pakistan International Airlines, 145 

Pakistan Navy, 231 

Pakistani Relief Camps, 192 

Pala Dynasty, 4 

Palestine Liberation Organization, 195, 
227 

paramilitary forces (see also Ansars; Armed 
Police; Bangladesh Rifles; East Paki- 
stan Rifles; Village Defence Party), 
xxxiv, 224-25, 236-40 

Parliament, 104, 151, 154-56; coalition 
forming in, 155; dissolved, 172, 214; 
limited role in military affairs, 218 

Patenga Airport, 146 

Pathans, 11, 205 

Penal Code, 242-43 

Penal Code of 1860, 244 

Permanent Settlement (Landlease Act), 8 

Persian language, 9 

petroleum, 132-33 

pharmaceutical industry, 108, 131 

pir(s), 73-74, 76, 79 

PL-480. See Public Law 480 (PL-480) 

Plain of Bengal, 47 

Planning Commission, 103, 104 

Plassey, 7 

Police Act of 1861, 242 

police services, 237-40 

Police Special Branch, 221 

political activity: alliances for, 182-83; at 



local level, 163-64, 174-76; in local 
urban areas, 175-76; of women, 
184-85 

political leaders (local), 174-75 

political parties, 151, 178; abolished in 
Pakistan, 25; coalition forming after 
election, 155; Islamic, 181-82; left of 
center, 180-81 

population (see also family planning; tribal 
population): emigration and migration 
of, 57; growth of, xxix, 45, 53-55, 
57-58; rural location of major part, 55 

population control, 57-58, 92 

Portuguese settlers, 83 

postal savings service, 109 

poverty, 45, 62 

president, 156-57 

Presidential Security Force, 221-22, 237 
Press Information Department, 186 
Prisoners Act of 1900, 244 
Prisons Act of 1894, 244 
privatization: of banking system, 109-10; 

of industry under new Industrial Policy, 

xxxii, 107 
Proclamation Order of 1977, 160 
Project Evaluation Committee, 104 
public health (see also disease and disease 

control), xxix, 90-94, 102 
Public Law 480 (PL-480), 115-16 
Public Services Commission, 161 
Punjab, 16, 20, 23, 24, 205 
Punjabis, 11, 205 
purdah, 64-65 
Pusur River, 143 



Qatar, 138 

Quit India movement, 18 
Quran, 69 

Rab, A.S.M. Abdur, 181 
Radio Bangladesh, 187 
Rahman, Atiqur, 229, 236 
Rahmat Ali, Chaudari, 16 
railroads, 11, 144-45 
Rajshahi, 48, 55, 59, 60, 146, 162, 175, 
196 

Rajshahi University, 87 
Rangamati, 55 
Rangpur, 146, 229 

Razakars (Keepers of Public Order), 210 
Razzak, Abdur, 179 



301 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



ready-made garments. See garment in- 
dustry 

recruitment policy, 205, 230 
refugees, 57, 191, 242; from East Paki- 
stan, 30 
religion, 68-84 

religious education. See education 

remote sensing, 135 

representation, local, 163-64 

Resistance Day, 30 

revenues: sources of, 104 

Revolt of 1857, 10, 11 

Ribatat al Alam al Islami (Union of the 

Islamic World), 192 
rice, xxviii, xxix, 121-22 
river systems: importance of, 49 
roads, 143-44 
Roberts, Frederick, 205-6 
Roman Catholic Church, 83, 84 
Romania, 108 
Roy, Ashish Kumar, 216 
Royal Bengal Tiger, 47, 128 
rubber production, 47 

SAARC . See South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
Saidpur, 55, 229 

Samajbadi Dal (Socialist Party), 179 
Samatata kingdom, 4 
Sangu River, 51 
Sanskrit, 9, 22 
Santals, 60 

Sattar, Abdus, 38, 39, 40, 166, 180, 204, 
215-16 

Saudi Arabia, 77, 89, 138, 140, 145, 226, 
227; Bangladesh relations with, 194 

Savar, 192, 228, 229 

Sayem, Abu Sadat Mohammad, 36-37, 
204 

School <of Infantry and Tactics, 230 
seafood. See fisheries 
security: internal, xxiv, 236-40 
Security of Pakistan Act of 1952, 243 
Self-Sufficient Village Government Plan 

{see also Village Defence Party), 162, 

177, 240 
Senas, 4-5 

separation of powers, 154 
Sepoy Rebellion, 10, 11, 205 
Sevak Bahini (Service Force) {see also 
Mukti Fauj (Liberation Force)), 209 
Shaheed Minar, 22 



Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), 241-42 

Shia Islam, 72-73 

ships, naval, 234 

Shiva worship, 79 

Shyampur, 118, 120 

Siddiqi, Kader, 38, 212 

Siege of Dhaka, 171, 178, 184 

Sikhs, 14, 20 

Simla, 18 

Sind, 16, 24 

Singapore, xxxvi, 108, 140, 234 

Siraj, Shajahar, 181 

Siraj ud Daulah, 6, 7 

social structure {see also caste system; class 

distinctions), 66-68 
society: in rural areas, 61-62, 174-76; in 

urban areas, 62, 175-76; women in 

rural, 65-66 
South Asian Association for Regional 

Cooperation (SAARC), 38, 152, 193, 

198 

Soviet Cultural Centre, 196 

Soviet Union, 34, 117, 132, 140, 152, 
192; Bangladesh relations with, xxxiii, 
187-88, 195-96; military assistance 
by, 211, 226, 234; political opposition 
to in Bangladesh, 36; relations with, 
187 

Special Powers Act of 1974, 186 
spending: government, 104-6 
spices, 137 

Sramik Kalyan Federation (Workers Wel- 
fare Federation), 182 

Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal (Workers 
and Peasants Socialist Party), 181 

Sri Lanka, 38, 193 

Stock Exchange (Dhaka), 106 

strategic location, 222-24 

students {see also education): political 
power of, 183-84 

Suez Canal, 1 1 

Sufism, 73-74, 79 

Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed, 24-25, 26 

Sundarbans, 47, 128, 141 

Sunni Islam, 72, 73; predominance in 

Bangladesh of, 45-46, 73 
Supreme Court, 157, 158, 160 
Supreme Judicial Council, 160 
Surma-Meghna river system, 51 
swadeshi movement, 13, 14 
Sweden, 108, 116 
Switzerland, 116 
Syed Ahmad Khan, 12 



302 



Index 



Sylhet, 47, 48, 55, 59, 60, 83, 132, 137, 
143, 230 



Tagore, Rabindranath, xxx, 59 

Taher, Abu, 212 

Taiwan, 108 

Talibabad, 146 

Tangail, 229 

Tawab, M.G., 213 

taxation, 104-5 

taxation agreements, 108 

tea, 137 

teachers, 86-87 

telecommunications {see also media), 146 

terms of trade, 138 

terrorists, 38-39, 213 

textile industry, 9, 130 

Thailand, 126 

Tibet, 50, 59 

tidal bores. See weather-related problems 

Tikka Khan, 29, 31 

Tippreras (Tipras), 59-60 

Tista River, 50, 191 

Toaha, Muhammad, 240 

tourism, 146 

Trade Union Centre, 181 
transportation, xxix, 11, 140-46 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons, 196 
tribal insurgency, xxxiv, 241-42 
tribal population, 59-60, 82-83 
Tripura, 31, 57, 210, 242 
Tripura National Volunteers, 191 
Turkey, 108 
Turkish conquest, 4-6 
Two Nations theory, 17 

ulama, 25, 74, 76, 79 
unani medical practice, 92, 95 
United Arab Emirates, 138, 140 
United Front, 24 

United Nations, 152; Bangladesh as 

member of, xxxiii, 193, 197 
United Nations Children's Fund, 92 
United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme, 49, 115 
United Nations Fund for Population 

Activities, 115 
United Nations General Assembly, 190 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, 115 



United Nations Population Award, 197 

United States, 108, 130, 136, 137, 139, 
140, 152, 196-97, 226, 227; Agency for 
International Development (AID), 115; 
aid to Bangladesh, xxxiii, 102, 115-16, 
123, 143, 197; Bangladesh relations 
with, 187, 196; National Aeronautic 
and Space Administration, 135; Pub- 
lic Law 480 (PL-480) program, 115-16 

United States Information Service: library 
burnt at Rajshahi, 196 

Universal Immunization Program, 92 

universities, 87 

University Grants Commission, 87 
University of Dhaka, 30, 87, 184 
University of Engineering and Technol- 
ogy, 87 

urban areas: growth of population in, 55; 

society in, 62, 175-76 
Urdu language, xxx, 20, 22, 59, 187 



vegetables, 137 

Victoria (queen of England), 10-11, 205 
Village Defence Party, 236, 240 
village society, 174-75 
Vishnu worship, 79 



water control projects, xxxv-xxxvi, 51, 53 
water disputes between Bangladesh and 

India, 190-91 
waterways, inland, 140-41, 143 
Wavell, Archbald, 18 
weapons. See military equipment 
weather-related problems, xxxv-xxxvi, 

28, 45, 46, 48-49, 99, 143, 220 
West Bengal, 7, 12, 31, 210 
West Germany, 108, 116, 140, 197 
West Pakistan: administrative coordina- 
tion in, 20, 24; economic growth in, 
26-27 

West Wing. See Pakistan; West Pakistan 
Western Europe, xxxiii, 108 
wheat, 122-23 

women {see also Hasina; purdah; Ziaur 
Rahman, Begum Khaleda): in Ansars, 
237; in armed forces, 219; education of, 
84-85; place in society, 63-66; in po- 
litics, 184-85 

workers: export of, 138-40; political power 
of, 183 



303 



Bangladesh: A Country Study 



Workers-Employees United Council 
(Sramik Kamachari Oikkiya Parishad), 
171, 183 

Workers Party, 181 

World Bank: aid to Bangladesh, xxxii, 
102, 109, 110, 112-13, 114, 129, 147; 
International Development Associa- 
tion loans, 114; project financing of, 
129 

World Food Programme, 115, 118, 123 
World Health Organization, 92, 115 



Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, 28-32, 
208 

Yang Dezhi, 225 
Yarlung Zangbo Jiang, 50 
Yugoslavia, 234 



Zakat Fund Committee, 77 

zamindars, 6, 9, 120, 174; functions of, 8 

Zia administration {see also Ziaur Rah- 
man): army reorganization of, 228; 
economic and political program of, 
37-38; reestablishes public order, 38-39 

Zia International Airport, xxxv, 49, 146 

Ziauddin, M., 240 

Zia ul Haq, Mohammad, xxxi, 192 

Ziaur Rahman (Zia), 31, 36-37, 153, 157, 
195, 197; assassination of, xxxi, 39-40, 
165, 214; contributions of, 216; demo- 
cratic reform of, 162; foreign policy of, 
38; forms Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 
176; investment policy of, 106; martial law 
under, xxxi, 213-14; replaces Mujib, 213 

Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaleda, 40, 167, 
168, 169, 171, 178, 180, 183, 184, 245 



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